Questions of Sovereignty – Somalia on the UN Security Council

On 6 June 2024 Somalia won a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, along with Denmark, Greece, Pakistan and Panama. As East Africa’s representative, Somalia along with the other newly elected members will join five already existing members to create the 10 non-permanent members on the Security Council. They will join the Security Council’s five permanent veto-wielding members of Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States. This two-year position, commencing in 2025, gives Somalia a voice in how the UN responds to conflicts around the world. Reacting to this development, the Foreign Minister of Somalia stated that Somalia would take up “its position on the global stage” and that “We stand ready to play a vital role in promoting peace and security in the world,” while the UN secretary general’s special representative for Somalia claimed “Somalia has come a long way over the past three decades on its path to peace, prosperity and security.”

Somalia, though, is a country that has minimal control over its territorial boundaries; with the secessionist region of Somaliland in control of the northeast of the country, various regional administrations with limited allegiance to federal authorities in central and southern regions and the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab holding arguably more territory than the government to the south. In this blog, we discuss Somalia’s election to the UN Security Council in relation to the juridico-political concept of sovereignty. We contend that Somalia’s election to the UN Security Council reveals one of the central problems with the concept of sovereignty: the disparity between a state’s internal sovereignty – a state’s ability to exercise effective control over its territory – and external sovereignty, also known as juridical sovereignty – the recognition by other states of a state’s rights to exercise control over its territory. We assert that there appears to be an increasing gap between Somalia’s ability to exercise sovereignty within its own territory and therein over its own people and its investment in external sovereignty or rather the investment of the international community in Somalia’s external sovereignty.

Sovereignty in Africa – a colonial inheritance

One of the most important concepts in contemporary political thought and practice is the juridico-political doctrine of sovereignty. The long and complicated history of this concept can be traced to the early history of state formation in Europe when it functioned as an organizing concept in debates over political authority

Since the emergence of the nation-state in Europe and its subsequent spread to the rest of the world, sovereignty has become synonymous with state authority and prerogative. As such, the specific history of this concept in African political history is deeply intertwined with the rise of the colonial state in the era of colonization. Ironically, the doctrine of sovereignty was initially part of the legitimating discourse used to justify European colonization of non-European peoples, including Africans. It was claimed that the attainment of a certain level of cultural and civilizational status was necessary in order for a particular society to legitimately claim sovereignty. Africans, as well as other colonized peoples, were too backward to exercise sovereignty over themselves, it was argued, and must be governed.

While Africans and other colonized peoples rightly celebrated the attainment of sovereignty at independence, the historical legacy of colonialism was made evident when postcolonial sovereignty was bestowed on the successor of the colonial state, the postcolonial state. In Africa, this meant that the political borders drawn by colonizing European states were to crystalise into the parameters of postcolonial juridico-political sovereignty.

Despite arguments by some African scholars that the form of sovereignty inherited from colonialism is incompatible with African political history, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), have maintained that respect for colonial borders is a practical necessity to avoid chaos and balkanization of the continent into countless ethnic enclaves. But as the postcolonial state in Africa has come under increasing economic and political crisis, so has the contestation over sovereignty become a contemporary reality in Africa.

No region in Africa is this more evident than in the Horn, considered one of the most conflict-prone regions on the continent. A significant contributor to the region’s conflicts are contestations over sovereignty. There have been several wars in the region over the question of sovereignty, including the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the 1961-1992 war that led to Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia.

The recent and highly controversial MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, signed on 1 January 2024, is only the latest expression of one of the fault lines of conflict in the region.  The agreement gives Ethiopia access to and the right to build on land on the Somaliland coast: land that the Somali government considers to be its own sovereign territory. The disputes over sovereignty in the Horn is further exasperated by the complete disintegration of the postcolonial Somali state in 1991.

Somaliland – internal sovereignty, external exclusion

The origin of the dispute over Somaliland’s sovereignty lies in the fallout from the breakdown of the Somali Republic. After about a decade of armed rebellion by several rebel groups, the longtime military regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre fell in 1991. Subsequent to the regime’s fall, the different rebel forces failed to agree upon the formation of a new government. This failure threw the country into a prolonged period of civil war creating the longest running and the paradigmatic example of a ‘failed state’ in the contemporary world. Reflecting the socio-cultural structure of Somali society and the machinations of rebel leaders, the various rebel movements were organized on the basis of clan and regional identity. This meant that when the military regime fell in 1991, each rebel group took control of the region where their specific clan predominated. The north-eastern part of the country was taken over by the Somali National Movement (SNM), whose members were primarily from the Issaq clan. Subsequent to their takeover of the region, SNM and traditional leaders from the region (Issaq and non-Issaq) decided to unilaterally secede from Somalia in 1991.

In keeping with the dominant understanding of sovereignty in postcolonial Africa, regional authorities in Somaliland grounded their right to secede on sovereign authority inherited from the colonial state. Their argument is based on the fact that the region was a distinct colonial entity from the rest of Somalia. It was under British colonial administration from 1884-1960 and known as British Somaliland, or officially, the Somaliland Protectorate, while the rest of Somalia was colonized by Italy, Italian Somaliland. Five days after becoming independent on June 26, 1960, British Somaliland merged with Italian Somaliland to form the postcolonial state of Somalia.  Separatist officials from Somaliland argue that they are separating from Somalia and reclaiming the sovereign statehood, which was lost when the region voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland. This argument is made with an eye to the AU’s position that the political borders inherited upon independence should be the basis of African sovereignty and statehood.

Subsequent to its unilateral declaration of independence, Somaliland has created a relatively effective governance structure combining indigenous and modern forms of governance mechanisms. Consequently, and for the most part, Somaliland exercises a certain level of internal sovereignty, especially when compared with the rest of Somalia, where there has not been an effective internal authority since the fall of the state in 1991. Even Somaliland’s internal sovereignty and legitimacy was always more contested than claimed and has arguably weakened in recent years, including most evidently in the form of the Las Anod conflict. Despite its arguments and relative stability, however, no state has recognized Somaliland’s claim to sovereign statehood, That said, Somaliland does maintain quasi-official diplomatic relations with some countries (Ethiopia) as well as other contested/semi-recognised polities (Taiwan).

Somalia – limited internal sovereignty, external recognition

Somalia’s internal sovereignty is limited both by the secessionist Somaliland (as indicated above), but also by highly autonomous regional states, such as Puntland, whose formation precedes that of the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as by the persistence of al-Shabaab, whose own lifespan is longer than the Federal government, and which opposes the current Somali state.

Following the collapse of the state in 1990/91 and various periods of conflict and a succession of internationally supported peace processes, Somalia’s current federal government was established in 2013. It is very much the product of external intervention and a response to the perceived Islamist threat in a post-9/11 world, vividly described by Ken Menkhaus as’ ‘principally a division of spoils that is held together by a combination of a common threat posed by Al-Shabaab, copious levels of security driven external aid, and protection afforded by AMISOM peacekeepers.’

Since the establishment of this governmental arrangement Somalia is now in its third Presidential election cycle. As a sovereign entity it largely operates as a series of city states, divided between the Federal Government based in Mogadishu, operating out of a bunkerised ‘green zone’ and the Federal Member States, each with its own limitations on territorial control and legitimacy. Al-Shabaab holds sway over large swathes of the rural hinterland as well as possessing  a strong extra-territorial power, is able to tax business and people in government-held territory and operates a sharia’a based judicial system that many people utilise as it is considered both relatively fair/just and has the coercive capacity that ensures judgements are implemented.

Aisha Ahmad et al. argue that in fact there are two key parallel political bargains in Somalia, an elite political deal or bargain between members of the Federal Government and Federal Member States and a civilian deal which al-Shabaab establishes with citizens under its influence. The former deal is essentially backed up by the international community in the name of state sovereignty, and which serves to undermine the incentive for the government to develop a social compact with much of its population.

For many Somalis as well as many in the international community who work in and on Somalia, there is increasing recognition that domestic governance or internal sovereignty is not progressing even as the federal authorities in Mogadishu are increasingly invested by the international community with more powers of external/juridical sovereignty.

Conclusions

Somalia’s acceptance on the UN Security Council continues this external legitimising dynamic – and external sovereignty – with  limited signs on the ground that government – whether at the national, regional or local levels – is acting to improve its legitimacy with local populations, or that negotiations are taking place with either Somaliland or al-Shabaab, to further develop its internal sovereignty. It is in fact possible to argue that the continued legitimization of the Somali government by the international community in the name of sovereignty disincentivises government authorities from acting to consolidate internal sovereignty by investing in effective governance structures, improving its legitimacy with the local population through service provisioning and negotiating with the various competing authorities throughout the country. While reconciling the Westphalian notion of sovereignty with the complicated realities of African states struggling to exert internal and external sovereignty has always been difficult, the situation in Somalia underscores not only this country’s struggle with sovereignty, but the potential for contradictions between the external trappings of sovereignty and the internal reality.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

This blog was originally published by ISS Blog Bliss on 01 October 2024.

About the authors:

Dr. Ahmed Sh. Ibrahim is a socio-cultural anthropologist with a PhD from the Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY). He is currently an anthropology instructor with Carleton College’s Ecology and Anthropology Program in Tanzania. Dr. Ibrahim has done research in the Horn of Africa and among the African diaspora in the U.S. with a focus on the history and politics of religion, political conflicts and immigration. His research has appeared in peer-reviewed academic journals, edited volumes, and popular websites such as Africa is a Country and Responsible Statecraft. He can be reached at ahmedf95@gmail.com.

Dr. Nisar Majid is the research director for the PeaceRep (Somalia) programme at the LSE. He has worked in and on the Horn of Africa and the Somali territories for over 20 years, in various applied and research capacities. His areas of research have included food security and famine studies, humanitarianism, and diaspora studies. He is the co-author of ‘Famine in Somalia, Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures’, 2011-12 (Hurst). He can be reached at N.Majid1@lse.ac.uk.