Europe-Asia Studies

ISSN: 0966-8136 (Print) 1465-3427 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/ceas20

United in Trust: Ukrainian Attitudes to the European Parliament After the Russian Invasion (2022)

Danyil Karakai, Valentyn Hatsko, Ruslana Moskotina, Karina Shyrokykh, Tymofii Brik & Andrii Darkovich

To cite this article: Danyil Karakai, Valentyn Hatsko, Ruslana Moskotina, Karina Shyrokykh, Tymofii Brik & Andrii Darkovich (13 Jul 2026): United in Trust: Ukrainian Attitudes to the European Parliament After the Russian Invasion (2022), Europe-Asia Studies, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2026.2682218

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2026.2682218

Published online: 13 Jul 2026.

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2026
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2026.2682218

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

United in Trust: Ukrainian Attitudes to the European Parliament After the Russian Invasion (2022)

DANYIL KARAKAI, VALENTYN HATSKO, RUSLANA MOSKOTINA, KARINA SHYROKYKH, TYMOFII BRIK & ANDRII DARKOVICH

Abstract

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reshaped public opinion toward the EU and European institutions. Using unique two-wave panel data collected before and after February 2022, we examine how war-related threats have affected Ukrainians' trust in the European Parliament. Our findings show that trust in the European Parliament increased following the invasion, and that this increase was more pronounced among those with a lower prewar European identity. Both individual traumatic experiences and geographical proximity to Russia are also associated with the rise of trust in the European Parliament. Our findings demonstrate how acute external threats can swiftly transform public opinion, diminishing regional divides in attitudes towards European institutions.

THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE IN 2022 HAS dramatically transformed not only Ukraine's internal dynamics but also its relationship with international organisations. As this special issue highlights, the war exemplifies the fragmentation of global order, a

The authors used ChatGPT-4 (OpenAI) for language improvement, as all authors are non-native English speakers. The authors reviewed and verified all AI-assisted edits to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the content. The mapping of Ukraine's democratic space by the Center for Sociological Research, Decentralization and Regional Development at the KSE Institute is supported by the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) for the benefit of developing countries. This research was funded by the Swedish Institute Baltic Sea Neighbourhood Programme (grant number 01221/2023). The first phase of data collection was supported by a grant from the International Renaissance Foundation and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in Ukraine, as part of the project 'Ukraine in European Social Survey 2021' (signed on 15 November 2021). The second phase of the study received funding from George Washington University within the framework of the PONARS Eurasia project (The Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia). Both stages of the study were conducted at the request of the Kyiv School of Economics. Disclosure statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2026.2682218

process characterised by the diffusion of power and the disruption of traditional geopolitical hierarchies. The invasion has also fundamentally altered security realities across Eastern Europe, where external threats, particularly from Russian expansionism, have transitioned from hypothetical risks to palpable dangers. Although European integration had long dominated Ukraine's foreign policy agenda (Shyrokykh 2018), Russia's full-scale invasion effectively eliminated any viable alternatives to the European Union (EU) and NATO (Riabchuk 2023; Panchuk 2024; Shyrokykh *et al*. 2025). Before 2022, some Ukrainian political parties advocated for a so-called multivector foreign policy, including cooperation with Russia (Shyrokykh 2018); however, since the invasion, these parties have not only lost public support and legitimacy but have also been legally banned (Sauer 2022). Thus, it is important to understand how Ukrainian public opinion of Western organisations has developed and what is driving this change. The EU, once viewed primarily as an economic and political alliance, as existing research shows (Fiott 2023), is now increasingly perceived as a potential source of stability and security, suggesting a complex interplay between security attitudes and foreign policy preferences which requires further investigation.

We examine how the changed security situation resulting from Russia's war influences public opinion on EU institutions. More specifically, we focus on trust in the European Parliament. As the primary vector of political and economic integration for Ukraine, the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions among Ukrainians must be better understood, especially as Ukraine moves closer to EU membership. Gaining a new member state whose trust in EU institutions remains unknown could pose challenges for the Union's future policymaking. Therefore, given that the European Parliament is directly elected by EU citizens, it is particularly important to understand the factors shaping both current and future citizens' trust in this institution. Our essay is particularly timely: while there is much research on public support among Ukrainians for EU integration (Kovalska 2021; Onuch 2023), trust in individual European institutions remains largely unexplored in the context of Ukraine–EU relations.

We acknowledge a likely overlap between specific trust in the European Parliament and general support for the EU. Ukrainians are not yet citizens of an EU member state and may be less familiar with the division of functions among EU bodies; consequently, some share of trust in the European Parliament might reflect diffused attitudes towards the EU as a whole. We do not treat these as competing phenomena. Following published works on general attitudes to the EU and support for the European Parliament (Gabel 2003; Arnold *et al*. 2012), we propose that institutional trust is, in part, a result of identification with and confidence in the EU. In this sense, European Parliament trust can be seen as an expression of EU support; thus, studying it offers a focused view on how wartime dynamics have translated into confidence in a concrete EU institution with direct electoral legitimacy.

Our contribution is twofold. Empirically, using a two-wave panel that brackets Russia's 2022 invasion, we show that war has not only strengthened Ukrainians' pro-European attitudes but has also translated into greater trust in the European Parliament, especially among citizens who were previously less supportive of Europe; those who were geographically closer to Russia; and those who have been more directly affected by the war. Unlike earlier works that examine the effects of exogenous threats on foreign policy

attitudes in Ukraine (Coupé & Obrizan 2016; Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2018; Onuch 2023), support for democracy (Alexseev & Dembitskyi 2024) or trust in domestic institutions (Razumkov Centre 2024a; Tamilina 2024; KIIS 2025a), we test whether war increases trust in international actors.

Building on the 'rally-around-the-flag' concept, we posit that shared danger experienced by citizens can affect political trust beyond the nation-state setup, influencing trust in international institutions. We contribute to the literature on trust in EU institutions by exploring the trust dynamics in one candidate country. Unlike existing works that focus on the context of internal member states,[1] we explore how major security threats in candidate countries can affect their trust in EU institutions. Additionally, this study sheds new light on how war shapes regional polarisation, affecting attitudes towards supranational institutions.

To test our theoretical expectation about the effects of war-related threats on foreign policy orientation, we use unique panel data and show that since the beginning of the full-scale war, both individual and contextual threats have been positively associated with trust in the European Parliament. The greater an individual's exposure to the war and the closer they live to the Russian border, the more likely it is that their attitude towards the European Parliament has become more positive during the war. We also highlight the role of European identity before the full-scale invasion in shaping the association between war and trust in the European Parliament. Following the 2022 invasion, trust in the European Parliament increased among respondents with lower levels of prewar attachment to Europe. At the same time, European identity did not inform the relationship between either individual or contextual threats and trust in the European Parliament.

The essay is organised as follows. First, we provide background on the determinants of citizens' attitudes toward the European Union in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, highlighting regional differences. Then, we propose theoretical expectations on the determinants of trust in the European Parliament. In the third section, we lay out our research design. Next, we empirically test our hypotheses. We conclude with a summary of our main findings and a discussion of future research directions.

Attitudes to the EU in Ukraine: balancing East and West

Before the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, also commonly referred to as Euromaidan, and the onset of the Russo–Ukrainian war, including Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian attitudes towards the EU were deeply influenced by the country's internal cultural, linguistic and religious divisions (Shyrokykh 2018). In the east and south—regions with larger Russian-speaking populations—there was greater scepticism towards the EU and a stronger preference for maintaining ties with Russia and other countries in the post-Soviet region (Munro 2007; Razumkov Centre 2012; Armandon 2013; Dembitskyi & Liubova 2014). By contrast, the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking western

[1]Such as socio-economic factors (Hobolt & de Vries 2016; Foster & Frieden 2017; Vasilopoulou & Talving 2024), institutional performance (Kumlin 2009; Binder & Heupel 2015; Dellmuth & Tallberg 2015; Dellmuth *et al*. 2019) and crises (Howorth 2017; Economou & Kollias 2019, 2023; Gehring 2022; Panchuk 2024; Nicoli *et al*. 2024).

regions held more favourable attitudes towards the EU, reflecting a strong desire for European integration (Munro 2007; Razumkov Centre 2012; Armandon 2013; Dembitskyi & Liubova 2014). These contrasting orientations shaped a multivector foreign policy in which Kyiv balanced relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Western institutions (White *et al*. 2010; Buhbe 2017; Shyrokykh 2018; Chebotarova 2019).

The events of 2014 triggered a gradual shift in attitudes, although significant regional differences remained evident. While overall support for EU membership rose from 28% in 2007 to 52% in 2017, this was highest in the west (up to 78%), while support in the east and south remained much lower (33–38%) (Buhbe 2017; EU Neighbours East 2020). In some eastern and southern *oblasti*, preferences for EU integration were matched or exceeded by support for non-aligned status. Although pro-Russian orientation had decreased as a result of Russia's actions in Crimea and Donbas, Ukrainians remained uncertain about alternatives, including the EU (Minich & Cheryba 2022). These dynamics marked the start of regional convergence in geopolitical orientations, but some divides persisted through 2021.

The full-scale invasion of 2022 accelerated this trend towards a near national consensus. By early 2024, support for EU membership reached 91% in the west, 86% in the centre, 78% in the east and 74–75% in the south (Razumkov Centre 2024b).[2] Compared to 2018, when only 21% in the east of the country and 25% in the south backed EU accession, the regional gap had narrowed dramatically: the west–east divide shrank from nearly 60 percentage points to just 13–15 points (IKDIF 2018, 2019; IRI 2021; Palagnyuk 2025). An August 2023 survey similarly reported 90% national support, with sharp increases in the previously more sceptical south (+25 percentage points) and east (+28 points) (Onuch 2024a). Analyses from the MOBILISE panel indicate that regional divides persisted prior to and early in the war, with the south and the east significantly less supportive than the centre in 2019 and 2021, and the west consistently most supportive. By 2022–2023, the negative effects for the east had weakened and were no longer statistically significant, consistent with gradual convergence, even as the south remained relatively more Eurosceptic (Onuch 2024b). Alexseev and Dembitskyi (2024) observed no heightened regional polarisation during the war period, though their 2021 regression models still showed the south less supportive than the west and centre. While trust in EU institutions is lower than support for accession, regional variation is also modest: by December 2024 the gap in trust between west and east stood at just seven points (KIIS 2025b). Overall, Russia's war has catalysed a broad pan-regional shift towards a pro-European orientation, even if traces of the earlier hierarchy (the west most supportive, the south most sceptical) remain visible in some datasets.

