Syria Findings
Key findings from PeaceRep research in Syria (2021 – 2026)
PeaceRep’s Syria work was led by the University of Edinburgh and LSE CCRG.
The landscape of the Syrian conflict, and the political transition ushered in by the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, are divided and fragmented in many shapes and forms. Our research has explored how this fragmentation plays out in practice, across different areas of control and at different levels of public authority. In particular, we have focused on the foundations of a viable post-Assad transition, social cohesion and local peace dynamics, governance, economic conditions for stability, and international influence on the transition.
Our research drew on the PA-X Peace Agreements Database as well qualitative and survey methods. We worked closely with Syrian researchers and civic actors, including through the Mapping Syria project in which we have used innovative expert surveys to examine issues such as public authority, justice, and inclusive development.
Browse our key findings and publications in the tabs below.
Foundations of a Viable post-Assad Transition
The transition inherits the legacy of ‘power peace’: Earlier peace architectures prioritised geopolitical stabilisation and regime endurance over inclusion and accountability, leaving deep legitimacy gaps that continue to shape the transition and fuel mistrust in national processes (Beaujouan 2025a).
The transition is occurring amid fragmented, under-resourced peacebuilding: Bottom‑up peacebuilding remains severely underfunded, fragmented, and weakly institutionalised, limiting its ability to shape national peace processes or anchor the transition in local legitimacy (Gharibah 2026).
Civic space is shrinking at the very moment it is most needed: Civil society actors – central to reconciliation, dialogue, and local legitimacy – are increasingly restricted and excluded from formal transitional processes, weakening prospects for an inclusive peace settlement (Gharibah 2026).
Economic transition is inseparable from peace process design: Economic governance reform, transparency, and accountability are core peace issues. Unresolved austerity, privatisation, and crony structures risk fuelling renewed grievances and undermining any political settlement (Daher and Mehchy 2025).
Payment and financial systems are part of peace infrastructure: Reliable, trusted payment rails are essential for delivering visible peace dividends. Without functioning financial channels, neither citizens nor businesses experience tangible benefits from the transition, eroding confidence in peace processes (Thompson 2025).
Governance Choices that Shape Peace
Legitimacy matters more than formal design: Comparative lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon show that constitutional engineering alone will not stabilise Syria; what matters is whether institutions deliver services, inclusion, and responsiveness, and whether they are locally anchored and perceived as legitimate (Beaujouan and Thompson, 2026a).
Centralisation versus local legitimacy is a defining tension: Unresolved tensions between central authority and local governance – especially where parallel local structures emerged during the conflict – will shape whether the transition consolidates into renewed authoritarianism or a more plural, negotiated order (Ibid). Empirical evidence points to the more legitimate model of governance. Community-based, bottom-up health sector governance models scored higher on every source of legitimacy than top-down models, with direct implications for how transitional institutions secure voluntary compliance rather than relying on coercion (Alkhalil et al. 2024).
Risk of reproducing authoritarianism through transitional institutions: If representation gaps, executive dominance, and security sector influence are not checked, transitional bodies may simply re‑embed centralised, coercive governance under a new façade, undermining the credibility of peace processes.
Civic participation is a stabiliser, not an add‑on: Mechanisms for civic participation – including women, youth, and returnees – are critical to preventing fragmentation and sustaining political cohesion, beyond symbolic consultation (Al-Ali 2026). Excluding civil society from formal peace and transition structures removes one of the few remaining sources of social trust (Gharibah 2026).
Economic Conditions for Stability
Economic exclusion directly threatens peace: Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises are a key stabilising actor. When they are constrained by over‑compliance and lack of finance, and when politically driven post‑2024 investment patterns that prioritise elite interests over developmental needs, economic grievances deepen and can translate into broader conflict risks (Mehchy, Turkmani and Gharibah 2024; Koman and Mehchy 2025).
War economy legacies are a justice and peace issue: Unresolved questions around illicit wealth, regime‑linked assets, and public debt shape perceptions of fairness, legitimacy, and whether the transition represents a real break from kleptocracy (Daher and Mehchy 2025).
Informal and digital systems should be integrated into peace thinking: Hawala networks and emerging digital payment systems are already central to economic life. A phased approach that bridges informal, digital, and formal finance is essential to avoid destabilising shocks and to underpin local peacebuilding and recovery (Thompson 2025).
International Influences on the Transition
Aid and reconstruction are arenas of political contestation: The shift from humanitarian relief to reconstruction is increasing state control over aid flows, with centralised financing mechanisms and emerging executive‑controlled reconstruction funds strengthening national ownership but also risking elite capture, reduced transparency, and geographic inequality in peace dividends (Beaujouan and Thomspon, 2026c).
