Explaining External Actors’ Absence in al-Assad’s Ouster: Opportunities and...

On 8 December 2024, the Syrian regime led by Bashar al-Assad was toppled by Syrian rebel groups after over 13 years of brutal conflict. For a conflict that has been characterised by internationalisation and external interference, the fact that this occurred without external interventions on behalf of either side was unexpected, yet likely a key condition for such an outcome. That is not to say that Türkiye, the rebels’ key supporter, was not involved. Indeed, Ankara supported the operation that has now placed it as the most influential external actor in Syria. Rather, except for the minimal retaliatory support provided by Russia and Iran for the Assad regime as the rebels took Aleppo in the first days of December, external actors were absent from the battleground on the sides of both the regime and the rebels. Those external states that had, and continue to have, a military presence in Syria, namely Türkiye, Russia, Iran, the US, and Israel, were absent from the military operation that resulted in al-Assad’s ouster. Similarly absent was the political and diplomatic involvement of key intergovernmental organisations, such as the United Nations and Arab League.

The emerging situation in the wake of al-Assad’s ouster has created challenges and opportunities for the international community’s future engagement in Syria, largely pertaining to: dissuading sectarianism and sectarianisation; promoting Syria’s economic recovery and stability; and dealing with the issue of detained foreign fighters.

Explaining the Absence of these Actors during al-Assad’s Ouster

What explains the absence or inactivity of these actors during the 12-day rebel operation that ousted Bashar al-Assad’s regime can be distilled to: the diminished strategic bandwidth of al-Assad’s external partners, Iran and Russia, due to their recent losses and embroilment in other conflicts, and the complicated public image of the main rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with whom external actors that supported the rebels were loath to affiliate. HTS had been designated a terrorist or proscribed entity by numerous organisations and states, such as the UN, US, and even Türkiye, complicating partnerships for the rebels’ main backers.

Israel’s Conflicts and the Russia-Ukraine War

Even prior to the outbreak of Israeli attacks on Gaza, Yemen, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria in the aftermath of the Hamas attacks on Israelis on 7 October 2023, Israel had been targeting Iranian and Hezbollah installations in Syria. Specifically, in 2018, Israel had upped the ante against Iranian positions in Syria, having claimed that it had targeted all known Iranian military targets in response to alleged Iranian attacks on the Golan Heights. While attempts at deconfliction were made with Russia and the US both pledging to push Iranian forces back from the Syrian border with Israel, Tel Aviv continued to target Iranian military posts in Syria. Israeli attacks on Iran and Hezbollah, both directly and within the Syrian arena, intensified after the commencement of Israel’s war on Gaza and with Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition to assassinations carried out in Iran and Lebanon of senior figures within the so-called “axis of resistance”, namely Hassan Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah, and Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of Hamas’ political bureau, Israeli strikes also targeted such figures in Syria. Most notable were: Israel’s attack on Iran’s diplomatic mission in April 2024, in which seven members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force were assassinated, including the two generals who headed Iran’s missions in Syria and Lebanon; the pager attack on Hezbollah members in Syria and Lebanon; and Israel’s attacks on Palmyra in November 2023 and Damascus and Homs in February 2024, which targeted Hezbollah and Iranian militias and killed numerous civilians. Not only did these attacks weaken Iran’s position within Syria, but they also weakened the Syrian regime, which has relied heavily on its external backers to recapture and retain control over territory.

As the rebels began to capture urban centres, such as Aleppo and Homs, Iranian troops withdrew rapidly from 7 December, while giving rhetorical support to the Assad regime during talks with the other guarantors of the Astana peace process, Russia and Türkiye. This is a key indication of Iran’s lacking willingness and capacity to invest in the Assad regime as it had done for the last thirteen-and-a-half years. The military and financial investments made in the Assad regime and Iran’s decision to discontinue its military support for al-Assad demonstrates the extent of Tehran’s weakened capacity to engage in Syria as it had. Since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, Israel invaded the demilitarised zone between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Syria, and has likely conducted over 500 hundred airstrikes allegedly to remove Syria’s strategic military capabilities, as Tel Aviv continued its offensive in Gaza and agreed to a ceasefire with Lebanon. However, this has also led to speculation about whether Tel Aviv seeks to maximise territorial gains in Syria while Syrian military capacities are weakened.

At the same time, Russia was facing new challenges in its conflict with Ukraine. On 19 November 2024, Ukrainian forces launched their first strikes on Russian territory using long-range ATACMS missiles supplied by the US, which hit military bases in Bryansk. Only a day later, Kyiv used UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles for the first time targeting military housing for Russian and North Korean soldiers in Kursk. Such missiles had only previously been used by Ukraine on occupied Ukrainian territory and sparked a Russian retaliation in the form of an amended nuclear doctrine, which now permits the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, rather than purely existential, attacks. This also incentivised Moscow to use a nuclear warhead-ready Oreshnik missile for the first time, which destroyed a rehabilitation centre for the disabled in Dnipro. The intensity of tensions was evinced by the Russian-Belarussian agreement that allowed both states to use “all available forces and means”, including nuclear weapons, to secure their territorial integrity and independence, often synonymous with power. Furthermore, the deployment of North Korean troops to the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield suggests Russia’s lacking strategic capacity and appetite to utilise Russian troops in combat, due to the innumerable personnel losses in its war on Ukraine.

Hence, while Russia conducted airstrikes against rebels in the first days of the operation that took Syria, it swiftly withdrew vessels and equipment from Tartous naval base and Hmeimim airbase and ceased its military support for Bashar al-Assad, instead facilitating his escape to Moscow. Nonetheless, Moscow has been keen to maintain its control over its military bases in Syria, and has opened channels of communication with HTS. However, given Russia’s brutal crackdown on not only HTS but also other rebel groups and, particularly, Syrian citizens, it is unlikely that Russia will be rewarded in this way. Moscow would likely need to offer a valuable service for the new Syrian leadership to entertain a partnership.

HTS: An Unattractive Partner

While HTS’s fighting prowess has earned it accolades amongst other rebel groups and was instrumental to Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, it remains a designated terrorist organisation by many states, including the key backers of rebel forces Türkiye and the US, as well as the UN. It’s predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra were an offshoot of al-Qa’eda. Despite having cut ties with the organisation and having attempted an ideological and public relations makeover, HTS has always remained a jihadi organisation intent on establishing an Islamic state. Hence, it has received little support, especially militarily, from external states. And, despite the advantage Türkiye has gained due to HTS’s victory, they have always maintained a fraught relationship. Ankara had been bound by agreements under the de-escalation mechanism of the Russian-led Astana peace process to remove HTS from its areas of influence. However, HTS did not withdraw or disband, and never took orders from Türkiye; HTS never fully committed or adhered to Turkish demands for their withdrawal from Idlib. Even less likely to have emerged as a backer of the HTS-led offensive was the US, which has maintained a wait-and-see approach to the rebel operation that led to al-Assad’s ouster and its aftermath. This approach is likely to continue not least due to the reinstatement of Donald Trump as president. Trump already underscored the US’s reluctance to intervene or interfere in Syria’s transition.

Challenges and Opportunities

As such, Bashar al-Assad’s ouster is indeed the end of an era, but it is also the very beginning of a new chapter in Syria’s struggle to establish a system of governance that is equitable, durable, and can meet the needs and aspirations of Syrians. For the international community, this new chapter, which has reconfigured the mosaic of actors involved in Syria, creates challenges and offers opportunities.

While HTS was able to govern and provide some basic provisions for populations under the control of its Salvation Government in Idlib, it ruled with a degree of authoritarianism and lacking mandate enough to spark protests not long before they led the offensive that took Syria. HTS has a track record of eliminating or co-opting rivals and opponents. And in the wake of al-Assad’s ouster, potentially-rivalrous rebel groups have negotiated their role in the new system and have declared support for the emerging government. Furthermore, HTS, as well as other rebel groups, have stated their intention to establish an Islamic state, albeit with tolerance for other sects. However, the HTS-led government has the task of galvanising a complex and diverse tapestry of ethnic and social groups with a variety of interests in the wake of protracted sectarianised conflict. Although, its current plan for national dialogue on the basis of sectarian representation is sparking fears that sectarian divisions will be further consolidated, rather than eradicated, by the new government. It also remains to be seen if the current government will adhere to its commitment to stay in power only until March 2025. As such, it is key that policy makers support Syrian civil society organisations that have a civic rather than sectarian foundation to prosper in the Syrian political context.

Furthermore, the new leadership has inherited a dire economic situation in Syria, and while the likes of Türkiye and Qatar are likely to provide some funding in the short term, Syria requires sustained and well managed economic recovery and funding to secure the provision of material and social goods for Syrians’ welfare and prosperity, key conditions to secure public support. While the recent announcement by Washington to lift some economic restrictions on transactions with the Syrian government is an initial first step to facilitating Syria’s economic recovery, more needs to be done to support investment into small and medium sized businesses in the country. These are the lifelines that ordinary Syrians rely on, and diversification of the economy is key to political empowerment, as it secures against the establishment of neopatrimonial linkages that can lead to the monopolisation of the political economy, as occurred under the Assads’ dictatorships.

Additionally, as the structure of governance in Syria changes, there remains the key issue of detention centres, which contain thousands of foreign fighters and their families, most of which came to Syria to fight for ISIS. Disputes have emerged even between allies in Europe and the US over how to deal with these foreign fighters. While the former, in some instances, refuse repatriation, the latter keenly encourages it. Syria needs support in managing these populations. With public goods and services already scarce, the burden of providing for those in detention centres may lead to their release, further radicalisation, and worsening humanitarian conditions.

Finally, it is important that, much like for Syrian representation during its transition, states that have stakes in the political outcome in Syria are not excluded from dialogue about Syria’s transition. That is not to say that external actors should have the ability to intervene in Syria. Rather, multilateral fora where the Syria file is discussed should include all key external actors interested in Syria’s political transition so as not to risk any actor becoming a spoiler of national reconciliation and dialogue.


About the author

Kasia Houghton is a Research Fellow with the Global Transitions project at PeaceRep. Her research focuses on conflict interventions, especially in the Syrian civil war.

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