PeaceRep research has shown that the post-2021 coup context, and the resulting anti-military resistance movement, have engendered an unparalleled form of inter-ethnic collaboration within Myanmar, coalescing different fronts of the opposition together. The result is a natural sense of reconciliation which has been forged between the dominant Bamar majority and the minorities, underpinning the successes of the resistance movement. Patterns of funding for the resistance movement illustrate this trend, as ethnic minorities in the diaspora tend to fund the newly created People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) more than Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) (Tueseng, Khual, Adhikari and Hodge 2024).

Beyond the objective of ‘winning the revolution’, which unites the broad anti-military opposition, there is also an acknowledgement of the need for dialogue on immediate strategies and pathways in managing the political transition. Discussions on pathways need examination at a greater level of granularity and to connect with emerging challenges on the ground, such as interim measures to support the new governance mechanisms being incepted across the country (Adhikari and Hodge 2024).

In response to this domestic fragmentation, and in the absence of a national- level political settlement, sub-national regional governance projects have emerged, which aim to unite different anti-military groups, and consolidate governance alongside brokering a constitutional settlement at the sub-national level. A notable example is the establishment of the Interim Executive Council of Karenni State, which drafted a state-level interim constitutional framework and set a precedent for other regions/states. These have included the Sagaing Forum, in the Sagaing region, the Magwe Region Interim Arrangements Preparation Commission and the Mandalay Interim Governing Council. These bodies have focused on facilitating dialogue among diverse groups and reaching agreements on governance and institutional frameworks at the sub-state level.

A consensus has emerged amongst Myanmar stakeholders that coherence and trust-building amongst the anti-military opposition is crucial for the future political trajectory. At the same time, emerging realities on and off the battlefield paint a mixed picture on prospects for unity. Multimediation may be a helpful response to the current situation, rather than encouraging or waiting for a ‘grand bargain’ peace or transition moment, which may not arrive. This approach could be framed as ‘sets of conversations’ on distinct issues that are built up and connected over time (Adhikari and Hodge 2024).

Along with the need to build trust between the opposition groups, there is also an acknowledgement of the need to sequence different sets of conversations – first amongst the broader opposition, and then ultimately with the military on issues such as accountability for human rights violations. Yet ongoing extreme violence, conscription laws introduced by the military in February 2024, failed dialogue processes of the past, and a lack of trust that the military will abide by the terms of any future agreements are all reasons why engaging in ‘dialogue’ with the military remains distant for many of the anti-military opposition (Adhikari and Hodge 2024).

The need for ensuring inclusivity beyond ethnicity, and accountability beyond the military are also increasingly being articulated. Amongst post-coup revolutionary groups, there has been some systematic thinking around the need to integrate ‘gender’ into Myanmar politics. Issues around women’s representation in the senior leadership of ethnic movements, as well as the need to address ‘patriarchy’ embedded within Burmese society, featured as core issues needing to be dealt with. Overall, a lack of women in leadership positions in various groups was seen to have implications for the representativeness of the possible dialogues taking place across anti-coup decision-makers, potentially leading to key underlying issues not being raised in discussions (Adhikari and Hodge 2024).

Five years since the coup, while the resistance movement has grown from strength to strength, their ability to mobilise and raise funds has been impeded by the control of the junta’s State Administrative Council (SAC) over central institutions such as the central bank, and digital repression (Tueseng, Khual, Adhikari and Hodge 2024).

Internationally supported and domestically initiated dialogue mechanisms exist but remain fragmented. Western support has predominantly been indirect, often channelled through Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) processes, focusing on providing technical assistance for existing domestic dialogue forums. In contrast, regional actors such as China, India, Japan, and ASEAN have initiated and supported various distinct dialogue processes since the coup, though these have yet to crystallise into an agreement or forum that succeeds in bringing all key parties to the table. This global fragmentation, intersecting with conflict fragmentation — characterized by multiple parties and competing interests — has caused contemporary dialogue efforts to be disaggregated (Adhikari et al 2025). PeaceRep has observed this disaggregation across (a) scales or geography, where some dialogue processes target the national level while others focus on sub-state or local levels; (b) themes, as dialogue initiatives concentrate on specific issues such as humanitarian relief or ceasefires instead of pursuing comprehensive settlements; and (c) actors, with numerous domestic groups subscribing to different initiatives (Adhikari et al 2025).

The mix of conflict fragmentation and global fragmentation of peacemaking has shaped the ambitions and outcomes of peace initiatives in Myanmar. Existing dialogue processes, brokered or facilitated by different external actors, can best be described as ‘lite’ (Adhikari, Hodge & Wise 2026). This ‘lite’ approach is marked by four key features:

1. the primacy of stabilisation through ceasefires and local peace agreements rather than comprehensive peace plans;
2. a focus on immediate ‘wins’ such as humanitarian assistance rather than long-term conflict termination;
3. short-term and ad hoc institutional arrangements to bring actors into talks; and
4. transactional mediation relationships conditioned by the economic and security interests of regional powers.