This blog by Professor Michael Semple and Atta Ur Rahman Saleem summarises analysis from a forthcoming policy brief, and draws on research and findings from a significant report on the status of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate (forthcoming).
They argue that the Taliban’s uncompromising ideological project leaves little room for political progress in Afghanistan, but makes it essential to renew and refocus the UN’s political mission on realistic, “lean years” objectives while preparing for future opportunities.
Revised Role for the UN in Afghanistan: Pragmatic Presence Today; Preparing for...
The Taliban leadership is uncompromisingly pursuing its own ideological project in Afghanistan, irrespective of the wishes of its people. This leaves little immediate prospect of progress towards either an internal Afghan political settlement or the normalisation of Afghanistan’s international relations. Nevertheless, as its mandate draws to a close in March 2026, it is essential to recommit to the United Nations political mission in Afghanistan – but with a revised role.
The extremist nature of the Taliban’s ideological project suggests that, sooner or later, Afghanistan may again disturb regional peace and stability. The Taliban’s adventurism both makes it important to maintain a UN presence, but also constrains what it can realistically do. The renewal of UNAMA’s mandate is an opportunity to reposition the mission’s stance to pursue attainable and constructive objectives, and at the same time ensure it is ready to help Afghans attain a just and sustainable peace when new opportunities arise.
The Taliban’s Extremist Ideological Project – Four Key Pillars
The ideological project of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate rests on four key pillars: 1) vigorous assertion of Islamic legitimacy; 2) an autocratic approach to power; 3) a cultural revolution; and 4) glorification of armed jihad.
Pillar 1) Asserting Islamic legitimacy – The Taliban Amir claims divine inspiration – the laws he signs off on are ‘God’s laws’. The Taliban assert that any rebellion against their Islamic Emirate is tantamount to enmity with God and must be subdued ruthlessly, justifying the deployment of repressive apparatus to secure the regime.
Pillar 2) Autocratic power – Amir Haibatollah has unchallengeable supreme authority to issue decrees and orders, directly control state appointments and resources, and is the sole arbiter of policy, with a small circle of conservative Sunni clerics. Leadership figures may seem critical of the hardline policies, but they all know that the Amir controls appointments and can sideline them at the stroke of a pen.
Pillar 3) Cultural revolution – The Taliban are remaking state and society in line with the Amir’s vision of Islamic rectitude – purging Afghanistan of western cultural pollution from the era of ‘corrupt’ democracy; removing women from the public sphere and education, enforced by the amr bil maroof (morality police); and rewriting school and university curricula to inculcate Taliban values and ready Afghans to defend the Islamic system against a hostile world.
Pillar 4) Glorifying armed jihad – The Taliban try to position themselves as heirs to Islam’s glorious history of armed jihad – trying to (not wholly successfully) establish security forces of ideologically reliable fighters through multiple rounds of purges – urging veterans of the insurgency and madrassah students to prepare to sacrifice themselves in the next round of jihad; memorialising suicide bombers; and semi-covertly supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency in Pakistan.
Taliban materialism and discrimination –The Taliban’s ideological project does not fully account for all of its actions in power. Elements of the Taliban regime are focused on enriching themselves through all means available; corruption is as endemic as it was during the Republic. The regime is dominated by ethnic Pashtuns whose tribal networks have benefited from economic opportunities, such as being awarded mining licences.
Revised Role for the UN – Surviving the ‘Lean Years’
Challenges with the UN’s comprehensive ‘mosaic’ approach
The UN has pursued a ‘comprehensive approach,’ aimed at fully reintegrating Afghanistan into the international community, with ‘full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of Afghan women in the process throughout’. But the UN mission quickly came up against a Taliban regime wholly opposed to any political process that questioned the status quo.
In 2025, the UN mission reframed its strategy as pursuing ‘mosaic issues’ – referring to a flexible and gradual transitional process, where external countries or institutions can pick and choose to engage on specific issues – from political dialogue, to human rights, regional cooperation and economic engagement – without committing to formal recognition of the Taliban. But in response, the Taliban doubled down on its position – for example, they blocked UN field missions trying to respond to the August 2025 Kunar earthquake if they included Afghan women.
Pragmatic presence today – five core missions for a revised UN presence
The Koran and the Old Testament both describe how Prophet Joseph counselled belt-tightening so that people would survive during seven ‘lean years’ and later thrive when a rejuvenated River Nile brought back abundance.
The UN cannot achieve a comprehensive transformation of Afghanistan. But the Islamic Emirate is not fully consolidated, and the current power structure is likely not permanent – even if how change may come about is not yet clear. The UN political mission in March 2026 can switch to ‘lean years-mode’: dropping over-ambitious objectives, trimming down to core functions, and building preparedness to grasp opportunities when they arise. Five core mission functions are relevant and practicable:
Mission 1) Political reporting – Quarterly reports delivered in the name of the UN Secretary-General have been essential – helping the key international and regional actors to establish an agreed set of facts on Afghanistan. The UN’s team on the ground is able to access extensive Afghan networks and conduct reality checks on issues such as the Talibanisation of the civil service, public finance, economic policy, migration, security, counterterrorism, narcotics and promotion of extremism.
Mission 2) Human rights reporting – The UN is well placed to generate the most authoritative assessments of the real-world consequences of the Taliban’s multiple restrictions imposed on women and the Emirate’s curtailment of civic and political rights.
Mission 3) Working-level engagement with Islamic Emirate officials – The UN can sustain and even expand working-level engagement on a range of governance issues, unconnected to system overhaul or regime recognition. The UN is a key interlocutor with Taliban officials on the reception and protection of returnees and checking the irregular movement of Afghan migrants abroad. Current experiences of UN-convened working groups on counternarcotics and private sector development suggest that productive relations are possible.
Mission 4) Monitoring international aid – No one should expect UNAMA to exert leverage or implement aid conditionally. However, it can be tasked with monitoring and analysis of international aid flows and their impact on the economy and society.
For the first two years of Taliban rule, international aid continued at levels higher than the Taliban’s domestic revenue. Only in 2024 did aid drop below the level of the Taliban budget. World Bank projections for 2025 and 2026 have aid continuing at around 12% of Afghan GDP – more than two thirds of what the Taliban raise themselves. Arguably, donor resources have helped protect Afghanistan from the kind of severe economic pressure which triggered unrest in Iran. As long as aid continues at scale, UN monitoring and reporting should be a part of its stewardship.
Mission 5) Convening future-oriented political dialogue – Any ideas for a UN role in promoting inclusiveness must take account of the Taliban’s current ‘radical intransigence’. Nevertheless, the UN can still usefully convene future-oriented Afghan political dialogue, building on the efforts of former UN Special Coordinator Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioghlu. Convening Afghan groups who show some agency and find creative ways of mobilising inside the country is key. But the Taliban’s authoritarianism means that much meaningful dialogue will have to take place outside the country.
Preparing for opportunities tomorrow – anticipating openings
It is not yet time to close the book on Afghanistan. The international community can find a shared interest in renewing the mandate for a political mission in Afghanistan, appropriately reformatted for the current realities of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. The changes pushed by the Taliban Amir through his ideological project are too far-reaching for their consequences to remain confined to Afghanistan. A ‘lean years’ mission should help the UN anticipate those consequences and maintain the organisation’s competence to lead an international response to future eventualities.