Military power-sharing involves sharing the armed forces between factions to the conflict. This can take the form of a merger of forces or joint command structures. It means those involved in conflict control the military so rule of law and human rights protections are important. While it encourages inclusion of different groups, it can also create an incentive for smaller groups outside the process to assert claims violently (Bell, Gluckstein, Forster and Pospisil, 2018).

Military power-sharing must be understood as one part in a wider ‘security transition’. It needs to be supported with contextual awareness and understanding of the different possible goals of the arrangements. It is important to anticipate whether military power-sharing proposals are likely to result in joint exercise of power in a unified state army or ‘split’ security force with ‘forces within forces’ reporting to a split ‘government of national unity’ or a highly territorially devolved political arrangement (Bell, Gluckstein, Forster and Pospisil, 2018).

Important questions to ask of military power-sharing arrangements include:

• Whether the provisions are intended as transitional, in which case they will affect the conduct of the transitional arrangements and will need a longer-term security transition plan.
• Whether they are intended as part of a wider indefinite ‘deal’ focused on inclusion of a previously excluded ethnic group.
• Whether they are part of a broader process of democratisation of armed forces.
• Whether they contemplate not just army but also policing functions and the need to re-configure the relationship between the two.
• The extent to which there is a tradition of functional public institutions and any rule of law capacity in the society.
• Whether international peacekeeping forces or other forms of international DDR and SSR support mechanism are present.
• Whether rule of law and reform measures might mitigate the role of elite and powerful leaders maintaining permanent dominance through military power-sharing in the long-term (Bell, Gluckstein, Forster and Pospisil, 2018).

PSRP research on armed groups and governance in conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo revealed that the increasing fragmentation of the security landscape results from the interplay between the growing engagement of lower-level political actors in militarized politics, the volatility of local conflict dynamics, and counterproductive military policies, including military operations. There is a need to devise policies that focus primarily on armed groups themselves and their political-economic support networks, which should be complemented by army reform and measures addressing conflict dynamics (Verweijen and Wakenge, 2015:1; Verweijen, 2016a).

Armed groups in eastern DRC are able to mobilize popular support by evoking two issues of existential importance to local communities—marginalization and security. These issues give meaning to armed groups’ bids for local authority and legitimize their engagement in a wide range of governmental practices normally ascribed to the state, such as taxation and the provision of justice and security (Vlassenroot, Mudinga, and Hoffman, 2016:10).

To promote a demilitarization of public life in eastern DRC, it is essential to address the civilian support networks of armed groups, to deal with more structural causes of militarization, including the conduct of the security forces, the return of refugee populations and disputes over land ownership. These cannot be resolved without a genuine national land reform process, which requires the mobilization of the necessary political will and technical capacity (Vlassenroot, Mudinga, and Hoffman, 2016:11; Mathys, and Vlassenroot, 2016)

To sustainably demilitarize eastern DRC, it is necessary to defuse conflicts related to customary authority, weaken armed groups and their civilian support networks, and improve security management and regulation of local defence forces. It is important to recognize and address the adverse roles sometimes played by politicians, business-people and local authorities in armed mobilization. It is also important to reduce incentives for citizens to solicit armed groups to provide security, dispute resolution and other public services by improving the governance of customary authorities and security services (Verweijen, 2016b).

Security is a highly gendered concept. Violence during armed conflict often affects women and men differently. Security provisions in peace agreements tend to focus on security in relation to armed actors that are primarily men, and often fail to take into account women’s experiences of insecurity during conflict, and the security needs they expect and require the peace process to deliver. It is therefore important to highlight the particular security challenges for women at all stages of peace negotiations and peace processes (Pospisil and Bell, 2018:1).

Security is particularly important for women to address in peace negotiations because it affects all aspects of their lives. Unless and until physical security can be guaranteed, other forms of security are very difficult to achieve, as are any broader gender equality outcomes or other improvements to women’s lives. Women also bring insight and knowledge about the insecurities faced by women, which are useful to addressing practical issues of security more generally (Pospisil and Bell, 2018:1).

Language around security is an important tool in seeking to influence peace talks. Reframing security issues and tensions in creative ways can be a successful strategy for inclusion of women and gender-sensitive approaches, as well as helpful to the talks process as a whole in reshaping polarised debates to make it easier for the parties to find compromise (Pospisil and Bell, 2018:12).

