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BROAD AND NARROW VISIONS OF SECURITY

Investigating the strategic discourse of selected NATO Member States

Policy Brief

20th March 2024

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About the Author

Agata Mazurkiewicz holds a PhD in Political Science (Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland) and is an Assistant Professor in the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. Her research interests include civil-military cooperation and interactions, resilience and NATO affairs. She was a principal investigator and researcher in several national and international research projects devoted to NATO, resilience, as well as civilian input into deterrence and defence. Her recent publications include a research monograph entitled Civil-Military Cooperation in International Interventions: The Role of Soldiers (Routledge, 2022).

Introduction

After two years of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, European decision makers still emphasise the need to support Ukraine but also increasingly point out the risks of the current security environment to their home countries and the necessity for preparedness and enhanced resilience. In January 2024, Commanders of both Norwegian and Swedish Armed Forces have warned against the possible dangers coming from Russia. While the Norwegian gen. Eirik Kristofferson remarked on a window of opportunity of up to three years to "to prepare a strong national defence to be able to meet an uncertain and unpredictable world"[1], Swedish gen. Micael Byden urged the population to "mentally prepare" for war[2]. Similarly, Germany's Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius predicted that Russia's attack against a NATO member state might happen in "a period of five to eight years"[3], while Polish Minister of Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz noted the need "to be ready for every scenario"[4]. Statements like these bring understandable unease and sometimes outright fear in the populations of European countries which have enjoyed a nearly 80-year period of peace.[5] Yet they are reflective of a significant change in the perception of the security environment, the very definition of security, as well as the desired ways of responding to threats and risks.

The purpose of this report is therefore to trace the evolution of the understanding of what security is and how it can be achieved. In order to do that, I will analyse the strategic discourse of selected European states focusing on two factors: the broadness of the definition of security and the assignment of responsibility for security. Where available, two iterations of national security strategies will be taken under consideration – one from before 2014, as the benchmark year of Russia's aggressive posture, as well as the most recent one. This allows for identifying changes in national discourses and provides grounds for recommendations.

The selection of cases for the analysis has been performed in a two-pronged manner. The first focus was on the so-called NATO "frontline states" i.e., countries bordering with Russia and/or Ukraine.[6] Their geopolitical position, as well as their troubled historical relations with Russia have made them the frontrunners in terms of support to Ukraine and vocal advocates of Ukraine among their Western counterparts. Three states have been selected out of this group: Finland, Estonia, and Poland. This allowed to maintain a fairly broad representation in terms of the sizes of population and military force, as well as allowed to include one of the most recent NATO member states. This group has been supplemented with Hungary, which constitutes an interesting outlying case of a technically frontline state which does not fully share the definition of the situation with

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[1] Mait Ots, Marcus Turovski, "Norwegian army chief warns against Russia threat", 22.01.2024, err.ee, https://news.err.ee/1609229460/norwegian-army-chief-warns-against-russia-threat.

[2] Charles Szumski, "Swedish minister, commander-in-chief warn of possible war in Sweden", 90.01.2024, Euractiv.com, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/swedish-minister-commander-in-chief-warn-of-possible-war-in-sweden/.

[3] Nicolas Camut, "Putin could attack NATO in '5 to 8 years,' German defense minister warns", 19.01.2024, Politico.eu, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-germany-boris-pistorius-nato/.

[4] „Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz o zmianach w TK i sądownictwie: Jeszcze trochę czasu", 06.02.2028, RP.pl, https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art39790921-wladyslaw-kosiniak-kamysz-o-zmianach-w-tk-i-sadownictwie-jeszcze-troche-czasu.

[5] Louise Nordstrom, "Sweden's call for population to prepare for war sparks panic and criticism", 18.01.2024, france24.com, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240118-sweden-s-call-for-population-to-prepare-for-war-sparks-panic-and-criticism.

[6] Agata Mazurkiewicz and Wojciech Michnik, „Towards the Frontline States Concept: Understanding the Responses to Russia's War Against Ukraine" (PeaceRep report), Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics, 2023, https://peacerep.org/publication/towards-the-frontline-states-concept/.

the rest of this group in terms of desired political responses to the conflict[7]. The second group of cases consists of other European Allies, and includes Germany and the Netherlands, serving as a point of comparison in terms of the definitions of security and the distribution of responsibility of its provision. Following the analysis of each case, the report ends with conclusions and recommendations.

[7] See: Agata Mazurkiewicz and Wojciech Michnik, „Towards the Frontline…".

Finland

The Finnish strategic discourse will be analysed based on two documents: the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy published in 2012 and the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy published in 2020, supplemented with the Government Resolution "Security Strategy for Society" published in 2017. As the country does not issue a single, comprehensive security strategy, these three documents will allow to trace the of Finnish concept of security in the context of foreign affairs and grasp the vision of security promoted in the domestic context.