Taken together, the evidence shows a clear trajectory: from a country divided in its attitudes towards EU membership before 2014, through a period of partial convergence in geopolitical orientation following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the outbreak

[2]The four macro-regions (West, Centre, East, South) constitute the standard regional division used in Ukrainian survey research and are employed by the country's main polling institutions, including KIIS, the Razumkov Centre and the Rating Group. Northern *oblasti* (Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Zhytomyr) are conventionally included within the Centre macro-region rather than treated separately, which is why no 'North' category appears.

of war in Donbas, to a near pan-regional consensus in support for EU accession in the aftermath of the 2022 invasion. Regional gaps in EU support have narrowed sharply, with the once-sceptical east and south moving much closer to the national mainstream, even if the south continues to be somewhat less enthusiastic. Yet despite this macro-level convergence towards a pro-EU stance, the individual-level drivers of attitudes towards the EU and its institutions remain insufficiently understood. It is also unclear whether this shift has been driven primarily by personal experiences of threat or by broader, shared insecurities associated with living through war, and how these different forms of insecurity shape confidence in supranational bodies such as the European Parliament.

Theory and hypotheses: the nexus between insecurity and trust

The literature on how crisis events affect interpersonal and institutional trust is both extensive and controversial. Trust in institutions can either increase or decrease after crisis events.[3] Several mechanisms identified in the existing literature can explain both scenarios.

For example, heightened vulnerability during crises can make individuals evaluate others more critically, as the perceived risks of betrayal or harm are higher (Delhey *et al*. 2023). Empirical studies from China and the United States have documented declines in generalised trust, belief in others' trustworthiness, and interpersonal trust during major crises (Li *et al*. 2021; Malik *et al*. 2021; Fang *et al*. 2023). Political actors also face sharper scrutiny: when they appear self-serving, inconsistent or ineffective—or when institutions are seen as responsible for, or incapable of managing, the crisis—trust can deteriorate rapidly (Aassve *et al*. 2024).

On the other hand, compensatory trust mechanisms may arise under conditions of uncertainty. When individuals feel powerless to influence events, they often turn to institutions or authorities for reassurance and a sense of order (Kay *et al*. 2009; Roccato *et al*. 2021). In such circumstances, people are more likely to trust those perceived as capable of resolving the crisis. Montgomery *et al*. (2008) argue that in times of threat, the demand for assistance increases sharply, making trust 'useful' for restoring a sense of security. Trust is more likely to be extended to actors who demonstrate competence, integrity and benevolence.

An alternative mechanism for building trust is based on the idea of in-group solidarity (Simmel 1955; Stein 1976). During major crises, especially those involving an external threat, people set aside internal divisions and unite behind their group and its leadership. This 'rally-around-the-flag' effect, a surge of solidarity and trust directed at leaders and institutions perceived as representing the in-group, has been observed after traumatic events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain (Skocpol 2002; Lai & Reiter 2005; Perrin & Smolek 2009; Dinesen & Jæger 2013; Feinstein 2018).

The mechanism works through categorisation rather than deliberate calculation. When people lack prior experience on which to evaluate institutions, they often rely on

[3]See review by Aassve *et al*. (2024).

heuristics, simplified rules of thumb that allow for quick decisions (Hobolt 2007; Campbell & Cowley 2014; Bernhard & Freeder 2020). Categorisation plays a critical role in this process (Williams 2001): people tend to trust members of their own group more on the assumption of shared priorities and values, while competing groups attract distrust. The rally effect therefore attaches to 'our' leaders and institutions specifically, those seen as standing in opposition to 'them'.

Crucially, the boundary between 'us' and 'them' is not only social but also geosocietal (Alexseev & Dembitskyi 2024). People are capable of drawing this line along geopolitical alliances: when a country is perceived as a threat, individuals distance themselves from it and align more closely with those who share the same adversary. Alexseev and Dembitskyi (2024) demonstrate this empirically, showing that aggression from the Russian Federation—a country perceived as representing the opposite of freedom and self-determination—led to a significant increase in the value Ukrainians placed on democracy. The in-group to which the rally effect attaches, in other words, need not be the nation alone; it can extend to any community defined by a shared adversary, including a supranational one.

Regarding trust in the European Parliament and the EU more broadly, most recent studies indicate that crises tend to have a negative effect on trust in supranational institutions, and the COVID-19 pandemic was no exception. Cavazza *et al*. (2022) reported a decrease in trust in the EU during the pandemic, attributing this to the EU's limited role in managing the crisis compared with national governments. Eurofound (2022) confirmed a decline in trust in the EU during the pandemic, noting the absence of a 'rally' effect for supranational institutions. A study on changes in trust during COVID-19 by Roccato *et al*. (2021) found that the pandemic led to decreased trust in international institutions, including the EU, as the crisis highlighted challenges in policy coordination and fostered a sense of 'every country for itself'.

Several mechanisms help explain why trust in the EU fell rather than rose during the crisis. First, the decline reflects the broader erosion of interpersonal trust commonly observed during crises. Second, the compensatory trust effect, by which citizens typically turn to higher-level institutions for reassurance, was not activated, as the EU was often perceived as an ineffective crisis manager and, in some cases, even as partially responsible for the crisis (Roccato *et al*. 2021; Cavazza *et al*. 2022; Eurofound 2022). Third, the 'rally-around-the-flag' effect, by which we mean a temporary surge in citizen support for an institution in response to an external crisis perceived as a shared threat, did not materialise, since the EU was not perceived as an 'in-group' institution. As Harteveld *et al*. (2013) argue, strong national identity can undermine trust in the EU by emphasising distinct interests and national sovereignty, which often compete with the collective goals of European integration and foster scepticism towards EU institutions. For most citizens, during the pandemic the EU functioned not as an 'own' institution, but rather as an external or even competing actor.

We argue that this 'rally-around-the-flag' effect is more likely to occur in the presence of an external collective threat: in the context of this study, from Russia. Gehring's (2019) analysis showed that Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 not only strengthened European identity but also increased public support for EU policies. Steiner *et al*. (2023) documented a transnational 'rally' effect, showing that the Russian invasion of Ukraine

heightened interest in EU politics, strengthened attachment to the EU, and consolidated support for European integration among European university students. Furthermore, they found that many Europeans expressed greater trust in EU institutions and stronger identification with the EU community not because their own country was directly attacked, but because the aggression was framed as a threat to collective European security and values (Steiner *et al*. 2023). Similarly, Eurobarometer data from 2022 indicate that 43% of respondents reported feeling a stronger identification with Europe following the start of the war, with this effect particularly pronounced in countries bordering Russia.[4] However, findings regarding trust in supranational institutions are mixed. Klymak and Vlandas (2022), in a study closely related to ours, found no significant effect of the Russian invasion on trust in international organisations, including the European Parliament.

With each wave of Russian aggression, Ukrainians' European identity grew stronger (Minesashvili 2022; Onuch 2023), as did support for joining the EU and NATO (IKDIF 2022).[5] Surveys indicate that in the year following Russia's full-scale invasion, nearly half of Ukrainians developed more favourable attitudes towards the EU, with notable gains even in traditionally sceptical southern and eastern regions (Razumkov Centre 2022; Minich & Sereda 2023). The EU and its member states have provided humanitarian, financial and military assistance to Ukraine (Trebesch *et al*. 2023; Haesebrouck 2024), as widely recognised by Ukrainians (EU Neighbours East 2024). This shift in public attitudes towards Europe can be understood through the lens of geosocietal identity mobilisation (Alexseev & Dembitskyi 2024), whereby external threats catalyse a redefinition of group boundaries and increase identification with international allies. As a result, the EU is increasingly viewed as part of the 'in-group' that shares common values and interests with Ukraine. In this context, European authorities may not be perceived as 'ours' in a strict sense, but they are certainly viewed as friendly, while the EU is seen as a group sharing common values and goals.

We identify two interrelated mechanisms that can explain increased trust in the European Parliament. First, Ukrainians may perceive the EU as a strong ally capable of helping them cope with the threat of Russia. When individuals feel powerless to address existential dangers themselves, a compensatory trust mechanism may be activated, and they are more likely to trust actors perceived as able to provide meaningful assistance. Second, the mechanism of in-group solidarity comes into play; in other words, the external threat from Russia may strengthen Ukrainians' determination to defend their European choice, fostering a stronger European identity. In both cases, increased identification with the EU can lead to a spillover of trust to its institutions, including the European Parliament. Accordingly, our first hypothesis (H1) is that after the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians' trust in the European Parliament increased.

[4]'EU's Response to the War in Ukraine', Eurobarometer, 2022, available at: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2772, accessed 17 November 2025.

[5]'National Poll: Ukraine at War (March 1, 2022)', Rating Group, available at: http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_1_marta_2022.html, accessed 17 November 2025.

However, Ukrainians have not experienced the war uniformly: some have endured greater personal harm and disruption, others less; likewise, perceptions of danger from Russia vary. These differences should modulate both compensatory trust and in-group solidarity. Therefore, we examine whether individuals facing more intense wartime exposure exhibit larger post-invasion gains in trust in the European Parliament. Our second hypothesis (H2) is that greater war exposure is associated with greater increase in trust in the European Parliament after the full-scale invasion.

Finally, drawing on the idea that salience of in-group identity increases perceived cost of the loss from the aggressor (Alexseev & Dembitskyi 2024), we expect that geosocietal identity mobilisation should be most pronounced among individuals who already identified with Europe prior to the full-scale invasion. Accordingly, we hypothesise (H3) that the strength of European identity before the full-scale invasion moderated the relationship between exposure to war and increased trust in the European Parliament: the stronger an individual's prewar European identity, the more their trust in the European Parliament increased.

Data and methods

Sample and data collection

This study uses data collected by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on behalf of the Kyiv School of Economics as part of the LIWS (Life in War Survey) project.[6] The first wave was conducted from 18 January to 8 February 2022, through in-person interviews. The sample represents Ukrainians aged 15 and older residing in territories under Ukrainian control. The sampling approach involved regional stratification by *oblast* (24 Ukrainian regions and Kyiv) and settlement type (urban/rural). At the initial stage, electoral precincts were randomly selected within each stratum, followed by a random walk household selection within these precincts. In each household, a respondent was randomly chosen from the eligible members, resulting in 1,531 completed interviews, with a response rate of 30.2% for the first wave.

