Galkayo and Kismayo – Understanding Urban Fragments in Somalia’s Peace and Conflict...

In an analysis of PeaceRep’s global database on ‘local’ agreements, Christine Bell and Laura Wise discuss how the general failure of national peace processes has contributed to the emergence of new spaces and dynamics of both peace and conflict, particularly at sub-national levels. They identify three typologies that characterise these new spaces: territorially limited transcalar spaces, borderland mediation spaces, and route-of-passage spaces – and argue that there is a need to better understand these spaces in order to reimagine peace processes.

In a recent research report and policy brief, we have taken this conceptualization of the peace-conflict landscape and applied it to the area of justice and security, focusing on two of the fragments of Somalia’s peace/conflict tapestry, Kismayo and Galkayo; both are significant urban spaces, each with their own local dynamics, and each set within a broader arena of actors and relationships, including their respective federal member states (FMS), the federal government (FGS), and their regional and transnational positionalities.

Background

Kismayo, in southern Somalia, is the de facto capital of Jubbaland and its political authority – including justice and security arrangements – is informed by the ‘Islamist turn’ in Somalia and its geographic location vis-à-vis the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab. Crucial in this context is that the Jubbaland authority holds a monopoly on violence in this seaport and town. Its economic and security relationships with Kenya and Ethiopia are salient additional factors in its form of political order. Galkayo, on the other hand, is a divided border town in central Somalia, marking the boundary between Puntland and Galmudug FMS, and the different clan and sub-clan identities on either side of the border. Political authority in Galkayo – including justice and security arrangements – is contested. There is no dominant security actor in the town. Each of these two urban centres is influenced to different degrees by ‘non-local’ forces, including their respective diaspora as well as the federal government in Mogadishu. Furthermore, both Kismayo and Galkayo are important trading hubs, notable factors in Somalia’s processes of state formation. These respective histories, identities and factors have shaped processes of state formation as well as justice and security outcomes.

Justice and security – Comparing Kismayo and Galkayo

In the report we discuss the contexts of Kismayo and Galkayo in relation to three themes: everyday justice, revenge killings and political space.

Everyday Justice and Public Authority – Use of Government Courts

By everyday justice, we refer to a range of cases including marital disputes, accidents and injuries, smaller land/property disputes and small-scale business disputes. These are distinguished from murders or killings and larger business and property disputes, which carry a higher social and political weight and can generate or exacerbate conflicts. Settling such everyday cases may take place in different ways, including under traditional authority, privately engaging sheikhs (practicing sharia’a law), or through the government courts.

In the case of Kismayo, some of the privately practicing sheikhs were moved to the government-run courts as part of the reforms made to the legal system there, as they were considered well-versed in the law, and locally credible and sought after. Court observations at the time demonstrated that these courts were well utilised by local residents and judicial outcomes were well received. Few examples of miscarriages of justice were noted, including cases where political and clan identity, as well as power, did not appear to influence court judgments.

In Kismayo, the actions of the town’s police force were considered more problematic than the practices within the courts themselves. The political and security context in Kismayo, with a dominant security actor, was seen as beneficial for enforcing judicial rulings – a major limitation in other parts of the country, except in areas or cases where Al-Shabaab was involved.

In order to accommodate the plural legal environment, where customary law and sheikhs are consulted privately, the Jubbaland authority created an elders committee with representation from all clans in Kismayo, which works with the government-run courts to manage and register cases. It does the same with the private administration of disputes by sharia’a judges. The legal process concerning everyday justice in Kismayo has a level of functionality and credibility that is uncommon in Somalia.

In Galkayo, the situation is more complex. The courts operate separately on either side of the town’s border, within their respective FMS structures and within a more ambiguous political-security context. On both sides of the town, political – and therefore security – authority is contested between customary (i.e. clan) and government structures, and many clans are heavily armed. In this context, clan hierarchies and clan power are considered the dominant factor in the provision of everyday justice. Court and enforcement processes are strongly influenced by these power hierarchies. These hierarchies are less relevant where equally matched parties are in dispute and therefore where there is an interest to settle to avoid potential escalation. In Galkayo therefore, recourse to the law and the enforcement of justice is heavily mediated by the existing power hierarchies and the absence of a monopoly on violence.

Revenge Killings

The provision of a credible justice system is most starkly evident around murder and revenge killings, which can quickly undermine everyday security and escalate into larger conflicts. In Kismayo, there has been little or no practice of inter-clan-based revenge killings under the Jubbaland authority. This reflects the position and character of the authority as the dominant security actor; no tolerance for a potentially destabilising cycle of revenge killings would be permitted. In this case, destabilisation carries a huge risk, given the close proximity of Al-Shabaab. If a murder took place, the Jubbaland authority would quickly identity the culprit and punish them accordingly (typically by execution).

In the case of Galkayo, while the population has benefited enormously from the 2017 Agreement, the risk of revenge killings has remained, and in 2024, it escalated significantly, threatening the underlying peace agreement. These episodes, including revenge killings between groups within Galkayo North and across the border between the Lelkasse and Sa’ad, proved extremely difficult—if not impossible—for government authorities to address. The authorities openly admitted that these were ‘clan issues’ and acknowledged they would be significantly outgunned if they attempted to enforce their authority.

As a repercussion of these escalations, many innocent bystanders are killed, leading to further escalation of tension, and further killings as new groups are brought into the violence. Vulnerable groups will often leave town temporarily, since victims are targeted based on clan identity rather than their involvement in the incidents.

In Galkayo, the situation is further complicated by the weakened authority of clan elders, undermined by the political elite, and the proliferation of inflammatory discourse on digital platforms, which clan elders struggle to control

Political Space vs Justice and Security

Another point of comparison between Kismayo and Galkayo concerns the character of the political space in both towns and its intersection with the provision of justice and security. As noted, the Jubbaland authority in Kismayo performs relatively well in maintaining peace and security, nurturing a credible everyday justice and mitigating against destabilising outbreaks of revenge killings. These are considerable benefits in a region with a recent history of serious violence. However, when it comes to contesting elections and parliamentary seats, the situation is very different, with very limited opportunities to challenge the incumbent president and his close allies.

The quality of this political space is difficult to assess, as serious political challenges have originated from Somalia’s political centre in Mogadishu, and are embedded in core-periphery tensions. These tensions often reflect a desire for the centre to dominate the peripheries, typically by installing compliant presidents in the regional/FMS elections through the use of money and/or violence. This dynamic provides a rationale for Madobe to resist such threats by maintaining his own monopoly over political space and violence in Kismayo.

That said, President Madobe also represents a form of Islamist political authority and an authoritarianism also present in Somalia through Al-Shabaab (and its various predecessors, including the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al Itihad Al Islamia). Madobe is also a valuable security partner in regional and international security regimes against Al-Shabaab, which further enables and emboldens him in his hold on power.

In contrast, Galkayo has a more open and plural political context, with space to criticise both government and customary authority, although this criticism is primarily directed at the respective regimes to the north and south of Galkayo. A notable observation about the Galkayo Agreement concerned the role of youth and women as peace activists. This activist role of the youth has continued, with some members speaking out critically against the government and elders in relation to the series of revenge killings, calling on political authorities to intervene, partly because some of them were targeted. Also in Galkayo’s favour is that it is not at the centre of politics of its respective FMS, and is therefore away from the spotlight of election-related politics.

Conclusions

In relation to Bell and Wise’s typologies, while both towns exhibit characteristics from all three types, Kismayo, under the Jubbaland administration, aligns more closely with a territorially limited transcalar space, where governance and security are consolidated under a dominant authority within a local political settlement that both reflects and shapes the wider Somali peace-conflict landscape. The ‘Kismayo bubble’ has enabled credible justice provision while also fostering processes of inter-clan reconciliation. However, while its more centralized structure has improved stability, it has also limited civic and political space, reinforcing exclusionary forms of governance.

Conversely, Galkayo functions more as a borderland mediation space, where its dual administration requires ongoing negotiation between its respective federal member states, Puntland and Galmudug, its clan constituents, and the federal government in Mogadishu. Unlike Kismayo, Galkayo lacks a dominant security actor, making justice and security governance fluid and contingent on continuous mediation. The 2017 Galkayo Agreement opened avenues for dialogue and conflict resolution, yet governance in town remains inherently unstable. Bell and Wise’s framework suggests that such spaces require sustained negotiation and adaptation to maintain security and political order.

Amongst the key messages we identify in our policy brief, we suggest that a granular understanding of Somalia’s fragmented governance landscape – Kismayo and Galkayo – can enhance policy and programmatic engagement, by shifting the focus from dominant elite-level narratives to local realities. This is particularly important in securitized, “bunkerized” environments such as Somalia.

In addition, we identify that peacebuilding, justice and security efforts, must engage actors at multiple levels, ensuring that international stakeholders do not become entangled in center-periphery or periphery-periphery political struggles. Facilitating dialogue and exchange among stakeholders across different spaces and levels can foster comparative understandings of justice and security dynamics, leading to more contextually relevant interventions that reflect Somalia’s diverse political realities.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that political authority remains in flux across Somalia, requiring continuous negotiation and adaptive policymaking from both local and national actors. While Kismayo and Galkayo exhibit distinct characteristics, their governance structures are shaped by broader political, economic, and security shifts, underscoring the need for flexible and responsive peacebuilding approaches.


Further reading:

Research report: Mapping the Fragments – Justice and Security in Somalia: Galkayo and Kismayo

Policy brief: Fragmented Governance in Somalia: Understanding Justice and Security through Galkayo and Kismayo