Buying and Selling Loyalty: Market Logics and Political Finance in the Somali Territories

The Horn of Africa remains a hotspot of geopolitical and security tensions. In Ethiopia, conflicts in Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara continue to fuel instability, compounded by increasing regional militarisation. Abiy Ahmed’s push for sea access has heightened regional security concerns, exacerbating geopolitical rivalries, stoking nationalist sentiments, and straining Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbours. His framing of port access as an existential and economic necessity has unsettled Somalia, especially in the wake of the contentious Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Somaliland in January 2024. While Ethiopia and Somalia recently agreed to restore diplomatic ties following a Turkey-brokered deal, the deep rift caused by this issue is unlikely to heal easily. Beyond Somalia, Abiy’s maritime ambitions have also introduced friction with Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya—each of whom holds strategic maritime security interests within the Red Sea and Indian Ocean littoral. From Puntland’s recent offensive, Operation Hilac (Lightning), against the Islamic State (IS) in Somalia (backed by the first air strikes of President Trump’s administration) to the ongoing offensive against Al Shabaab in the south of the country, there are multiple security challenges across the Somali territories.

Against this backdrop, this blog examines how political finance and transactional politics shape conflict and governance in the Somali territories through two contemporary cases: President Hassan Sheikh’s sale of constitutionally protected public lands in Mogadishu, and the recent cross-border Dacawaley conflict involving the Somali Regional State (SRS) and Somaliland administrations.

Politics in the Somali territories operates within what Alex de Waal (2015) describes as a political marketplace—a transactional system shaped by violence, patronage, and the flow of money. Despite its materialist emphasis, the framework offers a valuable lens for theorising key trends in the region’s political and security landscape. Across the Horn of Africa, political finance is a key variable, mobilised through a variety of means, including theft and extortion. Recent checkpoint-related research by RVI and by PeaceRep has been examining resource accumulation at these sites of power. These studies have explored trade corridors and the various types of checkpoints they host—whether at seaports, interior roads, or border crossings. Checkpoints are operated by different actors, including government forces, militias, Al Shabaab, and others, each extracting revenues in a complex system of financial and political control.

The commodification of elite politics, where loyalty is bought and sold, provides a crucial entry point for understanding the evolving political and security landscape in the Somali territories. This system has deep historical roots. Take, for example, the 2000 Arta Somali National Peace Conference hosted by Djibouti’s Ismail Omar Guelleh. The primary goal was, in the words of Guelleh, to establish a ‘viable and legitimate authority’ and move away from ‘militaristic options.’ Yet, the initiative ultimately failed, leaving Somalia with a fragile transitional government that struggled against the proliferation of authorities and various sub-national governance structures. Instead of fostering stability, the political vacuum gave way to further militarisation, as various factions competed for power and resources.

Over time, the transactional nature of politics in the Somali speaking territories has evolved into a sophisticated patronage network, shaping how both politics and business are conducted. A striking example in and around Mogadishu is the auctioning of public land, including a public cemetery and a former military camp, in violation of Somalia’s constitutional and legal provisions. Even more concerning is the forced eviction of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable communities from these public lands—only for them to be sold to wealthy businessmen. In a joint statement earlier this year, opposition figures such as former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, and MP Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame strongly condemned Hassan Sheikh’s continued auction of public lands. They warned businesses against participating in what they described as “national plunder.” The cash proceeds from these transactions serve a dual purpose: bolstering President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s own capital while rewarding the wealthy allies who bankrolled his election campaign. This monetization of political loyalty is not new, but its increasing visibility underscores how power is consolidated in the Somali territories—not through legitimacy, but through transactional exchanges where money and violence shape politics and governance. Whether through checkpoint taxation, land deals, or political favours, the underlying logic remains unchanged: political survival is driven by financial flows, and political loyalty is a commodity traded to the highest bidder in the political marketplace.

A further dimension to this logic is where local entrepreneurs engage in transactional arrangements with regional and federal security actors, shaping the broader conflict landscape. A recent example is the conflict in Dacawaley kebele in Fafan Zone in Somali Regional State of Ethiopia (SRS), a volatile border area with Somaliland. This conflict escalated into violent clashes between communities in December 2024, drawing in armed militias from Somaliland and the Somali Region’s Liyu Police (officially disbanded but still actively deployed in response to security crises). At the heart of this conflict lies a struggle over competing monopolies on violence, between the SRS administration, and local militias in Dacawaley that regularly traverse the border with Somaliland, both vying for control. What initially began as a land dispute between neighbouring communities quickly escalated, giving rise to more protracted, identity-based grievances that ultimately drew Somaliland forces into the clashes. In response to the conflict, which resulted in approximately 300 deaths, officials from Somaliland and Ethiopia reached an agreement to end hostilities in Dacawaley. This culminated in the deployment of the Ethiopian federal army to the area in an effort to ease tensions and stabilise the area.

The army’s presence was intended to assert Ethiopian territorial control and, in theory, neutralise the clan-based narratives fuelling the conflict. However, the entanglement of financial incentives, security actors, and political interests soon became evident. According to local communities affected by these clashes, competing political entrepreneurs offered financial incentives to Ethiopian federal forces stationed in Dacawaley in an effort to improve relations and influence future policies in favour of their respective communities. Moreover, political and business figures, initially far removed from the politics surrounding Dacawaley but hostile to the administration of Mustafa Omer, President of the Somali Regional State, continue to engage in transactional exchanges with appointed ‘peace brokers’ in Dacawaley, namely Ethiopian security actors. Through these exchanges, political finance is instrumentalised to keep Dacawaley as a thorn in the side of the SRS government.

Ethiopia’s Somali Region shares boundaries with all of Somalia’s sub-regions and the cross-border, entanglements seen in Dacawaley are evident throughout this sub-region and its porous boundaries, creating a fragmented and highly contested security landscape, which I am exploring within the PeaceRep programme.

Politics in the Somali territories is not solely driven by the rigid cost-benefit calculations of political entrepreneurs who instrumentalise political finance to shape loyalties. The expanding role of political entrepreneurs and financial influence defies simple marketplace logic but also intersects with political ideas and ideologies as well as the personal interests of those in power. Our forthcoming research paper aims to illuminate these areas further.

Juweria Ali is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Westminster’s Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and a Research Associate with PeaceRep (Somalia). Her research focuses on political violence, post-war governance, and the processes of nation and state-building in the Horn of Africa.

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