Constitution Building
Key findings from PeaceRep research on constitution building (2021 – 2026)
PeaceRep’s constitution-building research was led by International IDEA.
Overview
Constitution-building refers to processes for negotiating, drafting and implementing constitutions. As part of this process, existing constitutions can be amended or new constitutions designed. PeaceRep has been working to understand how constitution-building is intertwined with contemporary peace processes, and how this association has changed over time (International IDEA 2022).
In fragile and conflict-affected states, and in particular in those instances where conflict parties are at a draw, often the parties will seek to negotiate a new political settlement that will better respond to their own needs and demands. In the past, these negotiations have resulted in peace agreements that initiated a constitution-building process or very occasionally included a constitutional framework as part of the peace agreement. The Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia Herzegovina is the starkest example of the latter, as it included the constitution in one of the annexes to the agreement. In other instances, the constitution itself functioned as a peace agreement, such as the 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa.
Data Resources
PA-X Peace Agreements Database
Database on Constitution‑Building Processes in Fragile Settings
For examples of country timelines that include constitution-making amid wider institutional changes, see the PA-X Tracker. Select country and the tab for Timeline of Formal Change Processes.
Browse key findings on constitution-building in the tabs below.
Sequencing of peace agreements and constitutions
Interim or transitional constitutions often follow periods of crisis and (legal) uncertainty. Their adoption may signal the need to (re)build state institutions and establish (inclusive) processes that will allow the people to govern themselves. At the same time, it also indicates that stakeholders need a process that over time may lead them to adopt a more permanent constitution.
While there is an ideal path for twin transitions from conflict and authoritarianism to peace and democracy—with ceasefires followed by comprehensive peace agreements in turn resulting in constitutional reform—this sequencing has evolved to become significantly more varied. Rather than following a single, linear path, twin transitions have straddled from partial peace agreements leading to a final new constitution or a review of the old constitution, to transitional political arrangements preceding the drafting of a final constitution. In some cases, an interim constitution—sometimes following a peace or ceasefire agreement—has served as both a transitional framework and a precursor to the final constitutional stage. There have also been instances where transitional arrangements have been followed by one or several interim constitutions before moving to the final constitutional drafting. Often, economic interests, and in particular natural resource governance, drive parties’ positions on post-conflict constitutional negotiations (Zulueta-Fülscher and Murray 2024; Hickey and Rivera 2025).
Failure of constitution building
Nevertheless, increasingly there are circumstances in which the constitution-building process fails, either because stakeholders cannot reach consensus on a draft text, or because the proposed new or amended constitution is not approved or ratified. In some instances, a constitutional text is drafted but never adopted, such as in The Gambia (2020) or the ratification stalls indefinitely, such as in Yemen (2015).
There have also been temporary failures, where efforts to draft a constitution break down (either before or after the completion of the draft constitution) but are followed by renewed attempts, sometimes building on earlier work, such as in Fiji, Kenya and Nepal. In other occasions, constitution-making has been formally suspended or paused, only to be resumed at a later stage. There also are cases where only select parts of an agreement find their way into the final constitutional text. Additionally, some amendment procedures fail because the thresholds required for approval are simply too difficult to achieve. Together, these failures underscore the complex and often non-linear nature of modern constitution-building efforts. At the same time, the adoption and ratification of a new or amended constitution by a given deadline does not necessarily result in success, as its implementation may be challenged or it may be suspended shortly after adoption (Zulueta-Fülscher 2023).
Constitution-building efforts can fail due to a lack of trust among negotiating parties and disagreements over issues that have previously divided them; unattainably high thresholds for amendments; and fragmentation and polarization of actors that enable vetoes of individual actors, in particular when engaging in inclusive processes. Delays in drafting can also have an impact on the momentum for constitutional reform, and result in stalling. Poorly designed processes, whether too rigid or too flexible, also hinder progress. Leadership focused on short-term or personal interests may undermine consensus, and international intervention can disrupt legitimacy if it appears biased or overly controlling (Zulueta-Fülscher 2023).