The second wave, conducted from 24 August to 6 October 2022, used computer-assisted telephone interviews. During this wave, 595 respondents from the first wave were re-interviewed, representing 39% of the initial participants and 47% of those who had agreed to follow-up contact.

The timing of data collection immediately before the war minimised the likelihood that external factors unrelated to the conflict influenced respondents' answers. This strengthens our confidence that observed changes between the waves reflect contextual insecurity associated with the war rather than other potentially significant societal events or shifts.

Using novel panel data offered distinct advantages over cross-sectional data or data based on retrospective approaches. We captured changes in trust in the European Parliament by

[6]Datasets, questionnaires and documentation for this panel study are available at Ruslana Moskotina's online archive, *Life in War Survey (LIWS): Tracking Change Amid the Ukrainian–Russian War*, Discuss Data, 17 July 2025, available at: https://discuss-data.net/dataset/862a404c-f4b8-488d-aaa7-18b11141fa54/, accessed 27 May 2026.

comparing responses across both waves rather than relying on respondents' direct self-assessments of change. This method provides a more accurate measure of the actual shifts in trust, avoiding potential distortions from situational subjective perceptions.

Variables

The dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study is the level of trust in the European Parliament. This variable reflects respondents' answers to the question:

> Please tell me how much you personally trust the organisations I am about to name. Please rate your level of trust on a scale where 0 points means 'I do not trust it at all' and 10 points means 'I trust it fully'. So, how much do you trust … the European Parliament?

Given that Ukrainians may be less familiar with specific EU bodies, and that prior research shows they often view the EU as a generalised entity (Chaban *et al*. 2019), we treated this measure as an institutionalised expression of broader EU support, which may also capture the diffused attitudes towards the EU as a whole.

Independent variables. The literature on the consequences of war distinguishes between individual and contextual (sociotropic) threats (Immerzeel & van Tubergen 2013; Yaylacı & Price 2023). Individual threats refer to personal existential risks such as war-related poor health or injury or death by shelling. Contextual threats arise from living in unsafe environments; observing others in danger heightens risk awareness and creates a sense of shared vulnerability. Beyond direct dangers to oneself, sociotropic threats also involve concern for the safety and well-being of members of 'our' group (van Tubergen *et al*. 2023).

Exposure to war can be operationalised at different levels of aggregation (Yaylacı & Price 2023). Higher levels of aggregation capture a broad array of war-related events but risk incorporating incidents not directly tied to a conflict and obscuring individual heterogeneity. Crucially, contextual measures convey information not only about personal risks but also about threats to compatriots (sociotropic threats), whereas purely individual-level measures lose this dimension.

We balanced precision with scope by employing variables at multiple aggregation levels to capture both types of risk exposure. We posited that sociotropic threats, because they endanger the group as well as the individual, are more likely to activate in-group solidarity and identity mobilisation. By contrast, individual threats should be more closely linked to a compensatory-trust mechanism, whereby people seek support from external actors when they feel personally powerless. While we cannot fully disentangle these mechanisms empirically, our multi-level measurement strategy was designed to approximate both.

At the highest aggregation level, war was treated as a binary variable indicating whether a respondent lived in the country before or during the full-scale war: 0 = before the war (first wave), 1 = during the full-scale war (second wave). This approach was chosen for its simplicity and clarity. Collecting data immediately before the war minimised the influence of other external factors, increasing our confidence that observed changes between waves genuinely reflect contextual war-related insecurity rather than other societal shifts.

To assess contextual insecurity, we also used two geographic measures, both aimed at capturing spatial variation in exposure to war-related threats: the distance from the Russian threat and the macro-region of prewar residence. Geographic data have been widely used to study how the war in Ukraine affects well-being, trust and related attitudes (Kurapov *et al*. 2023, 2024; Karakai & Hatsko 2024; Hoch *et al*. 2025). Kurapov and colleagues (2024) show that both objective indicators of war exposure (such as number of air-raid alerts and explosions) and subjective perceptions of physical danger have varied markedly across regions, being lower in the west of Ukraine and higher in frontline areas, with some exceptions.[7]

Distance from the Russian threat. This measure includes the distance both from the Russian border and from occupied territories, with the latter data obtained from the Ukraine Control Map.[8] Geolocation information for respondents was derived from the textual descriptions of initial sampling locations for the first, prewar, wave of the survey. To obtain precise coordinates, we employed the 'Geocoding by SmartMonkey' extension for Google Sheets, which uses the Google Maps API. To ensure encoding accuracy, we cross-referenced the text descriptions from Google with respondents' recorded regions of residence from the survey dataset. Through this verification, we identified and manually corrected nine instances where respondents had been incorrectly located in the wrong regions.

Distances from each respondent to Russian-controlled borders were calculated using spatial functions in R. First, respondent locations were converted into spatial points using their geographic coordinates and projected onto the UTM coordinate system to ensure accurate distance calculations in metres. Then, the Russian borders and occupied territories were merged into a single spatial object. We calculated the shortest distance from each respondent's location to the nearest point along this border object. Finally, we applied a logarithmic transformation to this variable to reduce the impact of outliers and achieve a more symmetric distribution.

The macro-region of the respondent's residence before the full-scale invasion was created by grouping the 24 *oblasti* and the city of Kyiv into four macro-regions: 1 = eastern (reference category), 2 = western, 3 = central and 4 = southern.[9] We selected the eastern macro-region as the reference category since it is closest to the frontline and, as previously mentioned, has one of the most sceptical attitudes towards EU integration. Therefore, we expected the eastern region to show lower trust in European political institutions. In our analysis, the macro-regions were included as a set of dummy variables. We also included macro-region as a

[7]For instance, Kyiv *Oblast* experienced a more pronounced sense of subjective threat than neighbouring *oblasti*.

[8]The Ukraine Control Map (UAControlMap) is an open-source, crowdsourced geospatial project that tracks territorial control and frontline positions during Russia's war against Ukraine using verified open-source intelligence (OSINT).

[9]Regions were grouped into macro-regions according to the classification used by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, as follows (Hrushetskyi 2025): western—Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopilska, Khmelnytska and Chernivetska *oblasti*; central—Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Kyivska, Kirovohradska, Poltavska, Sumska, Cherkaska and Chernihivska *oblasti*, and Kyiv city; southern—Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka, Mykolaivska, Odeska and Khersonska *oblasti*; eastern—Donetska and Luhanska *oblasti* (government-controlled areas only), and Kharkivska *Oblast*.

control variable in our analysis, as it may confound the relationship between threat (contextual/individual) and trust in the European Parliament.

We considered distance from the Russian threat and macro-region to be reliable indicators of contextual threats, even though they were measured for a period before the full-scale war. First, our panel sample predominantly consisted of individuals who had not experienced displacement (those who had experienced it constituted only 16.3%). Second, even those who were displaced remained concerned about their loved ones and property in their prewar place of residence, as they continued to perceive that location as their own and the people living there as 'our people'.

Individual variation in war exposure was measured through seven variables capturing distinct traumatic experiences, reported only in the second survey wave: decrease in income; loss of employment; deterioration of physical health; deterioration of mental health; loss or damage to home; loss or damage to other property; experiencing forced displacement.[10] Each respondent received a score of 1 for each traumatic event experienced, and 0 if they had not experienced any. Summing these values for each respondent created a composite individual war-exposure index that captured the cumulative burden of war-related experiences.[11] Its values varied from 0 = exposed to no traumatic events to 7 = exposed to multiple traumatic events. Using an additive trauma-exposure index is standard practice across different studies, including those on social and institutional trust, religiosity and political participation (Bellows & Miguel 2009; Henrich *et al*. 2019; Hall & Werner 2022; Karakai & Moskotina 2025).

Moderator variable. To address the role of identity in shaping trust in the European Parliament, we included a measure of emotional attachment to Europe prior to full-scale war. This variable was based on respondents' answers to the question, 'How emotionally attached are you to Europe?', measured on a scale from 0 = do not feel any emotional attachment at all to 10 = feel strong emotional attachment. We used this variable as a moderator of the relationship between individual/contextual threats and trust in the European Parliament.

Models

To analyse the collected panel data, we employed a linear mixed-effects model. Such models enable the inclusion of random effects, making them well-suited for data with repeated

[10]Variables 1–6 corresponded to the answer options for the multiple-choice question, 'Have you experienced the following during the war?' Variable 7 was based on the question, 'Our lives have changed a lot since the beginning of the war, and many people have changed their location. Please tell me, after 24 February 2022, did you … ?'—a sentence-completion item with six options ranging from never having relocated to currently residing abroad. Any response indicating relocation was coded as 1, including cases where respondents moved from their place of residence during the war and later returned, as well as those who moved and did not return.

[11]War-related experiences are diverse and often overlap, with individuals frequently encountering multiple traumatic events simultaneously or sequentially. To adequately represent this complexity, we employed a formative index (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer 2001). This methodological approach does not require indicators to be interchangeable or highly correlated. Instead, each indicator contributes uniquely to defining the overall construct, ensuring comprehensive content validity.

measures collected from the same subjects over time, as they allow for controlling unobserved heterogeneity.

We constructed seven models to test our hypotheses. In all of them, we specified respondent's ID as a random effect. Since our measures of distance from the Russian threat, macro-region, individual war exposure and emotional attachment to Europe remained stable across waves, we could capture changes in trust in the European Parliament by examining their interactions with the survey wave. This underlies the specification of our models. The first and second models included individual war exposure and distance from the Russian threat, respectively, along with their interactions with the survey wave and macro-region as a control. The third model included an interaction between macro-region and survey wave. The fourth model introduced an interaction between emotional attachment to Europe and the survey wave, with macro-region as a control. The fifth and sixth models incorporated three-way interactions between the survey wave, individual war exposure/distance from the Russian threat, and emotional attachment to Europe, again controlling for macro-region. Finally, the seventh model included a three-way interaction between the survey wave, macro-region and emotional attachment to Europe.

For the primary analysis, we relied on a balanced panel dataset; that is, we included only those respondents who answered all items used in the models in both waves of the survey. To test the robustness of our results (see Appendices 3–5), we estimated weighted models using both balanced and unbalanced panels; the latter incorporated responses from all participants who took part in both survey waves, regardless of whether they were missing values for any of the variables. Robustness checks also included analyses using weighted models on balanced data.