The 2012 Government Security and Defence Policy Report is built on a broad, comprehensive concept of security factoring in not only a wide array of risks and threats, but also implying a broad responsibility for security. While the document assesses the security environment of Finland as stable, and the threat of a large-scale armed aggression as low, it does emphasise the necessity of development of deterrence and defence capabilities, resulting from the existence of various risks and threats and Finland's status of an (at the time) militarily non-aligned country. As such, "In addition to the traditional military threat scenario the comprehensive concept of security covers a number of different topics, phenomena and challenges such as climate change, scarcity of energy and water resources, population growth and migrations, terrorism, infectious diseases, organised crime in its different forms, such as drug and human trafficking, cyber attacks and the increasing vulnerability of society."[8]

The multidimensionality and interconnectedness of risks and threats, together with the historical military non-alignment of Finland result in this vision of security, which has a particular distribution of responsibility for security and a requirement of a wide range of instruments.[9] Bi- and multinational cooperation are presented as essential to security, with a particular role of the European Union and cooperation with other regional actors and the US.[10] NATO is also conceptualised as an important partner strengthening security in the region, and while "Finland maintains the option of applying for NATO membership"[11], the document also notes that "Finland will continue to see to its own defence."[12]

In addition to this, the document notes that in the complex security environment in which internal and external security are closely intertwined, "The prevention of threats as well as preparedness requires civilian and military resources from society."[13] As such, the Report notes that the civil society and the business sector are becoming increasingly important actors in securing the vital functions of the society.[14] What is more, "Preparedness for wide-ranging security threats demands networking between the defence establishment, society and the business community as well as close international cooperation."[15] This is reflected in the deterrence policy which comprises not only the assessment of Finnish military capabilities, but also such factors as "political and economic stability, the decision-making capability, resources allocated to defence, the will to defend the country, and the scope and depth of our international cooperation."[16] While the Defence Forces are designated as the nucleus of Finland's

[8] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 14.
[9] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 17.
[10] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, pp. 37, 43-45, 64-74.
[11] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 78.
[12] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 16.
[13] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 23.
[14] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 23.
[15] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 15.
[16] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 99.

defence, civilian capabilities and the population are presented as crucial for securing the vital functions of society.[17] The Report proposes several ways in which the civil-military ties might be forged and strengthened, including the development of regional units associating the Defence Forces with voluntary defence activities, common planning and exercises between the military and civilian authorities and services, and better use of the conscripts' civilian skills.[18]

The document pays also attention towards comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation in the context of crisis management and peacekeeping. As noted in the Report, "Finland supports conflict prevention and management as well as peacebuilding through the means of foreign, trade and development policies, and by participating in the development of civilian and military crisis management, mediation, humanitarian assistance, arms control and the promotion of human rights."[19]

The 2020 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy continues to build on the principle of comprehensive security, which implies not only a broad definition of security but also hints at a broad involvement in its provision. This is clear in particular in the overview of the security environment and the catalogue of resulting risks and threats. The document pays much attention to the increase of great power competition and the ensuing strain on the rules-based international system.[20] It also notes that "Despite the increasingly tense international situation, Finland is not under any immediate military threat. Nonetheless, Finland must prepare for the use or the threat of use of military force against it."[21] Here, the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic neighbourhood are seen as the most vulnerable. At the same time, the Report also discusses at length other, non-traditional and more dispersed risks and threats: "Finland examines security from a wide perspective that observes not only the military threats, competition between great powers and hybrid influencing but also the impacts of the global challenges currently in sight, such as climate change, health threats, human rights violations, migration, economic crises, increasing inequality, terrorism and international crime."[22]

In this context, close international cooperation (bi- and multilateral) is a significant aspect of Finnish deterrence, with the EU as the key framework of reference[23] and NATO as one of the significant partners[24]. As the revision of the Government's Defence Report is announced for 2024, it is likely that the newly obtained membership in NATO will also become one of the cornerstones of Finland's approach to deterrence and defence[25]. At the same time, the document, while clearly oriented towards foreign affairs and international aspect of security, recognises the need of a broad national involvement in security and crisis resilience achieved through wide-ranging collaboration between the authorities and various sectors of the society.[26] "Joint preparedness, planning, training and execution are implemented in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, where the vital functions of society are secured through extensive cooperation between various stakeholders."[27]

[17] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, pp. 99-100.
[18] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, pp. 104-105, 109.
[19] Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, p. 82.
[20] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, pp. 16-24.
[21] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, p. 26.
[22] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, p. 25.
[23] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, p. 27.
[24] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, pp. 30-31.
[25] Ministry of Defence of Finland, Defence Policy Reports, https://www.defmin.fi/en/themes/defence_policy_reports#c937490f.
[26] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, p. 25.
[27] Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, p. 35.

