



Fiscal and Monetary Governance in Fragile and Conflict Affected Settings: Political Authority, Institutional Pluralism, and the Limits of Technocratic Reform

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This project is funded by the UK government's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) through its Global Research and Technology Development portfolio. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or positions of the UK government's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) or its partners. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

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Acknowledgements:

The authors are grateful to participants in the PeaceRep-funded workshop on "The Politics of Fiscal and Monetary Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings", Edinburgh Law School, 10-11 March 2026, for their contributions. Thanks to Andrew Lang for peer review.

Design: Smith Design Agency. Cover images: All images may be subject to copyright. Getty Images ©2026
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7488/era/7347>

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Key Findings

- ▶ Fiscal and monetary governance (FMG) is not just a technical domain. It is central to political authority, legitimacy, and state–society relations in fragile and conflict affected settings (FCAS).
- ▶ In line with a broader resilience-building agenda in FCAS, policy-makers should focus on building fiscal resilience — the capacity of fiscal systems to withstand shocks and adapt, and/or contribute to broader systemic resilience.
- ▶ Understanding fiscal resilience in FCAS requires sustained and politically grounded analysis. We identify five key dimensions.
 1. Analytical integration: Develop frameworks that connect fiscal and monetary governance with political economy and institutional dynamics.
 2. Multi scalar approaches: Incorporate both macro indicators and micro practices into diagnostics and policy design.
 3. Legitimacy and inclusion: Assess how fiscal and monetary decisions shape perceptions of authority and social contracts.
 4. Adaptive engagement: Test and adjust reforms in ways that work with the grain of political incentives and institutional realities.
 5. Data politics: Attend to who produces, controls, and interprets fiscal and monetary data, and how this shapes governance narratives.

Executive Summary

Fiscal and monetary governance (FMG) is central to political authority, legitimacy, and state–society relations in fragile and conflict affected settings (FCAS). Traditional approaches often treat FMG as technical and siloed — focused on revenue collection, expenditure, and macroeconomic stability. Yet in FCAS, FMG is both inherently political, and inter-linked: it shapes and is shaped by contests over authority, institutional pluralism, and the processes through which collective value is defined and maintained. Understanding and engaging with this is central to building fiscal resilience — the capacity of fiscal systems to withstand shocks and adapt, and/or contribute to broader systemic resilience — which in turn is a key pillar of peace and stability.

This brief highlights three core conceptual insights:

- ▶ **Integration over separation:** Fiscal and monetary governance are deeply interdependent. Policies and institutions interact in complex ways, and separating them analytically or operationally can obscure critical political and economic dynamics.
- ▶ **Multi lens analysis:** To better understand FMG's role in building or undermining fiscal resilience, we must move beyond technical framings, towards a more detailed understanding of the different political functions of FMG, and how these intersect with fragility and conflict of different kinds. We argue FMG functions simultaneously as a policy instrument, a governance structure, and a constitutional framework. Each lens reveals, respectively, different dimensions: from technical implementation and resource allocation, to authority and legitimacy, to the production of shared norms and collective value. In order to 'think and work politically' on FMG in FCAS, it is important to grasp these functions and how they are interlinked.
- ▶ **Navigation over prescription:** Engagement with FMG in FCAS is defined by enduring *trade-offs*, rather than single solutions. These include balancing technocratic credibility with political legitimacy, working with existing institutions versus pursuing reform, and managing macro-level objectives alongside micro-level practices.

