Grounded Resilience: What Syria’s Earthquake Response Taught Us About Civic Ecosystems

On 6 February 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit northern Syria and Türkiye.^[1] The number of deaths in both countries has exceeded 51,000 people.^[2] Among them are around 6,000 people in Syria, most of whom are in northwest Syria (NWS),^[3] an area that was under the opposition forces’ control until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Its estimated population was 4.5 – 5 million.

The earthquake exacerbated an already vulnerable humanitarian situation that had been ongoing for more than 12 years due to war. In the first hours of the disaster, a spontaneous and decentralised community response emerged, complementing the efforts of local authorities and humanitarian networks. Looking at this response from a civic ecosystem perspective enhances our understanding of crisis management, power dynamics, and coordination while exploring aspects often overlooked in traditional studies of humanitarian efforts.

A civic ecosystem is a self-organised system of interdependent and diverse social actors held together by shared civic values to meet public needs, especially in crisis, through complementary roles.^[4]

This blog is based on our empirical observations as a research team, drawn from our ongoing research titled “Civic Ecosystem Responses to Compound Crisis: Evidence from Syria.” It seeks to highlight the complementarity of efforts of local communities, governmental and non-governmental health actors, social groups, and diaspora networks. It also explores how the civic ecosystem operates in limited statehood areas. Our examples are derived from northwest Syria, where we conducted our research and have access to relevant information.

Rapid Activating of Pre-Existing Civic Resources and Capabilities

The relative effectiveness of the earthquake response in NWS did not emerge from a vacuum. Instead, it resulted from social capital, institutional memory, trust, informal coordination mechanisms, and physical resources. These were developed over the years of war through dealing with complex crises, including bombed cities, chemical attacks, forced displacement, the systematic destruction of health facilities, and epidemics.^[5] The tacit knowledge of dealing with crises produced among institutions, groups, and individuals formed an essential basis for the community’s rapid response.

The Idlib Health Directorate (IHD) created a WhatsApp coordination group dedicated to coordinating the response within 20 minutes of the earthquake. This group included individuals known for playing significant roles during previous crises. Most of these individuals belonged to organisations operating in the area. They were, therefore, capable of mobilising their organisations as part of a coherent overall response.^[6] Others were social figures capable of mobilising community groups and resources. The extensive coordination that has taken place over the past years between the White Helmets (Civil Defence) and the IHD, which resulted in the “Volunteers Against Corona” campaign in 2020,^[7] facilitated the use of existing communication channels and structures between the two major institutions involved in the response. Community trust and the legitimacy of these institutions also played a significant role in ensuring adherence to general instructions, avoiding chaos in search and rescue operations, and providing life-saving services within health facilities.^[8]

Transformative Roles of Civic and Uncivic Actors

Crises significantly break social stagnation, reshape roles, and disrupt established norms and policies. Some inactive individuals became key responders immediately after the crisis. Survivors transformed into rescuers, with an estimated 3,000 people volunteering in search and rescue operations, working in coordination and under the direction of the White Helmets. Dozens of heavy equipment items, which the White Helmets lacked during the golden peak of the response, were secured by community members and military factions in the area.

Traditional civic actors, such as the IHD, the White Helmets, NGOs, community groups, and individuals played their expected roles. However, the response also highlighted that traditional uncivic actors may engage in civic ways, contributing to the ecosystem. For example, military factions contributed to search and rescue efforts through providing personnel and equipment, protecting medical convoys and facilitating the civil institutions’ work.^[9]

Enabling and Constraining Factors

Several factors facilitated or hindered the civic ecosystem’s response. The absence of a central authority led to a rapid civilian reaction, as people realised there was no state to respond, and small organisations and health facilities didn’t wait for top-down instructions. Everyone instinctively and understandably rushed to provide whatever they could. People’s reliance on social media, such as WhatsApp, for quick, informal communication also facilitated immediate coordination between fragmented institutions and geographical areas.

On the other hand, the bureaucratic structures of UN agencies, their presence outside the country’s borders in Gaziantep, Turkey, and the impact on the UN staff who were also victims of the earthquake that struck Turkey at the same time, hampered a swift response, delaying UN aid by about a week. The closure of the Turkish border, the only outlet for international assistance, and the eight-day delay in obtaining approval from the head of the Syrian regime to open additional humanitarian crossings, all led to a meagre international response at a time of dire need.^[10]

External, large, rigid bureaucratic institutions often struggle to adapt and improvise in ways that smaller, more agile networks can. However, they may play a crucial role in the post-acute response phase (3–7 days).

Complementarity Over Coordination

No single organised plan emerged to lead the response. Instead, many integrated, interconnected, and unconnected activities addressed diverse needs across the response spectrum.

Diaspora networks played a significant role in filling gaps created by the overwhelmed local response. They conducted fundraising, needs assessments, and advocacy campaigns. Additionally, money exchange and jewellery networks of Syrians residing between Syria and Turkey performed remarkably well, providing direct cash donations and some emergency supplies, such as diesel and generators, to responding hospitals.

International NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders, worked alongside Syrian organisations and health directorates. It opened its warehouses in northern Aleppo to responders within the first few hours and operated mobile clinics.^[11]

This division of labour was neither planned nor coordinated in advance, but rather ad hoc and emergent, built on accumulated trust between the parties, shared purpose, and an implicit understanding of roles and capabilities developed through responding to previous crises.

