A great majority of approaches tried to eliminate extremism through security. Instead, P/CVE approaches should aim to contribute to (social) peace and reduce structural violence. The “peace through development” framework developed by China, as rising actor of peacemaking in and outside the Middle East, is a good starting point. China’s approach places premium focus on infrastructure inter-connectivity between countries with the aim to build these countries into a community of interest for regional peace by way of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This approach to development should go beyond the economic sphere to include human development, that is, health, education and a decent standard of living. This “peace through development” approach also goes beyond the “peace through democracy” approach which has often been perceived as the imposition of socio-political values on specific cultures and communities who need to participate in the creation of their own model of governance.

P/CVE approaches should include a focus on mental health. In post-war societies (i.e., across the Western Balkans and MENA), there is a high level of trauma, competitive victimisation, and mutual stigmatisation. Only a conflict-sensible, contextually based approach to P/CVE can contribute to reducing the risk of alienating stakeholders and opening a space for meaningful and effective dialogue. Where post-war legacies of inter-group antagonism serve as a breeding ground for ethno-political, sectarian, or religious extremism, P/CVE needs to be combined with programmes for dealing with the past and reconciliation (Beaujouan et al., 2023).

P/CVE approaches should include a focus on the education sector. In conflict and post-conflict societies, such as Syria, the manipulation of the education sector overwhelmingly prioritises political rehabilitation and power consolidation over social cohesion and reconciliation. This highlights the need for combined efforts to turn education from a weapon into a tool for peace (Al Sakbani and Beaujouan, 2024).

The State

Dysfunctional power-sharing systems, “ethnocracies”, patronage networks, or state collapse play a large part in the vulnerability of large segments of society towards violent extremism. For instance, in Serbia and Lebanon (“state within the state”) and Iraq (“state of no-state”), parastatal structures dominate the political and security landscape. These parastatal formations weaken the state apparatus and its ability to prevent, detect, and react to episodes of violent extremism; at the same time, these powerful groups hinder opportunities for reform while feeding a pervasive culture of extremism across the whole society. The state, however, can also be a positive factor for resilience, providing people with better services, greater economic opportunities, and a renewed sense of being part of the political process.

Given that the role of the state is not always “neutral”, it cannot be given sole responsibility for P/CVE implementation. Therefore, any effort to channel P/VCE programmes should seek to strengthen multi-stakeholder platforms and partnerships across the state and society (Rasheed and Beaujouan, 2023).

Religious Leaders

In a number of contexts, religion is often utilised as a tool of resistance against the state (i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tunisia, and Lebanon). While religion is instrumentalised by violent extremist organisations to mobilise the masses and recruit members, local communities also use it as a tool to resist the state’s hegemonic powers in the face of marginalisation (Beaujouan et al., 2023).

Religious leaders – both formal and informal – act as power configuration actors in societies where religion plays an important role in everyday life. Therefore, they can facilitate P/CVE in their local communities, and should actively be involved in such efforts, as they can hold a high degree of legitimacy and authority among their congregations. Yet, one must be aware of the potential entanglement of religious actors in sectarian institutions, as they may be complicit with repressive or corruption-ridden political systems. Indeed, the relationship between the state and religion is rather complex, especially in postcolonial contexts where the processes of consolidation of the “modern” nation-state system are still ongoing. Moreover, it is crucial to adopt a discreet and light-footed approach to avoid delegitimising the role of religious leaders if they become perceived as pursuing a foreign agenda (Beaujouan and Rasheed, 2022).

Civil Society

P/CVE strategies are often perceived to be driven by external priorities and agendas, especially when national governments are fragmented and lack a common vision of the problem and its solutions. Moreover, the over-reliance of CSOs on external funding impedes their sustainability, and the non-alignment of international agendas with the real community needs on the ground may hinder both prevention and resilience (i.e., North Macedonia and Kosovo). For instance, such discrepancies can be exploited by extremist entrepreneurs to depict NGOs that receive external funding as tools of foreign influence in order to weaken the legitimacy of their projects in the eyes of local communities (Beaujouan et al., 2023).

Civil society leaders can play important horizontal and vertical bridging roles, for constructive social bonding (within communities), bridging (across communities) and linking (across state-society relations). Even when they are not labelled or conceived as P/CVE initiatives, civil society-led efforts enhance social cohesion (i.e., social clubs, artistic projects, or religious festivals) and contribute effectively to the prevention of extremist narratives and behaviours by providing disenfranchised youth with a renewed sense of pride and civic engagement (Beaujouan et al., 2023).

P/CVE initiatives should involve media outlets. This is because the unregulated online media environment, which allows unverified content, including hate speech, to be disseminated, is seen as a key factor in community vulnerability. Traditional media channels, which remain highly influential in shaping public opinion, may also contribute to the promotion of hostile or victimisation narratives against the outgroup, especially when controlled or co-opted by extremist voices within political elites and religious institutions (i.e., Kosovo and North Macedonia) (Beaujouan et al., 2023).

In some contexts, such as Tunisia, women may be particularly vulnerable to indoctrination by radical narratives through a combination of cultural factors (tribal conservatism and patriarchal dominance) and economic hardship. Yet, they also play a vital role in P/CVE, notably through their work in social organisations, schools, CSOs, and families, and as such, are well placed to identify early symptoms of extremism in their communities. However, women are still underrepresented in leadership positions across states and society (Beaujouan et al., 2023).

*When referencing these key findings, please cite the individual research paper or blog referenced in the text.*

Al Sakbani, N. and Beaujouan, J. (2024). Education in Syria: hidden victim of the conflict or weapon of war? Journal of Peace Education.

Beaujouan, J. et al. (eds.) (2023). Vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism: An actor-centric approach. London: Studies in Countering Violent Extremism Series, Routledge.

Beaujouan, J. and Rasheed, A. (2022). Investigating the role of religious institutions in the prevention of violent extremism in Nineveh province, Iraq. Journal of Deradicalization.

** The majority of these findings relate to the project entitled “Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism Through Community Resilience” (PAVE). The PAVE project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme **