Cash, Conflict and the Business of IDPs – Luuq, Somalia

‘If you want to stop the conflict, just stop the aid.’^[1]

Luuq town, in northern Gedo region, has seen high levels of conflict over the last year. Many circles recognise that control of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps—and the profits that can be made at these sites, particularly from cash programmes—is a major factor in the conflict. International and national aid actors are also implicated in IDP camp and local dynamics.

The civil war and territorial expansion

The collapse of the Somali state and the civil war in the 1990s led to significant population movement and a reorganisation of population and territory. Those living outside their clan territories were often forced to return in order to fall under the protection of their kin. This shift was particularly associated with urban areas, most notably Mogadishu, which as the capital city had a cosmopolitan population, but became one of the centres of violence.

Regions along the Juba and Shabelle rivers, attractive for their commercial farming potential and home to minority and other groups, also saw significant population movement. These areas had attracted investment in state and commercial plantations during both the colonial and post-colonial periods. During and since the civil war, the more powerful and better-armed clans have expanded their presence in many riverine areas in order to gain better access to land close to the river. Because many towns in Somalia lie close to the rivers, urban and rural population shifts were closely interlinked. For powerful groups, this might be considered a long-term livelihood strategy: they have the business investors as well as the political and financial capital to develop commercial agriculture. For others, this has meant forced displacement.

Many international aid projects over the last 30 years have targeted the riverine areas to support the development of irrigated agriculture along the river, both in the form of larger-scale infrastructure rehabilitation as well as through more modest, small-scale, agricultural improvements. Many small and medium sized towns along the Juba and Shabelle rivers have become the field bases for aid organisations. Belet Weyn and Johar on the Shabelle river and Dolow and Luuq on the Juba river are four such examples.

However, conflict over natural resources is not the only factor driving population reorganisation. Local clans need a district and a town to call their own, as this strengthens their national representation. Some towns and districts are historically dominated by a single group, but many have a more mixed population, making assuming control by one group difficult and highly contested. Clan-based groups can invest heavily in asserting a dominance, mobilising resources from the diaspora and locally. This is highly problematic in towns with diverse populations—Luuq town is one example.

Luuq town and the business of aid

Luuq is one of the most diverse towns in Somalia, with more than 80 Somali clans or lineages represented in its population. Chief among them are the Reer Hasan, the Ma’alin Weyne, the Dir, the Hawrarsame, the Gabaweyn and the Gasargude. Prior to the civil war, the Reer Hassan (Marehan) had already expanded into Luuq, initially arriving as refugees due to their displacement from Ethiopia during the Ethiopia-Somalia war (1977-78). By the time of the civil war, they made up a significant portion of the population, including many recent arrivals. Since the early 1990s, the Reer Hassan have expanded further in Luuq and the nearby riverine areas, pushing out the other clans, many of whom have had to move their farms from the western banks of the river to the eastern side. The Dir, for example, have been pushed to Bohol Garas to the east of the river and have expressed ambitions to create a new district there to secure better representation and access to resources. The expansion and political and military dominance of the Reer Hassan in Luuq town is also reflected in the town’s official/government leadership and in the staffing of many aid organisations. This pattern of expansion and dominance by powerful clans is repeated in many towns in Somalia.

There is increasing recognition that the high levels of displacement in Somalia have been commercialised, with IDP numbers often exaggerated. One example is the phenomenon of ‘bush bariis’, as well as the practice of ‘gatekeeping’, which involves a chain of actors, typically including an IDP camp manager, landowner, government official, and aid organisation. In Luuq, the Reer Hassan, as the dominant political group, has the greatest control over IDP camps through this network. The Ma’alin Weyne, another well-armed clan, is also involved in this business arrangement, playing a lesser role in the revenue-generating side, while making up a disproportionate share of the IDP population itself.

A recent catalyst of the violence in Luuq was a prominent Ma’alin Weyne elder who became outspoken over the unequal distribution of benefits from the IDP economy, speaking also to the marginalisation of his people that has been taking place over time. As a result, he was targeted and killed by those who saw him as a threat to their interests. The Ma’alin Weyne responded with force, escalating the initial incident,

Prominent figures in Kismayo with connections to Luuq have added to the politicisation of the conflict. As discussed in relation to violence in Belet Hawa, the upcoming elections and contestation of Gedo between Mogadishu and Kismayo may also have contributed to this context. In addition, the Reer Hassan have drawn the Gabaweyn into their orbit to prevent a joint Ma’alin Weyne-Gabaweyn movement against them, a strategy that so far appears successful.

Conclusions

Some aid organisations working in Luuq have become aware that their own staff may be involved in the conflict in the town. Others have not yet recognised this, or are driven by other incentives. Reports from the ground – as reflected in the quote at the start of this blogpost – suggest that aid organisations are not sufficiently informed and are wittingly or unwittingly continuing to exacerbate tensions rather than alleviate them.

However, it is also critical to emphasise that local field staff should not be the sole focus of attention or blame for this collusion, conflict and gatekeeping. Middle management and senior management figures within many organisations bear equal responsibility for enabling such practices to develop; institutional memory, organisational culture and incentives, and agency leadership all play into these dynamics. There is no shortage of publicly available documentation that highlight these challenges and suggest solutions.^[2]

Finally, the commercialisation of displacement can be seen as a specific problem of cash-based interventions. This, however, simplifies a much more complex reality, where long-standing grievances associated with territorial expansion and underlying power hierarchies have been incorporated into the aid economy. In this context, all resources are subject to capture. Cash happens to be a particularly prominent and fungible resource, yet agencies have not invested sufficient attention in developing risk mitigation measures. Addressing this requires internal reflection that prioritises strong, independent analysis of local contexts and the political economy of engagement, not simply the sub-contracting of third-party monitors and intensification of remote management practices.

*Further complicating the picture in Luuq and Gedo is the arrival of Egyptian forces within the AUSSOM mission, in areas where Ethiopian forces have long maintained a presence. This development is beyond the scope of this blogpost to analyse but will be monitored by PeaceRep.

[1] A common remark in Luuq currently.

[2] See: https://humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/create_somalia_report_2016.pdf; https://humanitarianoutcomes.org/save-interactive/index.php; https://peacerep.org/publication/time-for-change-the-normalization-of-corruption-and-diversion-in-the-humanitarian-sector/; https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/role-gatekeepers-somalia-may-2024

About the authors

Dr Nisar Majid is the research director for the PeaceRep Somalia programme at the Conflict & Civicness Research Group at LSE. He has worked in and on the Horn of Africa and the Somali territories for over 20 years, in various applied and research capacities.

Guhad Adan is an independent consultant, LSE Research Associate and regular contributor to PeaceRep.

Khalif Abdirahman is the PeaceRep Somalia research team’s senior field researcher with the Conflict & Civicness Research Group at LSE. Khalif is also a Fellow at the Rift Valley Institute.