This notion of comprehensive security is further developed in another document - the Security Strategy for Society, with its latest update published in 2017. According to this document, its assumptions rest on "a cooperation model in which actors share and analyse security information, prepare joint plans, as well as train and work together. The cooperation model covers all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities."[28] The catalogue of actors participating in the provision of comprehensive security is indeed broadly conceived, as it includes "central government, the authorities, business operators, regions and municipalities, [as well as – A.M.] such actors as universities, research institutions, organisations, other bodies and individuals".[29] Here, the role of households and individual citizens is not played down, but rather treated as an important contribution in the form of independent preparedness and enhancement of the resilience of the society. Indeed, both in the context of "accidents", "emergencies" or "disruptions", and in deterrence and defence, the Finnish society is conceptualised as an active security provider. Next to such factors as civil preparedness and strong will to defend, "Military national defence is systematically supported with the resources available in society without endangering the continuity of other vital functions."[30]

[28] The Security Strategy for Society 2017, p. 5.
[29] The Security Strategy for Society 2017, p. 7.
[30] The Security Strategy for Society 2017, p. 18.

Estonia

The two iterations of Estonia's security strategy, published in 2010 and 2023, subscribe to a comprehensive vision of security. The 2010 National Security Concept openly promotes a "broad concept of security, entailing all trends affecting security and essential areas required for ensuring security"[31], yet it visibly maintains the importance of a traditional, military threat. This is reflected equally in the catalogue of risks and threats and in the assignment of responsibility for the provision of security. And so, while discussing the security environment the document indicates that "Along with the emergence of new threats, conventional military threats and the policy of spheres of influence has remained."[32] It notes the unpredictability of the security environment, the global character of threats and the relative ease with which they permeate state borders, while mentioning such diffused and indirect threats and risks as the rising global demand for food and energy, climate change, radicalisation and terrorism, and economic instability and organised crime.[33] At the same time, already in the 2010 iteration of the National Security Concept, Estonia has indicated the potential risk stemming from Russia's policies by noting that it "occasionally does not refrain from contesting other countries. In addition to political and economic means, Russia is also prepared to use military force to achieve its goals."[34] Therefore, while "[a] military attack against Estonia is unlikely in the present and near future (...) one cannot exclude this possibility in the longer perspective."[35] The document also indicates the possibility of a foreign power using hybrid tools to destabilise Estonia or damage its international reputation.

In terms of the responsibility for security, similarly to other countries in the region, the 2010 Security Concept identifies membership of NATO and the European Union as the key aspects of credible deterrence and defence against an array of risks and threats, including military.[36] Close cooperation with other international partners is also presented as one of the means for achieving greater security.[37] What distinguishes Estonia from many other states in the region is the active role of the society in the provision of security. It is highlighted already in the introduction to the document, which points towards "the will to defend Estonia".[38] This becomes one of the vital threads in Estonian strategic discourse, highlighting the cohesion and resilience of the society, as well as civic initiative, as some of the necessary tools for achieving the security policy goals, next to foreign, defence, and internal security policies. As such, the 2010 Security Concept emphasises the importance of civil-military cooperation not only in terms of engagement in peacekeeping, but also deterrence and defence. "To prevent and repel military action against Estonia all capabilities will be used pursuant to the principle of total defence, including the efforts of state structures and the population."[39] The population and civilian non-governmental structures are therefore seen as an active element involved the defence of the country and supporting the armed forces. The 2010 Security Concept mentions also the engagement of voluntary national defence organisations and psychological defence as important elements of strengthening national security and promoting the will to defend.

[31] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, Tallin 2010, p. 4, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156839/Estonia%20-%20National%20security%20concept%20of%20estonia%202010.pdf.
[32] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 5.
[33] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 5-6, 8-9.
[34] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 7.
[35] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 8.
[36] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 4, 6-7, 9-11.
[37] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 11-12
[38] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 3.
[39] 2010 Estonia's National Security Concept, p. 13.

This general line of thinking was repeated and strengthened in the 2023 iteration of the National Security Concept of Estonia. Here, the breadth of Estonian definition of security is particularly emphasised and described as "all-encompassing" and "based on a holistic approach to society and the state".[40] However, the greatest threat to Estonia, as defined in this document – the Russian Federation, has a distinct traditional character, especially with the unambiguous recognition of its military and nuclear dimensions.[41] The 2023 Security Concept devotes considerable attention to risks related to Russia, including hybrid attacks and information influence activities, and only briefly mentions other types of threats and risks: "Other strategic challenges include climate change, migratory pressure, food security, pandemics, terrorism, extremism, energy security and risks to the global economy".[42] Even these however, are overshadowed by the increased rivalry and political polarisation which make it more difficult to solve these diffused threats through international cooperation. In this sense, despite the aforementioned announcement regarding the comprehensiveness of the definition of security, the focus of this document seems rather narrow, especially when compared to the 2010 Security Concept.