To be effective in having their demands heard and to influence a peace process, it is important for women to develop:

• a women-centred articulation of security needs;
• ideas about how these could be prioritized and delivered over time;
• an understanding of how the parties to the conflict will approach their security needs, and where there will be synergies and tensions with civilian and gender priorities;
• an identification of avenues of influence (the talks, the international supporters of the talks, wider civic engagement);
• practical strategies of engagement across multiple forums and actors (Pospisil and Bell, 2018:2).

The level of insecurity experienced by sexual and gender minorities is impacted directly by both ethno-nationalism and overt political conflict. Inclusive approaches to conflict transformation will include analysis and practices which seek to affect the security of multiple identity groups, including Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Transgender (LGB&T) communities (Ashe, 2019:1).

Framing LGB&T security within a universal human rights agenda underscores LGB&T people’s fundamental right to security. However, human rights approaches can underplay the relationship between LGB&T insecurities and the legacies of conflict. Contextualising LGB&T insecurities within a conflict framework can inform analytical and policy approaches to reimagining what the human right to security means in transitioning societies (Ashe, 2019:1).

Statist interpretations of security limit understandings of the sources of insecurity in conflict-affected states. LGB&T articulations of insecurity should guide both policy and practice in transitional societies; advocacy groups should have access to policymakers and a broad range of LGB&T groups should be appropriately resourced to address all aspects of their constituencies’ security needs during peacebuilding (Ashe, 2019:1).

LGB&T insecurity cannot be addressed solely through policy and legal change. Civil society organisations can play a role in preserving forms of LGB&T insecurity during conflict; consequently, they can play a central role in reducing forms of LGB&T insecurity during the conflict transformational period (Ashe, 2019:1).

Policing reform in transitional societies must fully address LGB&T security. If historically low-levels of confidence and trust between sexual and gender minorities pertain, and the police are a key institution for reform, re-building trust with a range of constituencies, including LGB&T constituencies must be addressed through institutional change and monitoring (Ashe, 2019:2).

Security sector reform, democratization and constitutional reform are intrinsically linked. The constitution-building process can therefore provide a critical forum for negotiations over changes in the relationship between civilian and security sector institutions (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:6).

Analyse the context: The parameters of the potential interactions between constitutional reform and security sector reform will to a great extent be determined by context. Key considerations will include the state of the security sector at the moment of transition, the leverage of security sector agencies in negotiations, the critical interests of security sector leaders, including economic interests, criminal accountability and normative values, and how security sector agencies are represented in political negotiations (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:6).

Separate civilian ministries staffed by professional bureaucrats and led by a cabinet minister should be established for each security sector agency, to ensure political responsibility, direction and accountability for the actions of the security sector, while at the same time to serve as an institutional buffer that protects the security services from partisan abuse (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:6).

In addition, consideration should be given to constitutionalizing the oversight powers of parliament – for example, through mandatory reporting – and to the establishment of independent oversight bodies, such as a National Police Service Commission. The composition of such bodies should be inclusive of civil society representatives and broadly representative of the population (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:6).

The constitutional and legal framework must clearly distinguish the different roles and institutional architecture associated with different security agencies. For example, the military should be responsible for national defence and the police should be responsible for law and order (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:6).

National Security Councils can be critical bodies for coordinating security, sharing intelligence and enabling whole-of-government responses to threats, but their composition should include a civilian majority to maintain democratic accountability. Careful thought should be given to balancing the need for confidentiality with the establishment of adequate procedures for oversight (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:6).

Most constitutions provide for states of emergencies, during which security sector agencies may be given expanded roles beyond their usual mandates, and with less oversight. These provisions should be drafted clearly and with sufficient detail to avoid ambiguity and should include maintaining an oversight role for the legislature throughout the emergency (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:7).

Where possible, establishing principles and parameters in the constitution can be a powerful first step in strengthening the chances of extensive security sector reform, while the details can, and often should, be left to legislation (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:7).

Militaries in non-democratic regimes may often have significant economic interests (e.g. commercial activity, salaries, patronage networks), which they seek to protect during the transition. Constitutional reform may jeopardize these interests. Careful thought should be given to the impact of constitutional reform on these economic interests from the very outset (Bisarya and Choudhry, 2020:7).

