Al-Shabaab and the Limits of Ma’awisley – State-sponsored Vigilantism

The state sponsored Ma’awisley offensive against Al-Shabaab preoccupied attention amongst Somali and international audiences from mid-2022. PeaceRep Somalia, amongst others, raised concerns early in this initiative in public and policy circles, as well as in a more recent mid-term review of the current presidential term. Abdifatah Tahir offers the most original and historically informed analysis to date of the Ma’awisley movement, which he summarises below, drawing on his full report – forging a future from a failed past? – concluding that any benefits of this initiative are outweighed by the harm that has taken place. We at PeaceRep Somalia concur with his view. Of particular note is the arms race that has taken place as a result of this tactic and the inability of the President to unite elites around this cause, dynamics that will continue to play out in the forthcoming elections. Tahir’s full report should be widely read by those working on Somalia.

Countering Al-Shabaab: the limits of Somalia’s state-sponsored vigilantism, Ma’awisley

State-sponsored vigilantism refers to the practice where governments rely on non-state armed groups to fulfil security roles such as combating insurgencies, enforcing law, or safeguarding state interests.[1] Advocates argue that such groups can fill gaps where formal institutions are or perceived as ineffective.[2] Conversely, detractors highlight that benefits are outweighed by the harm they cause.[3] I reinforce the latter perspective, and, in this piece, I summarise a working paper published at Hilin where I explored how social structures, historical legacies of governance, and fragmented power relations contribute to the failure of state-sponsored vigilantism in Somalia.

Specifically, I argue that current efforts to counter Al-Shabaab through clan-based mobilization, commonly known as Ma’awisley, are and will remain ineffective. This is due to a fundamental mismatch between the social and cultural dynamics at play and the demands of contemporary state-building.

Offensive, optimism, and subversions

Ma’awisley groups first appeared in Jubaland in 2014. They have since waxed and waned. Their latest resurgence in Hiiraan, which catalysed the still ongoing offensive, has not only fostered public optimism but also renewed policymakers’ faith in clan mobilization as an effective strategy against Al-Shabaab. In August 2023, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud established Dhusamareb, the capital of Galmudug state, as his interim command centre to intensify his vigilante-centred offensive against Al-Shabaab. He engaged with various Habargidir clans, as well as others, including the Murursade and the Surre.

Similar mobilization efforts targeted the Abgaal clans, who already held key roles within the military. Influential political figures from the region, both inside and outside the government, propped up the President’s efforts. However, divisions among the elites driving these efforts persisted. Within the Hawadle clan there was increasing concern that key federal government figures were exploiting the offensive for political gain. This fuelled dissent from figures like Ali Jayte, who challenged pro-government actors at a time when the Hawadle clan was more heavily armed than ever.

The elites of the Murursade clans were also divided. Those in government sought to project the clan’s greater involvement to consolidate their influence, as the clan’s support leaned toward former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre. Others argued against involvement, stating the clan could not meaningfully participate in a campaign that harmed their constituency – not due to Al-Shabaab’s pressure, but because the government had inadvertently blocked supplies to their members under Al-Shabaab’s control in February.

Together, these divisions have fuelled an arms race among clans. For example, an arms shipment meant for the Sacad (Habargidir) and Wacaysle (Abgaal) Ma’awisley groups was intercepted by Marehan counterparts, who claimed a right to the arms since they were purchased with state resources.

Surviving the offensive: countermeasures

Al-Shabaab has responded with three key actions. First, it formally declared war on clans supporting the Ma’awisley. In September 2022, the group launched a series of violent attacks, including burning villages and destroying wells. They ambushed a convoy in Hiiraan, killing civilians, including women and children, and targeted elders and key figures leading the resistance, as well as combatants treated in the capital. This escalation led elites from resisting clans to enhance their security or relocate temporarily to Nairobi. Additionally, the group’s actions have pressured other clans, causing some to withdraw from the conflict out of fear of retaliation against both their members and their economic interests.

Second, Al-Shabaab has intensified efforts to portray the Somali government as weak and unreliable, incapable of protecting even Mogadishu residents, let alone providing support to clans forming Ma’awisley groups in remote areas like Hiiraan. For example, in December, Al-Shabaab targeted the urban gang Ciyaal Weero in Kaaraan, Mogadishu, which had been causing significant disruption.^[4] While residents appreciated the crackdown, many, including Mogadishu’s Mayor Madaale, suspected that Ciyaal Weero’s rise and subsequent suppression bore the hallmarks of backing from groups like Al-Shabaab or Daesh. Despite these suspicions, Al-Shabaab denied involvement with Ciyaal Weero’s emergence.

Thirdly, Al-Shabaab promoted or sponsored clan infighting using existing wounds.^[5] This has frequently drawn in Ma’awisley members to supporting their respective clans and necessitated intervention from officials of the federal government, who have been dispatched to various clan territories to mediate and resolve these conflicts. In a recent instance, the Director of NISA along with the Chair of the Military Court, were sent to mediate conflicts in the regions of Mahas, Moqokori, and Adan Yabaal.

