Never Let a Good Crisis Go: On the Political Escalation in South Sudan

Political tensions in Juba, South Sudan flared high after First Vice President Riek Machar was placed under house arrest on 26 March 2025. This move followed the arrests of other leading figures of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), including their Chief of Staff, Gabriel Duop Lam, and the Minister of Petroleum, Puot Kang Chol.

The arrests were reportedly linked to recent armed clashes in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, where an escalation of violence has raised fears among international actors of a return to full-scale civil war. The current situation started in late February 2025 when the White Army, a Nuer community militia in Nasir County, launched attacks against units of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), claiming self-defence against an alleged disarmament campaign.

Recent attacks

During the fighting in March, the SSPDF suffered a series of humiliating setbacks, including the downing of a government gunship. Reports suggest that an Eastern European pilot was killed in the incident, a development that deeply embarrassed government forces and prompted a retaliatory offensive – one that was ultimately repelled. The clashes culminated in the White Army capturing the town and the Wec Yar Adiu army barracks. A planned evacuation of SSPDF troops by the UN peacekeeping mission UNMISS on 7 March turned tragic when an exchange of fire erupted during the mission. The resulting casualties included the SSPDF commander in Nasir, the prominent General Majur Dak, a Dinka from Duk County in Jonglei State, along with an UNMISS crew member and approximately 27 SSPDF soldiers.

In response to the escalating crisis, the South Sudanese government turned to Uganda for support. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) began deploying troops in Juba and other parts of the country. The UPDF reportedly conducted aerial bombardments over Nasir using a gunship and an Antonov aircraft, killing over 20 civilians.

Uganda’s involvement appears to go beyond short-term military assistance. ‘Any attack on President Kiir is a declaration of war against Uganda’, declared General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, son of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who, in another tweet on X, also said he was tired of ‘killing Nuer’. The stability of South Sudan holds strategic and economic importance for Uganda, which considers it a vital export market. A spiralling political crisis in Juba is not in Uganda’s interest, particularly given the long-standing partnership between Museveni and Kiir.

Political escalation

Meanwhile, the SPLM mainstream faction, known as SPLM in government (SPLM-IG), has sought to capitalise on the situation for political gain. The official narrative portrays the White Army attacks as orchestrated by the SPLM-IO, framing them as part of a broader effort to destabilise the country. While there are indications that SPLM-IO elements may have instigated some of the violence – allegedly in response to government plans to dismantle illegal but lucrative checkpoints along the Sobat River in Nasir and Ulang Counties, both under SPLM-IO control – such a framing oversimplifies the situation. These checkpoints, a major source of revenue for SPLM-IO, have long been contested.

Still, it is important to note that the White Army has historically acted autonomously, driven by its own internal dynamics rather than direct orders from political elites. In fact, during the failed evacuation attempt referenced above, which SPLM-IO leadership reportedly tried to facilitate, White Army fighters killed SPLM-IO soldiers, underscoring the complex and sometimes adversarial relationship between the two.

The subsequent arrests of SPLM-IO officials therefore appear to be less about accountability and more about sidelining the movement within government, undermining its legitimacy and humiliating its leadership. These actions seem closely aligned with the ambitions of Vice President Bol Mel, who was only appointed to the post in February 2025. Since then, he has assumed a prominent public role, taking over official communications and leading meetings with international partners, while President Kiir remains notably silent. Bol Mel, a wealthy businessman previously sanctioned by the United States in 2016 under the Magnitsky Act for corruption, has recently reinvented himself as a determined political actor with apparent aspirations to succeed Salva Kiir. Unlike others before him, he enjoys the president’s trust, at least for now.

While it remains unlikely that President Salva Kiir intends to relinquish power in the near future, Vice President Bol Mel is clearly using the current crisis to advance his own political ambitions. One major obstacle in his path is Riek Machar. Under the terms of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), in the event of the president’s temporary absence – such as for medical reasons – it is not Bol Mel or another trusted vice president who would assume power, but the First Vice President. The prospect of Riek Machar serving as acting president and commander-in-chief of the security forces is deeply unsettling not only for Bol Mel but for many within the SPLM-IG establishment.

In the event of an unexpected succession – should President Kiir be forced to retire permanently or pass away – the SPLM would have just 48 hours to appoint a new leader. Given Bol Mel’s lack of wartime credentials and his controversial business dealings, he remains unpopular within party ranks and cannot be assured of being selected in such a short timeframe. In such a scenario, the First Vice President would again assume a pivotal role, further threatening Bol Mel’s political ambitions.

To counter this, Bol Mel appears to be leveraging the current political crisis to build Dinka support for his project of succession. The political escalation is increasingly following an ethnopolitical trajectory, which is likely to intensify if Riek Machar is brought to trial, which seems a move now being seriously considered by Bol Mel and his allies, apparently, according to informal conversations, even against the advice of the Ministry of Justice. If any evidence emerges that Machar played a role in instigating the White Army along ethnically charged lines, it will almost certainly be used to mobilise Dinka backing for Bol Mel’s leadership bid.

The future of the transition

As things stand currently, it appears unlikely that Riek Machar will remain in his current position. The most probable outcome is the appointment of a weaker figure to serve as First Vice President on behalf of the SPLM-IO, much like the role played by Taban Deng Gai in 2016. There are indications that consultations around such a replacement are already underway. The key question now is whether the SPLM-IO will agree to return to the framework of the peace agreement or opt for open confrontation, having already declared the peace process a failure.

While the risk of renewed civil war is real, it remains a remote possibility for one central reason: even in 2018, the R-ARCSS was less a genuine peace deal than a de facto surrender agreement by the SPLM-IO, which had already lost the war militarily. Since then, the movement has grown even weaker, losing senior commanders and their respective forces, such as Johnson Olonyi, who joined the government, and Simon Gatwich, who defected from Machar’s camp and remained as an independent warlord. The SPLM-IO lacks the capacity to pose a credible armed threat at the national level – a fact the government is acutely aware of, and is currently testing by placing Machar under house arrest.

The most likely scenario is the continuation of South Sudan’s fragile transition process under a new First Vice President, with Machar maintaining a symbolic political presence – even if formally put on trial – and his wife, Angelina Teny, likely retaining a ministerial post. The SPLM-IO has much to lose in terms of political positions and access to state resources, and little to gain by allowing the transitional power-sharing arrangement to collapse. Strong regional engagement is also working to de-escalate the situation. The glue the R-ARCSS represents in terms of rewards of positions is likely also to prevent another split within SPLM-IO. Broader consultations are currently ongoing. The AU’s Panel of the Wise is in the country, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has visited in an effort to calm tensions, likely also with the aim of keeping the fragile transition on track.

It remains to be seen whether regional efforts will succeed in defusing the current escalation. Yet, paradoxically, the conditions may be more favourable than they appear. While Bol Mel undoubtedly sees this crisis as an opportunity to remove Riek Machar from power in pursuit of his own political ambitions, his internal support remains weak. Many senior figures within the government and security apparatus are reluctant to take significant risks on his behalf; indeed, some may even prefer to see him fail rather than be drawn into a conflict for his benefit. The same logic applies to the SPLM-IO. While the movement may publicly resist Machar’s removal, it may ultimately be willing to accept his sidelining in order to preserve its broader position within the government. In that sense, both camps may find it more pragmatic to maintain the status quo – however fragile – than to reignite open conflict.

About the Author

Jan Pospisil is Associate Professor (Research) at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University.

Explore all PeaceRep Sudan and South Sudan research.