Fragmented aid systems weaken peace‑linked recovery: Parallel humanitarian, early recovery, and reconstruction channels – combined with limited access for independent civil society and local actors – undermine coordination and reduce the ability of international programming to support a coherent peace process.
External actors influence peace without consistent accountability: Regional and international powers consistently shape both national and local arrangements – through financing, security guarantees, and economic deals – often without clear accountability standards, reinforcing a power peace logic that sidelines inclusive, rights‑based outcomes. Post-Assad investment flows already reflect this pattern, with Gulf Countries and Turkish capital deployed to legitimise the new authority rather than maximise inclusive development returns, and major contracts awarded to politically connected firms without competitive tendering (Koman and Mehchy 2025).
References
PeaceRep’s key findings series presents a top-line overview of findings from the breadth and depth of the consortium’s data-driven and in-country research between 2021 – 2027. To view all PeaceRep publications, visit the publications database.
Researchers and contributors
Zaid Al-Ali, N Al Sakbani, Christine Bell, Juline Beaujouan, Joseph Daher, Mazen Gharibah, Munaff Koman, Zaki Mehchy, Rebecca Thompson, Reem Turkmani
Citation
Beaujouan, J. & Mehchy, Z. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Syria. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
References
Al-Ali, Z. (2026). Syria at a Crossroads: Enhancing Inclusiveness in a Highly Centralized Political Transition – Twelfth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building 2025. International IDEA.
Al Sakbani, N., and Beaujouan, J. (2025). Education in Syria: hidden victim of the conflict of weapon of war? Journal of Peace Education, 22(2), 186–206.
Beaujouan, J. (2025a). Power Peace: The Resolution of the Syrian Conflict in a Post-Liberal Era of Peacemaking. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 19(3), 309–328.
Beaujouan, J. (2025b). Curriculum Review and International Engagement in Syria’s Education Sector. Unpublished.
Beaujouan, J. and Thompson, R. (2026a, forthcoming). “Political Governance”, Syria in Transition: Comparative Lessons and Implications for International Engagement. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Beaujouan, J. and Thompson, R. (2026a, forthcoming). “International Programming and Aid Delivery”, Syria in Transition: Comparative Lessons and Implications for International Engagement. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Beaujouan, J. and Thompson, R. (2026b, forthcoming). “Social Cohesion”, Syria in Transition: Comparative Lessons and Implications for International Engagement. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Bell, C. et al. (2025). PA-X Local Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, Version 9. www.peaceagreements.org.
Daher, J. and Mehchy, Z. (2025). Syria’s Economic Transition: From Kleptocracy to Islamic Neoliberalism in a War-Torn Economy (PeaceRep Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Gharibah, M. (2026). Civic Spaces in Syria’s First Year of Transition: Challenges, Ambiguities and Future Opportunities (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Koman, M. and Mehchy, Z. (2025). Potential Impact of Investment Agreements in Post-Assad Syria (PeaceRep Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh
Mehchy, Z., Turkmani, R. and Gharibah, M. (2024). Empowering MSMEs in Syria: Overcoming Operational Challenges (PeaceRep Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Thompson, R. (2025). From Cash to Code: Payment Rails as Peace Infrastructure in Syria (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Social Cohesion and Local Peace Dynamics
Local peace processes can help stabilise the country, but remain isolated from national tracks: Intercommunal dialogue and local agreements have repeatedly reduced violence even when national tracks failed, underscoring their importance as part of Syria’s peace infrastructure (PA-X Local Peace Agreements Database). However, they remain isolated, under‑supported, and weakly connected to formal peace architectures (Gharibah 2026).
Social fragmentation and mistrust constrain any national settlement: Deep mistrust between communities, returnees, and the state – compounded by displacement, poverty, and trauma – means peace processes must explicitly rebuild social cohesion and address everyday security and justice needs, not just elite bargains (Beaujouan and Thompson, 2026b).
Transitional justice is a core peace process gap: Weak, fragmented accountability mechanisms risk reinforcing grievances. Without credible, inclusive transitional justice, both local and national peace initiatives will struggle to gain legitimacy or prevent relapse into renewed violence (Ibid).
Conflict-era shifts in gender roles should be a foundation for inclusive transition: Women’s labour force participation increased in all areas during the conflict, with more women becoming primary breadwinners; this is a social transformation any transition must build on rather than reverse (Turkmani, Mehchy, and Gharibah 2022).
Education is a core, long‑term peace arena: Highly politicised, divisive curricula and the erasure of ‘other’ identities undermine prospects for reconciliation and a shared national narrative, while rapid, non‑consultative reforms risk replacing one exclusionary narrative with another and deepening mistrust. Transforming education into a peace tool is essential to support any future political settlement and transitional justice agenda (Beaujouan 2025b; Al Sakbani and Beaujouan 2024).