A substantial proportion of respondents from the first wave did not participate in the follow-up wave. To compensate for attrition bias, we constructed inverse probability weights for the respondents that we then applied to build weighted linear mixed-effects models on balanced and unbalanced data. The construction of weights involved three steps: variable selection, calculation of individual weights and the trimming of extreme values (Schmidt & Woll 2017).

In the first step, we selected variables for weighting based on Hatsko and Karakai (2025), who identified a range of socio-demographic characteristics and variables related to pro-European orientations and political attitudes.[12] These included region of residence, settlement type, prewar trust in the European Parliament, interest in politics (measured on a four-point scale: 1 = very interested, 2 = quite interested, 3 = a little interested, 4 = not interested at all), and the perceived importance of living in a democratically governed country (ranging from 0 = not at all important to 10 = extremely important). Additionally, we included emotional attachment to Europe as a variable reflecting pro-European orientation and serving as a moderator in some of our regression models. Respondents included in the panel differed significantly from those not included for all of these characteristics (see Appendix 1).

[12]All these characteristics refer to the first wave of the survey.

These variables were then used in logistic regressions to estimate the individual probability of participation. Since not all variables—specifically, emotional attachment to Europe and the perceived importance of living in a democratically governed country—proved to be statistically significant in the initial model, a revised model was estimated without them (see Appendix 2). Based on this second model, we proceeded to the second step. We calculated individual weights for each respondent based on the estimated probabilities from the logistic regressions. In the third step, we trimmed the distribution of weights: weights below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile were set equal to the respective threshold values (Schmidt & Woll 2017).

Results

Table 1 presents the frequencies and percentages of the dependent, independent and control variables. As shown, respondents' trust in the European Parliament increased following the outbreak of war compared with the period before full-scale war ($V_{\text{Wilcoxon}} = 101{,}242$, $p < 0.001$). Approximately one-third of respondents lived less than 100 km from the Russian threat before the full-scale invasion, while 18.7% resided 500 km or more away from it. Some 34.6% and 31.6% of respondents resided in western and central macro-regions, respectively, while 22.4% of participants were from the southern region and 11.4% lived in the eastern region before the war. Participants' individual exposure to war was relatively low: on average, they had experienced fewer than three out of seven possible traumatic events.[13] Their emotional attachment to Europe before the full-scale war can be considered moderate.

As shown in the models in Table 2, trust in the European Parliament increased following the outbreak of full-scale war, reflecting the difference between the pre-full-scale war and the post-2022 attitudes. In Model 1, the effect of individual war exposure on trust in the European Parliament is statistically insignificant ($\beta = -0.15$, $p > 0.05$). However, its interaction with the survey wave is significant ($\beta = 0.24$, $p < 0.05$). This indicates that a higher level of personal war-related experience strengthened the relationship between survey wave and trust in the European Parliament. In other words, the more traumatic events a person had gone through, the more likely their trust was to increase after the invasion. As illustrated by Figure 1, as individual war exposure increased, the difference in trust in the European Parliament between survey waves widened.

Regarding Model 2, the effect of distance from the Russian threat was not significant ($\beta = 0.63$, $p > 0.05$). At the same time, the distance from the territories controlled by Russia moderated the effect of the wave on trust in the European Parliament. Living farther from Russian-controlled territories was associated with less of an increase in trust in the European Parliament during the conflict ($\beta = -0.96$, $p < 0.001$). As shown in Figure 2, the difference between survey waves increased as the distance from the Russian threat decreases. Similar interaction effects held for the Model 3, where the macro-region moderated the relationship between the survey wave and trust in the European

[13]The most commonly reported traumatic experiences were: decrease in income (66.1%); deterioration of mental health (62.5%); deterioration of physical health (50.3%); and loss of employment (29.7%).

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES

	Wave 1 ($N = 595$)	Wave 2 ($N = 595$)
Trust in the European Parliament		
Mean (SD)	4.38 (3.32)	5.96 (2.60)
Missing	*80 (13.4%)*	*63 (10.6%)*
Individual war exposure		
Mean (SD)	–	2.41 (1.47)
Distance from Russian threat		
0–99 km	203 (34.1%)	
100–299 km	142 (23.9%)	
300–499 km	139 (23.4%)	
500 km +	111 (18.7%)	
Macro-region		
Western	206 (34.6%)	
Southern	133 (22.4%)	
Eastern	68 (11.4%)	
Central	188 (31.6%)	
Emotional attachment to Europe		
Mean (SD)	5.02 (3.29)	
Missing	*26 (4.4%)*	

Notes: The percentage for each category of the variables was calculated based on valid observations (excluding missing values). The percentage of missing values was calculated relative to the total number of observations. We also categorised the distance from the Russian threat (in kilometres) into four groups while calculating descriptive statistics. This allowed us to better understand how many respondents lived in less safe areas compared to those in relatively safe areas.

Parliament: living in the western ($\beta = -2.64$, $p < 0.001$), central ($\beta = -2.31$, $p < 0.001$) or southern ($\beta = -1.53$, $p < 0.05$) regions was associated with smaller increase in trust in the European Parliament following the invasion compared to living in the eastern region. The macro-region itself was also significantly associated with trust: living in the western ($\beta = 3.18$, $p < 0.001$), central ($\beta = 2.24$, $p < 0.001$) or southern ($\beta = 1.46$, $p < 0.01$) regions was related to a higher level of trust in the European Parliament compared to respondents living in the eastern region. Figure 3 shows that trust in the European Parliament increased following the onset of full-scale war in all regions except the western region. The greatest increase occurred in the eastern region, which had the lowest trust prior to the full-scale war. Thus, after the February 2022 invasion, regional differences in trust largely disappeared.

In Model 4, greater attachment to Europe is associated with higher trust in the European Parliament ($\beta = 0.37$, $p < 0.001$). Emotional attachment to Europe also moderated the effect of war (captured *via* the survey wave) on trust: greater attachment was associated with smaller increase in trust in the European Parliament following the invasion ($\beta = -0.23$, $p < 0.001$). Figure 4 also shows that the difference in trust in the European Parliament before and during the war increased as attachment to Europe decreased. However, the three-way interactions presented in Models 5–7 are not statistically significant. This suggests that emotional attachment to Europe did not moderate the relationship between individual or contextual threats and changes in the trust in the European Parliament.

The same results described above apply to the weighted regressions, both on balanced and unbalanced data (see Appendices 3 and 5). In the case of the unweighted unbalanced

TABLE 2
MIXED-EFFECT LINEAR UNWEIGHTED REGRESSION MODELS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT): BALANCED DATA

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.73***	−0.15	2.30***	2.04***	2.13**	−1.77	0.26
	(0.50)	(2.39)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.66)	(3.01)	(0.62)
Wave 2	0.86**	6.95***	3.48***	2.64***	2.40***	7.70**	4.42***
	(0.31)	(1.40)	(0.50)	(0.30)	(0.60)	(2.62)	(0.75)
Individual war exposure	−0.15				−0.03		
	(0.10)				(0.17)		
Western region	1.81***	1.60	3.18***	0.81*	0.80	0.93	3.23***
	(0.42)	(0.89)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.85)	(0.85)
Central region	1.03*	0.94	2.24***	0.34	0.33	0.30	2.60**
	(0.43)	(0.62)	(0.50)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.61)	(0.80)
Southern region	0.64	0.64	1.46**	0.61	0.60	0.59	2.54***
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.74)
Wave 2 × individual war exposure	0.24*				0.08		
	(0.11)				(0.20)		
Distance from Russian threat (log)		0.63				0.70	
		(0.49)				(0.60)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log)		−0.96***				−0.95*	
		(0.24)				(0.48)	
Wave 2 × western region			−2.64***				−2.63**
			(0.56)				(1.02)
Wave 2 × central region			−2.31***				−2.76**
			(0.58)				(0.97)
Wave 2 × southern region			−1.53*				−1.75*
			(0.60)				(0.89)
Attachment to Europe				0.37***	0.40***	0.99*	0.77***
				(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.41)	(0.17)
Wave 2 × attachment to Europe				−0.23***	−0.26**	−0.68	−0.35
				(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.47)	(0.21)
Individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					−0.01		
					(0.03)		
Wave 2 × individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					0.02		
					(0.03)		

(*Continued*)

TABLE 2 (*Continued*)

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						−0.11	
						(0.07)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						0.09	
						(0.08)	
Western region × attachment to Europe							−0.47*
							(0.19)
Central region × attachment to Europe							−0.46*
							(0.19)
Southern region × attachment to Europe							−0.44*
							(0.20)
Wave 2 × western region × attachment to Europe							0.21
							(0.23)
Wave 2 × central region × attachment to Europe							0.27
							(0.23)
Wave 2 × southern region × attachment to Europe							0.11
							(0.24)
Random effects							
σ^2	5.93	5.79	5.70	5.71	5.70	5.67	5.62
τ_{00}	2.55_{id}	2.62_{id}	2.66_{id}	2.14_{id}	2.16_{id}	2.16_{id}	2.14_{id}
ICC	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28
N	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}
Observations	916	916	916	916	916	916	916
Marginal R^2/Conditional R^2	0.099/ 0.369	0.106/ 0.384	0.112/ 0.395	0.166/ 0.393	0.167/ 0.396	0.170/ 0.399	0.181/ 0.407
AIC	4,537.395	4,521.413	4,512.773	4,477.571	4,499.244	4,486.836	4,488.703

Note: Models include regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.



FIGURE 1. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND INDIVIDUAL WAR EXPOSURE ACROSS SURVEY WAVES: PREDICTED VALUES FOR MODEL 1

regressions (see Appendix 4), some differences appear. First, the interaction between the survey wave and the southern region in Model 3 is not statistically significant ($\beta = -0.99$, $p > 0.05$). This is not unexpected, as the changes in trust in the European Parliament in southern and eastern regions since the start of the war were not sufficiently different to produce consistent statistical significance. This explains some fluctuations in the *p*-values. Second, in Model 2, the effect of distance to the Russian threat becomes statistically significant ($\beta = 0.96$, $p < 0.05$). Living farther from the Russian threat is associated with a higher level of trust in the European Parliament. This is not surprising: *oblasti* in western Ukraine are furthest from the Russian border and tend to be more pro-European. At the same time, this effect may be confounded by the macro-region, which is why statistically significant results are not always obtained.

In all regression models, the variance explained by random effects (differences between individuals) exceeds the variance explained by fixed effects. This indicates that both



FIGURE 2. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND DISTANCE FROM THE RUSSIAN THREAT ACROSS SURVEY WAVES: PREDICTED VALUES FOR MODEL 2

individual and contextual insecurity, as well as prewar European identity, are only weakly associated with changes in trust in the European Parliament.

