Taming of the Somali Parliament

Introduction

On 30 March this year, 254 members of the upper and lower houses of the Somali parliament assembled to vote on the first four chapters of the constitution in the ongoing review process. They not only appeared calm and orderly, but they also uncharacteristically voted unanimously to pass the four amendments. ^[1] This shocked many observers and led to accusations of corruption and bribery. While corruption allegations are not new to the Somali government, passing legislation/amendments of this importance has never been so straightforward. How did we arrive here?

The Somali Federal Parliament consists of two chambers, the House of the People and the Upper House. The former is based on the 4.5 power-sharing system, while the latter represents the federal member states and is not formally selected in reference to the 4.5 system. The House of the People, or the People’s Assembly by its other name, is, on paper, the heart and centre of Somali politics. In principle it represents virtually the entire population of the country (through the clan-based representation of MPs and Senators) ^[2], and is responsible for electing the country’s presidents, approving prime ministers and the cabinet, and above all, acting as the highest legislator, passing laws and amending the constitution. It used to be fierce, independent and unruly. However, this has changed over time as successive governments have sought ways to control it with varying degrees of success. As a result, today, it looks instead like a weak organ of the government that is, on all important issues, side-lined by the National Consultative Council (NCC), which is composed of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member State leaders who are pursuing much narrower interests.

A recent development, visible in the last two elections, has seen Federal Member State (FMS) presidents becoming the main decision-makers in electing MPs and Senators to the two houses in Mogadishu. The FMS presidents tend to choose weak representatives who they can easily influence when it comes to supporting or opposing legislation. This practice is often driven by their desire to safeguard their own political survival or advance their Federal presidential ambitions.

The NCC has effectively replaced the parliament. It represents the narrow interests of the dominant sub-clans in each FMS, undermining the principle of the 4.5 formula and the participatory democratic potential of the national Parliament.

Inherited chaos and ‘necessary’ corruption

The current President, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud’s (HSM) first term (2012-2017) was characterised by a chaotic parliament with MPs threatening to withdraw confidence from the government  regularly. At that time there were many strong-men who the government had to constantly buy off to keep itself in office and to pass laws. There were no political parties behind which the members could organise, and no norms to observe. As a result, any member could propose a motion to topple the government even if the actual aim was simply personal enrichment (i.e. to be bought off). During this period the word ‘motion’ entered the Somali lexicon but quickly came to symbolise the nexus between parliament, government and corruption. For those unfamiliar with the workings of government, a motion is an important tool through which the parliament conducts its business to legislate both positively and negatively. However, as a result of its use in Somalia, a motion has come to be understood by the local media and watching public primarily in negative terms, as a tactic to make money or gain a government position.[3] The logic behind this is that since MPs are known to have spent more than their four year’s salary on their election, motions are used to recoup these expenses by forcing the government to pay the MPs to avoid, block or survive motions against it. In other words, to many in the public, a motion symbolises corruption, disruption and chaos.

In terms of representation, a modicum of increased representativity has taken place over successive parliamentary cycles. In HSM’s first term, members of parliament were appointed by a single clan elder, who was often paid by the nominated MP to gain the position. The single, nominating clan elder was replaced with 51 delegates, which was subsequently increased to 101, to improve clan participation. In general, it has not worked. One repercussion has been the increased cost of becoming elected as an MP (more elders, delegates and officials require payment to be selected), which in turn incentivises an MP to reclaim those costs if and when elected.

In addition, coercive means are regularly utilised, and today FMS and their security forces have increasingly decided who will become MPs, for other clans as well as their own, based on their coercive or financial power. Not all seats and clans are affected in the same way, but typically the weaker clans have the least ability to resist the financial and coercive pressures of the more dominant clans in any FMS.

In addition to covering their election costs, corruption or self-enrichment was also rationalised by MPs because they were targeted by Al Shabaab and had to stay in well-protected and expensive hotels, as well as travel in armed vehicles and with guards. MPs also come under significant social and financial pressure from less well-off relatives and clan members who expect assistance, further adding to the pressure for additional financial rewards.