These insights lead to key cross-cutting themes:

- ▶ FMG in FCAS is characterised by *institutional pluralism*, where authority is fragmented across formal and informal actors, local powerbrokers, and external partners.
- ▶ Effective analysis and policy engagement must account for *multi-scalar dynamics*, connecting national budgets and central bank policies with local revenue practices and parallel monetary systems.
- ▶ The *politics of data and its infrastructure* — including visibility, access, and legitimacy — is crucial. Security and military expenditures, informal taxation, and alternative currencies are often opaque yet politically significant.
- ▶ *External actors* — donors, international financial institutions, and private financiers — play evolving roles in shaping FMG, introducing new capacities and risks, particularly around automation, digital finance, climate related instruments, and the financialisation of peace dividends.¹

The brief identifies seven persistent trade-offs that result, that will guide policy and research:

1. Integration vs institutional separation
2. Technocratic credibility vs political legitimacy
3. Working with existing institutions vs transformation
4. State centric vs plural approaches
5. Macro vs micro engagement
6. FCAS exceptionalism vs broader crisis learning
7. Short term stabilization vs long-term institution-building

Rather than prescribing solutions, this brief highlights the *conceptual frameworks*, *political dynamics*, and *operational considerations* that should guide policy engagement with fiscal resilience in fragile contexts. By foregrounding the intersection of politics, governance, and economics, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners can better understand how FMG contributes to legitimacy, state-building, and peace — and can design interventions that are context-sensitive, adaptive, and aware of trade-offs.

Introduction

This brief outlines the conceptual foundations, analytical challenges, and enduring trade-offs that should inform future research and policy engagement on fiscal and monetary governance (FMG) in fragile contexts. The brief draws on the findings of PeaceRep's two-year programme of research into the constitutional dimensions of FMG, and an expert policy workshop on the topic on 10-11 March 2026.

In the past two decades or so, the need for more politically sensitive policy engagement has become widely accepted amongst donors, researchers and practitioners (Laws and Marquette 2018). Yet conventional frameworks often treat FMG as technical domains focused on revenue collection, inflation control, and macroeconomic stability (Laws and Desai 2025: 4). This technocratic framing obscures fiscal and monetary systems' deep political and constitutional functions — as arenas in which contests play out over distributional outcomes, authority and legitimacy, and definitions of collective value. As such, FMG is central to prospects for peace in FCAS (Addison et al 2005).

In this brief, we emphasize how these political factors can contribute or undermine *fiscal resilience* – i.e., the ability of a state's fiscal systems to survive, recover, and adapt to conflict and other crises. We explore how fiscal resilience is built through integrated institutional arrangements. We argue that a politically-informed policy approach to fiscal resilience should involve three conceptual shifts:

- ▶ **Integration over separation:** Fiscal and monetary governance must be understood as interdependent dimensions of political economy, in spite of the persistence of policy and institutional silos.
- ▶ **Multi lens analysis:** To better understand FMG's role in building or undermining fiscal resilience, we must move beyond technical framings, towards a more detailed understanding of the different political functions of FMG, and how these intersect with fragility and conflict of different kinds. We argue that fiscal and monetary systems operate simultaneously as policy instruments, governance structures, and constitutional frameworks. These levels shape how contests and conflict over authority and value play out, and therefore provide a framework for policy efforts to 'think and work politically' on fiscal and monetary issues.

- ▶ **Navigation over prescription:** Policy engagement must grapple with persistent trade-offs, rather than assuming that enduring solutions will be available, or that 'all good things go together'.

These shifts reflect both the institutional pluralism of FCAS and the broader political economy of state formation, and they highlight the limits of standardised reform packages.

1: The Politics of Fiscal and Monetary Governance Matters in FCAS

Fiscal and monetary decisions are central to how authority is constituted, contested, and perceived. They are not just technical instruments for stabilising output or controlling price levels; they also shape state–society relations, influence elite bargains, and underpin social contracts (Moore 2004; Besley & Persson 2014). For example: how and from whom revenue is extracted, how public expenditures are allocated, and how monetary authority is exercised, all send powerful signals about fairness, inclusion, and legitimacy.

Whilst politics permeates economic governance in all contexts, in FCAS it can both mitigate and exacerbate conflict, and promote or undermine resilience. Weak fiscal systems, unpredictable revenue flows, and monetary instability can deepen grievances and fuel competition (Collier et al. 2003). Conversely, credible and inclusive FMG systems can enhance legitimacy and create incentives for cooperation (IMF 2022; OECD 2022).