Changing conflict dynamics and substate governance arrangements
In recent decades, conflict dynamics have undergone significant transformation, affecting not only approaches to constitution building but also the wider practice of peace mediation (Bell and Ainsworth 2022; Whitfield 2026; Peter et al 2026). Notably, comprehensive peace agreements as mechanisms for ending violent conflict have become increasingly uncommon (Bell and Badanjak 2019), with constitution building at times directly assuming a central role in addressing underlying causes of conflict. The Covid pandemic may indeed have exacerbated these dynamics with the unravelling of the post-cold war geostrategic framework.
Beyond this, intra-state conflicts increasingly lead to stakeholder fragmentation, with a growing number of state and non-state actors involved in multiple and overlapping conflicts, and territorially concentrated groups poised against central-state structures and authorities and attempting to renegotiate and restructure the state. In some instances, regional authorities may draft and adopt regional constitutions in advance of the central-state constitution being finalised (Zulueta-Fülscher and Welikala 2025). But the longer this negotiation process lasts, the more likely it is that substate (both local and regional) governance arrangements become fragmented and inconsistent. Understanding the complexity and fluidity of substate governance arrangements may allow central-state authorities to build effective and appropriate structures and processes, in communication with substate authorities (Zulueta-Fülscher and Murray 2025; see also Wahiu and Abebe 2025; Lackner 2025; Sumlut and Zulueta-Fülscher 2026).
References
PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2026. The findings presented here represent our main contributions to the field, but are not necessarily exhaustive of all PeaceRep work on each thematic and geographic area. Read the individual works linked here for more detailed analysis. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database.
To cite these findings, use the suggested citation below.
Researchers involved: Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, Christine Bell, Adem K. Abebe, Rhys Ainsworth, Sharon P. Hickey, Helen Lackner, Christina Murray, Anastasia Rivera, Gun Mai Sumlut, Winluck Wahiu, Asanga Welikala, Teresa Whitfield
Suggested citation: Zulueta-Fülscher, K. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Constitution Building. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
References
Bell, C. & Ainsworth, R. (2022). Constitution-building and Disruption: Addressing Changing Conflict Patterns – Eighth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2021. International IDEA.
Bell, C. & Badanjak, S. (2019). Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 56(3), 452–466.
Hickey, S. P. (2024). Natural Resource Management. Development and Environmental Protection in Constitutional Reform Processes. Fifth Women Constitution-Makers’ Dialogue, 2023. International IDEA.
Hickey, S. P., & Rivera, A. (2025). Independent Institutions: Enhancing Democratic Integrity and Accountability through Constitutional Design. Sixth Women Constitution-Makers’ Dialogue, 2024. International IDEA.
International IDEA. (2022). Database on Constitution-Building Processes in Fragile Settings, first posted September 2022, and accessed at https://pccbp.constitutionnet.org on 2 April 2026.
Lackner, H. (2025). From Local Governance to Constitution Building: Yemen after 10 Years of Conflict – Eleventh Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2024. International IDEA.
Peter, M., D’Amico, E., Houghton, K., & Badanjak, S. (2026). Mediation in 2025: Navigating overlapping conflict systems (MEND Data Series). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. https://doi.org/10.7488/era/7185
Sumlut, G. M. & Zulueta-Fülscher (2026). Myanmar’s Fragmented Future. Evolving Governance and Conflict Dynamics Five Years after the 2021 Coup – Twelfth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2025. International IDEA.
Wahiu, W. & Abebe, A. K. (2025). From Substate Governance to Constitution-building at the Centre: A View from Somalia – Eleventh Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2024. International IDEA.
Whitfield, T. (2026). Beyond the Deal? Rethinking Statebuilding Amid Conflict Fragmentation and Transactional Peacemaking – Twelfth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution Building, 2025.
Zulueta-Fülscher, K. (2023). Discussion Paper: How Constitution-making Fails and What We Can Learn from It – Ninth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2022. International IDEA.
Zulueta-Fülscher, K. & Murray, C. (2024). Shaping the Post-Conflict Landscape? The Role of Constitutions in Natural Resource Governance – Tenth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2023. International IDEA.
Zulueta-Fülscher, K., & Murray, C. (2025). Constitution-building in Deeply Fragmented States: The Role of Local Governance – Eleventh Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2024 International IDEA.
Zulueta-Fülscher, K. & Welikala, A. (2025). Building up Federalization: A Third Way of Federal State-formation. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2025.2565548