Violent Extremism
Key findings from PeaceRep research into violent extremism (2021 – 2026)
PeaceRep’s research on violent extremism was led by the University of Edinburgh.
Violent extremism is a multidimensional, cumulative process that is often fuelled by multiple grievances.
The ‘violent extremism’ label has analytical limits, especially where grievance-driven violence, criminal networks, and political repression intersect. In these settings, violence often emerges not from coherent ideology but from fragmented, situational, or opportunistic pathways shaped by exclusion, insecurity, and weak governance. Acknowledging these limitations, this comparative analysis presented here draws largely on the edited volume Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Actor-Centric Approach. PeaceRep’s work on Al-Shabaab specifically can be found in the Somalia key findings.
PeaceRep research has explored the links between cumulative extremism and structural violence; approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism; and the role of the state, religious leaders, and civil society as actors experiencing vulnerability and resilience.
Cumulative extremism and structural violence
What is often termed ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalism’ as such is not a problem. It can be a force for positive social change (i.e., the 2011 Arab uprisings were mostly described in Western Europe as a radical but democratic wave of change). Conflating radical ideas, dissent, or contentious politics with violence risks delegitimising non-violent mobilisation and reinforcing overly securitised policy responses (cite).
However, violent extremist narratives and behaviours should be prevented and countered. Therefore, preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policies should prioritise programmes that prevent and mitigate violence, focusing on behavioural change rather than ‘deradicalising’ people’s beliefs and ideologies (Beaujouan et al 2023). At the same time, behavioural approaches should be carefully designed to avoid becoming proxies for social control, surveillance, or the policing of beliefs, particularly in contexts where P/CVE frameworks are deployed within authoritarian or illiberal governance settings (Beaujouan forthcoming 2026).
Violent extremism is a multidimensional, cumulative process:
- It is often fuelled by multiple grievances, including social, economic, political, ethnic, and geographic patterns of exclusion, injustice, or inequality.
- These grievances are self-reinforcing and might result in many forms of identity-based radicalisation, which often develop cumulatively in reaction to one another. In that sense, ethno-political or sectarian manifestations of violent extremism are as relevant as religiously inspired or expressed violent extremism (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
- This perspective challenges rigid ideological typologies, underscoring the extent to which violent extremist narratives frequently overlap with criminal economies, local power struggles, and everyday survival strategies, particularly in settings marked by protracted insecurity.
P/CVE as peace through development
A great majority of approaches tried to ‘eliminate’ extremism through increasing security. This growing recognition reflects policy learning from two decades of security-centric interventions, which have often demonstrated limited effectiveness in addressing the underlying social, economic, and political drivers of violence, and in some cases have exacerbated grievances and mistrust (Beaujouan, forthcoming 2026, chapter 7).
In contrast to security-centric responses, P/CVE is increasingly analysed through a ‘peace through development’ lens that foregrounds the relationship between structural conditions and social peace. From this perspective, improvements in human development – including health, education, livelihoods, and access to basic services – are understood as shaping the environments in which grievances are either mitigated or compounded. When international engagement is embedded within locally grounded, bottom-up dynamics, peace may emerge not simply as the absence of violence, but as a more sustainable condition in which individuals experience freedom, dignity, and security in ways shaped by their own social and political realities.
P/CVE approaches should include a focus on mental health:
- In post-war societies (e.g., across the Western Balkans and MENA), there is a high level of trauma, competitive victimisation, and mutual stigmatisation.
- Only a conflict-sensitive, contextually based approach to P/CVE can contribute to reducing the risk of alienating stakeholders and opening a space for meaningful and effective dialogue.
- Trauma-informed approaches should avoid depoliticising violence by framing structural injustice solely in therapeutic terms, and instead remain attentive to the political conditions that sustain exclusion and grievance.
- Where post-war legacies of inter-group antagonism serve as a breeding ground for extremism, P/CVE needs to be combined with programmes for dealing with the past and reconciliation (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
P/CVE approaches should include a focus on the education sector:
- In conflict and post-conflict societies, such as Syria, the manipulation of the education sector overwhelmingly prioritises political rehabilitation and power consolidation over social cohesion and reconciliation.
- The increasing digitalisation of education systems in general and the expansion of informal online learning environments in conflict settings in particular have further complicated these dynamics, creating new spaces for both polarisation and peacebuilding beyond national curricula.
- There is a need for combined efforts to turn education from a weapon into a tool for peace (Al Sakbani and Beaujouan, 2024). Reframing education as a long-term investment in social trust, critical thinking, and civic agency reinforces its relevance to P/CVE strategies that seek to address violence as a symptom of deeper structural and relational breakdowns.
Resilience and its critiques
Actors of vulnerability and resilience
The State
Dysfunctional power-sharing systems, ‘ethnocracies’, patronage networks, or state collapse play a large part in the vulnerability of large segments of society towards violent extremism. For instance, in Serbia and Lebanon (a ‘state within the state’) and Iraq (a ‘state of no-state’), parastatal structures dominate the political and security landscape. These parastatal formations weaken the state apparatus and its ability to prevent and react to episodes of violent extremism; at the same time, these powerful groups hinder opportunities for reform while feeding a pervasive culture of extremism. The state, however, can also be a positive factor for resilience, providing people with better services, greater economic opportunities, and a renewed sense of being part of the political process.
Given that the role of the state is not always ‘neutral’, it cannot be given sole responsibility for P/CVE implementation. Therefore, any effort to channel P/VCE programmes should seek to strengthen multi-stakeholder platforms and partnerships across the state and society (Rasheed and Beaujouan, 2023).
More recently, the role of the state has expanded beyond institutional capacity to include regulatory and narrative functions, particularly in relation to digital governance. State responses to online mobilisation, platform regulation, and information control increasingly shape both vulnerability and resilience, while also raising concerns about the instrumentalisation of P/CVE frameworks to justify surveillance or the restriction of civic space.
Religious Leaders
In a number of contexts, religion is often utilised as a tool of resistance against the state (i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tunisia, and Lebanon). While religion is instrumentalised by violent extremist organisations to mobilise the masses and recruit members, local communities also use it as a tool to resist the state’s hegemonic powers in the face of marginalisation (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
Religious leaders – both formal and informal – act as power actors in societies where religion plays an important role in everyday life (Beaujouan and Rasheed, 2022). Therefore, they can facilitate P/CVE in their local communities, and should actively be involved in such efforts, as they can hold a high degree of legitimacy and authority among their congregations. Yet, one should be aware of the potential entanglement of religious actors in sectarian institutions, as they may be complicit in repression and corruption. Indeed, the relationship between the state and religion is complex, especially in postcolonial contexts where the consolidation of ‘modern’ nation states is still ongoing.
Those supporting religious leaders should be aware that religious authority has become increasingly fragmented (including due to informal and online influencers) and they should adopt a discreet approach to avoid delegitimising the role of religious leaders if they become perceived as pursuing a foreign agenda .
Civil Society
P/CVE strategies are often perceived to be driven by external priorities, especially when national governments are fragmented and lack a common vision of the problem and its solutions. Moreover, the over-reliance of civil society organisations on external funding impedes their sustainability, and the non-alignment of international agendas with the real community needs on the ground may hinder both P/CVE. Such discrepancies can be exploited by extremist entrepreneurs to depict NGOs that receive external funding as tools of foreign influence in order to weaken the legitimacy of their projects in the eyes of local communities (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
Civil society leaders can play important horizontal and vertical bridging roles, for constructive social bonding (within communities), bridging (across communities) and linking (across state-society relations). Even when they are not labelled or conceived as P/CVE initiatives, civil society-led efforts, such as social clubs or artistic projects, can enhance social cohesion and contribute effectively to the prevention of extremist behaviours by providing disenfranchised youth with a renewed sense of pride and civic engagement (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
However, civil society actors operating in P/CVE-adjacent spaces increasingly face legal, political, and social constraints, including securitisation, reputational risks, and activist burnout. In such environments, sustainability depends not only on funding, but also on the ability of civil society organisations to maintain neutrality, community trust, and physical and psychological safety.
Women
In some contexts, such as Tunisia, women may be particularly vulnerable to indoctrination by radical narratives through a combination of cultural factors (tribal conservatism and patriarchal dominance) and economic hardship. Yet, they also play a vital role in P/CVE, notably through their work in social organisations, schools, CSOs, and families, and as such, are well placed to identify early symptoms of extremism in their communities. However, women are still underrepresented in leadership positions across states and society (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
Emerging gender-sensitive approaches also caution against framing women primarily as early-warning actors, instead emphasising their political agency, leadership potential, and diverse positionalities, including as mobilisers or participants in extremist movements. At the same time, growing attention to masculinities highlights how gendered grievances, identity loss, and socio-economic marginalisation shape radicalisation pathways among men and boys.
The Media
P/CVE initiatives should involve media outlets. This is because the unregulated online media environment, which allows unverified content, including hate speech, to be disseminated, is seen as a key factor in community vulnerability. Traditional media channels, which remain highly influential in shaping public opinion, may also contribute to the promotion of hostile or victimisation narratives against the outgroup, especially when controlled or co-opted by extremist voices within political elites and religious institutions (i.e., Kosovo and North Macedonia) (Beaujouan et al., 2023).
References
PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2027. The findings presented here represent our main contributions to the field, but for the sake of brevity and ease of uptake are not necessarily exhaustive of all PeaceRep work on each thematic and geographic area. Read the individual works linked here for more detailed analysis. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database.
Citation
To cite these findings, use the suggested citation below.
Beaujouan, J., Al Sakbani, N., Rasheed, A. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Violent Extremism. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
References
Al Sakbani, N. and Beaujouan, J. (2024). Education in Syria: hidden victim of the conflict or weapon of war? Journal of Peace Education.
Beaujouan, J. (2026, forthcoming). Power Peace. The Resolution of the Syrian Conflict in the Post-Colonial Era of Peacemaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beaujouan, J. et al. (eds.) (2023). Vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism: An actor-centric approach. London: Studies in Countering Violent Extremism Series, Routledge.
Beaujouan, J. and Rasheed, A. (2022). Investigating the role of religious institutions in the prevention of violent extremism in Nineveh province, Iraq. Journal of Deradicalization 32.
The majority of these findings relate to the project entitled “Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism Through Community Resilience” (PAVE). The PAVE project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.