Government co-option

The unruly and unpredictable parliament, which was being instrumentalised by MPs for different reasons including financial gain, meant that government leadership had to find ways to manage parliament more effectively. The simplest and most cost-effective way was through the co-option of the leadership of parliament. The leader of parliament, his deputy, the general secretary, the chief whip of the House and later the leader of the Senate were all steadily co-opted into the government system by successive government regimes. In return for helping the incumbent regime to control parliament, they were given prominence and financial rewards. In return for endeavouring to control the parliament, using all tools at their disposal, the various parliamentary leaders (especially the speaker and their deputy) would be given preference in the appointment of ministerial positions for their respective clans. The tools they can use to control parliament include: agenda setting (including accepting or rejecting parliamentary motions; withholding unwanted motions indefinitely; delaying tactics (giving the government time to subvert motions not in its interest); and reporting quorums and votes wrongly/falsely. These tools are used selectively when the government needs to push something through urgently or that is of particular importance.

Under ex-President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’, the co-option process continued with the use of a heavy stick. He refused to consult with the parliamentary leadership on the nomination of the prime minister and when relations soured, he used heavy handed tactics (as well as money), including changing the units guarding the parliament with troops loyal to him (as a form of intimidation), and finally by ousting the leader of parliament himself. One MP explained the issue as such:

“Parliament was put under enormous pressure to conform during Farmajo’s term. The speaker was first targeted and removed in an undignified way. Then the next speaker was also cornered to the level of cutting from him water and electricity supply until he caved in. 

The same MP also reported that once coopted, a speaker banned 15 members of parliament on behalf of the incumbent leadership. The same MP went on to explain that:

“The impact is still with us as it was clear from the very important constitution review vote, in which I didn’t see any strong opposition, although it was clear members were not all convinced or paid or even pressured in anyway. It is the effect of last term’s tactics and heavy handedness that is still weighing heavy on our shoulders”

By the end of Farmajo’s term, the parliamentary and presidential election processes were largely under the full control of the FGS and FMS, rendering clans’ participation irrelevant, and resulting in the (s)election of MPs with less experience and capacity, typically on the basis of their ‘controllability’. As a result of these developments, MPs today lack collective organisation and capacity and realise that their role as an accountability mechanism to the executive does not pay. Instead, many MPs tend to quietly cooperate with or cower to the wishes of the ruling regime.

Resistance and options

There are, however, MPs that attempt to resist these developments in different ways. For example, some protest by not attending parliamentary sessions. As indicated, this tactic can be managed as quorum and votes are falsified if needed in order to pass legislation. As a result, the MPs that recognise and are unhappy with these practices are requesting for the automation of some of the functions of parliament such as attendance, quorum and voting, so that these are taken out of the hands of the parliamentary leadership and parliament can become relevant again. Such a development would inevitably be complicated and politicised, as both government and parliamentary leadership recognise that they will lose their influence and symbiotic relationship.

Another current sitting MP I spoke to stressed that,

“With such practices, the government can pass any law without quorum and majority. We are irrelevant then. They only need to keep the leadership happy, and they don’t need to worry about the parliament.” 

Conclusion

The relative ease with which the first four amendments in the recent constitutional review process were passed is usefully understood in terms of this history of parliamentary practice; established processes of co-option and the manipulation of voting, rather than just through specific pay-offs (although this may also have taken place).

Somalia is in its third full parliamentary cycle. In this time, ruling cabals have learned to tame parliament in order to pass or block legislation according to the interests of the incumbents. Importantly, a number of MPs are attempting to resist this development by pushing for automated processes of voting and validation through the quorum system. While this technical fix may have some positive impact, political elites of different persuasions have all been found wanting in their desire to abuse parliamentary processes.

These abuses of power delegitimise the whole system of government and particularly disempower the less well-armed and weaker clans and sub-clans (who make up a majority of the MPs), which can in turn generate a sense of injustice as well as empathy for Al Shabaab.

Endnotes

^[1] 212 of the lower house and 42 members of the upper house voted for the amendments with no abstention or rejection.

^[2] There are a small number of clans that are not represented in either the upper or lower houses.

[3] Examples of motions include: a no confidence motion on government; impeachment; rejection of government agreements (such as the maritime MoU with Kenya).

About the author

Khalif Abdirahman is the PeaceRep Somalia research team’s senior field researcher with the Conflict & Civicness Research Group at LSE.