Third parties as peace actors
Key findings from PeaceRep research into third parties as peace actors (2021 – 2026)
PeaceRep’s research on third parties as peace actors was led by the University of St Andrews and the University of Edinburgh.
Overview
Third parties have always played a crucial role in mediating violent conflicts—providing good offices, hosting negotiations, and serving as security guarantors for agreed outcomes. They often also support conflict parties in transitioning out of conflict, by providing aid, technical assistance, and security arrangements.
In the PA-X Peace Agreements Database (Bell and Badanjak 2019), two-thirds of peace agreements include a signatory that is not one of the main conflict parties, and half feature an international third-party signatory. These third parties range from states and international or regional organisations to domestic non-governmental organisations, religious groups, trade unions, and political parties (Badanjak 2023). While locally led peacemaking initiatives remain central to contemporary conflict management and resolution, the nature of international third-party involvement is evolving in response to increasing global fragmentation. In particular, our empirical research and the PA-X Peace Agreement Database and the Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND) have shown:
- a diversification of third parties and approaches
- an increasing regionalisation of peacemaking
- a decline of liberal actors and the rise of strategic approaches to conflict management
- a reconfiguration that has also transformed traditional peacemaking alliances and cooperation patterns
New but not-so-new actors
As a result of global fragmentation, we are observing two trends when it comes to international actors: (1) an increasing importance of regional actors in peace initiatives, and (2) diversification of global peacemakers beyond the liberal powers (Peter 2026 forthcoming). There is now a multiplicity of actors in any peacemaking field.
Regional powers have always been important actors in maintaining peace, with regional international organisations seen as playing a complementary role to global international organisations (Coe and Nash 2023; Magara 2025). But the prominence of regional states as conflict managers, in particular, has risen over the last decade or two. They are crucial in brokering interim arrangements and ceasefires during conflicts and are now often seen as more ‘honest brokers’ than global powers and international organisations. States such as Turkey (Sofos 2023), Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates (Freer 2022) are particularly active in their broader neighbourhoods (Peter et al 2026). The role of Turkey in facilitating the 2022 grain deal in the Russo-Ukraine war (Wittke 2023) or Qatar and Egypt in brokering short ceasefires and hostage exchanges in the Israel-Gaza conflict since 2023 (Peter et al 2025) serve as good examples.
Involvement of neighbours is also a prominent feature of peacemaking today. Sudan has acted as an important mediator in South Sudan, with South Sudan similarly helping mediate conflicts in Sudan (Pospisil 2023; Peter and Houghton 2023). Both Kenya and South Sudan pursue executive-driven mediation in their region, albeit often with different strategies and tactics (Magara and Pospisil 2024). Our mapping of mediators in the Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND) found that in every conflict across the Middle East and North Africa, neighbouring states ranked among the top mediators (Peter et al 2025). In 2024, Egypt was key to brokering agreements in conflicts involving all three of its neighbours: Libya, Sudan, and Israel-Gaza (Peter 2025). While regional involvement is nothing new, it is becoming more pronounced, displacing global initiatives.
Besides the rising role of regional actors, there is a diversification of global peace actors – that is, major powers with global conflict management ambitions and roles, once reserved mostly for Western states. Over the last decade, Russia, for example, has brokered agreements and increased its role in places like Syria, Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic, moving beyond its more traditional involvement in the Eastern Europe (Badanjak and Peter 2024). China’s peace diplomacy has grown more assertive, extending beyond its neighbourhood and support for multilateral efforts. It is now highly active unilaterally in regions of strategic Western interest, from Europe to the Middle East and Africa (Alden, Zolkina and Fiala 2025; Mariani 2024; McGrath 2025).
Today, one cannot presume that international organisations – global and regional – or Western states will become the primary mediators, guarantors of peace processes or funders of reconstruction efforts. Third parties vying to position themselves geopolitically as peace actors are much more diverse in contemporary conflicts – “no state can expect to create the ‘spheres’ of the type historically associated with a select few ‘great powers’” (Cooper 2024).
New approaches
Alongside the growing number of mediating actors, we are witnessing a diversification of peacemaking approaches. The previously fragile consensus around the primacy of international norms in guiding peace efforts has now fractured. The geopolitical context has shifted—from one in which a United Nations (UN)-led, norms-based global order supported peace and transition processes, to one where peace interventions themselves have become arenas of normative contestation (forthcoming).