However, this potential remains under realised in policy practice. Standard approaches to FMG often assume a level of institutional coherence and central authority that does not exist in many FCAS. What is formally a national budget or a central bank may, in practice, be an assemblage of competing authorities, informal practices, and hybrid governance structures (Box 2, 4). Ignoring this complexity undermines both analysis and engagement.

2. Conceptual Integration Beyond Technical Silos

Fiscal governance and monetary governance are typically studied and practised as discrete policy arenas. In conventional macroeconomic theory, fiscal policy refers to taxation and public spending, and is associated with allocation, redistribution, and stabilisation — often framed within government budget constraints. Monetary policy, on the other hand, is typically associated with price stability, control of inflation expectations, and financial sector regulation.

In many economies, this separation has analytical and operational convenience. These distinctions have underpinned standard policy prescriptions, including central bank independence and fiscal rules (Alesina & Summers 1993; Goodhart 1988).

However, fiscal and monetary governance are analytically and practically interconnected, in ways that are particularly stark in FCAS. Consider the political pressures faced by state-level decision makers dealing with internal armed conflict. The Government may need to finance security expenditures, humanitarian relief, or public employment in an environment where tax systems may be weak or contested. Under such conditions, central banks may be drawn into financing government operations, and monetary policy may be subordinated to urgent fiscal imperatives. This kind of monetary expansion may provide a short term response to fiscal demands, albeit at the cost of inflationary pressures (Box 1 and 2)². This interdependence between fiscal exigencies and monetary responses highlights the limitations of treating these domains separately.

From a political economy perspective, integrating analysis of fiscal and monetary governance reveals how core questions — about redistribution, legitimacy, state capacity, and authority — cut across technical policy domains. This integrated perspective also underscores why reform efforts that isolate one domain from the other often fail to take root in conflict affected contexts (Box 6).

3. Three Lenses for Analyzing Fiscal and Monetary Governance

In this section, we argue that the political functions of FMG in FCAS can be understood through three different perspectives— focusing on policy instruments, governance structures, and constitutional frameworks. The three perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Each illuminates different facets of how economic governance operates in contested environments. In order to ‘think and work politically’ on FMG in FCAS, it is important to grasp these functions and how they are interlinked.

3.1. FMG as Policy Instruments

Viewed through a policy lens, fiscal and monetary systems are tools for managing macroeconomic and developmental objectives. This perspective emphasises efficiency, sustainability, and outcomes such as growth, inflation control, and debt viability. It aligns with the technical mandates of international financial institutions.

Policy oriented research often focuses on improving revenue administration, designing equitable tax systems, stabilising currency, and enhancing debt management (IMF 2022; World Bank 2017). While these are important aims, focusing solely on technical optimisation can blind analysts to the political determinants of policy success or failure, and the political consequences of the same. For instance, a narrow tax base and dependency on external finance may limit a government’s ability to provide public goods, which may provoke grievances. Similarly, poorly sequenced fiscal adjustments can exacerbate economic contraction and social stress (Collier et al. 2003). Monetary policy decisions made under pressure — such as currency devaluation or interest rate cuts — also have distributional consequences that can inflame social tensions.

BOX 1: FMG and the 2016 Colombian peace agreement

The 2016 peace accords between the Colombian state and the FARC introduced a series of programmes aimed at promoting rural development, employment, and land formalisation in the territories most affected by the conflict. The government had to secure domestic commercial loans to support these economic and developmental objectives, which meant the independent central bank became a key actor in the peace process. The inflation and interest rates set by the central bank had implications for borrowing and spending capacity of the central government, and therefore set the background conditions for the implementation of the peace agreement and its associated policy objectives.