Shifting Practices and Behavioural Adaptation

The earthquake led to temporary shifts of behaviour and practices among individuals and institutions. Some healthcare workers ignored established procedures and bureaucracy, prioritising saving lives. For example, referral network workers transported injured patients to healthcare facilities without completing the required paperwork or obtaining prior approval from the referring facility. Some healthcare facility managers distributed patients among facilities based on available capacities during the earthquake, without waiting for the usual approvals from health authorities or supporting organisations.^[12] Adaptive behaviour was not limited to civilian sectors; some military groups allowed service institutions more significant space and control than would normally exist. Furthermore, many members of these groups engaged in civic behaviour by providing support and protection rather than interfering or obstructing efforts, as would sometimes occur in normal circumstances.

Sustainability and Innovations

The mechanisms for coordination, action, innovation, and complementary efforts that emerged during the response phase were unsustainable. As the acute phase of the response ended and international institutions intervened, the momentum of the community response declined, and many spontaneous networks disappeared. However, the civic spaces and tacit knowledge gained from this response remain valuable, whether recognised, understood, and documented immediately or years later.”

Another example from NWS is how some health workers, initially responding to the targeting of peaceful demonstrators after the 2011 uprising, went on to establish the most significant semi-governmental health institution in opposition-held areas. This experience went through several phases: field hospitals, medical offices, health committees, and finally, the IHD.^[13] Each phase included innovative and unconventional solutions to address health needs and security challenges, such as hospitals being excavated into the mountains’ rock.

This example highlights the potential for institutionalising civic responses, particularly when embedded in long-term community engagement and supported by diaspora actors.

Conclusion

The earthquake response in Syria demonstrated that resilience is not only a product of institutional capacities and traditional response networks, but also a product of the collective memory of communities, trust, adaptability, and civic creativity. The civic ecosystem that emerged in the earthquake response in Syria was informal, decentralised, and underappreciated in traditional aid models. This system’s flexibility and complementary nature allowed it to operate quickly and effectively. In an era marked by increasing compound crises and limited statehood resulting from wars, economic crises, climate change, and pandemics, recognising, supporting, and learning from civic ecosystems is an urgent need.

About the author:

Dr Munzer Alkhalil is a research fellow at the LSE IDEAS Conflict and Civicness Research Group, a NextGen Humanitarian Scholar at CHH-Lancet Commission, a senior research fellow at David Nott Foundation, and the chair of Syria Public Health Network. His research focuses on health governance, legitimacy, localisation and decolonisation of humanitarian aid, and aid effectiveness in areas of limited statehood. Alkhalil is a medical doctor by background and an orthopedist by training.

References:

[1] M. Alkhalil, A. Ekzayez, D. Rayes, and A. Abbara, “Inequitable access to aid after the devastating earthquake in Syria,” Lancet Glob Health, vol. 11, no. 5, 2023, doi: 10.1016/S2214-109X(23)00132-8.

[2] REUTERS, “Earthquake death toll in Turkey rises above 45,000 – AFAD | Reuters,” REUTERS. Accessed: Nov. 29, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/earthquake-death-toll-turkey-rises-above-45000-afad-2023-03-01/

[3] ACU, “Syria Earthquake Situation Update – ACU,” ACU. Accessed: Nov. 29, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://acu-sy.org/periodic_imu_reports/syria-earthquake-situation-update/

[4] I. Rangelov and M. Theros, “Civic ecosystems and social innovation: From collaboration to complementarity,” Glob Policy, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 797–804, Nov. 2023, doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.13248.

[5] A. Ekzayez, M. Alkhalil, P. Patel, and G. Bowsher, Pandemic governance and community mobilization in conflict: a case study of Idlib, Syria. 2023. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-443-18701-8.00006-0.

[6] Z. Alzoubi, M. Alkhalil, K. Meagher, A. Ekzayez, P. Patel, and M. Aledou, “Health Response(S) Scheme(S) to Natural Disasters in Conflict Zones- a Case Study of the Urgent Health Response to the Earthquake in Northwest Syria,” 2023. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4563110.

[7] R. Salahi, “Syrians respond to COVID-19 with renewed volunteer and community efforts,” Middle East Institute. Accessed: Mar. 24, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.mei.edu/publications/syrians-respond-covid-19-renewed-volunteer-and-community-efforts

[8] M. Alkhalil, R. Turkmani, M. Gharibah, P. Patel, and Z. Mehchy, “Capturing sources of health system legitimacy in fragmented conflict zones under different governance models: a case study of northwest Syria,” Globalization and Health 2024 20:1, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 1–22, Oct. 2024, doi: 10.1186/S12992-024-01074-4.

[9] Z. Alzoubi, M. Alkhalil, K. Meagher, A. Ekzayez, P. Patel, and M. Aledou, 2023, Op. cit.

[10] M. Alkhalil, A. Ekzayez, D. Rayes, and A. Abbara, 2023, Op. cit.

[11] Médecins Sans Frontières, “MSF’s response to earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria,” MSF. Accessed: Mar. 24, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://msfsouthasia.org/msfs-response-to-earthquakes-in-turkiye-and-syria/

[12] Z. Alzoubi, M. Alkhalil, K. Meagher, A. Ekzayez, P. Patel, and M. Aledou, 2023, Op. cit.

[13] M. Alkhalil, R. Turkmani, M. Gharibah, P. Patel, and Z. Mehchy, 2024, Op. cit.