The Risks of Peace Activism in Somalia – the Galkayo ‘Local’ Agreement

Somalia often features in stories about conflict and disasters. It, however, also has a very rich history in reconciliation and agreement-making. One of the very positive examples of such processes is the Galkayo Agreement of 2017 which, although under strain, still holds today.

Galkayo is a border town with a frontline running through it that represents a border at many levels; between Puntland and Galmudug, two of the Federal Member States of Somalia, as well as between two major clan families and their respective sub-clans. The town was effectively divided in two in 1991, at the height of the civil war following the collapse of the state. The Mudug Accord was agreed upon between two of the major warring factions and served as a longstanding ceasefire agreement. However, while it did stop serious conflict between populations to the north and south of this dividing line, it also separated them and was not part of any social reconciliation over subsequent years.

After major outbreaks of conflict in 2015 and 2016, a network of peace activists came together and contributed to the mitigation of conflict and ultimately to the Galkayo Agreement that was signed by different political leaders, traditional leaders, and representatives of civil society. This was a significant time in Somalia’s recent political history as an internationally supported government was formally recognized in 2013 and there was considerable momentum to form the Federal Member States that would be part of this new governmental arrangement. Fighting between two of these states, therefore, would be a significant setback to this  positive trajectory.

The Agreement that was made has since enabled social relations to be rebuilt across the historical dividing line in the town, and has led to increasing investment in the town, particularly in the south, which had been more unstable since 1991.

Over the last year, sadly, insecurity has worsened again, particularly through a series of revenge killings which have escalated. Peace activists have themselves become targets as some of them have developed public profiles as they attempt to raise attention to the difficulties faced in the town, motivated to bring attention of the political elite to these worsening developments. The profile of these peace activists brings them to the attention of those carrying out revenge killings.

Traditional elders as well as women and youth groups have played an important part previously, as part of the peace activist network. However, elders have pointed out that the role of new technologies such as WhatsApp has complicated their ability to intervene as they are less able to influence groups that share information and mobilize resources through the platform.

Galkayo is known to have an active youth group, but one of the members who spoke out against the revenge killings was himself targeted and had to leave the town for some time. He has since returned.

While the revenge killings have involved different local clans, the two major clans across the border have not been brought into these localized conflicts, and the Agreement in general is therefore holding even as many killings have also been taking place.

The Galkayo Agreement is a shining light within a highly complex and volatile Somali conflict. It addresses  an important part of Somalia and deserves far more attention. It represents a positive example of an agreement-making process which has led to significant social reconciliation. Furthermore, it has improved basic law and order by making sure that isolated cases of killings do not escalate into larger conflicts. These benefits help to protect the Agreement and also draw attention to the need to continue to invest in reconciliation and  enforce law and order.


This blogpost was originally published by Peace News on 26 August 2024.

About the author

Dr Nisar Majid has worked across the Somali-speaking Horn of Africa since the late 1990s, in various applied and research capacities. He was the Research Director at the LSE Conflict Research Programme (CRP) from 2018-21, and now leads its successor programme, the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep – Somalia), also at the LSE. He is the co-author of ‘Famine in Somalia, Competing Imperatives, Collective Failure, 2011-12’.