Conflict and Election Politics in Northern Gedo, Somalia

Introduction

On 27 July 2025, heavy fighting was reported in the town of Belet Hawa between government forces loyal to Jubbaland State and those allied to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Conflict spread to Dollow town, where the fighting focused around the Somalia National Army bases in both Belet Hawa and Dollow. The head of Somalia’s national intelligence services (NISA) in Dollow was reportedly captured by Jubbaland forces. A yet unknown number of people were killed, and others have been displaced. At the time of writing, forces allied to the FGS were in the ascendancy and tensions had reduced but those allied to Jubbaland remain within striking distance and may well do so.

Insecurity has been pervasive in northern Gedo for some time, including over the last year in Luuq. The catalyst for the current escalation is the recent appointment of the notorious Abdirashid Abdinuur ‘Janaan’ by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud (HSM), to the head of intelligence in Gedo region. Janaan was previously Security Minister for Jubbaland and a feared figure in northern Gedo. He was reportedly flown from Mogadishu to Belet Hawa by helicopter and brought to the Somalia National Army (SNA) barracks – nicknamed ‘UK’.^[1] Forces allied to Jubbaland attacked the ‘UK’ base in response to his arrival, and then later attacked its allied base in Dollow, alongside Ethiopian forces, in anticipation of forces there being mobilised to support colleagues in Belet Hawa. At the time of writing, Janaan’s forces are in the ascendancy.

The clan picture in Gedo is extremely complex and, in this conflict, both families and sub-clans are divided in their allegiances. For example, the Reer Ahmed of Abdirashid ‘Janaan’ are split between those loyal to him (and by extension to the FGS, currently) and those loyal to President Ahmed ‘Madobe’ in Kismayo. This division extends within families, where, for example, General Dhuumaal, sent by President Madobe, is pitted against his own brother and sons, who are allied to Mogadishu. These divisions may consolidate in time as lineages and sub-clans choose between sides.

While elites in Kismayo and Mogadishu instrumentalise these local fractures for their own purposes, the same elites are themselves either playing to the tune of foreign patrons or taking advantage of competing interests amongst them.

Why now?

This latest outbreak of conflict continues the now five-year contestation of Gedo between the Jubbaland authority in Kismayo and the Federal government in Mogadishu. Gedo has been in limbo for several years, neither fully under the authority of Jubbaland, nor closely allied to Mogadishu. In fact, Abdirashid ‘Janaan’ has been the only figurehead to represent a coherent portion of Gedo – the Belet Hawa-Dollow-Luuq corridor – within Jubbaland, until his 2019 arrest in Mogadishu by the administration of ex-President of Somalia, Mohamed ‘Farmajo’. Since then, Gedo has lacked clear direction.

While HSM initially adopted a hands-off approach in Jubbaland after his election in 2022—marking a shift from the more interventionist stance of the ‘Farmajo’ era—this changed as elections approached and his support and credibility declined. The Ras Kamboni debacle at the turn of 2024/25 was the most visible sign of these tensions, as HSM and his Ogaden allies in Mogadishu attempted to dislodge President Madobe in Kismayo.

Election dynamics

Local elections are due in Somalia within the next two to three months, and are supposed to take place on a one-person-one-vote (OPOV) basis. These elections are tied to a political party framework, allowing only the three largest parties to contest the 2026 presidential and parliamentary elections. Opposition figures believe the OPOV process, if implemented, will be manipulated by HSM and therefore have little trust in it. The actions of the government so far are indeed not encouraging, with all important decisions taken without serious consultation with or consideration of the opposition. Decisions around the election model, the changing of the constitution, the appointment of the electoral committee members, and the awarding of contracts for the election infrastructure/technology have all been taken by the president single-handedly. This has further entrenched the dispute around the elections and eroded trust to the extent that any eventual agreement will require sidestepping or changing the constitution.

Given this scenario, the appointment of ‘Janaan’ and his apparent alliance with Mogadishu represents a threat to Jubbaland, as elections could be held in the region and controlled by Mogadishu. That said, it is also the case that recent elections held in Kismayo were closely controlled by Madobe himself. As we reported in our election brief, under the current political conditions in Somalia, all incumbent elites are motivated to manipulate election processes in order to enhance chances of their re-election. President Said Abdullahi Deni succeeded in doing so in Puntland and President Madobe has already done so in Kismayo.

Regional factors

The interests of regional actors in Somalia—and their interactions with Somali elites—are a key factor in the current political context. Chief among these is the ongoing tension between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Although the Ankara Declaration marked a step toward de-escalation following the Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU, which resonated deeply throughout the region, distrust and antagonism between the two sides persist. Furthermore, this antagonism is itself a reflection of competing interests between the UAE and Turkey/Qatar, where the former is supporting Somalia’s peripheries in order to weaken the centre where Turkey and Qatar are influential.

The Ethiopians are now involved in a process of encirclement against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), pulling together Somaliland, Puntland, Jubbaland and several other entities in the south. The difficulties of building this coalition are evident, as many of their ‘friends’ are locked in a zero-sum game with each other. Credible reports signal the involvement of the UAE, who have port concessions in Somaliland, Puntland and Jubbaland, and are an ally of Ethiopia.