Building States while Building Peace? Statebuilding and Security Sector Reform in Peace Agreements

This report uses ten variables coded in PA-X as proxies for the intended strength of statebuilding in peace agreements. These are references to political institutions, constitution’s affirmation, constitutional reform, elections, electoral commission, political parties reform, civil society, public administration, police reform, and armed forces reform. Analysing these ten variables provides an interesting and telling picture of what statebuilding is understood to involve, and how strong the commitments to it are, in single agreements, in peace processes, which usually consist of several separate agreements, and across peace process trajectories over time.

Military Power-Sharing and Inclusion in Peace Processes

Military power-sharing is used frequently in peace processes to accommodate the competing interests of conflict parties to be included in the state’s power structures. Security forces are often a central issue because they control the state’s use of force. Military power-sharing is therefore agreed as part of a political package of measures relating to inclusion in the state and the logistics of ending violence, rather than being focused on issues of good management and administration of military matters understood to be central to security sector reform. Military power-sharing may, however, be a key part of a wider security transition which aims to deliver a reformed security sector, notably in terms of who is included in security forces and their oversight.

The Usalama Project: Governance in Conflict Series

The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been mired in violence for two decades and continues to be plagued by dozens of armed groups. Yet, these groups—and how they interact with their social and political environment—remain poorly understood. This Rift Valley Institute and PSRP series investigates governance in conflict in the region. It is guided by a series of questions: How do armed actors affect conflicts related to public authority? How, in turn, do local authorities shape patterns of armed group organization? And what are the effects of armed group presence on governance and service provision?

• Stable Instability: Political Settlements and Armed Groups in the Congo
• Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo
• A Microcosm of Militarization: Conflict, Governance, and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu
• Contesting Authority: Armed Rebellion and Military Fragmentation in Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu
• Recycling Rebels? Demobilization in the Congo
• Women, Conflict and Public Authority in the Congo
• ‘It’s not all about the land’: Land disputes and conflict in eastern Congo

‘Securing’ Peace: Women and Security Arrangements in Peace Processes

This brief focuses on the relevance of security arrangements in peace processes to women. Security provisions in peace agreements tend to focus on security in relation to armed actors that are primarily men, and often fail to take into account women’s experiences of insecurity during conflict, and the security needs they expect and require the peace process to deliver. The brief therefore highlights the particular security challenges for women at all stages of peace negotiations and peace processes.

Reimaging Inclusive Security in Peace Processes: LGB&T Perspectives

In deeply divided societies, political negotiations and accords focus on addressing the historical grievances surrounding ethno-nationalist political, social and cultural inequalities. As societies begin the transitional process, the grievances of other identities are often side-lined as residual matters in terms of making and building the peace. However, ethno-nationalist conflict can strengthen historical prejudices and inequities surrounding sexuality and gender identity creating insecurity and other forms of harm. This report draws on data from LGB&T focus groups to consider the relationship between LGB&T equality and one of the core objectives of conflict transformation, the cessation or reduction of levels of societal violence.

Security Sector Reform in Constitutional Transitions

Security sector reform, democratization and constitutional reform are intrinsically linked. The constitution-building process can therefore provide a critical forum for negotiations over changes in the relationship between civilian and security sector institutions. This policy paper aims to support advisors and decision-makers in navigating these complex transitions. The paper focuses on the relationship between security sector reform (SSR) and constitutional reform processes. While SSR and constitution-building are typically seen as separate issues, in practice they are deeply interconnected, and the success of a transition to constitutional democracy depends on the successful handling of security sector issues. Constitutional reform and SSR processes intersect in democratic transitions from military rule, civil war and authoritarian regimes.

National Security Strategies, Emergent Powers and ‘Sustaining Peace’

This report analyses the ninety-three counties we know of that produce a public National Security Strategy (NSS) document or Defence White Paper. Additionally, it analyses the content of these documents from seventy-four countries, using manual and automated methods to establish patterns and trends in using peace terminologies. It looks at differences between liberal/non-liberal states, ODA (Official Development Assistance)/non-ODA states, and UN-centred/non-UN-centred peace terminologies. The authors are developing the use of security and defence documents for international political analysis as a new and experimental approach: this report is a product of that approach.