Ukraine Findings
Key findings from PeaceRep research in Ukraine (2021 – 2026)
PeaceRep’s Ukraine research was led by LSE CCRG in close collaboration with the Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine Industry Expertise, and a wide network of Ukrainian collaborators and researchers.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion, PeaceRep has investigated the development of the Russo-Ukraine War from a holistic and multidimensional set of perspectives and lines of enquiry (see also the PeaceRep Ukraine synthesis report by Cooper et al. 2026). PeaceRep’s Ukraine programme started from the premise that the war needs to be analysed from a sociological and political economy vantage point and not understood narrowly as a state-based geopolitical dispute. Our research has assisted Ukrainian policymakers and civic actors with approaches and policy frameworks that support resilience and a politically just and sustainable peace. Key themes of our research include the nature of the war, economic stability, negotiating logics, and ‘civicness’.
Browse key findings in the tabs below.
Nature of the War
In the first phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2014 – 2022) conflict management on the contact lines in Eastern Ukraine, or at the de facto border to the illegally annexed Crimea, was shaped by a combination of official direction/micromanagement and the practices of local agents (Wittke 2023). This period of the war had many of the appearances of a situation of intractable violence of the type PeaceRep has studied in other conflict sites. In the Ukrainian case, the 2014 to 2022 period saw Russia patronise an insurgency, support it from August 2014 with regular forces, and promote exclusionary identity politics in the form of an expansionary Russian ethnonationalism. Ukraine also faced a severe balance of payment crisis resulting in an International Monetary Fund programme in an economy already struggling with long-term economic stagnation (Cooper 2025). Despite these conditions being often associated with state fragmentation and breakdown, the conflict remained localised and Ukraine’s coherence as a political entity in unoccupied territories did not come under significant strain.
Peace talks in this earlier phase (2014 – 2022) were also typical of the problems of predatory peacemaking often encountered in situations of intractable conflict, where the talks themselves become a means of kleptocratic actors to seize and control resources. Russia attempted to conceal this approach by positioning itself as a ‘third party’ mediator (Wittke 2023), despite its de facto involvement as an aggressor and critical sponsor of client networks. Russia’s patronage of the so-called peoples’ republics in Luhansk and Donetsk applied the model of intervention it had previously undertaken in its other patronised post-Soviet de facto states. This entails careful cultivation of proxies and criminal networks, utilising ethnonationalist identity politics and ‘exporting’ its domestic authoritarianism, in order to expand its perceived strategic interests in its near abroad (Gueudet 2024).
With the full-scale invasion of February 2022, the war appeared to transition into a more conventional interstate war fought for the political control of territory, a so-called ‘old’ war . But PeaceRep research has shown that this distinction between old/new or intractable/conventional can be overstated in the Russo-Ukrainian case. Both the nature of the Russian regime as an authoritarian and militarily aggressive state, and the logic of its war goals draw comparison with many other sites of conflict. Furthermore, were Ukraine to become a site of state breakdown and intractable conflict, this would represent a form of victory for the Russian side, given that it would make impossible Ukraine’s further integration into NATO and the European Union. This analysis informs how Ukraine’s theory of victory and a just outcome of the war is conceptualised. It poses the critical need for Ukraine to maintain societal cohesion and coherent state institutions in the face of Russia’s attempts to dismantle them.
Economic Stability
The internal fragmentations characteristic of ‘new wars’ are strongly associated with severe economic readjustments and debt crises, marked by falling production, rising joblessness and responses that tend to aggravate these conditions further by choking off demand and investment. PeaceRep’s Ukraine programme highlighted this risk at the outset of the full-scale invasion, as Ukraine experienced a severe war-induced recession and supply and demand crisis. At the time, the Ukrainian government was contemplating an experiment based on deregulation and steep tax reductions, rather than mobilising state capacity to support fragile markets (Cooper 2022). Our research highlighted relevant historical examples for fighting an all-out-war based on high levels of state intervention and supported the efforts of key stakeholders to adjust policies (Cooper 2022, Cooper 2023). We argued that economic demand from the war effort could offset the crisis afflicting the economy, driving investment and stabilising markets. This work went on to illustrate the under capacity in the Ukrainian industrial economy and the potential for ‘localisation’ policies (Vlasiuk and Milakovsky 2023; Milakovsky 2024). Our research showed how, by 2024, massive military spending was driving economic demand, providing a lifeline for the market economy, through government tendering and expanding the public sector payroll with military recruitment (Vlasiuk, Cooper and Milakovsky 2024).