One key factor driving the diversification of peacemaking approaches is the growing diversity of actors involved. New entrants often introduce distinct ideas and modalities, prompting increased attention to the roles of ‘non-Western’ and ‘illiberal’ states in peace and conflict processes (Adhikari 2023; 2025; Peter and Rice 2021; Peter and Houghton 2025). The ways in which these actors engage with conflict-affected states and societies were explored in the PeaceRep Global Transitions series. China has attracted particular interest—not only due to its global influence, but also because of the distinctiveness and potential impact of its developmental peace model. While there is broad consensus that no singular, coherent alternative to liberal peacebuilding exists, research has identified several areas of divergence:
- a strong emphasis on non-intervention;
- a departure from norms of accountability and participatory governance;
- and a prioritisation of economic development over democratic reform (Peter and Rice 2021).
Highlighting distinctions between different peacemaking models serves as a useful analytical tool, but the reality of conflict management practice is far more complex. Rather than two coherent paradigms in direct competition, we observe a fragmented landscape marked by diverse and often overlapping approaches (Peter forthcoming). Even among so-called illiberal or authoritarian actors, there is significant variation. For instance, although China and Russia are frequently grouped together, their methods of engagement differ markedly: Russia asserts its role in mediation and peace processes through security assistance, whereas China leverages its economic influence. Similarly, Qatar, as a small state, operates differently from its more regionally dominant neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Freer 2022), relying on different tools.
Moreover, state approaches are not static—they vary across time and geography. China, which typically advocates for impartiality and non-interference in domestic affairs in distant conflicts, has shown flexibility by engaging with sub-state actors and influencing domestic political dynamics in places like Myanmar and Nepal. Turkey also adapts its strategies depending on regional contexts (Sofos 2022).
The distinction between Western and non-Western states in peacemaking is also often overstated. While emerging powers may introduce new ideas and modalities, peacemaking and peacebuilding remain fundamentally instruments of foreign policy—used by both Western and non-Western actors to advance strategic interests. Western powers, including the United States, have similarly employed transactional approaches, as seen in contexts ranging from the Western Balkans and the Middle East to Ukraine. These examples illustrate that liberal actors also pursue peace in ways that align with national interests.
Impact on peace practices
The decline of liberal actors and the rise of strategic approaches to conflict management have significantly reshaped the dynamics of international peace efforts, often privileging coercive methods over negotiated settlements. In many conflict contexts, we are witnessing the emergence of highly partial mediators – states that simultaneously provide military support to belligerents while engaging in peacemaking – resulting in ‘power peace’ (Beaujouan 2024). Russia’s recent involvement in Syria and Libya, Turkey’s operations in Syria, and the United States’ role in Israel-Gaza exemplify this strategic use of mediation and aid alongside military engagement, the so-called ‘peace-military-mercantile complex’ (Houghton forthcoming). This fusion of warmaking and peacemaking has altered the nature of peace agreements. These now tend to focus more on conflict management than resolution (Bell and Badanjak 2019; Badanjak et al 2025), and are increasingly informal or unwritten (Peter 2025).
This reconfiguration has also transformed traditional alliances and cooperation patterns. Rather than aligning with like-minded states and working through international organisations to pursue long-term goals, there is a growing trend toward ad hoc collaboration through minilateral arrangements — small, flexible groupings formed around shared short-term interests that often bypass formal institutions (Peter forthcoming). A comparison of peacemaking efforts in Sudan during the 2000s and the 2020s illustrates this shift:
- The earlier process, culminating in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, was led by the Troika (US, UK, Norway) in partnership with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and followed by UN-led missions in South Sudan and a hybrid United Nations-African Union operation in Darfur. This reflected a model of cooperation among like-minded states and international organisations.
- In contrast, contemporary peacemaking in Sudan involves the US working alongside Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as part of the Quad, amid competing regional and neighbour-led initiatives (Pospisil 2023; Peter et al 2025).
Sudan is emblematic of a broader trend in which third-party involvement increasingly results in the construction of parallel processes—running concurrently, in competition, and at times in complete isolation from one another (Peter and Rice 2022) – or alternatively as in the case of Myanmar, complete disaggregation of mediation and the turn towards localisation (Adhikari et al 2025). Interview-based research with senior mediators reinforces this picture, suggesting the field is now characterised by an overabundance of mediators and ad hoc, regionalised multimediation (Bell 2024). These efforts operate alongside a UN system that continues to seek relevance and attempts coordination within this increasingly complex and decentralised landscape.
References
PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2027. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database.