Discussion

We confirmed our first hypothesis: with the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian trust in the European Parliament increased. In line with the idea of geosocietal mobilisation (Alexseev & Dembitskyi 2024), we argue that Russia's aggression strengthened Ukrainians' pro-European orientation in opposition to Russia. What makes this finding particularly noteworthy is that it shows this mobilisation translated not only into improved attitudes towards European allies but also into trust in their representative institutions, namely the European Parliament.



FIGURE 3. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND MACRO-REGION ACROSS SURVEY WAVES: PREDICTED VALUES FOR MODEL 3

We also confirmed our second hypothesis: both individual traumatic experiences of war and geographical proximity to Russia are associated with greater increases in trust in the European Parliament. Using different metrics, we consistently showed that the war is associated with heightened trust in the European Parliament. Although we cannot empirically disentangle the mechanisms, we suggest two plausible explanations for these effects: first, in-group solidarity, likely amplified by threats to one's close social circle, which are more commonly experienced by people living near the frontlines; and second, the need for reassurance, which is probably stronger among those who have suffered more directly from the war.

The third hypothesis is not supported: we did not find evidence for the expectation that stronger attachment to Europe prior to the war would be associated with a greater increase in trust in the European Parliament. On the contrary, higher identification with Europe before the full-scale war was linked to a smaller increase in trust after the



FIGURE 4. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE ACROSS SURVEY WAVES: PREDICTED VALUES FOR MODEL 4

invasion, even though it remained associated with higher overall levels of trust in the European Parliament. It may indicate that geosocietal mobilisation was driven primarily by those who had previously been less supportive of Europe, individuals more oriented towards Russia or non-alignment who were forced to reassess their worldview after the full-scale invasion. Accordingly, the most notable increase in sympathy towards Europe occurred not among those who already held strong pro-European attitudes, but among those who had not.

Emotional attachment to Europe moderates the association between the invasion (captured *via* the survey wave) and trust in the European Parliament but does not moderate relationships involving individual or contextual threats. Stronger European identity before the full-scale war was more likely to activate in-group solidarity, while weaker identity may still have triggered the need for reassurance; through either route, trust in the European Parliament increased, though the gains were larger among those

with weaker prewar attachment to Europe. Empirically testing these mechanisms, however, requires further research.

We have demonstrated that regional variation in trust has decreased. Before the invasion, trust in the European Parliament was highest in the west and lowest in the eastern region. During the war, however, the east exhibited the largest increase, while changes in the west were negligible due to already high baseline levels. As a result, the regional hierarchy outlined at the outset flattened, with the west–east gap shrinking to a level that was no longer statistically significant. This confirms broader polling evidence of pan-regional convergence in support for the EU and demonstrates that such convergence extends beyond support for EU membership to trust in a specific EU institution.

These findings contribute to three strands of research. First, existing work on public support for European integration emphasises relatively slow-moving determinants: identity, utilitarian calculation and heuristic cues (Kritzinger 2003; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Hobolt 2007). Our wartime case introduces a dynamic component: under acute exogenous threat, trust in a specific EU institution can increase quickly and compress entrenched regional cleavages.

Second, crisis and identity scholarship suggests that shocks can heighten European identity and support for common policies (Gehring 2019, 2022; Steiner *et al*. 2023; Kuhn & Seimel 2025). Pandemic-era studies, however, often reported stagnant or declining trust in EU institutions because the Union was not perceived as the primary crisis manager (Roccato *et al*. 2021; Cavazza *et al*. 2022; Eurofound 2022). Ukraine's case clarifies the scope conditions for a supranational rally: the threat is clearly both geopolitical and posed by an out group, and the EU is seen as a capable and benevolent ally.

Third, we contribute to the literature on the effects of the war on Ukraine and public opinion in Ukraine. We complement findings showing post-invasion increases in support for EU enlargement and civic mobilisation (Riabchuk 2023; Panchuk 2024; Bulana & Holubytska 2025; Razumkov Centre 2025) and connect to work on the effect of exogenous threats on foreign policy attitudes (Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2018). Rather than focusing solely on diffusing pro-EU sentiment, we show that person-level characteristics and cross-regional variation continue to matter for trust in specific EU institutions.

Finally, our findings have broader relevance for policy and geopolitical debates about the future of the global order. We demonstrate that trust in institutions can be built even during wartime. Shared vulnerabilities, alongside rallying around a common enemy and cause, remain central to fostering trust and strengthening political order. At the same time, we do not aim for generalisation to other EU candidate countries. Although Ukraine is one of the few current EU candidates, its context—particularly due to the ongoing war—differs fundamentally from that of other candidate states. For this reason, we do not seek to generalise our findings to countries currently undergoing the accession process in peacetime.

Limitations

Our study has several limitations. First, spatial variation in war-related exposure overlaps with regional specificities, as regions differ not only in proximity to the war but also in cultural and historical legacies that may shape trust in the European Parliament. Second,

indicators of insecurity have a limited ability to explain trust in the European Parliament. Specifically, the variance explained by random effects exceeds that of fixed effects, both in weighted and unweighted regressions on balanced and unbalanced data. This may be related to the fact that we did not directly measure compensatory needs for reassurance or perceptions of group threat/hostility toward Russia. Instead, we relied on indicators of war exposure, which we treated as proxies hypothesised to capture different levels of war-related threats.

Third, the full-scale war may have introduced a sampling bias, as some participants were unable to continue participating because they lived close to the frontlines or had relocated abroad. These issues could affect the representativeness of our sample, potentially limiting the generalisability of the study's findings. Lastly, we applied different data collection methods for the first and second waves of data collection, which could have also introduced bias into our results.

DANYIL KARAKAI, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine. *Email*: dkarakai@kse.org.ua

VALENTYN HATSKO, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine. *Email*: vhatsko@kse.org.ua
http://orcid.org/0009-0009-6572-9584

RUSLANA MOSKOTINA, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine. *Email*: rmoskotina@kse.org.ua

KARINA SHYROKYKH, Department of International History and Economic Relations, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. *Email*: karina.shyrokykh@ekohist.su.se

TYMOFII BRIK, Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine. *Email*: tbrik@kse.org.ua

ANDRII DARKOVICH, Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine.
Email: adarkovich@kse.org.ua

References

Aassve, A., Capezzone, T., Cavalli, N., Conzo, P. & Peng, C. (2024) 'Social and Political Trust Diverge During a Crisis', *Scientific Reports*, 14, 1.

Alexseev, M. A. & Dembitskyi, S. (2024) 'Geosocietal Support for Democracy: Survey Evidence from Ukraine', *Perspectives on Politics*, 22, 4.

Armandon, E. (2013) 'Popular Assessments of Ukraine's Relations with Russia and the European Union Under Yanukovych', *Demokratizatsiya*, 21, 2.

Arnold, C., Sapir, E. & Zapryanova, G. (2012) 'Trust in the Institutions of the European Union: A Cross-country Examination', Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Scholarly Paper No. 2191428, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2191428, accessed 17 November 2025.

Bellows, J. & Miguel, E. (2009) 'War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone', *Journal of Public Economics*, 93, 11–2.

Bernhard, R. & Freeder, S. (2020) 'The More You Know: Voter Heuristics and the Information Search', *Political Behavior*, 42, 2.

Binder, M. & Heupel, M. (2015) 'The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates', *International Studies Quarterly*, 59, 2.
Buhbe, M. (ed.) (2017) *How Ukrainians Perceive European Values: Main Results of an Empirical Survey* (Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), available at: https://collections.fes.de/publikationen/ident/fes/13731, accessed 10 March 2026.
Bulana & Holubytska (2025) *Ukraine's Path to the EU: Reform, Resilience, and the Politics of Enlargement*, Schuman Policy Paper 796, 25 June, available at: https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/796-ukraine-s-path-to-the-eu-reform-resilience-and-the-politics-of-enlargement, accessed 17 November 2025.
Campbell, R. & Cowley, P. (2014) 'What Voters Want: Reactions to Candidate Characteristics in a Survey Experiment', *Political Studies*, 62, 4.
Cavazza, N., Russo, S., Colloca, P. & Roccato, M. (2022) 'How and Why is the COVID-19 Crisis Impacting Trust in Institutions? A Two-Wave Longitudinal Study in Italy', *Psicologia Sociale*, 17, 3.
Chaban, N., Elgström, O. & Knodt, M. (2019) 'Perceptions of EU Mediation and Mediation Effectiveness: Comparing Perspectives from Ukraine and the EU', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 54, 4.
Chebotarova, A. (2019) 'Renegotiating Ukrainian Identity at the Euromaidan', in Schmid, U. & Myshlovska, O. (eds) *Regionalism Without Regions: Reconceptualizing Ukraine's Heterogeneity* (Budapest & New York, NY, Central European University Press).
Coupé, T. & Obrizan, M. (2016) 'Violence and Political Outcomes in Ukraine—Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 44, 1.
Delhey, J., Steckermeier, L. C., Boehnke, K., Deutsch, F., Eichhorn, J., Kühnen, U. & Welzel, C. (2023) 'Existential Insecurity and Trust During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of Germany', *Journal of Trust Research*, 13, 2.
Dellmuth, L. M., Scholte, J. A. & Tallberg, J. (2019) 'Institutional Sources of Legitimacy for International Organisations: Beyond Procedure Versus Performance', *Review of International Studies*, 45, 4.
Dellmuth, L. M. & Tallberg, J. (2015) 'The Social Legitimacy of International Organisations: Interest Representation, Institutional Performance, and Confidence Extrapolation in the United Nations', *Review of International Studies*, 41, 3.
Dembitskyi, S. & Liubova, T. (2014) 'Geopolitical Orientations of the Population of Ukraine: Before and After the Conflict with Russia', *Ukrainske suspilstvo: Monitorynh sotsialnykh zmin*, 1, 1.
Diamantopoulos, A. & Winklhofer, H. M. (2001) 'Index Construction with Formative Indicators: An Alternative to Scale Development', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 38, 2.
Dinesen, P. T. & Jæger, M. M. (2013) 'The Effect of Terror on Institutional Trust: New Evidence from the 3/11 Madrid Terrorist Attack', *Political Psychology*, 34, 6.
Economou, A. & Kollias, C. (2019) 'Security Policy Preferences of EU Citizens: Do Terrorist Events Affect Them?', *Public Choice*, 178, 3.
Economou, A. & Kollias, C. (2023) 'In NATO We Trust(?): The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and EU27 Citizens' Trust in NATO', *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 29, 2.
EU Neighbours East (2020) 'Annual Survey Report: Ukraine 5th Wave (Spring 2020)', available at: https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/euneighbours-east_as2020report_ukraine.pdf, accessed 17 November 2025.
EU Neighbours East (2024) 'Ukraine Annual Survey 2024—Country Report', available at: https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/publications/ukraine-annual-survey-2024-country-report/, accessed 17 November 2025.
Eurofound (2022) *Maintaining Trust During the COVID-19 Pandemic* (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union).
Fang, G., Tang, T., Zhao, F. & Zhu, Y. (2023) 'The Social Scar of the Pandemic: Impacts of COVID-19 Exposure on Interpersonal Trust', *Journal of Asian Economics*, 86, 101609.
Feinstein, Y. (2018) 'One Flag, Two Rallies: Mechanisms of Public Opinion in Israel During the 2014 Gaza War', *Social Science Research*, 69.
Fiott, D. (2023) 'In Every Crisis an Opportunity? European Union Integration in Defence and the War on Ukraine', *Journal of European Integration*, 45, 3.
Foster, C. & Frieden, J. (2017) 'Crisis of Trust: Socio-Economic Determinants of Europeans' Confidence in Government', *European Union Politics*, 18, 4.
Gabel, M. (2003) 'Public Support for the European Parliament', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41, 2.
Gehring, K. (2019) 'External Threat, Group Identity, and Support for Common Policies—The Effect of the Russian Invasion in Ukraine on European Union Identity', Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Scholarly Paper No. 3511287, available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3511287, accessed 17 November 2025.