As the war is both a military and economic contest, the stability of either side’s war economy can, in turn, be expected to shape their negotiating calculations and how they interpreted the war’s domestic political trade-offs and risk of regime instability. In 2025, we provided an evidence-based assessment of the balance of power between the Russian and Ukrainian political economies and their relative strengths and vulnerabilities on the eve of the US-led ceasefire negotiations (Cooper 2025).
Negotiating Logics
For both sides, the negotiation calculation in the conflict changed at the pivot point of February 2022. Russia’s dramatic escalation in military aggression led it to adopt maximalist demands to end the war. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s initial success in repelling the invasion – with its victory in the Battle of Kyiv by April 2022 particularly notable (Snyder et al 2022) – confounded the widespread expectation of a rapid and overwhelming Russian military victory. Negotiations in this context tended to focus on limited, humanitarian goals, seeking ‘islands of agreement’ (Wittke 2023) on issues such as energy security, nuclear safety and prisoner of war exchange. Ukraine’s November 2022 ‘peace formula’ prioritised these demands and the preservation of international legal and political norms around sovereign equality, human rights, territorial integrity and conflict prevention.
Ukraine’s attempt to engage non-western actors, for example through the Jeddah format of August 2023, with a multiplicity of mediating third parties at different points entering the space, is indicative of the broader turn in conflict management in a more fragmented global order that PeaceRep’s wider research has highlighted. Rather than the war representing a resurgence in so-called ‘great power competition’, it is arguably better conceptualised as part of a trend to authoritarianism and conflict in a more fragmented and polycentric international order (Cooper 2024). In this context of heightened rivalry but shifting alliances and uncertain geopolitics blocs, China’s ambiguous position in the Russo-Ukrainian War combined with its capacity to project economic power and its geostrategic competition with Europe and the United States, significantly complicates Ukraine’s foreign policy and post-war economic planning (Alden et al 2025). The trend to rising authoritarianism and transactionalism has also been felt among Ukraine’s western allies. The initial unity among NATO states has given way overtime to growing internal contention (Mazurkiewicz and Michnik 2023). And the erratic positioning of the US under the Trump administration has also defined the 2025 negotiation conjuncture of the war (Kaldor and Cooper 2025).
Building on earlier work (Wittke 2023), PeaceRep responded to the 2025 talks by highlighting the opportunity for civic actors to utilise them to push for meaningful humanitarian and rights-based goals, framing this in the OECD and Helsinki Accords language of the ‘human dimension’ with 31 key priority policies for the talks (Kaldor and Cooper 2025). These proposals were formulated with the direct input of representatives of civil society from Ukraine, Russia and the wider international community. This research ecosystem contributed directly to the strengthening of transnational civic space, with workshop discussions leading to the formation of the People First advocacy coalition, the first public joint initiative between Russian and Ukrainian civil society since the full-scale Russian invasion (Kaldor and Cooper 2025).
