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Humanitarian Affairs

Key findings from PeaceRep research on humanitarian affairs (2021 – 2026)

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PeaceRep’s humanitarian affairs research was led by the LSE Conflict and Civicness Research Group, LSE Middle East Centre, the University of Edinburgh, and the University of St. Andrews.

While their goals and principles are different, humanitarian assistance and peace processes are deeply intertwined phenomena. According to the PA-X Peace Agreement Database, around 13% of international and national-level peace agreements between 1990 – 2025 contain humanitarian assistance provisions (239 out of 1,861 agreements). Prominent recent examples include the Black Sea Grain Deal (22 July 2022), in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; and the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan (11 May 2023).

PeaceRep’s research has shown how, in contemporary conflict environments, humanitarian action is increasingly shaped by fragmentation, politicisation, and the blurring of humanitarian, development, and security objectives:

  • Recent mediation efforts focused on short-term humanitarian or ceasefire deals across the globe reflect the limited ambition of modern peacemaking in many contexts, while creating opportunities for humanitarian action and confidence building between conflict parties (Peter 2025).
  • At the same time, across Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Iraq, humanitarian systems are no longer temporary emergency mechanisms but have become long-term governance tools that shape livelihoods, local acceptance, and political settlements.
  • The humanitarian sector across contexts is facing a legitimacy crisis, as international organisations are perceived as disconnected, paternalistic, or complicit in political agendas, while local actors carry disproportionate risk and responsibility.

Our research has highlighted four cross-cutting realities:

  • Peace agreements increasingly focus on humanitarian issues and provisions;
  • Humanitarian response is driven by local civic ecosystems;
  • Humanitarian aid is deeply embedded in political and conflict economies; and
  • The humanitarian system faces structural risks that undermine legitimacy, access, and effectiveness.

These patterns show that, beyond delivering aid, humanitarian action is also about negotiating power, identity, and authority in contested environments.

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Humanitarian provisions in peace agreements

Across conflicts in West Asia and Africa, short-term single-issue agreements have dominated mediation efforts and peace agreements in recent years. Agreements have prioritised humanitarian pauses, stabilisation, prisoner and hostage exchanges and releases, and aid access arrangements. Recent peace processes demonstrate peacemakers’ increasing reliance on an incremental and issue-focused approach to agreements. Comprehensive political settlements remain elusive (Badanjak et al. 2025).

Many contemporary peace agreements are not brokered within high-stakes legal frameworks. Rooted in incrementalism, humanitarian agreements offer pragmatic measures to mitigate civilian harm. Simultaneously, they offer channels of communication between adversaries who lack the trust required for political negotiation and binding political settlements, sustained by a shared—or performative—interest in civilian protection. This points to the prioritisation of stabilisation by belligerents and mediators, as well as the impact of humanitarian necessity, ad hoc negotiations, and backchannel diplomacy.

  1. Sudan: Between 2023 and 2025, humanitarian ceasefires and arrangements were the focus of agreements (Badanjak et al. 2025). The Aligned for Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan Group Humanitarian Access Agreement, which prioritised the expansion of aid routes, was brokered by one of the largest multiparty mediation networks recorded that year (Peter 2025). In September 2025, the mediating Quad for Sudan—the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—announced an incremental roadmap to peace, starting with a humanitarian truce and moving towards a permanent ceasefire and civilian-led political transition. Local belligerents largely rejected the political aspects of the initiative and mediators focused heavily on opening humanitarian corridors (Peter et al. 2026).
  2. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): In 2024, the Angola-led peace process resulted in agreements that primarily delivered a humanitarian truce and its extension in Eastern DRC (Badanjak et al. 2025).

However, mediation and peace agreement data also point towards a close connection between stabilisation measures and the language of civilian protection and human rights provisions. Historically, UN-led frameworks have explicitly foregrounded commitments to civilian protection. As state-led peace processes have surged in recent years, such as the Astana Process in Syria and various processes related to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory as key examples led by Donald Trump, civilian protection is predicated on the successful fulfilment of stabilisation and normalisation measures, prioritising security arrangements, such as the removal of fighters from key territory, territorial monitoring, and temporary ceasefires. These measures are infrequently successful. Because ceasefires are routinely and swiftly broken and confidence between conflict parties is rarely built, belligerents maintain strong incentives to continue fighting and durable civilian protection measures are not implemented.