Janaan in Gedo

The fact that HSM has drawn upon Abdirashid Janaan at all is deeply problematic, and it is worth briefly recounting his background. Janaan was the Somali ‘big man’ in northern Gedo at the time of Jubbaland’s establishment in 2013. President Madobe needed a way to incorporate Gedo region into the newly established Federal Member State (FMS), and Janaan offered this as the District Commissioner in Dollow and the dominant figure in northern Gedo at that time, working closely with the Ethiopian security apparatus to maintain his position. Janaan initially drew his power from revenue collected at the checkpoints in northern Gedo, a key trade route connecting Mogadishu and Kismayo with markets in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Janaan also benefited enormously from the establishment of Dollow town as a humanitarian hub during the response to the great Somalia famine of 2011/12, and the continuing aid response thereafter. He created his own NGOs and companies in order to gain contracts – rents – and even taxed the staff of different agencies. He had a say in organisational recruitment across northern Gedo as well as in directing where agencies could and could not go.

While he initially had the support of his own sub-clan (Marehan–Reer Ahmed)—though not from the broader Marehan clan—as well as others whom he rewarded generously with positions and money, he grew increasingly brutal over time. In 2017, the UN-mandated Eritrea and Somalia Monitoring Group implicated him in rights abuses including targeted killings, torture, the unlawful transfer of detainees to Ethiopia and the manipulation of humanitarian aid, also reported on by Human Rights Watch (HRW). At this time, he was the Security Minister of Jubbaland and still a close ally of President Ahmed Madobe.

On 29 March 2019, a workshop hosted by the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) in Nairobi—attended by senior representatives from the donor, UN, and NGO community—discussed the need to shift towards ‘more inclusive and conflict-aware approaches’ in Somalia. One of the case studies presented focused on Abdirashid Janaan’s control and manipulation of the entire aid system in Dollow and northern Gedo. Unfortunately, Brexit and Covid-19 forced the UK government to withdraw funding for a ‘Better Aid’ facility.

On 31 August 2019, Janaan was detained in Mogadishu for serious crimes. However, his arrest took place at the same time that incumbent President Farmajo was embroiled in a concerted effort to oust Madobe from Jubbaland, and his arrest was considered by many to be political rather than due to his criminal activities. However, on 28 January 2020, Janaan escaped his detention and fled to Kismayo and then to Kenya, from where he staged an attack on FGS forces in Belet Hawa, but was defeated. He has maintained a very low profile since that time.

On 21 July 2025, Janaan was appointed as head of intelligence in Gedo region by HSM. Given Janaan’s past and very public record, including his previous arrest, escape from Somalia, and the reporting of the UN Monitoring Group, his recent appointment seems remarkable. However, Somali politics is shaped by shifting alliances and transactional tactics, aided by limited institutional memory and high turnover among international actors. Moreover, global attention on Somalia is currently low, overshadowed by more urgent conflicts and priorities elsewhere.

Displacement questions – ‘Gatekeeping’ and ‘bush bariis’

The fighting in Belet Hawa and Dollow towns has inevitably caused residents to move, both to nearby rural areas as well as across the border to Mandera. However, the extent to which this constitutes a serious displacement crisis justifying a humanitarian response should be carefully considered. The fighting has been confined within urban areas allowing local residents to relocate to relatives in nearby safe and accessible locations. The various armed actors and Al Shabaab have allowed civilians to move freely, and families reportedly expect to return to their homes soon.

The IDP business economy is a well-known phenomenon in Somalia, identified during the recent corruption and aid diversion scandal. In a recent study, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are reportedly commonly taxed at up to 50% of their cash entitlements in order to access and remain in an IDP camp. Anecdotal reports amongst our research networks continue to identity fake IDP camps in different locations in southern Somalia – bush bariis – as well as a continuing inability of aid actors to change the terms of their engagement with gatekeepers.

Gatekeeping interests will mobilise in Mandera and in Belet Hawa in response to the possibility of resources coming in.

Conclusions

The Gedo conflict reveals the interacting levels of Somalia’s unpredictable political marketplace, from the regional to the national to the local, where no alliance is fixed and where foreign security forces are used by local entrepreneurs for their own advantage. The outcome of the current fighting is still to play out, but it has already caused significant disruption.

Election dynamics will continue to influence conflict trends over the coming weeks and months, as is the case in northern Gedo currently. The re-emergence of Abdirashid ‘Janaan’ and the recurrence of infighting between government forces should be treated with great concern by all working in northern Gedo.

In times of resource scarcity in international aid, the humanitarian community needs to assess the underlying dynamics and ‘needs’ associated with events such as described here in a much more critical and nuanced way, and avoid inadvertently reinforcing the IDP business model.

[1] Reflecting the source of its funding

About the authors

Dr Nisar Majid is the research director for the PeaceRep Somalia programme at the Conflict & Civicness Research Group at LSE. He has worked in and on the Horn of Africa and the Somali territories for over 20 years, in various applied and research capacities.

Khalif Abdirahman is the PeaceRep Somalia research team’s senior field researcher with the Conflict & Civicness Research Group at LSE. Khalif is also a Fellow at the Rift Valley Institute.

Guhad Adan is an independent consultant, LSE Research Associate and regular contributor to PeaceRep.

Read the new report by PeaceRep Somalia: Gedo, Jubbaland and the Translocal Marehan: State fragmentation, identity politics and regional reconfigurations in the Somali territories

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