In this blogpost, Jan Pospisil delves into the recent outbreak of anti-Sudanese riots in South Sudan, sparked by reports of violence in Wad Madani, Sudan.
He examines the complex interplay of social media influence, socio-economic struggles, rising anti-foreigner sentiment, and political dynamics that have fuelled the unrest.
Pospisil further explores the broader implications of the riots for Sudanese-South Sudanese relations and the fragile stability of post-conflict South Sudan.

The First Violent Spillover: Sudan’s War Ignites Violence in South Sudan
On Thursday 15 January, South Sudan witnessed a series of violent anti-Sudanese riots, with youth attacking and looting Sudanese-owned shops and Sudanese-looking people in various parts of Juba. By the following day, the unrest had spread to other regions, including Aweil and Bor. A total of nine people have been killed in the violence. In response, the transitional government declared a nationwide curfew in an effort to curb the escalating violence.
The riots have been sparked by social media reports of killings in Wad Madani, Al-Ghazira State, where Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fighters targeted South Sudanese workers, primarily those employed in the agricultural scheme, among other victims. Wad Madani, which had been under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since the onset of the Sudanese war, was retaken by SAF in an intensely violent operation. Reports indicate the use of drones, indiscriminate bombings and targeted killings, leading to extensive civilian casualties. These events have been widely condemned, with the United States imposing sanctions on General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of Sudan’s coup regime, for his role in orchestrating these actions.
The SAF leadership further inflamed tensions by accusing South Sudanese of siding with the RSF. Sanctioned Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasir al-Atta even claimed that 65% of RSF fighters originated from South Sudan, citing the known involvement of Nuer forces loyal to Stephen Buay in the Sudanese war – an absurd and baseless assertion only intended to justify the atrocities committed by the army. Such inflammatory statements not only lacked credibility but also exacerbated tensions in Juba, where these allegations were perceived as a provocation against an already volatile population. The dissemination of these claims through various channels amplified their impact, deepening mistrust and hostility between communities.
While the security situation in Juba has always varied across respective areas of town, with economic desperation adding to these issues, these riots are still an exceptional development with the potential to sustainably deteriorate Sudanese-South Sudanese relations, first and foremost on a social and socio-economic level. With regards to South Sudan, three critical dimensions of this unfolding crisis merit closer examination: the role of social media campaigns, increasing anti-foreigner sentiment, and political implications.
The Role of Social Media Campaigns
For a country like South Sudan, the mobilisation of anti-foreigner sentiment through social media represents a relatively new and concerning phenomenon. Social media platforms became a vehicle for disseminating inflammatory content, amplifying grievances, and coordinating actions against Sudanese individuals. Pictures and videos mainly distributed on SAF-friendly accounts on Facebook and Instagram, sometimes accompanied by positive comments, went viral within South Sudan within a couple of hours of being shared. While the spread of such campaigns highlights the growing digital connectivity within South Sudan, it also underscores the risks associated with unregulated online spaces in a volatile socio-political context.
Rising Anti-Foreigner Sentiments
The anti-Sudanese riots are not only a violent reflection of the deep-seated collective South Sudanese trauma of the Sudanese civil war. They are indicative of deeper socio-economic frustrations that have been simmering in South Sudan for years.
South Sudan faces a severe economic crisis, characterised by public servants remaining unpaid for over a year, that has plunged much of the population into extreme poverty and desperation. Chronic economic deprivation, coupled with widespread discontent over a corrupt kleptocracy that has failed to provide even the most basic services to its citizens, has created a fertile environment for xenophobia to take root.
In such circumstances, anger and frustration are often misdirected towards convenient scapegoats, such as specific groups of foreigners. This pattern is not unique to South Sudan; it has been observed in neighbouring Kenya, where anti-Somali riots erupted following al-Shabaab attacks, and in Europe and the UK, where recent riots in England and Northern Ireland were incited by the spread of false rumours about the killing of children by Islamists. These parallels highlight how socio-economic grievances, when combined with misinformation and prejudice, can lead to dangerous eruptions of xenophobic violence.
The fact that these sentiments have targeted Sudanese refugees – many of whom fled the horrors of war in their own country – is particularly tragic. This development underscores the pervasive frustration within South Sudanese society, including among educated elites and civil society members, who increasingly misattribute the country’s systemic economic failures to the presence of foreigners and their business activities.
The looting during the riots in Juba and other South Sudanese towns was not merely an expression of anger but also a reflection of economic survival tactics in a collapsing economy. A growing number of deprived youths aim to capitalise on such situations in the daily search for food, drinks, and other means of everyday livelihood. South Sudan’s economic crisis has led to severe inflation, eroding purchasing power and increasing the cost of living for the population. This economic instability has left many young people without access to financial capital, education, relevant skills, and employment opportunities.
Political Implications
The riots also carry significant political undertones and have implications on the Sudanese-South Sudanese state relations. The unrest coincides with the recent removal of Tut Kew Gatluak, a figure closely aligned with SAF, from his position as the Security Advisor to the President and head of the National Transitional Committee. This shift is seen as moving the regime closer to the RSF, with which South Sudan pursues economic relations. Simultaneously, South Sudan remains heavily reliant on the pipeline to Port Sudan for its oil exports, which constitute the backbone of its state revenue – currently used mainly for loan repayments. This pipeline is mainly under SAF control, forcing the South Sudanese government to navigate a delicate balance between conflicting interests.
The recent events mark the first significant instance of the Sudanese war’s violent spillover into South Sudan. While the government’s swift imposition of a curfew may help restore order temporarily, the underlying frustrations among South Sudanese citizens pose a long-term threat to stability. South Sudan lacks a tradition of organised protests, but the high levels of desperation – exacerbated by rampant corruption among the elite and extortionate practices by government agencies – could lead to more frequent and widespread unrest.
The anti-Sudanese riots in South Sudan highlight the interconnectedness of conflicts in the region and the fragility of post-conflict societies. While the immediate triggers may have been external, the events have laid bare deep-seated grievances and structural deficiencies within South Sudan. Without urgent and comprehensive action, such as the payment of salary areas for the public sector, the country risks further socio-economic tensions that, at one point, might turn into a direct threat to the SPLM-led transitional government.
Dr Jan Pospisil is Associate Professor (Research) at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University. His work engages with the governance of transitional processes, state legitimacy, state fragility and statebuilding, peace processes and institutionalist approaches in international relations.
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