Civicness and the State
PeaceRep’s approach of working closely with activist researchers seeking democratic and rights-based outcomes has been referred to as ‘civic network research’ (see also the ‘Mapping Ukraine’s Democratic Space (2023-2026): Final Summary Report’ by Nesterenko and Darkovich 2026). Ukraine’s successful resistance to the invasion – especially at the point of greatest asymmetry, prior to the inflow of western military aid, in February-April 2022 – was strongly supported by the voluntary actions of citizens, not only through mobilising for the armed forces but also through humanitarian relief and everyday societal support systems. These networks developed often close cooperation with state authorities at different levels, creating something akin to a kind of volunteer-supported ‘civic state’ (Hatsko et al 2023; see also Hatsko et al 2024; Darkovich et al 2025). To study this civic transformation, PeaceRep worked with our partner, the Kyiv School of Economics, to draw 118 local activists spread across 40 territorial communities into a panel providing data on local governance, security and economic conditions (Hatsko et al 2023; et al 2024; Darkovich et al 2025). Across three survey waves, our panel has also consistently reported high levels of engagement and consultancy between activists and local government, reflecting the ‘civic state’ aspect of Ukraine’s successful resistance (Hatsko et al 2023; et al 2024; Darkovich et al 2025).
This aspect of what we could refer to as Ukraine’s participatory model of security aligns with what PeaceRep has referred to more widely as ‘civicness’, a set of behaviours based on mutual obligation towards other citizens that construct an implicit form of social contract (Cooper and Kaldor forthcoming, Cooper et al forthcoming). These networks have played a key role in generating public goods, whether through fundraising for the armed forces (Fedirko and Artiukh 2025) or conducting evacuations from occupied territory (Cooper et al 2025; Cooper et al forthcoming). The voluntary mobilisation of citizens also crossed national borders, as the Ukrainian refugee population undertook a massive aid effort, often blurring the distinction between military and humanitarian aid to support Ukraine’s security and right of self-defence (Czerska-Shaw and Jacoby 2023).
Ukraine’s on-going of state transformation during the war has been shaped by these conditions, with citizens normally distrustful of the state ‘rallying around the flag’ (Darkovich et al 2025). Significantly, the popular mobilisation against the Russian invasion united previously rival, identity-based camps, creating a much more inclusive, civic form of nationalism as actors previously seen as pro-Russian in sentiment rallied strongly and, in some cases, dramatically, to the Ukrainian cause.
Taxation revenue – long a source of popular resentment due to corruption – has proven highly resilient, a sign of the state’s ability to strike a social contract in the throes of the war (Cooper 2023b). This process is however a complex tug of war between citizen and state, and Ukraine’s wartime development is far from a linear process of state-building. There are signs of burnout as the rally around the flag effect diminishes with rising war weariness (Darkovich et al 2025). Ambiguities and tensions are observable in attitudes to conscription (Fedirko and Artiukh 2025) and these intersect with on-going challenges of corruption, undermining the authority of the state. As Ukraine’s war effort and state formation is also fundamentally dependent on external aid (Fedirko and Artiukh 2025), the state engages in this push-and-pull with an active and politicised citizenry ‘at home’ is, while at the same time having to continually negotiated with its external partners – the US Government under Donald Trump, for example, has aggressively attempted to leverage its power over Ukraine, e.g., by seeking preferential access to its mineral reserves (Cooper 2025b).
References
PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2027. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database.
Researchers and contributors
Chris Alden, Volodymyr Artiukh, Daria Bevziuk, Luke Cooper, Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Andrii Darkovich, Taras Fedirko, Lukas Fiala, Sophie Gueudet, Valentyn Hatsko, Iryna Ilnytska, Tamar Jacoby, Mary Kaldor, Yulia Kazdobina, Anna Kostenko, Agata Mazurkiewicz, Wojciech Michnik, Brian Milakovsky, Roksolana Nesterenko, Khrystyna Petrynka, Anna Prokhorova, Myroslava Savisko, Olexander Scherba, Timothy Snyder, Volodymyr Vlasiuk, Cindy Wittke, Mariia Zolkina
Citation
Cooper, L. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Ukraine. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Evidence Research Programme, University of Edinburgh.
References
Alden, A., Zolkina, M., & Fiala, L. (2025). Understanding the ‘China Factor’ in the Russia-Ukraine War (PeaceRep Report: Global Transitions Series). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Artiukh, V., and Fedirko, T. (2025). War and dependent state formation in Ukraine. Focaal, 2025(102), pp. 57-72.
Cooper, L. (2022). Market economics in an all-out-war? Assessing economic and political risks to the Ukrainian war effort. Conflict and Civicness Research Group, The London School of Economics.
Cooper, L. (2023). Economic resilience, social dialogue and democracy in wartime: Critical reflections on the challenges facing Ukraine’s economy. Conflict and Civicness Research Group, The London School of Economics, http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5141
Cooper, L., (2023b). Insourcing the Ukrainian war-effort. International Politics and Society.
Cooper, L. (2024). The War Against Ukraine and the Failure of “Great Power Politics”. In: Cope, Z. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Geopolitics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25399-7_60-1
Cooper, L. (2025). Russo-Ukrainian War: The Political Economy of the Present Balance of Forces (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Cooper, L. (2025b). Ukraine’s economy has greater staying power than Russia’s, but the US mineral deal shows how fragile its advantage is. The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/may/07/ukraine-economy-russia-us-mineral-deal-kyiv (Accessed 28 October 2025).
Cooper, L. and Kaldor, M. (Forthcoming). Ukraine and new wars.
Cooper, L., et al. (2026). Investigating the Russo-Ukrainian War: Evidence and Analysis from PeaceRep’s Ukraine Programme [Research Synthesis Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Cooper, L., Kostenko, A., Prokhorova, A., & Gueudet, S. (2025). Life under Occupation in the Russo-Ukrainian War: Insights from Activist Networks (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Cooper, L., Kostenko, A., Prokhorova, A., & Gueudet, S. (Forthcoming). Survival and civicness traversing militarised borders: the networks conducting evacuations from occupied territory in the shadows of Russian power.
Czerska-Shaw, K. and Jacoby, T. (2023). Mapping Ukrainian Civicness Abroad in the War Effort: A Case Study of Poland (PeaceRep Ukraine Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Darkovich, A., Hatsko, V., Nesterenko, R., Bevziuk, D., & Ilnytska, I. (2025). Mapping Ukraine’s Democratic Space: Part 3 (PeaceRep Ukraine Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Gueudet, S. (2024). The Ukraine War and the Nature of Russian Power (PeaceRep Ukraine Policy Brief). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Hatsko, V., Savisko, M., Darkovich, A., and Petrynka K. (2023). Mapping Ukraine’s democratic space in 40 localities (PeaceRep Ukraine report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Hatsko, V., Savisko, M., and Darkovich, A. (2024). Mapping Ukraine’s Democratic Space: Part 2 (PeaceRep Ukraine Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Kaldor, M. & Cooper, L. (2025). On the Peace Negotiations Between Russia and Ukraine: Prioritising the Human Dimension (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Mazurkiewicz, A. and Michnik, W. (2023). Towards the Frontline States Concept: Understanding the Responses to Russia’s War Against Ukraine (PeaceRep report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Milakovsky, B. (2024). Reindustrialization as a Key Element of Ukraine’s Recovery (PeaceRep Ukraine Policy Brief). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Nesterenko, R. & Darkovich, A. (2026). Mapping Ukraine’s Democratic Space (2023-2026): Final Summary Report (PeaceRep Ukraine Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Snyder, T., Kazdobina, Y., & Scherba, O. (2022). Is a Peace Deal Possible With Putin? On the problems of peacemaking in the Russian war on Ukraine (Policy Brief). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, LSE IDEAS, The London School of Economics.
Vlasiuk, V., Cooper, L. and Milakovsky, B. (2024). A State-led War Economy in an Open Market: Investigating state-market relations in Ukraine 2021-2023 (PeaceRep Ukraine Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Vlasiuk, V., and Milakovsky, B. (2023). “Insourcing” the Recovery: Maximizing engagement of Ukrainian manufacturers in reconstruction efforts (PeaceRep Ukraine policy brief). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Wittke, C. (2023). Creating ‘Islands of Agreement and Civility’ through Humanitarian Negotiations: A Conflict Management and Disaster-Mitigation Strategy in Russia’s War against Ukraine (PeaceRep Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.