  1. Gaza: Between 2023 and 2025, agreements related to the conflict in Gaza emphasised confidence-building through incrementalism. A comprehensive final agreement, which has not prioritised civilian protection, was predicated on phased steps through hostage exchanges, humanitarian access, and stabilisation often facilitated by the ICRC (Peter et al. 2026).
  2. Syria: from 2020 until the fall of al-Assad, mediation focused heavily on refugee returns and relation normalisation to project stability for foreign investment, before shifting to manage regional friction like Israeli incursions and violence in southern Syria. The Road Map to End the Crisis in Suwayda and Stabilize Southern Syria, brokered by Jordan and the United States, outlined 13 steps to provide humanitarian assistance, restore essential services, and stabilise the security situation through the deployment of security personal, removal of civilian fighters, and prisoner exchanges (Badanjak et al. 2026).

As well as impacting the sequencing of peace processes, the prioritisation and foregrounding of humanitarian and stabilisation issues in peace agreements has also affected who is involved in negotiations and implementation, and who mediates. Often humanitarian and stabilisation agreements are not brokered within traditional legal frameworks, opening avenues for the participation of actors that have excluded or avoided traditional mediation settings and efforts towards a comprehensive settlement. Across Middle Eastern and North African conflicts, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has proven indispensable to the provision of humanitarian aid as well as the exchange and return of prisoners and hostages. The United Nations has also played a key role in facilitating humanitarian agreements, rather than comprehensive political settlements (Peter 2025; Peter et al. 2026).

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Local civic ecosystems

In many contexts, humanitarian response is led by informal civic networks rather than formal institutions:

  1. These ecosystems were central in the Ukrainian refugee response, where rapid mobilisation occurred through personal contacts, local networks, and diaspora communities, enabling flexible and timely assistance that complemented state efforts while formal systems were still mobilising (Czerska-Shaw and Dunin-Wąsowicz 2025).
  2. Similarly, Poland’s response relied on civic actors for rapid support, although this created coordination and accountability challenges (Pankowski, Czerska-Shaw and Rangelov 2023).
  3. In Afghanistan, community structures such as Community Development Councils enabled effective delivery despite political constraints (Alam 2023).
  4. In Tigray (Ethiopia), local organisations and community-based groups are identified as essential components of the civic ecosystem for rapid, locally owned response and reconstruction (Gebrehiwot and de Waal 2023).

These civic ecosystems also support humanitarian negotiations and small-scale cooperation:

  1. In Ukraine, local civic mobilisation created networks of trust and coordination that enabled pragmatic cooperation across conflict lines and facilitated aid delivery in ways that complemented formal diplomacy (Czerska-Shaw and Dunin-Wąsowicz 2025).
  2. During the Syrian conflict, the fragmentation and weakness of formal governance made local civil society indispensable, particularly in opposition-held areas, not only for delivering services and humanitarian aid but also for mediating conflict dynamics and maintaining social cohesion (Beaujouan 2022; Beaujouan 2026, chapter 6).
  3. Humanitarian action in Syria also depended heavily on negotiation with armed groups and informal power structures, a reality that local civil society actors navigated daily through mediation, corridor management, and conflict-sensitive programming – roles that similarly sit within the broader civic ecosystem (Beaujouan 2023a).

In this context, humanitarian negotiations often take the form of ‘islands of agreement and civility’ that describe temporary, issue-specific arrangements that allow limited cooperation on humanitarian, environmental, or security risks without requiring a broader political settlement (Wittke 2023). These localised forms of negotiation and cooperation can reduce immediate risks and create space for civil society resilience, but they also risk being instrumentalised by conflict actors or normalising unequal power dynamics if not paired with safeguards for accountability and civilian protection (Beaujouan 2023b).

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Politicised aid economies

Humanitarian action is deeply entangled with political and military logics, especially in protracted conflicts. In Ukraine, humanitarian and military support merged as the crisis evolved, driven by a shared political objective of survival and victory. This resulted in practical integration across humanitarian, development, and security activities without formal coordination mechanisms (Czerska-Shaw and Dunin-Wąsowicz 2025). In Tigray, the post-cessation environment similarly points to the need for integrated approaches that combine emergency aid with reconstruction and reconciliation (Gebrehiwot and de Waal 2023).

Neutrality and impartiality are increasingly contested. In Ukraine, neutrality is often perceived as tacit support for aggression, undermining the legitimacy of agencies that insist on strict neutrality (Czerska-Shaw and Dunin-Wąsowicz 2025). In Syria, humanitarian access and aid distribution are inseparable from political negotiations, generating persistent perceptions of bias and unequal treatment among populations (Beaujouan 2023a; Beaujouan 2023b). In Somalia, religious leaders are forced to speak out against the exploitative practices they associate with humanitarian aid (Edle 2025).