Gehring, K. (2022) 'Can External Threats Foster a European Union Identity? Evidence from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine', *Economic Journal*, 132, 644.
Haesebrouck, T. (2024) 'EU Member State Support to Ukraine', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 20, 2.
Hall, J. & Werner, K. (2022) 'Trauma and Trust: How War Exposure Shapes Social and Institutional Trust Among Refugees', *Frontiers in Psychology*, 13.
Harteveld, E., van der Meer, T. & de Vries, C. E. (2013) 'In Europe We Trust? Exploring Three Logics of Trust in the European Union', *European Union Politics*, 14, 4.
Hatsko, V. & Karakai, D. (2025) 'Sampling Bias During War: The Case of Panel Data', in *Problemy rozvytku sotsiolohichnoi teorii: Voienni vyklyky, suspilni reaktsii ta kontseptualni refleksii. Materialy XXI Mizhnarodnoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii*, 6 December 2024, Kyiv.
Henrich, J., Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilová, J. & Purzycki, B. G. (2019) 'War Increases Religiosity', *Nature Human Behaviour*, 3, 2.
Hobolt, S. B. (2007) 'Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration', *European Journal of Political Research*, 46, 2.
Hobolt, S. B. & de Vries, C. E. (2016) 'Public Support for European Integration', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19.
Hoch, G., Pondorfer, A. & Shkola, V. (2025) 'Conflict and Social Capital: Evidence from the Russian War Against Ukraine', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 53, 2.
Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2005) 'Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 6, 4.
Howorth, J. (2017) 'EU–NATO Cooperation: The Key to Europe's Security Future', *European Security*, 26, 3.
Hrushetskyi (2025) 'Chy ymovirno, shcho cherez 10 rokiv Ukraina bude protsvitaiuchoiu krainoiu-chlenom YeS', KIIS, available at: https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1547&page=1, accessed 17 November 2025.
IKDIF (2018) 'Yevropeiska intehratsiia u vymiri hromadskoi dumky', Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 28 September, available at: https://dif.org.ua/en/article/evropeyska-integratsiya-u-vimiri-gromadskoi-dumki, accessed 17 November 2025.
IKDIF (2019) 'European Integration of Ukraine: The Dynamics of Public Opinion', Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 5 December, available at: https://dif.org.ua/en/article/european-integration-of-ukraine-the-dynamics-of-public-opinion, accessed 17 November 2025.
IKDIF (2022) 'How the War Changed the Way Ukrainians Think About Friends, Enemies, and the Country's Strategic Goals', Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 30 May, available at: https://dif.org.ua/en/article/how-the-war-changed-the-way-ukrainians-think-about-friends-enemies-and-the-countrys-strategic-goals, accessed 17 November 2025.
Immerzeel, T. & van Tubergen, F. (2013) 'Religion as Reassurance? Testing the Insecurity Theory in 26 European Countries', *European Sociological Review*, 29, 2.
IRI (2021) 'Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine, March 13–21, 2021', International Republican Institute, available at: https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/public_-_03.2021_national_eng-_public.pdf, accessed 17 November 2025.
Karakai, D. & Hatsko, V. (2024) 'Perspective(s) of R. Inglehart's Theory of Evolutionary Modernization: Analysis of Change in Religiosity in Ukraine During the War', *Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing*, 1.
Karakai, D. & Moskotina, R. (2025) 'Existential Upheavals: Tracing War's Immediate Effect on Individual Religiosity in Ukraine', *Social Compass*, 72, 1.
Kay, A. C., Whitson, J. A., Gaucher, D. & Galinsky, A. D. (2009) 'Compensatory Control: Achieving Order Through the Mind, Our Institutions, and the Heavens', *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 18, 5.
KIIS (2025a) 'Dynamics of Trust in Social Institutions in 2021–2024', 9 January, available at: https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1467&page=1, accessed 17 November 2025.
KIIS (2025b) 'Vymiry stavlennia do YeS i NATO ta stavlennia do SShA', 14 January, available at: https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1468&page=1, accessed 17 November 2025.
Klymak, M. & Vlandas, T. (2022) 'The Impact of Russia's Invasion on European Attitudes', Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Scholarly Paper No. 4315398, available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4315398, accessed 10 March 2026.
Kovalska, O. (2021) *Determinants of Individual Support for European Integration: The Case of Ukraine*, BACES Working Paper 03-2021 (Barcelona, Barcelona Centre for European Studies), available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47259, accessed 17 November 2025.
Kritzinger, S. (2003) 'The Influence of the Nation-State on Individual Support for the European Union', *European Union Politics*, 4, 2.

Kuhn, T. & Seimel, A. (2025) 'Forged in Crisis: The Causal Impact of Crisis on European Identity Formation', unpublished manuscript.
Kumlin, S. (2009) 'Blaming Europe? Exploring the Variable Impact of National Public Service Dissatisfaction on EU Trust', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 19, 5.
Kurapov, A., Danyliuk, I., Loboda, A., Kalaitzaki, A., Kowatsch, T., Klimash, T. & Predko, V. (2023) 'Six Months into the War: A First-Wave Study of Stress, Anxiety, and Depression Among in Ukraine', *Frontiers in Psychiatry*, 14.
Kurapov, A., Schabus, M., Kahveci, S., Wilhelm, F. H. & Blechert, J. (2024) 'Explaining Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms and Sleep Disturbance in Ukrainian Civilians: Perceived Threat Versus Objective War Exposure', *European Journal of Psychotraumatology*, 15, 1.
Lai, B. & Reiter, D. (2005) 'Rally Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948–2001', *International Studies Quarterly*, 49, 2.
Li, J., Zhang, Y. & Niu, X. (2021) 'The COVID-19 Pandemic Reduces Trust Behavior', *Economics Letters*, 199, 109700.
Malik, S., Mihm, B. & Reichelt, M. (2021) 'The Impact of Face Masks on Interpersonal Trust in Times of COVID-19', *Scientific Reports*, 11, 17369.
Minesashvili, S. (2022) 'Ukraine: European Identity Discourses and Elite Relations Under Crises', in Minesashvili, A. (ed.) *European Identities During Wars and Revolutions: Change Under Crises in Georgia and Ukraine* (Cham, Palgrave Macmillan).
Minich, R. & Cheryba, N. (2022) 'Ukrainian Expectations from European Integration: Based on SCORE 2021 Ukraine', Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index, February, available at: https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PB_UKRTCA20_Support-for-EU.pdf, accessed 17 November 2025.
Minich, R. & Sereda, P. (2023) 'Score-Inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population (SHARP): Assessing Social Cohesion, Resistance, and People's Needs in Ukraine Amid Russian Full-scale Invasion—Wave 1 (2022)', available at: https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-05/SHARP-report-wave-1-2022.pdf, accessed 10 March 2026.
Montgomery, K., Jordens, C. F. C. & Little, M. (2008) 'How Vulnerability and Trust Interact During Extreme Events: Insights for Human Service Agencies and Organizations', *Administration & Society*, 40, 6.
Munro, N. (2007) 'Which Way Does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations Toward Russia and Western Europe', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 54, 6.
Nicoli, F., van der Duin, D., Beetsma, R., Bremer, B., Burgoon, B., Kuhn, T., Meijers, M. J. & de Ruijter, A. (2024) 'Closer During Crises? European Identity During the COVID-19 Pandemic and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 31, 10.
Onuch, O. (2023) 'European Ukrainians and their Fight Against Russian Invasion', *Nations and Nationalism*, 29, 1.
Onuch, O. (2024a) 'Ukrainians' Unwavering Path Toward the EU', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 June, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/ukrainians-unwavering-path-toward-the-eu?lang=en, accessed 17 November 2025.
Onuch, O. (2024b) 'Fighting for Europe: The EU's Democratic Pull Phenomenon in Ukraine, Poland and Belarus', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 62, 6.
Palagnyuk, Y. (2025) 'Public Opinion in Ukraine on European Integration During Russia's War Against Ukraine', *Przegląd Politologiczny*, 1.
Panchuk, D. (2024) 'The Impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Public Support for EU Enlargement', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 31, 10.
Perrin, A. J. & Smolek, S. J. (2009) 'Who Trusts? Race, Gender, and the September 11 Rally Effect Among Young Adults', *Social Science Research*, 38, 1.
Pop-Eleches, G. & Robertson, G. B. (2018) 'Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine—Before and After the Euromaidan', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 34, 2–3.
Razumkov Centre (2012) 'Vidnosyny Ukrainy z YeS i RF: Pozytsii ta otsinky hromadian', 4–5 (133–134), available at: https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD133-134_2012_ukr.pdf, accessed 17 November 2025.
Razumkov Centre (2022) 'Ukraina na shliakhu do YeS: Realii i perspektyvy', 1–2 (187–8), available at: https://razumkov.org.ua/images/journal/NSD187-188_2022_ukr_full.pdf, accessed 17 November 2025.
Razumkov Centre (2024a) 'Assessing the Situation in the Country, Trust in Social Institutions, Politicians, Public Officials, and Society Figures, and Belief in Victory (September 2024)', 18 October, available at: https://razumkov.org.ua/en/component/k2/assessing-the-situation-in-the-country-trust-in-social-institutions-politicians-public-officials-and-society-figures-and-belief-in-victory-september-2024, accessed 17 November 2025.

Razumkov Centre (2024b) 'Attitude to Foreign Countries, International Organisations and Politicians, and Ukraine's Accession to the European Union (January 2024)', 28 February, available at: https://razumkov.org.ua/en/research-areas/surveys/attitude-to-foreign-countries-international-organisations-and-politicians-and-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-european-union-january-2024, accessed 17 November 2025.

Razumkov Centre (2025) 'Ukraine's European Integration: Current State, Challenges, Prospects. Expert Opinions and Positions, April 2025', available at: https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2025/05/2025-European_integration-ENGL.pdf, accessed 17 November 2025.

Riabchuk, M. (2023) *Rallying Around the Flag: War Challenges and Civic Mobilization in Ukraine*, Working Paper (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University), available at: https://oar.princeton.edu/handle/88435/pr1nc5sc3p, accessed 17 November 2025.

Roccato, M., Colloca, P., Cavazza, N. & Russo, S. (2021) 'Coping with the COVID-19 Pandemic through Institutional Trust: Rally Effects, Compensatory Control, and Emotions', *Social Science Quarterly*, 102, 5.

Sauer, P. (2022) 'Ukraine Suspends 11 Political Parties with Links to Russia', *The Guardian*, 20 March, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/20/ukraine-suspends-11-political-parties-with-links-to-russia, accessed 17 November 2025.

Schmidt, S. C. E. & Woll, A. (2017) 'Longitudinal Drop-Out and Weighting Against its Bias', *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, 17, 1.

Shyrokykh, K. (2018) 'The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine: External Actors and Domestic Factors', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 70, 5.

Shyrokykh, K., Busol, K. & Koval, D. (2025) 'European Integration, and Democracy and Human Rights Reforms in Ukraine in the Wartime', in Rabinovych, M. & Pintsch, A. (eds) *Ukraine's Thorny Path to the EU: From 'Integration Without Membership' to 'Integration Through War'* (Cham, Palgrave Macmillan).

Simmel, G. (1955) *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations* (Glencoe, IL, Free Press).

Skocpol, T. (2002) 'Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American Civic Democracy?', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 35, 3.

Stein, A. A. (1976) 'Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 20, 1.

Steiner, N. D., Berlinschi, R., Farvaque, E., Fidrmuc, J., Harms, P., Mihailov, A., Neugart, M. & Stanek, P. (2023) 'Rallying Around the EU Flag: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Attitudes Toward European Integration', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 61, 2.

Tamilina, L. (2024) 'Do Ukrainians Trust Democratic Institutions? Institutional Confidence and Democracy Amid the War in Ukraine', *Vox Ukraine*, 23 December, available at: https://voxukraine.org/en/do-ukrainians-trust-democratic-institutions-institutional-confidence-and-democracy-amid-the-war-in-ukraine, accessed 17 November 2025.

Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E. & Schramm, S. (2023) *The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which Countries Help Ukraine and How?* Kiel Working Paper No. 2218 (Kiel, Kiel Institute for the World Economy), available at: https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/270853, accessed 17 November 2025.

van Tubergen, F., Kosyakova, Y. & Kanas, A. (2023) 'Religious Responses to Existential Insecurity: Conflict Intensity in the Region of Birth Increases Praying Among Refugees', *Social Science Research*, 113, 102895.

Vasilopoulou, S. & Talving, L. (2024) 'Euroscepticism as a Syndrome of Stagnation? Regional Inequality and Trust in the EU', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 31, 6.

White, S., McAllister, I. & Feklyunina, V. (2010) 'Belarus, Ukraine and Russia: East or West?', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 12, 3.

Williams, M. (2001) 'In Whom We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Context for Trust Development', *Academy of Management Review*, 26, 3.

Yaylacı, Ş & Price, C. G. (2023) 'Exposure to Violence as Explanatory Variable: Meaning, Measurement, and Theoretical Implications of Different Indicators', *International Studies Review*, 25, 1.

Appendix 1. Comparison of the distribution of characteristics of the panel sample and those who were not included in the panel

	Included in the panel ($N = 595$)	Not included in the panel ($N = 936$)	Overall ($N = 1,531$)	*p*-value
Region of residence				*<0.001**
Vinnytska *Oblast*	27 (4.5%)	33 (3.5%)	60 (3.9%)	
Volynska *Oblast*	17 (2.9%)	22 (2.4%)	39 (2.5%)	
Dnipropetrovska *Oblast*	48 (8.1%)	82 (8.8%)	130 (8.5%)	
Donetska *Oblast* (only areas controlled by Ukraine)	23 (3.9%)	55 (5.9%)	78 (5.1%)	
Zhytomyrska *Oblast*	20 (3.4%)	30 (3.2%)	50 (3.3%)	
Zakarpatska *Oblast*	14 (2.4%)	31 (3.3%)	45 (2.9%)	
Zaporizka *Oblast*	26 (4.4%)	47 (5.0%)	73 (4.8%)	
Ivano-Frankivska *Oblast*	30 (5.0%)	20 (2.1%)	50 (3.3%)	
Kyivska *Oblast*	18 (3.0%)	57 (6.1%)	75 (4.9%)	
Kirovohradska *Oblast*	21 (3.5%)	19 (2.0%)	40 (2.6%)	
Luhanska *Oblast* (only areas controlled by Ukraine)	2 (0.3%)	28 (3.0%)	30 (2.0%)	
Lvivska *Oblast*	42 (7.1%)	63 (6.7%)	105 (6.9%)	
Mykolaivska *Oblast*	7 (1.2%)	38 (4.1%)	45 (2.9%)	
Odeska *Oblast*	50 (8.4%)	40 (4.3%)	90 (5.9%)	
Poltavska *Oblast*	16 (2.7%)	44 (4.7%)	60 (3.9%)	
Rivnenska *Oblast*	26 (4.4%)	19 (2.0%)	45 (2.9%)	
Sumska *Oblast*	19 (3.2%)	26 (2.8%)	45 (2.9%)	
Ternopilska *Oblast*	28 (4.7%)	12 (1.3%)	40 (2.6%)	
Kharkivska *Oblast*	43 (7.2%)	62 (6.6%)	105 (6.9%)	
Khersonska *Oblast*	2 (0.3%)	38 (4.1%)	40 (2.6%)	
Khmelnytska *Oblast*	25 (4.2%)	31 (3.3%)	56 (3.7%)	
Cherkaska *Oblast*	15 (2.5%)	35 (3.7%)	50 (3.3%)	
Chernivetska *Oblast*	24 (4.0%)	11 (1.2%)	35 (2.3%)	
Chernihivska *Oblast*	12 (2.0%)	28 (3.0%)	40 (2.6%)	
Kyiv city	40 (6.7%)	65 (6.9%)	105 (6.9%)	
Settlement type				*<0.001**
Regional centre	270 (45.4%)	251 (26.8%)	521 (34.0%)	
Other city/township	154 (25.9%)	341 (36.4%)	495 (32.3%)	
Village	171 (28.7%)	344 (36.8%)	515 (33.6%)	
Trust in the European Parliament				*0.002**
Mean (SD)	4.38 (3.32)	3.80 (3.13)	4.03 (3.22)	
Missing	*80*	*170*	*250*	
Emotional attachment to Europe				*0.002**
Mean (SD)	5.02 (3.29)	4.47 (3.27)	4.69 (3.28)	
Missing	*26*	*43*	*69*	
Interest in politics				*<0.001**
Mean (SD)	2.58 (0.95)	2.79 (0.88)	2.71 (0.91)	
Missing	*2*	*5*	*7*	
Importance of living in a democratically governed country				*0.001**
Mean (SD)	8.29 (2.64)	7.88 (2.77)	8.04 (2.72)	
Missing	*24*	*54*	*78*	

Notes: The percentage for each category of the variables was calculated based on valid observations (excluding missing values). The percentage of missing values was calculated relative to the total number of observations. An asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant differences between respondents who were included in the panel and those who were not. For categorical variables, the Chi square test was applied, while the Wilcoxon rank sum test was used for numeric variables.

Appendix 2. Logistic regression models (dependent variable: included/not included in panel)

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	1.54	2.00*
	(0.66)	(0.64)
Region of residence (reference: Lvivska *Oblast*)		
Vinnytska *Oblast*	1.42	1.33
	(0.54)	(0.49)
Volynska *Oblast*	1.17	1.41
	(0.49)	(0.57)
Dnipropetrovska *Oblast*	1.00	0.97
	(0.32)	(0.29)
Donetska *Oblast* (only areas controlled by Ukraine)	0.94	1.01
	(0.37)	(0.37)
Zhytomyrska *Oblast*	1.21	1.26
	(0.47)	(0.48)
Zakarpatska *Oblast*	1.14	1.17
	(0.47)	(0.47)
Zaporizka *Oblast*	0.86	0.83
	(0.34)	(0.30)
Ivano-Frankivska *Oblast*	3.87***	3.28**
	(1.50)	(1.22)
Kyivska *Oblast*	0.64	0.78
	(0.28)	(0.30)
Kirovohradska *Oblast*	5.11**	3.74**
	(2.72)	(1.82)
Luhanska *Oblast* (only areas controlled by Ukraine)	0.21	0.18
	(0.23)	(0.19)
Mykolaivska *Oblast*	0.27*	0.33*
	(0.14)	(0.16)
Odeska *Oblast*	2.19*	2.59**
	(0.80)	(0.88)
Poltavska *Oblast*	0.90	0.87
	(0.36)	(0.34)
Rivnenska *Oblast*	3.00**	2.70**
	(1.16)	(1.02)
Sumska *Oblast*	1.14	1.24
	(0.49)	(0.50)
Ternopilska *Oblast*	4.22**	4.02***
	(1.85)	(1.69)
Kharkivska *Oblast*	1.08	0.99
	(0.35)	(0.31)
Khersonska *Oblast*	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Khmelnytska *Oblast*	2.02	1.72
	(0.78)	(0.64)
Cherkaska *Oblast*	0.69	0.66
	(0.31)	(0.28)
Chernivetska *Oblast*	3.62**	3.85**
	(1.70)	(1.75)
Chernihivska *Oblast*	0.53	0.74
	(0.29)	(0.36)
Kyiv city	0.47*	0.45*
	(0.16)	(0.15)