Yet, within this framework, the responsibility for the provision of security is still highly distributed. The reliance on NATO and EU, as well as a broad cooperation with other international partners and within international organisations is upheld.[43] In particular, the 2023 Security Concept calls for continuous military presence and activities of NATO on Estonian territory viewing it as an important part of Estonian defence.[44] But also, "Based on Estonia's comprehensive national defence concept, the defence of the nation and preparations for it draw on all available military and non-military capabilities and resources, involving also the public, private and third sector."[45] Here in particular, the Security Concept emphasises the need to a long-term development of non-military national defence capabilities, military defence spending, as well as funding for civil protection. Military and non-military sectors are therefore conceptualised as equally significant, mutually supportive and interlinked. At the same time, according to the document the responsibility for the provision of security rests on all levels of public administration, volunteers and communities, and reaches down to individual citizens, who are required "to protect themselves during a crisis until help arrives, and to assist each other if necessary."[46] This broad participation in deterrence and defence is to be achieved through the development of a strong defence resolve, raising awareness and creating opportunities for military and non-military contribution to national defence.[47]

[40] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, Republic of Estonia Government, Tallin 2023, p. 4.
[41] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 6.
[42] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 7.
[43] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 4, 15-17.
[44] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 14.
[45] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 4.
[46] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 13.
[47] 2023 National Security Concept of Estonia, p. 14.

Poland

The evolution of the Polish vision of security is analysed based on two consecutive iterations of the National Security Strategy: published in 2014 and 2020. The 2014 edition contains indications of the broader approach to security in terms of its definition, but not so much in regards to the responsibility for the provision of security. While describing the security environment, the document acknowledges the "blurring of the boundaries between internal and external, as well as military and non-military dimensions of security".[48] Still, it immediately notes the constant presence of military challenges and threats, and puts considerable emphasis on state-centred and traditional threats such as interstate rivalry, disputes and tensions, local and regional conflicts or rise of authoritarian regimes.[49] According to the document, Poland faces military and non-military threats from other states, "In the case of military threats, they may take the form of crisis or war, i.e. armed conflicts of various scales - from military operations below the threshold of a classic war, to less likely large-scale conflicts".[50] Only after this, does the document proceed to the discussion on more dispersed sources of threats and risks, such as terrorism, organised crime, cyber threats, extremism, increased demand on energy, food and water, or aging populations.[51]

Unsurprisingly, against this backdrop, international cooperation, in particular in Euro-Atlantic and European structures is seen as critical for strengthening Polish security.[52] At the same time, while the strategy directly references the notions of an integrated system of national security[53], the wider population is viewed primarily as a referent object, with individual and collective protection of Polish citizens presented as one of the national security priorities.[54] "The essence of social activities in the sphere of security is to create safe conditions for decent living of citizens and the spiritual and material development of the nation."[55] In addition to that, the role of the society in security is narrowed down to public awareness of appropriate responses to emerging threats.[56] Indeed, the social and economic sectors are explicitly treated as support systems, tasked with the provision of capabilities and resources to the sectors of defence and internal security.[57] In this context, the 2014 Security Strategy assigns the defensive tasks solely to the armed forces and related state capabilities (e.g. diplomacy, intelligence, and counterintelligence), and does not provide framework for a broader involvement of civilian actors.[58]

The latest iteration of the Polish National Security Strategy published in 2020 also refers to "a comprehensive vision of shaping the national security of the Republic of Poland in all its dimensions".[59] At the same time, it continues to put greater emphasis on traditional definition of security and understanding of threats including aggressive behaviour by Russia, rivalry between states, discrepancies among allies within international organizations, conflicts, and the development of armament technologies.[60]

[48] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, President of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, art. 24.
[49] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 24-29.
[50] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 36.
[51] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 30-33, 47-53
[52] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 6, 37-38.
[53] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 12.
[54] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 11.
[55] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 94.
[56] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 96.
[57] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 17.
[58] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, art. 18, 70.
[59] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, President of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2020, p. 5.
[60] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, pp. 6-10.

This does not mean that threats of a non-state, non-military, and dispersed nature have not been noted, but even in their case, the primacy of the state-centric perspective is evident. Thus, the Strategy points to challenges for the financial security of the state, the changing age structure of the population posing a challenge to public finances, as well as Poland's energy security. Among the threats more typical to a broader vision of security, the Polish Strategy also takes into account civilisation diseases and advancing climate change.

In this context, the responsibility for security assigned by the Strategy is rather focused on state institutions and military force, though not exclusively. The first strategic objective described in the document is the "Integration of national security management, including state defence management and construction of adaptive capabilities".[61] Such an integration is supposed to result from merging the previously separate systems of national security management, crisis management, and cybersecurity, and in this sense, it reflects the assumptions of a broader approach to security and its provision. The aim to create an integrated security system indicates readiness to combine a wide spectrum of available mechanisms and tools to strengthen security, enabling a smooth "transition from a state of peace to a state of crisis and war".[62] In this regard, the importance of coherence between civilian and defence planning is emphasised, and the "creation of a universal defence system based on the effort of the entire nation"[63] was announced. Thus, the comprehensive resilience of the state to military and non-military threats is supposed to include "the full potential of state and local government institutions, educational and higher education institutions, local communities, economic entities, non-governmental organizations, and citizens".[64] At the same time, in the context of defence and deterrence, the Strategy makes a clear distinction between the armed forces and the civilian environment, granting absolute priority to the military. In a similar way, the universal will to defend the country's territory is subordinated to the military sphere through the Territorial Defence Forces.[65] Despite the aforementioned references to the comprehensiveness and integration of the national security system, the 2020 edition of Polish Security Strategy does not create specific conditions for closer connections between civilian and military environments and assigns society a rather supporting role in deterrence and defence assigned to the armed forces.

