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Afghanistan

Key findings from PeaceRep research in Afghanistan (2021 – 2026)

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PeaceRep’s Afghanistan work was led by Conciliation Resources and LSE Conflict and Civicness Research Group (CCRG) in collaboration with the Afghanistan Research Network (ARN).

PeaceRep’s research on Afghanistan has explored how dialogue and international policymaking can contribute strategically to stability and promoting plural and peaceful political transition in Afghanistan in the short- and long-term. Central to this approach was bringing together diverse Afghan perspectives and actors engaged on Afghanistan to develop a shared understanding of the challenges and opportunities ahead.

PeaceRep’s research has spanned two practice-oriented projects on Afghanistan:

  • Peace matrix: design and support of the next Afghan peace process. Conciliation Resources worked with international and Afghan researchers to generate insights relevant to the design and the support of the next phase of an Afghan peace process: investigating the dynamics of the ongoing conflict; documenting new Afghan thinking on strategies for advancing sustainable peace; and mapping political actors and constituencies capable of contributing to a post-Taliban inclusive peace settlement.
  • Afghanistan Research Network. The LSE CCRG, in collaboration with the Civic Engagement Project (CEP) established the Afghanistan Research Network (ARN) with a group of more than 20 Afghan experts and activists from a diverse range of backgrounds across seven countries. The ARN’s goal was to support, preserve and amplify Afghan expertise and knowledge, and to provide analysis that can inform creative actions in the short-term while helping shape future prospects for a more stable and pluralistic Afghanistan in the long-term. A series of reflections from Afghan experts provided recommendations on how to approach key challenges in the current context in Afghanistan, including in relation to its domestic and international politics, how to support Afghan researchers at risk, and various other topics such as climate change, dialogue, human rights, the economy, gender, the information environment, mental health, mining, and security. The full series of reflections can be accessed here: Afghanistan Research Network.

Browse key findings in the tabs below.

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Afghanistan Since 2021

Afghanistan needs a peace process. Re-escalation of armed conflict is widely opposed or feared by Afghans. However, many express multiple grievances against the Taliban. Taliban alienation of the population risks triggering violent mobilisation. Aggrieved Afghans complain at the treatment of women, the Taliban monopoly of state employment, the suppression of opportunities for youth, onerous taxation, the mishandling of the economy, arbitrary rule, sexual violence, ethnic prejudice, and the concentration of power in an unaccountable Amir (Saleem and Semple 2024).

The need for a peace process becomes apparent considering the key political developments after the Taliban takeover in 2021 that our research has examined. In sum, the Islamic Emirate has become the predominant source and manifestation of violence in Afghanistan:

  1. The Taliban govern with all the hallmarks of authoritarianism. Their strategic vision is to consolidate their Islamic Emirate for permanent rule of Afghanistan, staffed exclusively by Taliban, and imposing the doctrines of the Hanafi sect as the sole source of Islam and discriminating against all other Muslim sects. Tribal and ethnic discrimination are rife. But the extreme concentration of power in the hands of the Amir means that no ethnic group is fully included in the system. Calls for a broad-based government are rejected (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  2. Taliban supporters have been accommodated and Republic-era civil servants displaced within national and sub-national administrative structures through manipulation of the tashkeel (staffing plan). In civil service recruitment, those with Taliban links and religious education are favoured over candidates with a modern education (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  3. Education policy has been used to exclude women and transform society, including increased recruitment of students to madrassahs, appointing Taliban to headmaster positions, censoring modern subjects, propagating Taliban ideology and preparing a new generation of militant extremists (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  4. Motasibeen (enforcers) in the Ministry for Propagation of Virtue and Suppression of Vice impose the moral code, including restrictions on women’s dress and mobility and men’s beards, hairstyles and dress (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  5. Under the pretext of counter-terrorism Taliban routinely detain, torture and summarily execute critics and Afghans from areas with a history of resistance (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  6. Taliban have increased existing taxes, imposed new taxes and often claimed ‘back taxes’ from the Republican era. State expenditure is opaque, with reports of both petty and large-scale corruption. They have shifted resources from public service provision to maintenance of the Taliban’ own ranks. Mining contracts have been awarded to Taliban and other contractors have been forced to partner with Taliban (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  7. Claims by the Islamic Emirate to be honouring commitments to quell foreign militant groups are contradicted by reports that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan are operating from bases in Afghanistan, and Afghan Taliban have been involved in operations in Pakistan. This policy of harbouring militants threatens Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbours (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  8. The Islamic Emirate has seemed to pivot away from pursuing broader international recognition and double down on defiance of international norms. But countries in the region have been increasingly open to pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, notably an exchange of ambassadors with China (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  9. Deepening internal contradictions within the Taliban’s system, mounting popular grievances, and the break-down in the Taliban’s relations with Pakistan have led many Afghans to conclude that the Islamic Emirate may not survive long (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  10. Outreach by parts of the Taliban movement to the opposition has signalled that they sense the need for change. However, the Taliban leadership remains adamantly opposed to any meaningful or transformational political process (Semple 2023).

All efforts to persuade the Taliban leadership to moderate its stance have failed. PeaceRep research suggests the Taliban leadership will continue to reject meaningful intra-Afghan political dialogue or any compromise on women’s rights (Semple 2024).

A ‘matrix’ approach to peace offers a viable alternative to a conventional peace process. A conventional process that tries to negotiate a political settlement between Taliban and non-Taliban Afghans is impracticable, either to overcome Taliban intransigence, or to tackle the complexity of current challenges (Saleem and Semple 2024).

A peace matrix allows different Afghan individuals and groups to lead a range of different peace actions in order to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peace matrix actions can progress at different speeds without the need for a structured process of formal peace talks. Progress towards peace ultimately involves transformation of the Taliban regime into a pluralist political system in which all Afghans see themselves represented (Saleem and Semple 2024).