Narrative: the battle over public feeling

The government, eager to maintain a positive image, viewed any setbacks as harmful to its vigilante-centred counter-insurgency efforts. In response, it took two key measures against independent media, whose reporting sometimes contradicted its optimistic portrayal. First, it criminalized the dissemination of Al-Shabaab-related news, with Deputy Minister for Information Abdirahman Al-Adala claiming over 40 websites were shut down. Second, a directive from Minister of Post and Communications Jama Hassan Khalif instructed telecommunications companies to help protect national security by preventing terrorists from using their networks. Telecommunications companies found the directive unreasonable, as the government failed to ensure their safety. Their fears were validated when a Hormuud Telecom tower was attacked by unknown assailants.

Additionally, the government sought to legitimize vigilante resistance by leveraging religion. It held a consultative meeting on combating extremist ideologies in October 2022 and mandated that Al-Shabaab only be referred to as “Khawarij,” a term used for an infamous extremist sect that emerged during the 7th-century Islamic civil war.

Given the government’s poor reputation and the need to validate its propaganda, securing broader support for its narrative was essential. To achieve this, the President announced a conference to establish an Islamic supreme council. Held from January 23 to 26 2023, the event brought together over 300 religious scholars and preachers from various regions. After carefully curated and televised discussions, the participants issued a statement supporting vigilante resistance, reinforcing the government’s stance, and condemning Al-Shabaab and Daesh as “Khawarij” criminals who have strayed from Islam, causing bloodshed and chaos in Somalia.

Aware of the threat posed by these delegitimization efforts, Al-Shabaab actively worked to counter the government’s narrative to legitimize state-sponsored vigilantism. For example, the group has increasingly invoked the concept of ‘riddah,’ apostasy, to reinforce their interpretation of Islam, justify attacks on government and civilian targets, and instil fear in those who might oppose them. Such propaganda content was distributed through texts, audio, and video via social media channels such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Telegram.

Outcome: short-term gains, long-term failures

The short-term positive effects of the local uprisings against Al-Shabaab are: first, they have shown that the people’s resolve to defend themselves against repressive rule is strong. From the Hiiraan-Galgaduud border to the riverine areas, the Hawadle Ma’awisley continues to defend these regions, including Ceeldheer, Masagawaa, and Harardhere. Second, they highlight the value of local knowledge in guerrilla warfare, showing how regular armies can benefit from the tactical and terrain expertise of local militias. Nevertheless, the use of vigilantism to combat insurgencies has failed to bring about stability. A proverb, often quoted by President Mohamud to support government decisions, “calool waxay ku bukootay laguma daweeyo” (loosely translating to “a stomach is never cured by that which made it ill”), in fact captures this failure.

Al-Shabaab continues to control a significant portion of south-central Somalia, with estimates suggesting they hold over 30% of the country’s land. Several factors hinder the efforts to reclaim these territories. One major challenge is intra-clan competition. Al-Shabaab exploits these rivalries, leveraging divisions to advance its agenda, especially when vigilantes operate outside their own territories. In such cases, clans that feel marginalized prioritize preventing anti-Al-Shabaab efforts from increasing their vulnerability. Additionally, the increased availability of weapons often leads to or intensifies conflicts over political or resource issues, further undermining operations against Al-Shabaab.

The second challenge is a lack of trust among the political elite, stemming from the 2022 electoral process. Opposition groups that had supported President Mohamud’s campaign felt excluded from the new administration. This exclusion fuelled unspoken fears that if the government succeeded in its offensive, it might bypass existing electoral arrangements without offering a viable or acceptable alternative.

The third challenge is the limited financial capacity to sustain the war against Al-Shabaab. With the federal government generating just over $200 million in domestic revenue, large-scale clan mobilization efforts were impractical without significant external financial support. Moreover, suspicions grew that the ruling elites were more focused on securing contracts and tenders than genuinely liberating territories. This perception undermined trust and contributed to the missed opportunity for meaningful progress, as the government failed to convincingly show that its fight against Al-Shabaab was driven by a genuine liberation agenda rather than personal gains.

Historical parallels: lessons from past failures

The overall impact of vigilante operations has been minimal in advancing state recovery, a pattern consistent with Somalia’s history of vigilantism. In the late 1890s, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, also known as the Sayyid, formed a strong resistance movement against colonial powers in the Somali peninsula.[6] In response to this native resistance, the British dispatched a large expeditionary force under Richard Corfield to crush the rebellion. However, the British were defeated, and Corfield was killed in the 1913 Battle of Dul Madoba.[7] Following this loss, the British shifted tactics, forming alliances with local clans who already had antagonistic relationships with the Sayyid.