(*Continued*)

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2
Settlement type (reference: regional centre)		
Other city/township	0.40***	0.39***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Village	0.32***	0.32***
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Trust in the European Parliament	1.06*	1.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Emotional attachment to Europe	0.98	–
	(0.02)	
Interest in politics	0.76***	0.76***
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Importance of living in a democratically governed country	1.04	–
	(0.03)	
Observations	1,193	1,274
Nagelkerke's R^2	0.201	0.188
AIC	1,480.049	1,584.922
BIC	1,637.660	1,734.269

Notes: Models include regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses). In the logistic regression models, we present exponentiated coefficients. The first model incorporates all independent variables (six predictors), while the second model incorporates only statistically significant factors (four predictors). We calculated weights based on Model 2. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

Appendix 3. Mixed-effect linear weighted regression models (dependent variable: trust in the European Parliament): balanced data

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.57***	0.55	2.32***	2.07***	2.36***	−0.60	0.24
	(0.50)	(2.36)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.65)	(3.01)	(0.60)
Wave 2	0.99**	5.76***	3.43***	2.61***	2.03***	5.62*	4.44***
	(0.31)	(1.36)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(0.58)	(2.55)	(0.69)
Individual war exposure	−0.13				−0.10		
	(0.10)				(0.17)		
Western region	1.84***	1.64	3.03***	0.83*	0.83	1.01	3.11***
	(0.42)	(0.89)	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.86)	(0.86)
Central region	0.99*	0.88	2.06***	0.31	0.31	0.30	2.45**
	(0.42)	(0.61)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.61)	(0.77)
Southern region	0.70	0.67	1.53**	0.64	0.64	0.63	2.87***
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.50)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.72)
Wave 2 × individual war exposure	0.24*				0.21		
	(0.11)				(0.19)		
Distance from Russian threat (log)		0.49				0.49	
		(0.49)				(0.60)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log)		−0.73**				−0.57	
		(0.24)				(0.47)	
Wave 2 × western region			−2.35***				−2.21*
			(0.53)				(1.01)
Wave 2 × central region			−2.09***				−2.58**
			(0.54)				(0.89)
Wave 2 × southern region			−1.64**				−2.18**
			(0.57)				(0.83)
Attachment to Europe				0.35***	0.34***	0.89*	0.78***
				(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.41)	(0.17)
Wave 2 × attachment to Europe				−0.20***	−0.18	−0.47	−0.38
				(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.46)	(0.20)
Individual war exposure ×attachment to Europe					0.00		
					(0.03)		
Wave 2 × individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					−0.01		
					(0.03)		
Distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						−0.10	
						(0.07)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						0.05	
						(0.08)	
Western region × attachment to Europe							−0.49*
							(0.19)
Central region × attachment to Europe							−0.48*
							(0.19)

(*Continued*)

Appendix 3 (Continued)

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Southern region × attachment to Europe							−0.53** (0.20)
Wave 2 × western region × attachment to Europe							0.21 (0.22)
Wave 2 × central region × attachment to Europe							0.28 (0.22)
Wave 2 × southern region × attachment to Europe							0.22 (0.23)
Random effects							
σ^2	13.25	13.13	12.90	12.77	12.75	12.78	12.64
τ_{00}	2.73_{id}	2.75_{id}	2.78_{id}	2.40_{id}	2.42_{id}	2.40_{id}	2.36_{id}
ICC	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
N	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}	458_{id}
Observations	916	916	916	916	916	916	916
Marginal R^2/ Conditional R^2	0.060/ 0.221	0.061/ 0.224	0.065/ 0.231	0.094/ 0.237	0.094/ 0.239	0.094/ 0.237	0.101/ 0.243
AIC	4,581.573	4,571.981	4,562.171	4,531.947	4,553.367	4,544.144	4,543.187

Note: Models include regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

Appendix 4. Mixed-effect linear unweighted regression models (dependent variable: trust in the European Parliament): unbalanced data

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.64***	−1.87	2.37***	2.07***	2.25***	−1.65	0.59
	(0.45)	(2.12)	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.60)	(2.84)	(0.54)
Wave 2	1.01***	7.80***	3.27***	2.69***	2.14***	7.71**	4.34***
	(0.30)	(1.34)	(0.47)	(0.28)	(0.58)	(2.53)	(0.68)
Individual war exposure	−0.15				−0.05		
	(0.09)				(0.16)		
Western region	1.84***	1.20	3.08***	1.05**	1.01**	0.66	2.75***
	(0.37)	(0.78)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.79)	(0.77)
Central region	0.98**	0.64	2.02***	0.47	0.44	0.24	2.72***
	(0.37)	(0.53)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.55)	(0.72)
Southern region	0.63	0.52	1.14*	0.72*	0.71	0.63	2.40***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.66)
Wave 2 × individual war exposure	0.24*				0.20		
	(0.11)				(0.19)		
Distance from Russian threat (log)		0.96*				0.73	
		(0.44)				(0.57)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log)		−1.09***				−0.94*	
		(0.23)				(0.47)	
Wave 2 × western region			−2.39***				−2.59**
			(0.53)				(0.96)
Wave 2 × central region			−1.97***				−2.50**
			(0.55)				(0.89)
Wave 2 × southern region			−0.99				−1.66*
			(0.57)				(0.82)
Attachment to Europe				0.33***	0.36***	0.55	0.66***
				(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.38)	(0.14)
Wave 2 × attachment to Europe				−0.24***	−0.22*	−0.62	−0.39*
				(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.45)	(0.19)
Individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					−0.01		
					(0.03)		
Wave 2 × individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					−0.00		
					(0.03)		
Distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						−0.04	
						(0.07)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						0.08	
						(0.08)	
Western region × attachment to Europe							−0.34*
							(0.16)
Central region × attachment to Europe							−0.45**
							(0.16)

(*Continued*)

Appendix 4 (Continued)

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Southern region × attachment to Europe							−0.39* (0.17)
Wave 2 × western region × attachment to Europe							0.26 (0.21)
Wave 2 × central region × attachment to Europe							0.28 (0.21)
Wave 2 × southern region × attachment to Europe							0.16 (0.22)
Random effects							
σ^2	6.14	5.95	5.89	5.76	5.75	5.72	5.66
τ_{00}	2.33_{id}	2.41_{id}	2.46_{id}	2.20_{id}	2.22_{id}	2.24_{id}	2.23_{id}
ICC	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28
N	580_{id}	580_{id}	580_{id}	558_{id}	558_{id}	558_{id}	558_{id}
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,016	1,016	1,016	1,016
Marginal R^2/ Conditional R^2	0.110/ 0.355	0.122/ 0.376	0.124/ 0.382	0.151/ 0.386	0.154/ 0.389	0.155/ 0.392	0.165/ 0.401
AIC	5,195.467	5,173.036	5,170.252	4,981.278	5,002.488	4,991.446	4,994.338

Note: Models include regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

Appendix 5. Mixed-effect linear weighted regression models (dependent variable: trust in the European Parliament): unbalanced data

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.51***	−0.91	2.40***	2.14***	2.44***	−0.50	0.63
	(0.45)	(2.09)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.60)	(2.85)	(0.53)
Wave 2	1.17***	6.52***	3.25***	2.68***	1.84***	5.76*	4.43***
	(0.30)	(1.30)	(0.44)	(0.27)	(0.55)	(2.46)	(0.63)
Individual war exposure	−0.13				−0.11		
	(0.09)				(0.16)		
Western region	1.81***	1.24	2.87***	1.07**	1.05**	0.71	2.56**
	(0.38)	(0.78)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.80)	(0.79)
Central region	0.90*	0.60	1.82***	0.44	0.42	0.23	2.53***
	(0.37)	(0.53)	(0.43)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.55)	(0.70)
Southern region	0.63	0.52	1.19**	0.71	0.72	0.63	2.67***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.66)
Wave 2 × individual war exposure	0.23*				0.31		
	(0.10)				(0.18)		
Distance from Russian threat (log)		0.77				0.52	
		(0.43)				(0.57)	
Wave 2 × distance from Russian threat (log)		−0.84***				−0.58	
		(0.23)				(0.46)	
Wave 2 × western region			−2.08***				−2.23*
			(0.51)				(0.95)
Wave 2 × central region			−1.77***				−2.38**
			(0.51)				(0.82)
Wave 2 × southern region			−1.11*				−2.15**
			(0.54)				(0.78)
Attachment to Europe				0.30***	0.30***	0.43	0.64***
				(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.39)	(0.14)
Wave 2 × attachment to Europe				−0.21***	−0.14	−0.43	−0.42*
				(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.44)	(0.17)
Individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					−0.00		
					(0.03)		
Wave 2 × individual war exposure × attachment to Europe					−0.02		
					(0.03)		
Distance from Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						−0.03	
						(0.07)	
Wave 2 × distance to Russian threat (log) × attachment to Europe						0.04	
						(0.08)	
Western region × attachment to Europe							−0.33*
							(0.16)
Central region × attachment to Europe							−0.43**
							(0.16)

(*Continued*)

Appendix 5 (Continued)

Coefficients	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Southern region × attachment to Europe							−0.45** (0.17)
Wave 2 × western region × attachment to Europe							0.27 (0.20)
Wave 2 × central region × attachment to Europe							0.30 (0.19)
Wave 2 × southern region × attachment to Europe							0.27 (0.20)
Random effects							
σ^2	13.67	13.47	13.34	12.82	12.78	12.81	12.64
τ_{00}	2.62_{id}	2.65_{id}	2.69_{id}	2.57_{id}	2.59_{id}	2.59_{id}	2.59_{id}
ICC	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
N	580_{id}	580_{id}	580_{id}	558_{id}	558_{id}	558_{id}	558_{id}
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,016	1,016	1,016	1,016
Marginal R^2/ Conditional R^2	0.066/ 0.216	0.069/ 0.222	0.070/ 0.227	0.084/ 0.237	0.085/ 0.239	0.084/ 0.238	0.091/ 0.246
AIC	5,245.336	5,231.212	5,227.632	5,040.467	5,060.710	5,053.899	5,054.886

Note: Models include regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.