Supporting Women in Peace Processes as Civic Space Shrinks

Civic space around the world is changing. There is some debate as to whether civic space – understood here as the space or environment beyond government which enables citizens to collectively organise and act – is really shrinking or shifting. However, there is widespread concern among proponents of democracy that civic space, and those who engage in it, are progressively under pressure from repressive governments, extremist groups, and authoritarian regimes. This pressure is coupled with the rise of an international anti-gender movement, whereby individuals, organisations, and institutions oppose the concept of ‘gender’, and work to restrict and threaten the rights of women, gender, and sexual minorities.

For women who actively engage in civic space, this restrictive environment combines with patriarchal repression in ways that amplify the squeeze on their available civic space and exacerbates individual risk. In 2022, the United Nations Secretary General annual report on Women Peace and Security noted the relationship between authoritarianism and patriarchy and stated that women human rights defenders (WHRD) in conflict affected countries were increasingly at risk of targeted attacks, with inadequate international response or support. A 2019 report from CIVICUS detailed the experiences of physical threats, violence (including sexual violence), intimidation, harassment, detention, and targeted killings that WHRDs reported having experienced. And although the issue is perceived as a growing problem, it is not new: women publicly involved in peace processes in the 1990s have spoken about the violent threats and attacks that were levelled at them by armed groups to deter women’s civic engagement.

Shrinking civic space can manifest in diverse ways, all of which may have different impacts on women’s political participation in peace processes and can impact individual women differently based on intersectional characteristics such as race, social class, location, or language. Restrictions to civic space can include (but are not limited to): ‘Physical threats and intimidation, up to and including violence; Criminalisation; Administrative barriers; Non-Governmental Organisation legislation [such as] regulations on international funding; Stigmatisation and defamation; and Limited space for dialogue and consultation, e.g. through co-optation, restrictions on access, token consultations.’ Restrictions to women’s political participation and threats to protection can also be understood as manifesting in different ways at different ‘levels’ of an ecosystem: Catherine Turner and Aisling Swaine explore shrinking space for women’s participation in Libya at ‘individual, interpersonal, community, national institutional, societal, and global institutional’ levels.

In my work with gender-equality and women’s rights advocates engaged in peace processes, an often-raised issue by external actors is how to support women’s full, safe, equal and meaningful participation in conflict contexts where civic space is restricted, shrinking, or squeezed. Unsurprisingly the answer to this question would depend hugely on the context. Responses by international donors to limited civic space will necessarily need to target and adapt to the different ways that shrinking civic space is impacting women at different ecosystem levels of participation and be flexible to adjust to shifting impacts of restrictions. However, the following points are reflections on potential steps for an external actor to support women’s rights advocates and women led organisations across a variety of restrictions.

1. Do No Harm and reviewing existing protection mechanisms for women political and civic actors is critical to any response to shrinking civic space. Women in and of a context are best placed to identify and request necessary protection measures or support. For external actors, this requires a grounded and up-to-date understanding of how women are experiencing shrinking civic space, and if they do not have this knowledge, they may need to identify trusted partners who could contribute to better analysis of specific threats. For example, various organisations have commissioned studies to assess obstructions for women’s participation and the impact of systematic exclusion of women in the public sphere in South Sudan, Libya, and Jordan, which identified elements of shrinking civic space relevant to each context.
2. Any moves to using digital technologies in response to shrinking civic space need to be carefully thought through and risk-assessed as much as in-person activities would be. Changing from in-person organising to working via digital platforms is sometimes a response to restrictions on gatherings, intimidation, or risks to physical safety. Whilst this may mitigate some risks and restrictions, and offer pathways for wider participation, digital technologies can present new risks for women’s safety (such as surveillance or online sexual and gender-based violence) and impact the quality of women’s participation, therefore exacerbating rather than reducing restrictions on civic space. Digital risk assessment guidance and support are becoming increasingly available, including tools and trainings specifically designed to support digital security for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
3. Protection mechanisms need adequate resourcing. As with the prior reflections, risk mitigation is critically important, and whilst necessary, can require additional resourcing for participation programming (such as hosting meetings in more secure venues, providing legal advice, distributing secure electronic communication devices, or travelling to a foreign location for activities). If sufficient resources are unavailable to bolster support for women’s protection, external actors may need to support women’s organisations to apply to rapid or flexible funds. Such applications can place an additional burden or risk to women’s or civic organisations, so external actors may need to provide technical support for the submitting the application, or apply on their partner organisation’s behalf.
4. Learning from women’s existing experience is central to realistic planning for supporting women in peace processes. Despite the risks, women consistently exercise their agency to work for change in conflict contexts, practicing what Julia Margaret Zulver calls ‘High Risk Feminism’. Listening to individual women or women’s organisations in or of the country may identify experiences where women have managed to successfully mobilise or participate politically despite shrinking civic space in their context. This can help external actors to explore the enabling factors which have made this possible, and whether these are exceptional experiences based on privileges (such as close political connections with elites), or whether there are opportunities to adapt their counterstrategies.
5. Within increasingly competitive and complex mediation spaces, there may be an opportunity to amplify women’s demands through external partnerships. For example, by leveraging relationships with trusted regional or international partners who can act as approved conduits of women’s demands or agendas (transfer strategies), to prevent silencing or protection risks caused by a restriction of domestic civic space. Accurate mapping of peace processes could help to identify transfer strategy partners who have strong political currency with conflict parties or hold roles within high-level peace process fora. However, in contexts where governments have prohibited communication between domestic civic organisations and international actors, additional care needs to be taken when presenting or sharing women’s demands to mitigate risks.
6. Strategic partnerships with governments who have Feminist Foreign Policies (FFP) could also be a window for other external actors to mobilise additional resources or transfer strategies, due to the mandates those governments have for supporting women in peace processes. This coalition building would specifically relate to peace processes where states with FFP are already actively involved (rather than advocating for introducing new states to a process). Governments with FFP involved in the process may already be actively supporting women’s political participation, and therefore there would need to be co-ordination to ensure coherence across actors and tracks, with the potential for coalition building across interested states if the political will to do so exists.

In the current climate, it is unlikely that the threats to women’s full, equal, meaningful and safe participation will recede any time soon. Therefore, immediate responses to shrinking civic space, as outlined in the reflections offered here, will need to be paired with ‘a much longer-term view of what constitutes risks and protection concerns for women and addressing them much earlier.’ This involves doing work to ensure that protection measures don’t only address the threats that women face in times of crisis, but the everyday structural barriers that restrict women’s political participation. Working with women to identify longer-term avenues for structural change is perhaps difficult to prioritise, particularly when funding environments often focus on short-term ‘results’. However, longer-term thinking is central to genuinely feminist and transformative programming, which needs to be considered alongside immediate short-term goals for supporting women in peace processes.

About the Author

Laura Wise is a Research Fellow and Programme Coordinator with PeaceRep at the University of Edinburgh. She regularly works with peacebuilding professionals, from grassroots activists to governments, to understand gender perspectives in peace and transition processes.