[61] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, p. 13.
[62] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, p. 14.
[63] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, p. 15.
[64] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, p. 15; see also: Maciej Stępka, *W poszukiwaniu odpowiedzi na współczesne kryzysy: ewolucja rezyliencji w polskim dyskursie strategicznym (2007-2020)*, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej" 2021, vol. 19, no 1, pp. 25-42.
[65] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, p. 19.

Hungary

Against the backdrop of other NATO member states in the region, Hungary stands out both in terms of its immediate response to Russia's invasion[66], and in terms of its recent perspective on the security environment. This might seem surprising as its pre-2014 iteration of the national security strategy resembles that of its direct Allied neighbours. And so, the document published in 2012 emphasises "an unprecedented level of security" resulting from "the successful process of Euro-Atlantic integration (...) and their joint action against foreign and global threats".[67] At the same time, it notes an array of rather dispersed and indirect risks and threats resulting from the ever changing and unpredictable security environment, including emerging new powers and dysfunctional states, unresolved conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, as well as global financial and economic crises.[68] As such, the Hungarian security strategy of 2012 frequently invokes the broad and comprehensive interpretation of the concept of security which "makes it indispensable for its political, military, economic, financial, environmental and human dimensions to be managed in a comprehensive manner, by applying a whole of government approach."[69] It also highlights the requirement of cooperation and coordination of the stabilisation and peace efforts on the international arena, with membership in NATO and the EU as "the basic framework of Hungary's security policy"[70] and a willingness to play an active role in regional cooperation all around the world[71].

In terms of the responsibility for so broadly understood security, Hungary's 2012 iteration of National Security Strategy conforms to the traditional pattern. The unlikely conventional threats are to be deterred by the membership in NATO and the EU, as well as the national defence forces. Global stabilisation efforts are to be conducted under the appropriate international arrangements, through economic and trade relations, and based on the international law.[72] Here, the 2012 Strategy recognises the need for both military and civilian components of international peacekeeping and crisis response.[73] Yet it is primarily the state and its bodies that are responsible for the provision of security. This is reflected in the concept of the whole-of-government approach, which requires "close and effective cooperation and coordination between the defence, national security, law enforcement, justice, disaster prevention and civilian crisis management institutions".[74] Within this framework, the civilian population remains rather passive, and subordinate to the states' policies, the implementation of which requires "a broad-based national consensus"[75]. Its role is mentioned mainly in terms of the adequate preparation and crisis response requiring "a resilient, well-prepared and well-informed society"[76], the need for a societal awareness to cyberthreats[77], and

[66] See: Tamás Csiki Varga, András Deák and Krisztián Jójárt, „Narrowing room for manoeuvre: The effects of Putin's war on Hungary," 18.03.2022, Heinrich Böll Foundation, https://cz.boell.org/en/2022/03/18/russo-ukrainian-war-effects-hungary.
[67] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Budapest 2012, p. 2.
[68] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 2-7.
[69] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, p. 2.
[70] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 12.
[71] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 19.
[72] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 25-38.
[73] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 44-47.
[74] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 43.
[75] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 41.
[76] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 29 e.
[77] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 31 a.

participation of civil organisations in disaster response[78]. Within the rest of the document, the population is treated as an object that requires protection from health risks, natural and industrial disasters or exploitation by extremist groups. The "solid social foundations" that uphold Hungarian security are therefore defined in terms of well-being, eradication of poverty and marginalisation, and management of demographic problems.[79]

The next iteration of the Hungarian National Security Strategy was published in April 2020 and to a certain degree presents a different perspective on security. It notes that "new challenges stem from an emerging multi-polar world order" and therefore "put a premium on security-related thinking".[80] In this way, while noting that "Hungary's security situation is currently stable",[81] it indirectly notes an increased importance of traditional, military threats "and the demands of modern warfare [which - A.M.] require complex and expensive weapons systems".[82] Among the threats and risks, it enumerates the more "traditional" types such as rivalry between states, including world powers, asymmetric and hybrid warfare, and the increase of military expenditure and capabilities. It also acknowledges "the possibility of unexpected attacks in the immediate vicinity of Hungary, including attacks against our Allies that reach the threshold of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty".[83] At the same time, contrary to other states in the region, the Hungarian Security Strategy places a sudden armed attack only as the second source of risk[84] and does not point to the source of this possible attack.

Still, the document retains some of the elements of a broad vision of security as it notes the uncertainty and volatility of the security environment. It recognises the risks resulting from climate change, environmental scarcity, demographic trends, and diseases, and puts great emphasis on uncontrolled illegal mass migration.[85] It also notes new types of risks posed by technological advancement and cryptocurrencies.[86] The 2020 Strategy also still underscores the value of international security cooperation as "most challenges require multilateral and global responses".[87] NATO is presented as the cornerstone of Hungarian security, the EU as a tool for "defence against shared challenges", and other regional and multilateral formations as important cooperation platforms.[88]

In terms of the provision of security, similarly to the previous document, the 2020 Strategy seems to give the population a rather passive role. It strongly emphasises the necessity of protection of Hungarian people on par with the Hungarian statehood and sovereignty. "The security of Hungary and the Hungarian citizens is another fundamental value in the political, economic, financial, social, technological, environmental, health, military, law enforcement, information, and cyberspace dimensions."[89] While it recognises that, "In a volatile world, making Hungary secure and successful in the long run requires the efforts and cooperation of the nation as a

[78] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 34 c.
[79] 2012 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 40.
[80] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy. A Secure Hungary in a Volatile World, Government Resolution 1163/2020, 21 April 2020, Budapest 2020, art. 1.
[81] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 44.
[82] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 28.
[83] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 51.
[84] 2020 Hungarian National Security Strategy, art. 124.
[85] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 49-50, 56-58, 61-64.
[86] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 72-72, 76.
[87] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 18.
[88] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 14-15, 18.
[89] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 8.

whole",[90] it is the Hungarian Defence Forces which are responsible for "safeguarding Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity".[91] Here, the society is viewed as a support system, characterised by "a patriotic commitment and willingness to make sacrifices."[92] While the cooperation of the society with state bodies is viewed as key, it boils down to supporting state's policies. In this light, similarly as in the previous iteration, the document confirms the state's responsibility for security within the whole-of-government approach and notes the necessity of "close cooperation of armed forces and law enforcement – both with each other and with the relevant civilian actors".[93]

[90] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 4.
[91] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 25, 134.
[92] 2020 Hungarian National Security Strategy, art. 126.
[93] 2020 Hungary's National Security Strategy, art. 31.

Germany

Germany has published its first ever National Security Strategy in 2023, giving it the title "Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany." While this makes it more difficult to trace the changes in the strategic discourse, it does provide us with ample information about the promoted vision of security and the desired distribution of responsibility for its provision in one of the largest and economically strongest European NATO member states. As suggested by the name of the document, Germany promotes a comprehensive definition of security in which defence against war and violence is equally important as ensuring a free and democratic legal system and protection of critical natural resources.[94] Russia's aggressive posture, increasing competition between states, and wars, crises, and conflicts in Europe's neighbourhood are identified as the main threats to German security, yet equal attention is devoted to non-state, non-military, and diffused threats such as terrorism, economic relations, organised crime, and climate change and its consequences. The document unequivocally indicates the interconnection of internal and external security, although it primarily addresses external threats in a direct manner.[95] Interestingly, the German Security Strategy assumes that the primary object of protection is not so much the state as the individual. Here, the assumption is that "Enhancing the security of the individual and guaranteeing their democratic rights and freedoms also enhances the stability of the state and of society."[96]

Given such a vision of the security environment promoted by the German Security Strategy, integrated security can only be ensured through "the collaborative interaction of all relevant actors, resources and instruments that, in combination, can comprehensively guarantee the security of our country and strengthen it against external threats".[97] Cooperation is here exceptionally broadly defined and encompasses both the internal dimension ("the Federal Government, the Länder, the municipalities, the business sector and the public taking on responsibility together"[98]) and the external dimension ("to work with our allies, neighbours and partners to foster security in Europe and around the globe"[99]). At the same time, in line with the assumptions of the Strategy, security is perceived as an integral aspect of all other German policies and is their ultimate goal.[100] Therefore, from the perspective of German security, state resilience, civil protection, and the protection of natural resources are equally significant. Nonetheless, issues related to deterrence and defence are addressed solely in the context of Bundeswehr activities and cooperation within NATO and the European Union.[101] Society and civilian actors are rather perceived as supporting sectors, and the population protection is discussed primarily (though not exclusively) in the context of natural disasters response.[102] In other words, while in the realm of defence and deterrence, the main role is still assigned to the armed forces, "Integrated Security means joining up civilian, military and police capabilities in crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding and including these capabilities in our actions at international and multilateral level."[103]