This counterinsurgency strategy initially brought some success but ultimately led to widespread chaos. A particularly devastating episode occurred in 1912, referred to as “Xaaraamacune” (the year of disaster), when a combination of available weapons, clan rivalries, and drought resulted in mass killings, famine, and suffering.[8] What colonial authorities viewed as a quick, cost-effective solution to anti-colonial resistance became a social, economic, and administrative catastrophe. Similarly, postcolonial governments adopted state-sponsored vigilantism to suppress insurgencies, with equally poor outcomes.

In 1969, a coup led by General Mohamed Siad Barre replaced the civilian government with a socialist military dictatorship. Although initially popular, the regime soon alienated key political actors and major clans.[9] The first two significant movements to resist Barre’s regime were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in 1978 by dissident Majerteen clan army officers, and the Somali National Movement (SNM), founded in 1981 by Isaaq clan members based in London and Saudi Arabia.

In response, Barre armed militias from loyal clans, forming vigilante groups—a strategy reminiscent of failed colonial methods. The SNM and SSDF leveraged the government’s clannism-based counterinsurgency tactics to rally support from their communities. By the late 1980s, the conflict escalated as additional groups, most notably the United Somali Congress, formed. Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991, plunging the country into chaos, with clan militias vying for control of land and resources. The use and misuse of clan-based strategies was a key factor in the war’s destructiveness.[10]

Why clan-based vigilantism to counter insurgency fails

The failure of clan-based vigilantism as a counter-insurgency strategy largely stems from a fundamental mismatch between traditional clan practices and the sustained, resource-intensive demands of modern state-driven conflict. Historically, clan mobilizations were reactive, short-term efforts tied to the community’s natural rhythms, providing protection during periods of immediate threat. The year-round, politically driven operations against Al-Shabaab require sustained resources, coordination, and discipline that often exceed the independent capacity of clans. This strain has weakened traditional systems, leading to fatigue among both fighters and their communities, and diminishing the initial support for these efforts.

Narrative formation is another arena of difference. Historically, intra-clan conflict propaganda was grounded in specific principles, particularly the commitment to truthfulness about the enemy. Accurate depictions allowed clans to effectively mobilize resources and personnel, ensuring coordinated defensive efforts. The Somali proverb “Gaal dil oo gartiisana sii” (“You may kill an infidel, but you must give him his due credit”) reflects this ethos, as false propaganda could significantly undermine strategic efforts. Moreover, clan narratives traditionally avoided divisions based on religious practices, instead focusing on unity. This cohesion was critical for collective action. In contrast, contemporary mobilization often relies on divisive religious orientations, eroding the social cohesion necessary for effectiveness.

In a nutshell, the social framework of clan mobilization is designed to protect communal interests rather than advance broader national agendas, limiting its effectiveness in both military and political contexts. Therefore, clan mobilization cannot serve as an effective counter-insurgency strategy nor as a meaningful political tool for consolidating power within a highly divided society like Somalia.

About the author:

Dr Abdifatah Ismael Tahir is the Executive Director of Hilin, a non-profit research organization, and a Research Fellow at the School of Geography and Planning, University of Sheffield. Previously, he worked as a Research Associate at the Global Development Initiative at the University of Manchester. Dr Tahir has extensive experience as a researcher, consultant, and a development practitioner in Somalia. His current research interests centre on the politics and governance of urban land and infrastructure in Somalia. Additionally, he is interested in broader national and regional politics, geopolitics, and their intersections with urban development. His recent publications focus on land administration policies, conflict adjudication, and critical infrastructures.

References

[1] Michal Kucera and Miroslav Mares, ‘Vigilantism during Democratic Transition’, Policing and Society 25, no. 2 (2015): 170–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2013.817997.

[2] Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, ‘: The Civilian Joint Task Force’, Oxford Development Studies 48, no. 4 (2020): 360–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2020.1837093.

[3] Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, and Adam Scharpf, ‘Pro-Government Militias and Conflict’, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2022.

[4] In the past, Al-Shabaab seldom engaged with urban security issues on a large scale, except during its campaign against Daesh.

[5] In contrast, Al-Shabaab addresses clan divisions in areas where it has full control, viewing them as a threat to its administration and authority.

[6] Jon Abbink, ‘Dervishes, Moryaan and Freedom Fighters: Cycles of Rebellion and the Fragmentation of Somali Society, 1900–2000’, in Rethinking Resistance (Brill, 2003), 328–65.

[7] Patrick K. Kakwenzire, Richard Corfield and the Dul Madoba Incident: An Episode in the Somali Struggle against British Colonialism (Helmut Buske Verlag, 1984), https://arcadia.sba.uniroma3.it/handle/2307/2898.

[8] Aw Jama Omar Issa, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta Iyo Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan, (1895-1921). (Mogadishu, Somalia: National Press, 1976).

[9] Radoslav Yordanov, ‘Free to Decide Their Destiny? Indigenous Resistance to External Forms of Socialist Modernity in Siad Barre’s Somalia’, Third World Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2021): 543–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1722096.

[10] Afyare Elmi and Abdullahi Barise, ‘The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and Peace-Building Strategies’, African Security Review 15, no. 1 (2006): 32–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627386.