Sudan Findings
Key findings from PeaceRep’s research in South Sudan
PeaceRep research in Sudan focuses on the role of civic groups in the Sudanese revolution and in the resistance against the military coup; considerations of civic, armed group, and political marketplace financing; and the regional mediation setting following the outbreak of the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023.
Read more about our Sudan research focus and teams.
Overview
One of the main challenges after the Sudanese revolution that ousted long-term dictator Omar al Bashir was the fragmentation of the forces opposing the Sudanese army. At the same time, the dynamics of the Sudanese political marketplace remained and the militarised fragmentation of the country’s public finances posed particular challenges (Benson et al, 2023).
The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) split the armed opposition movements into signatories and non-signatories and introduced a power-sharing agreement on top of an already fragile political compromise that paved the way to the military coup (Pospisil, 2020). The integration of all armed forces into SAF, as foreseen by the JPA, and the failure to overcome the obstacles for a sustainable security sector reform (Berridge, Makawi, Detzner and Benson, forthcoming), finally emerged as the trigger point for the outbreak of the war.
The war is highly internationalised, with several regional powers playing a major role in financing and supporting the belligerent parties. The war economy is also highly internationalised (Benson et al, 2023). PeaceRep research illustrates how political discourse on political settlements focuses on powersharing and security, all while neglecting revenue considerations and the patterns of resources generation that underpin war financing and power struggles (Benson, Makawi, & Srinivasan, forthcoming).
Precarity remains widespread. Poverty and food insecurity are high, and the economy is not creating enough productive jobs for those entering the labour market. In a political marketplace like Sudan, precarity is reconfigured but not ended by peace processes, and peace agreements should be considered as an element of ongoing political machinations (Sarkar, 2024).
Mediation
In mediation efforts, there is a marked trend to regionalisation (Pospisil and Jenner, 2022). The once-influential Troika countries – the US, the UK and Norway – have largely lost influence. The mediation setting is highly competitive (Pospisil, 2023), with countries such as Egypt, Kenya or South Sudan aiming to play a role in parallel to multilateral efforts spearheaded by the African Union and IGAD (Peter and Houghton, 2023).
International mediation, however, has been largely unsuccessful. In particular, the consultation attempts by the now dismantled UN transition mission UNITAMS was rejected by all relevant political and military actors, not the least since the mission attempted to unify the different mediation processes ongoing in parallel (Pospisil, 2024a).
PeaceRep research suggests that several mediation attempts ongoing in parallel are not necessarily a weakness, but can strengthen attempts of peacemaking, even if these processes are competitive and fragmented (Pospisil, 2024b).
The African Union’s activities in Sudan have been criticised by regime-affiliated and anti-government media outlets for being dominated by elites and marginalising grass roots actors, as well as being an assault on Sudanese sovereignty. The AU’s status as a body representing the African continent did not confer it automatic legitimacy (Berridge, 2024).
China and Russia are influencing peace and transition processes through economic and military leverage. China’s focus on UN-authorized action, deep economic engagement, and loan-based investment is a stark contrast to Russia’s more modest trade relationship, and focus on licit and illicit security engagement (Peter and Plichta, 2023).
Turkish involvement in conflicts in the Horn is increasingly characterised using violent, militarised, non-inclusive methods alongside the deployment of soft power (Sofos, 2023).
Civic Groups
The fragmentation of civilian forces, as gathered, for instance, in the Resistance Committees (Abbashar, 2023), is a defining characteristic of pro-democracy civic groups in their quest to escape authoritarianism (Benson, Makawi, & Srinivasan, forthcoming). International support should work with, rather than undermine, their particular character. International mediators must recognise that diplomatic interventions at time of urban revolution and civic protest cannot be resolved using the same methods as in the case of conflicts between governments and armed movements (Benson, Makawi, & Srinivasan, forthcoming).
Violence is also highly gendered with women experiencing the brunt of atrocities, with armed actors wielding sexual violence in pursuit of political and economic gain. Future postwar reconstruction efforts therefore require substantial women’s rights reforms (Makawi, forthcoming).
A tangible peace process for Sudan needs to be inclusive and must not focus on the two fighting parties alone. Such a process needs to reflect the diversity of civilian and opposing forces and must also integrate the regional and international actors with prevalent interests in the country (Benson, Makawi, & Srinivasan, forthcoming).
PeaceRep’s findings also underscore the need for humanitarians to rethink how to engage with in country and diaspora civic networks, which are the primary emergency service providers in the country (Makawi and Benson, forthcoming).
References
*When referencing these key findings, please cite the individual research paper or blog referenced in the text.*
Abbashar, A. (2023). Resistance Committees and Sudan’s Political Future (PeaceRep Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Benson, M., Alneel, M., & Makawi, R. (2022). The Everyday Politics of Sudan’s Tax System: Identifying Prospects for Reform (PeaceRep Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, The London School of Economics.
Berridge, W. J. (2024). The African Union in Sudan: Perspectives from the Sudanese Media (PeaceRep Policy Brief). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.
Peter, M., and Houghton, K. (2023). Congestion and Diversification of Third-Party Mediation in Sudan and South Sudan: Longer-Term Trends (Global Transitions Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.
Peter, M., and Plichta, M. (2023). China and Russia in Sudan: Surveying Data on Economic and Military Engagement (Global Transitions Series Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Pospisil, J. (2023). Post Architecture: The Competitive Marketplace of Transition Management in Sudan (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Pospisil, J. (2024a, 31 Jan). A Stalemate That Does Not Ripen: On the Stagnant Busyness of Sudanese Conflict Mediation (blog). https://peacerep.org/2024/01/31/a-stalemate-that-does-not-ripen/
Pospisil, J. (2024a, 24 Apr). Sudan: Civil War Stretches into a Second Year with No End in Sight (blog). https://peacerep.org/2024/04/24/sudan-civil-war-stretches-into-a-second-year-with-no-end-in-sight/
Pospisil, J. and Jenner, A. (2022). Fragmented Transitions in the Context of Competitive Regionalism: The Case of Sudan. (PeaceRep Report: Global Transitions Series). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Pospisil, J. (2020, 23 Jul). Sudan: The Potential Price of Peace (blog). https://peacerep.org/2020/07/23/sudan-the-potential-price-of-peace/
Sarkar, A. (2024). Peacemaking, Precarity, and Accumulation by Dispossession in the Horn of Africa (PeaceRep report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Sofos, S. (2023). Navigating the Horn: Turkey’s Forays in East Africa (Global Transitions Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.