Elections
Key findings from PeaceRep research on elections (2021 – 2026)
PeaceRep research on elections was led by Coventry University and LSE CCRG in collaboration with Detcro and The World Peace Foundation, Tufts University.
Elections in conflict-affected settings unfold within political orders best understood as enduring transitions rather than linear paths to consolidation. PeaceRep has examined elections and electoral politics in Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan . As is the case in many contemporary conflict-affected settings, power-sharing arrangements in these countries solidify into long-term orders rather than temporary bridges, producing transitions marked by uncertainty, rupture, and improvisation (Pospisil & Jenner 2022). This framing shifts the focus from delivering reforms to navigating unsettledness, exploiting critical junctures and enabling creative political re-configuration. Within such contexts, elections become moments of disruption rather than endpoints: opportunities to reshape elite incentives, redistribute uncertainty and test governing legitimacy (Pospisil 2024).
Elections need to be viewed as critical junctures within enduring transition trajectories: moments when generational change, elite renewal and political re-configuration become feasible (Pospisil 2025). Rather than simply preserving the status quo, elections in this framing can catalyse change: new cohorts, technocrats, and civic-sector actors may leverage electoral openings to challenge entrenched kleptocratic elites. Disruption should be understood as a positive force in often protracted transitional contexts. Against this backdrop, several key issues and principles emerge when approaching elections in transitional contexts: sequencing, political incentives, civil space, electoral system design, shocks and buffers, and citizen participation.
Browse key findings in the tabs below.
Sequencing
When approaching elections in transitional contexts, sequencing is decisive. Elections should be thoughtfully embedded within the broader transition architecture – interim constitutions, referendums, power-sharing frameworks – and treated as one component of a negotiated political settlement rather than as a stand-alone endpoint.
PeaceRep and partner dialogues highlight two typical failures: siloed electoral assistance that treats constitution-making, elections and mediation as separate tracks; and over-reliance on external legitimacy when elections are delayed or contested. A more durable approach links timing and typology of elections to agreed transitional milestones and incorporates legitimacy mechanisms for contingencies.
Political Incentives
Technical excellence cannot compensate for mis-aligned political incentives. PeaceRep analysis showed that electoral strategies and design features are absorbed into existing political marketplaces (Miller 2024). These marketplaces are shaped by status-quo bias, elite bargaining and the tactical manipulation of procedures.
The key task is to negotiate rules with a clear understanding of stakeholder incentives, to identify where incumbents may trade certainty for reform, and to anticipate last-minute interventions that undermine even well-sequenced plans.
Elections can open windows for accountability but simultaneously heighten transactional bargaining, vote-buying and coercive capture of institutional processes (Miller 2024). PeaceRep work shows campaigns and tallying become high-stakes arenas where elite cartels deploy inducements, coercion and manipulation to secure their power. Thus, electoral design and assistance must focus not only on form but on underlying incentives structuring the political marketplace.
Civic Space
Elections function poorly as proxies for popular consent when civic space is constrained. Evidence from PeaceRep country programmes shows that narrowing assembly, media and association spaces erode trust, heighten fear of violence and reduce the signalling value of electoral outcomes (Deng et al. 2024).
The strategic imperative is to safeguard minimal civic space before, during, and after polling. Methods include independent media protections, observer access, plural campaign channels and community-level dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Comparative findings suggest that enhancing the performative implementation of electoral models, and expanding citizen and local agency, can deliver credibility even where formal reforms remain limited (Majid et al. 2024).
Electoral System Design & Shocks and Buffers
Design matters but is not the panacea. Electoral systems should reflect the inclusion logics of the settlement from which they emerge: hybrid mechanisms, such as reserved seats, tiered voting, negotiated districting, may better align with enduring transitions than pure majoritarian or proportional formulas.
At the same time, altering system architecture alone cannot offset elite manipulation of venues, registration or timelines. PeaceRep research emphasises pragmatic improvements – locally chosen polling places, cooling off between contest rounds, and visible external red-line enforcement – as accessible levers that shift incentives and build trust without waiting for full structural reform (Majid et al. 2024).
Shocks and Buffers
Transitional elections are especially vulnerable to late shocks and need built-in buffers. Legal or political shifts close to polling day are common. PeaceRep research highlights the need for robust contingency planning: diversified logistics, procedural fallback options, transparent result publication, layered verification, and pre-agreed mediation channels for recounts or reruns help prevent escalation when disputes or manipulation occur.
Citizen Participation
Across all contexts, citizen expectations must be carefully managed. Elections are necessary but not sufficient for durable peace: they cannot themselves resolve deep distributive conflicts, rebuild institutions or substitute for long-term governance reform (Pospisil 2024).
Messaging should emphasise what elections can deliver in terms of representation and a reset of political authority, and what they cannot: automatic stability, service delivery or instant accountability. External actors must avoid treating ‘holding elections’ as a success indicator in itself, as this can inadvertently delegitimise transitions that require broader structural reforms.
References
Researchers involved
Jan Pospisil (key findings lead author), Khalif Abdirahman, Guhan Adan, Sophia Dawkins, David Deng, Alice Jenner, Nisar Majid, Jared Miller, Christopher Oringa
Suggested citation
Pospisil, J. (2026). PeaceRep Key Findings: Elections. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh
References
Deng, D., Pospisil, J., Dawkins, S. and Oringa, C. (2024). Elections and Civic Space in South Sudan: Findings from the 2024 Public Perceptions of Peace Survey (PeaceRep and FES Research Report). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, South Sudan Office.
Majid, N., Abdirahman, K., & Adan, G. (2024). Somalia Election Brief – Making Elections Relevant (PeaceRep Policy Brief). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Miller, J. (2024). Ballots and Bills: Electoral Competition in Political Marketplaces (PeaceRep Report). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Pospisil, J. and Jenner, A. (2022). Fragmented Transitions in the Context of Competitive Regionalism: The Case of Sudan (PeaceRep Report: Global Transitions Series). PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.
Pospisil, J. (2024). Voting out of Transition? Perspectives on the Planned National Elections in South Sudan. #69 Sudan Studies for South Sudan and Sudan.
Pospisil, J. (2025). Elite Recyclement or Generational Change: South Sudan’s Critical Juncture. African Affairs, Volume 124, Issue 495, April 2025, Pages 205–218.