Syria further illustrates how humanitarian access is shaped by geopolitical competition and border politics. The use of cross-border closures as bargaining tools has constrained aid delivery and undermined local civil society actors (Beaujouan et al. 2023; Beaujouan 2026, chapter 5). Similarly, the response to the earthquake in Syria showed how humanitarian channels increasingly depend on diplomatic negotiation and external leverage, turning aid into geopolitical strategy (Beaujouan 2023c).

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Structural challenges

The humanitarian system faces systemic constraints across diverse contexts. In Syria and Somalia, humanitarian delivery is embedded in local power economies, requiring negotiation with armed groups and informal governance structures, which increases risks of diversion, coercion, and political manipulation (Beaujouan et al. 2023; Thomas and Majid 2023). In Afghanistan, sanctions and compliance requirements create persistent legal uncertainty, often forcing humanitarian actors to rely on informal financial channels and networks to operate (Alam 2023; Sarabi 2023). In Somalia and Afghanistan, common humanitarian practices such as rapid scale-up, subcontracting, and third-party monitoring create incentives for  and diversion, suggesting that these problems are structural rather than exceptional (Jackson and Majid 2024).

Transitions from humanitarian to development funding also carry significant risks. In Iraq, the shift from emergency assistance to development-oriented funding following the defeat of the Islamic State group raised concerns about speed, transparency, and capacity, risking gaps in support for displaced populations (Travers 2024).

Digital innovation offers potential solutions but remains constrained by capacity and governance. In Syria, blockchain has been proposed as a tool to improve transparency and reduce compliance burdens, yet adoption is limited by technical capacity and fragmented governance arrangements (AlOkaily & Alzoubi 2024). More broadly, reliable payment systems are essential for delivering cash assistance, paying staff, and enabling remittances. In Syria, the growing use of mobile payment applications, digital ledgers, and stablecoin settlement could enable faster humanitarian transfers, provided it is appropriately regulated and monitored to prevent diversion, illicit finance, and political capture (Thompson 2025).

Lessons from Somalia point out that technical measures to curb corruption and diversion risks have limited impact,and it is important to preserve safe spaces where humanitarian actors can openly discuss the sensitive power dynamics in which they operate (Majid, Abdirahman and Adan 2023; Hailey and Majid 2024).

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Conclusion

With comprehensive political settlements elusive in most modern conflicts, humanitarian action and agreements have become a central pillar of modern conflict management. From incremental access deals in Ukraine and Sudan to grassroots resilience in Syria and Afghanistan, aid delivery is deeply entangled with political authority, local power dynamics, and the pursuit of survival in contested environments.

While incrementalism, local civic ecosystems, and localized “islands of agreement” offer vital pragmatic lifelines and open crucial communication channels between adversaries that would otherwise avoid negotiating, they also present profound systemic risks. Humanitarian systems are increasingly vulnerable to political instrumentalisation, geopolitical bargaining, and deep entanglement in conflict economies, often eroding neutrality and stretching the legitimacy of international actors.

These pressures are intensifying just as global powers are cutting humanitarian funding and political attention, leaving aid systems overstretched and under-resourced. At the same time, the humanitarian, development, and political spheres remain structurally siloed; working on the same conflicts but with different mandates, incentives, and timelines, and rarely aligning their strategies. This fragmentation weakens collective leverage and forces humanitarian mechanisms to carry responsibilities they were never designed to bear.

These trends signal a fundamental shift in how peace and assistance are pursued. If modern peacemaking relies so heavily on humanitarian mechanisms to bridge political deadlocks, the international community must move past short-term fixes. To prevent aid from fueling local divisions or masking a lack of political will, policymakers must strengthen accountability, foster dialogue and coordination across humanitarian, development, and political actors, and empower local civic networks. Humanitarian action in contested environments is inherently political and requires vigilant stewardship and true accountability and sensitivity to local populations.

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References

PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2027. The findings presented here represent our main contributions to the field, but for the sake of brevity and ease of uptake are not necessarily exhaustive of all PeaceRep work on each thematic and geographic area. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database. 

To cite these findings, use the suggested citation below. 