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[94] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany. National Security Strategy, The Federal Government of Germany, Berlin 2023, p. 19
[95] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 19.
[96] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 29.
[97] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p.11.
[98] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 13.
[99] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 17.
[100] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 30.
[101] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 30-34.
[102] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 35-36.
[103] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 14.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands adopted its first, overarching International Security Strategy in 2013 and entitled it "A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World". Contrary to the Dutch National Security Strategy (published in 2010), which focuses on domestic measures, the International Security Strategy "focuses on what the Netherlands aims to do in and alongside other countries to safeguard its interests."[104] The document suggests a broad definition of security, including a strong emphasis on the nexus of internal and external security and its continuously changing characteristics. Indeed, in its discussion of the security environment, the document presents a wide catalogue of threats and risks: "Besides familiar issues like arms control, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), other the crisis management and issues like cyber security, piracy, cross-border crime and the threat of terrorism (including use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by terrorists) have also become very timely. New issues like water and resource scarcity, pandemics, loss of biodiversity and climate change also have disturbing implications."[105] In other words, the Dutch International Security Strategy recognises both types of threats and risks: the more traditional, state-centred and military ones, as well as those that can be characterised as dispersed, non-state and non-military. It also matches with the broad vision of security promoted by the National Security Strategy which combines territorial, economic, ecological and physical security, and social and political stability.[106]

Given this broad definition of security, the International Security Strategy claims the need to involve a wide range of actors in its provision. "Security cannot be taken for granted. It is something that we continually need to work at, together with other countries, international organisations, civic institutions, the private sector and members of the public."[107] And so, close international cooperation is seen as fundamental for the achievement of three strategic interests of the Netherlands: the defence of Dutch and Allies' territory, an effective international legal order and economic security. Here, "NATO remains a crucial pillar of Dutch security policy."[108] At the same time, the involvement of non-state and non-military actors in the provision of security is rather scarce and limited to private sector's work on innovative solutions to some of the risks, as well as public-private and civil-military cooperation in terms of cyber-security.[109] The document also refers to an integrated approach in terms of international stabilisation efforts, linking "the instruments of defence, diplomacy, development cooperation, the police, the justice system and trade".[110] This includes cooperation between international military and non-military actors, as well as "coordination of the activities of Dutch military personnel, police officers, lawyers, businesses, civil society organisations, civilian experts and diplomats in conflict zones."[111] Thus, despite the claim of a broad involvement of civil and military actors in the provision of security, the International Security Strategy does not provide a detailed framework in which this involvement could take place.

Similarly, the latest iteration of the Dutch Security Strategy, published in 2023, interweaves elements of a broader and more traditional definitions of security. The intensification of relations between states is viewed as a challenge and a source of risk

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[104] International Security Strategy. A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World, The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hague 2013, p.2.
[105] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 3.
[106] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 8.
[107] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 2.
[108] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 11.
[109] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 14, 17.
[110] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 16.
[111] International Security Strategy. 2013, p. 17.

for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but it has a completely different character than in the cases of e.g. Estonia and Poland discussed above and in certain aspects is more similar to that of Hungary. The Dutch Security Strategy does not consider the possibility of direct aggression, but at the same time emphasises that: "We cannot rule out the possibility of an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the territory of our allies".[112] The description of the security environment and the catalogue of threats take into account aspects such as geopolitical rivalry, intensified strategic competition, and the proximity of armed conflict, while also indicating that the "The new power politics are not limited to the traditional security domain."[113] It also points to the accumulation of challenges and mutual linkages between traditional (military) threats and non-military and non-state factors, such as organised crime, humanitarian crises, climate change, or societal polarisation.

As a result of this vision of the security environment, the Netherlands clearly lean towards the principles of a comprehensive approach to security. As stated in the 2023 Security Strategy: "the creation of a secure and resilient society requires commitment from all: not only from all branches of government but also citizens, businesses and civil society organisations."[114] The responsibility for the provision of security is thus dispersed among different sectors, albeit to a lesser extent in the context of defence and deterrence. Here, the Dutch Security Strategy points to the role of international cooperation (within the European Union and NATO) and rather perfunctorily to the necessity of effective civil-military cooperation, primarily during host nation support tasks and during peacekeeping missions and operations.[115] Much greater involvement of non-military entities is envisaged in countering non-military threats (including hybrid and economic ones). In this context, the Netherlands refers to the concepts of whole of government and whole of society, which are key to the comprehensive vision of security. As such, they assume joint efforts by individual ministries in the government and sectors of society to achieve common goals. Equally important according to the Dutch Security Strategy is building societal resilience in such a way that it adapts to existing threats, survives potential crises, and is able to return to normal functioning.[116] Still, the issue of resilience is discussed here not in terms of deterrence and defence, but rather in relation to climate change, critical infrastructure protection, health security, and crisis management.

[112] The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security, the Hague 2023, p. 13.
[113] The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 14.
[114] The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 20.
[115] The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 22.
[116] The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 29-31.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As shown in the above discussion, the strategic discourse of the selected European NATO member states has undergone an evolution, though the changes in terms of the definition of security and the assigned responsibility for its provision are not as deep as the proponents of "the return to hard power" suggest.[117] Indeed, the stronger emphasis on the traditional conceptualisation of threats, as posed by other states and of a predominantly military character, is clear in many of the discussed cases. Here, Estonia seems to be a notable exception, as its strategic documents have been steadily indicating the Russian Federation as a potential military security threat since 2010. On the other hand, the German Security Strategy, even though published after the aggression against Ukraine, devotes relatively equal attention to both traditional and more dispersed threats.

In terms of their understanding of the security environment, the most recent iterations of the analysed strategic documents present a relatively similar picture. Most of them assign great importance to state-centred, military threats, with Russia being named as the main source of insecurity. In this respect, in particular the similarity between frontline states is clear. An interesting rapprochement occurs between Hungary, which, having a border with Ukraine, could technically be qualified as a frontline state, and the Netherlands. Neither of these states acknowledges the Russian Federation as a direct threat to themselves. This could be explained by the simple fact that neither of them borders with Russia, however Germany, which is in a similar geographic position, clearly states that "Russia is directly threatening our security"[118].

Despite this visible increase of preoccupation with traditional, military threats, all of the analysed strategies make some reference to the comprehensive conceptualisation of security. The shared understanding of threats and risks includes such phenomena as terrorism, organised crime, climate change, and the changing demographics. Indeed, all of the states' strategic documents recognise the nexus between the internal and the external security and emphasise the importance of international cooperation and view membership in regional organisations as a cornerstone of their national security.

Within this broader context, the strategic discourse of most of the states directly refers to the concept of comprehensive or integrated security, understood as requiring cooperation between various military and non-military as well as state and non-state actors. That would imply that all of the analysed states assign at least some importance to the idea of involvement of civilian actors and the population in the provision of security. Two models can be distinguished in that respect.

The first model, represented by Finland and Estonia, fully reflects the idea that security is all-encompassing and in order to answer the complex threats of today all actors need to be active and included. Therefore, the responsibility for the provision of security is very broad and dispersed, ranging from the international community, through the various levels of state authority, public institutions (including the armed forces and law enforcement), private sector, volunteering and not-for-profit organisations, as well as the individual citizens. This includes not only the contexts of disaster response and peace support operations, but is also clearly included in deterrence and defence scenarios. This model has been developed in states with a small population (i.e. Estonia) or which were historically non-allied (i.e. Finland) and results from a perception of a

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[117] Harsh V. Pant, "The Return of Hard Power", 30.10.2023, Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-return-of-hard-power/; Tergel Batnyam, "The Return of Realism in International Relations Discourse", 4.07.2020, ICRP Budapest, http://culturalrelations.org/the-return-of-realism-in-international-relations-discourse/.

[118] Robust. Resilient. Sustainable., p. 22.

higher intensity of threat. As a consequence, it puts large emphasis on the will to defend and reflects the urgency of "all-hands on deck" in the event of a crisis.

The second model, represented by the rest of the analysed states, assumes a rather limited participation of civilian entities in the provision of security. While it does recognise the requirement of cross—sectoral cooperation, it either limits its extent to specific types of engagement or does not include some of the civilian actors as active security providers. In the first case, the broader civil-military responsibility for security is narrowed down to the contexts of disaster relief or peace support operations, where the participation of the armed forces, law enforcement, various levels of civilian authorities, and other civilian entities is recognised as necessary. Another example is the involvement of the business sector in cybersecurity without the recognition of its importance in responding to other types of threats. In the second case, the responsibility for security does not seem to include the civilian population, which is treated as a passive object that requires protection. Here, the expectation extended towards the population might involve (a usually rather undefined) resilience or preparedness, but not active involvement. In this model, the provision of security in the contexts of deterrence and defence is assigned solely to the armed forces, while the society plays at most a supportive function. Some of the explanations behind the use of this model include a relatively lower threat perception and/or relatively strong capabilities to respond to crises.

Here, Poland represents an interesting case of bridging these two models. Its most recent Security Strategy indicates the development of a general readiness to defend the country, which would suggest a deeper involvement of the society in security. However, it also entrusts the responsibility for cultivating the will to defend to the Territorial Defence Forces, effectively militarising it. It could be argued that as a result of that, the responsibility for deterrence and defence tasks is still limited to the various types of military service.

Based on the discussion above, it is possible to formulate two recommendations. The first one consists of the avenues of further inquiry for the academic community. More study should be devoted to the approaches of other states towards the definition of security and the role of civilian actors in its provision. In particular, this should include non-European states, whose ideas on the responsibility of civilian actors for security may differ and therefore may supplement the two models presented above. Also, more research should be conducted to increase the understanding of the rationale for using particular models of civilian involvement in security by various states. The second recommendation is directed at the decision-makers on state and NATO levels and involves the consideration of the desired models of civilian involvement in security. While the first model assumes an increased societal cohesion and an easier access to civilian resources in case of emergency, it also requires much more time and effort to be developed and might be less feasible in states with large populations. Still, a deliberate examination of options should be conducted, leading to the formulation of guidelines and policies.

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Cover Image: NATO military police provide security for 600 people assigned to Allied Air Component Command Headquarters Ramstein (Courtesy Photo) © NATO 2008

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