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Peace Matrix Approach

Peace matrix approach in practice. PeaceRep research identified actions that can be pursued by Afghans to enable and effect progress towards sustainable peace (Saleem and Semple 2024):

Dialogue and mediation

  1. Intra-Afghan mediation – Afghan democratic groups and forces are fragmented. There are Afghans with relevant experience of peacemaking who can usefully mediate between different elements of the opposition to the Taliban. This underlying peacemaking resource can be supported and engaged, to help build a more consolidated democratic coalition (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  2. National dialogue could usefully help to address the current representative deficit among Afghans. Prevailing authoritarianism means a national dialogue would have to be convened outside Afghanistan. Initial steps of a national dialogue process could include using communications technology and ‘digital dialogue’ as a way to engage people from all provinces of Afghanistan and the diversity of Afghan society (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  3. Communication with amenable parts of the Taliban leadership should be kept open, in order to facilitate short-term prospects of limited cooperation, identify potential areas of future agreement, and signal that reconciliation with the Taliban will be possible alongside regime transformation (Saleem and Semple 2024).

Mobilisation

  1. Afghan national democratic struggle –Afghan opposition political groups have been reticent in developing a programme of action to achieve their objectives. Progress towards peaceful democratic pluralism is more likely to emerge through struggle against, rather than negotiations with the Taliban leadership. Restoring a sense of Afghan agency and the belief that Afghans, rather than remote external powers, can shape their future, is key. Furthermore, there are many experiences among Afghans of civic actions and non-violent protest, which teach that struggle against the Islamic Emirate does not exclusively manifest as armed resistance (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  2. Mobilising Afghans living under authoritarianism – mass mobilisation may be the fastest pathway to exerting leverage over the Islamic Emirate, raising the possibility that the Taliban cannot indefinitely rule by force and boosting the legitimacy of the national democratic coalition. There are examples of effective mobilisation to draw on from previous phases of Afghan resistance to authoritarian regimes (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  3. Culture of peace – Afghan Islamic scholars can espouse teaching on moderation, the Islamic case for democratic pluralism, and critiquing the Islamic Emirate’s departure from the reasonable Muslim consensus (Saleem and Semple 2024).

Alternative political system

  1. Widespread support exists for a new political system among non-Taliban Afghans, according to PeaceRep and Conciliation Resources research. Researchers have contributed to ‘guiding principles’ for democracy and peace through discussions among different Afghan constituencies. A consensus has been taking shape among divergent groups on the parameter for a reinvigorated democratic pluralism as a credible alternative to the Islamic Emirate (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  2. Credible transitional leadership is important to present a vision for an alternative political system and eventually head up transition to democratic pluralism. It could comprise competent, principled and representative Afghans, who would renounce claims to post-transition public office in order to avoid risks of the political process returning corrupt people to power (Saleem and Semple 2024). PeaceRep research has examined corruption in Afghanistan in its banking (Theros 2024) and humanitarian aid sectors (Jackson and Majid 2024), in particular.
  3. Incubating the future political system – Afghans need to prepare an inclusive, accountable and effective post-Emirate government and political system, including designing institutions, norms and codes which enshrine democratic pluralism, and building agreement on them (Saleem and Semple 2024).

International partnership

  1. International partners can incentivise and facilitate Afghans to work for peace and democratic pluralism and avoid rewarding the Taliban for obstructing this (Semple and Saleem 2026).
  2. Progress towards a pluralistic alternative would be greatly accelerated if international partners could enable Afghanistan’s democratic opposition to access a safe place to convene and organise (Saleem and Semple 2024).
  3. The UN sanctions regime is imperfect. But it can potentially offer important leverage to encourage the Taliban to cooperate with peace efforts and could be more actively used to signal that relations have not been and will not be normalised until the Taliban pivot to cooperating with an inclusive political transition (Saleem and Semple 2024).
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Afghanistan Research Network

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References

PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2027. The findings presented here represent our main contributions to the field, but are not necessarily exhaustive of all PeaceRep work on each thematic and geographic area. Read the individual works linked here for more detailed analysis. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database.

Citation

Ramsbotham, A. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Afghanistan. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Researchers involved

Alexander Ramsbotham, Atta Ur Rahman Saleem, Michael Semple, Marika Theros, Sahar Halaimzai, Nisar Majid, Ashley Jackson, Afghanistan Research Network

References

Jackson, A. and Majid, N. (2024). Time for Change: The Normalization of Corruption and Diversion in the Humanitarian Sector (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh

Saleem, M. A. & Semple, M. (2024). Peace Matrix for Afghanistan: Strengthening Afghans’ pursuit of democracy, freedom and economic recovery (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Saleem, M. A & Semple, M. (2026). Revised Role for the UN in Afghanistan: Pragmatic Presence Today; Preparing for Opportunities Tomorrow (PeaceRep blog). 23 Jan 2026.

Semple, M. (2023). Talking with the Taliban can wait (PeaceRep blog). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Programme, University of Edinburgh. 8 June 2023

Semple, M. (2024). How Do You Structure a Peace Process Under Conditions of Authoritarianism? Reflections on Afghanistan (PeaceRep blog). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Programme, University of Edinburgh. 16 Feb 2024

Semple, M. & Saleem, M. A (2026). Revised Role for the UN in Afghanistan: Pragmatic Presence Today; Preparing for Opportunities Tomorrow (PeaceRep Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh

Theros, M. (2024). Natural bedfellows: corruption, criminality and the failure of international reconstruction. A case study of the Kabul Bank. Conflict, Security & Development, 1–27

The Afghanistan Research Network series can be accessed here: https://peacerep.org/2023/05/29/afghanistan-research-network/