Researchers and contributors
Monalisa Adhikari, Chris Alden, Sanja Badanjak, Juline Beaujouan, Christine Bell, Brooke Coe, Luke Cooper, Elisa D’Amico, Lukas Fiala, Courtney Freer, Jennifer Hodge, Kasia Houghton, Ibrahim Magara, Bernardo Mariani, Jessica F. McGrath, Kathryn Nash, Mateja Peter, Hayley Rice, Jan Pospisil, Zabra Siwa, Spyros Sofos, Cindy Wittke
Citation
Peter, M. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Third Parties as Peace Actors. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
References
Adhikari, M. (2023). Non-Western engagement in peace processes and the rise of ‘hedging’ by elites in conflict-affected states. Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Adhikari, M. (2025). Statebuilding beyond Western interventions: Rising powers, emerging modes of institution-building, and the implications for peace studies. Journal of Global Security Studies.
Adhikari, M., Hodge, J., Bell, C., & Siwa, Z. (2025). Disaggregated mediation: The localisation of peace processes amid global and domestic fragmentation. European Journal of International Relations. Advance online publication.
Alden, C., Zolkina, M., & Fiala, L. (2025). Understanding the ‘China factor’ in the Russia-Ukraine war. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6172
Badanjak, S., et al. (2025). Peace Agreements in 2024: Insights from the PA-X Database [PA-X Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh
Badanjak, S. (2023). Third parties in peace agreements: First look at new data and key trends. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5190
Badanjak, S., & Peter, M. (2023). Third parties to peace agreements. PeaceRep. https://www.peaceagreements.org/visualizations/third-party-scroll/
Beaujouan, J. (2024). Power peace: The resolution of the Syrian conflict in a post-liberal era of peacemaking. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 18(3), 1–20.
Bell, C. (2024) Multimediation’: adapting in response to fragmentation. In Whitfield, T. (ed.), Still time to talk: adaptation and innovation in peace mediation, Accord 30 (London: Conciliation Resources, 2024), 27-30.
Bell, C., & Badanjak, S. (2019). Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 56(3), 452–466. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318819123
Coe, B. & Nash, K. (2023). Regionalized Governance in the Global South (Elements in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009376587
Cooper, L. (2024). The war against Ukraine and the failure of “great power politics”. In Z. Cope (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Geopolitics (pp. 439–458). Springer Nature Switzerland.
Freer, C. (2022). Qatar and UAE in peacemaking and peacebuilding. PeaceRep Global Transitions Series, LSE Middle East Centre.
Houghton, K. (Forthcoming)
Magara, I. & Pospisil, J. (2024). Executive Decisions: Regional Conflict Mediation by Kenya and South Sudan (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh
Magara, I. (2025). Redefining Peace in a Shifting World: IGAD, South Sudan, and the New African Security Paradigm. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-96402-2
Mariani, B. (2024). China’s global security vision in a changing world. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5240
McGrath, J. F. (2025). Russian and Chinese influence in Africa: Power asymmetries and the threat to African Union agency in global governance. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6251
Peter, M. & Rice, H. (2022). Non-Western approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding: State-of-the-art and an agenda for research. (PeaceRep Report: Global Transitions Series). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh
Peter, M. (2025). Mediation in 2024: First insights from the MEND database. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Peter, M. (Forthcoming 2026). Alternative (non-Western) approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding. ENCYCLOPEDIA.
Peter, M. (Forthcoming)
Peter, M., & Houghton, K. A. (2025). The Dayton peace process: A keyhole into Russian and Chinese engagement with liberal peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping, 32(4), 865–891.
Peter, M., & Houghton, K. (2023). Congestion and diversification of third-party mediation in Sudan and South Sudan: First look at some longer-term trends. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.
Peter, M., Badanjak, S., D’Amico, E., & Houghton, K. (2025). Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND). Harvard Dataverse, V1, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PYRHS6
Peter, M., D’Amico, E., Houghton, K., & Badanjak, S. (2026). Mediation in 2025: Navigating overlapping conflict systems (MEND Data Series). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. https://doi.org/10.7488/era/7185
Pospisil, J. (2023). Post architecture: The competitive marketplace of transition management in Sudan. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. https://peacerep.org/publication/post-architecture-transition-management-in-sudan/
Sofos, S. (2022). Peacebuilding in turbulent times: Turkey in MENA and Africa. PeaceRep Global Transitions Series, LSE Middle East Centre.
Sofos, S. (2023). Turkey as a mediator. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. https://peacerep.org/publication/turkey-as-conflict-mediator-2023/
Wittke, C. (2023). Creating ‘islands of agreement and civility’ through humanitarian negotiations: A conflict management and disaster-mitigation strategy in Russia’s war against Ukraine. PeaceRep Report, Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.