Researchers involved

Khalif Abdirahman, Guhad Adan, Hila-Nawa Alam, Muhannad al-Rish, Abdullah AlOkaily, Sohaib Alzoubi, Sanja Badanjak, Juline Beaujouan, Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Elisa D’Amico, Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz, Abdirahman Edle, Abdallah El hafi, Tim Epple, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Eyas Ghreiz, Peter Hailey, Niamh Henry, Kasia Houghton, Ashley Jackson, Nisar Majid, Ayham Odat, Rafal Pankowski, Mateja Peter, Iavor Rangelov, Claire Thomas, Rebecca Thompson, Alannah Travers, Alex de Waal, Robert Wilson, Cindy Wittke

Citation

Beaujouan, J. and Houghton, K. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Humanitarian Affairs. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

References

Alam, H. (2023). Humanitarian Aid Delivery in Contemporary Afghanistan (Afghanistan Research Network Reflection). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

AlOkaily, A. and Alzoubi, S. (2024). Exploring Blockchain Technology for Humanitarian Aid in Conflict Zones: A Syrian Case Study (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Badanjak, S., Amaya-Panche, J., Beaujouan, J., Epple, T., Farquhar, A., Henry, N., Wilson, R., and Wise, L. (2025). Peace Agreements in 2024: Insights from the PA-X Database [PA-X Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Badanjak, S., Wise, L., Farquhar, A., Henry, N., Guichardaz, H., Wilson, R., Epple, T. (2026). Peace Agreements in 2025: Insights from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database [PA-X Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

Beaujouan, J. (2026, forthcoming). Power Peace. The Resolution of the Syrian Conflict in the Post-Colonial Era of Peacemaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beaujouan, J. (2023a). ‘Negotiating Humanitarian Aid with Armed Groups: Humanitarian Imperative or Red Line?’PeaceRep Blog, 9 August.

Beaujouan, J. (2023b). Humanitarian Aid and Peace in Syria: An Intricate Relationship’ PeaceRep Blog, 3 August.

Beaujouan, J. (2023c). ‘Syria and the Politics of the Earthquakes’. PeaceRep Blog, 28 July.

Beaujouan, J., al-Rish, M., El hafi, A., Ghreiz, E., and Odat, A. (2023). Navigating Fragmentation: Humanitarian Aid, Borders and Conflict Lines (Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Beaujouan, J. (2022). ‘The Covid-19 Pandemic and Alternative Governance Systems in Idlib’ in Allouche, J. and te Lintelo, D.J.H. (Eds)Humanitarianism and Covid-19: Structural Dilemmas, Fault Lines, and New Perspectives, IDS Bulletin, 53.2, Brighton: IDS.

Czerska-Shaw, K. and Dunin-Wąsowicz, R. (2025). Enacting the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) Triple Nexus: civic ecosystems at the frontlines of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Globalizations, 1–18.

Edle, A. (2025). Humanitarian aid in Baidoa: religious leaders speak out,PeaceRep blog, 27 January.

Gebrehiwot, M. and de Waal, A. (2023). Humanitarian Priorities for Tigray, Ethiopia, after the Cessation of Hostilities. Somerville, MA: World Peace Foundation.

Hailey, P. and Majid, N. (2024). Fighting corruption in Somalia: continuing the momentum, building on technical ‘fixes’,13 November. 

Jackson, A. and Majid, N. (2024). Time for Change: The Normalization of Corruption and Diversion in the Humanitarian Sector (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Majid, N., Abdirahman, K. and Adan, G. (2023). Can we (ever) have a conversation about corruption and accountability in Somalia, PeaceRep blog, 7 August.

Peter, M. (2025). Mediation in 2024: First Insights from the MEND Database [MEND Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Peter, M., D’Amico, E., Houghton, K., & Badanjak, S. (2026). Mediation in 2025: Navigating overlapping conflict systems [MEND Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

Pankowski, R., Czerska-Shaw, K., and Rangelov, I. (2023). Poland’s Role in Ukraine’s Security Amid the Challenge of Migration: Humanitarian Responses, Civic Solidarities and Downstream Risks (PeaceRep Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.

Sarabi, N. (2023). Aid Coordination and Delivery in Afghanistan: Assessing Past and Current Architecture (Afghanistan Research Network Reflection). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh

Thomas, C. and Majid, N. (2023). ‘Powerful networks impose taxes on aid in Somalia. It’s time for this to end’. The New Humanitarian, 10 October.

Thompson, R. (2025). From Cash to Code: Payment Rails as Peace Infrastructure in Syria (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Travers, A. (2024). The UN’s Humanitarian Transition from Emergency Assistance to Development Funding in Iraq: The Politics of Delivering Aid in a Country of Protracted Post-Conflict Displacement (PeaceRep Research Paper). Middle East Centre, London School of Economics.

Wittke, C. (2023). Creating ‘Islands of Agreement and Civility’ through Humanitarian Negotiations: A Conflict Management and Disaster-Mitigation Strategy in Russia’s War against Ukraine (PeaceRep Report). Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics.