Checkpoints in Hiraan – ‘Everything is Upside Down’

Ahmed Guney* has worked as a minibus driver for the last ten years. He either drives a small minibus with a capacity of six people or a slightly larger vehicle which can carry eight to ten passengers. Based in Belet Weyn town, he works on routes around the town within Belet Weyn district. He is from the Hawadle clan, the dominant clan on the eastern side of the Shebelle River, which divides the town, district and region into its eastern and western portions. Ahmed also drives his minibus to and from Galkayo town in neighbouring Galmudug region, a distance of approximately 300 km.

Ahmed contrasts the organization of checkpoints that he sees in Galmudug with that of Hirshabelle, noting that on the route between Galkayo and Belet Weyn, checkpoints in Galmudug are well organized, operated by the regional government, receipts are provided for any payments, and there is little security threat, either to him or his passengers. This relatively good organization extends to the Haber Gedir clan territories in the border areas of Galmudug and Hirshabelle, where the first checkpoint is in Mataban. While he reports a level of orderliness, he is less sure about whether any of the taxation money goes to the Hirshabelle government (although in Galmudug we are aware that there is relatively well-functioning system of tax collection).

Driving along this route – from Galkayo to Belet Weyn – he identifies the Ba’da checkpoint as the point where travellers start dealing with the ‘Ma’awisley’ checkpoints, manned by militias, which have sprung up in the Hawadle territories since the offensive against AS began. He explains that many checkpoints ‘appear and disappear daily, all wanting money and are all threatening and dangerous.’ He asserts that many drivers have been killed at these checkpoints, one of the reasons why women have started to protest recently in Belet Weyn town.

Ahmed points out that in order to navigate these checkpoints, drivers have to use men or brokers nicknamed ‘mukulaal madow’ (black cats). Utilizing some kind of intermediary is often required in Somalia, as we reported in a previous blog, where a transport committee worked on behalf of vehicle owners, coordinating between AS, government and militias to enable trade to flow as smoothly as possible. The breakdown of order in eastern Hiraan region since the offensive has led to the use of the brokers, as well as to transporters themselves putting armed men on their vehicles – trucks, carrying larger loads – and refusing to pay the rising costs as checkpoints proliferate.

The brokers are from the same sub-clans as those manning each checkpoint and offer to take vehicles through safely and for a minimum cost. A driver will provide the brokers with a sum of money considered appropriate and they will use a combination of haggling and money to get a vehicle through the checkpoint with minimum additional costs. The brokers themselves have sometimes been killed, which has contributed to the demonstrations in Belet Weyn.

Expressing his frustration with this arrangement, Ahmed exclaims that, ‘When it comes to the Ma’awisley checkpoints, you see them in large numbers, more than ten in a small area, all asking for money. They have no system and no reason to be there other than robbing vehicles passing. They are collecting money for themselves, and they have no cause. For this they are similar to Hirshabelle or Hiraan state [soldiers] but they do nothing that benefit the public with the money they collect. It is all for them.’

This predicament has led to the Hawadle Ugaas, the highest traditional authority of the clan, attempting to intervene by offering his services and position on behalf of all of the sub-clans of the Hawadle, to try and bring some order to the situation. This offer requires the willingness and agreement of the various sub-clans to fall under his leadership, which has not yet materialized. Representatives of the Hawadle at the federal level accept that there is little coherent governance in the region.

Reflecting on the Ma’awisley offensive and the last two years, Ahmed concludes with the following, ‘We were all with the Ma’awisley revolution, but had we known that it will come to such a chaos and lawlessness, we would have never supported them. Every man with ten sons now has a checkpoint. It is pure greed and banditry. For the last two years we have been walking on our head, everything is upside down. There is no solution in sight. I can’t see any solution.’

While the offensive against AS is generally recognized to have stalled, its fall-out continues in different forms in Somalia, including inter-clan tensions as well as the proliferation of militias and their main source of revenue, checkpoints. Both the Islamic Courts Union in the past and AS currently have prioritized bringing order to checkpoint management, and thereby to trade, recognizing checkpoints’ critical role in the country’s economy, the widespread discontent they cause, and the dangers they pose to everyday travel.

The proliferation of checkpoints and associated violence is evident in other areas of the country, including in other parts of Hirshabelle, where they can be the cause or locus of inter-clan conflict. Government intervention is urgently required to address these issues, especially given its role in supporting clan militias in its fight against Al Shabaab.

*This name and other details have been changed to protect the identity of the interviewee.

About the authors

Nisar Majid is the Research Director at the LSE PeaceRep (Somalia) programme. He has been working in and on the Somali territories of the Horn of Africa since the late 1990s in various research and applied capacities.

Khalif Abdirahman is senior field researcher on PeaceRep (Somalia) and has extensive research experience across the Horn of Africa, particularly in the Somali speaking regions.

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