3.2. FMG as Governance Structures

A governance lens emphasises how fiscal and monetary structures generate and distribute authority, legitimacy, and accountability (or fail to do so). For example, taxation — both its presence and how it is conducted — shapes citizens' perceptions of the state and affects their willingness to comply with its demands (Levi 1988; Moore 2004). Public budgeting decisions signal priorities and values (Schumpeter 1991), and monetary stability conversely conveys institutional competence.

In FCAS, where legitimacy is often contested, the symbolic and governance functions of FMG are particularly salient. For instance, uneven enforcement of tax obligations across regions may reflect and reinforce unequal political relationships. Monetary instability may be interpreted not only as an economic problem but as evidence of state weakness.

This lens highlights that fiscal and monetary governance are not neutral but are deeply embedded in processes of authority building and contestation (Tilly 1990). It draws on literatures on state-building, governance, and public administration to show how FMG practices can construct or undermine political bargaining spaces (Migdal 2001; Centeno et al. 2017), and their resilience to evolving conflict dynamics.

BOX 2: FMG, authority, and legitimacy in Myanmar

Myanmar's political architecture has transformed since the military coup in February 2021. Against a backdrop of ongoing conflict and contested statebuilding, citizens in many areas experience a patchwork of often overlapping administrations and tax regimes. This fragmentation reveals how different approaches to fiscal governance shape political relationships between different authorities and their subjects. The National Unity Government (NUG), for example, sees itself as the legitimate leader of the democracy movement and representative of the people of Myanmar, and so it raises funds in the same way as any state would lawfully do so. This includes the sale of bonds, rents from natural resources and sale of assets, lotteries, taxes, and donations. The NUG has also foresworn the production, trade, or taxation of illicit narcotics. Local administration bodies, under the NUG's guidance, have begun raising funds through various taxation channels. Legality, centralised discipline, and transparency, are recognised as crucial for maintaining public trust and financial support (Turnell 2025).

3.3. FMG as Constitutional Frameworks

The constitutional lens extends beyond formal policy and governance to consider how FMG contributes to defining collective value and shared political order. Money and revenue systems help define what it means to belong to a political community: they encode expectations about reciprocity, rights, and obligations (Polanyi 1944; Ingham 2004).

Constitutional analysis foregrounds how fiscal and monetary governance help constitute political settlements — the ongoing compromises and agreements among elites and social groups that underpin political order (Kelsall et al. 2022) — by providing a shared structure of value through which these compromises can be articulated and calculated. The politics of these constitutional frameworks, then, are contests over the units and structures of value that should pertain. In FCAS, these frameworks are often fluid and incomplete. Monetary systems may be plural — with informal or alternative currencies circulating alongside official legal tender — while fiscal arrangements may reflect negotiated distributions of revenue rights among competing authorities.

This lens is useful for understanding how economic governance intersects with identity, legitimacy, and shared norms. It moves the focus beyond efficiency to consider how fiscal and monetary systems underpin normative questions about inclusion, representation, and collective belonging.

BOX 3. The constitutional role of FMG in early American history

In her analysis of the history and political economy of capitalism, Christine Desan (2014) argues European settlers in early America re-invented money a system of public credit. The implications of this demonstrate what we refer to as the constitutional role of FMG. The provincial assemblies in early America faced a systemic problem with their money supply. The goods they bought from Europe cost more than the things they sold, so they faced recurring shortages of physical coins. In response, they created a new indigenous money, in the form of bills of credit or IOUs. This had profound, world-building implications. Once the colonial authorities realised they could make payments in the public domain with paper IOUs and tax them back, they were able to make decisions about their collective trajectory independently of the British empire. It was understood that fiscal and monetary practices were distributive, political decisions that could be used to engineer a particular kind of political community. For example, using these new monetary powers to allow farmers to borrow money against the value of their land was a deliberate choice, and one that underpinned early American self-determination.

These three perspectives bring out shared background conditions that shape the politics of FMG in FCAS – and that can form the backbone of any politically-sensitive engagement with FMG in FCAS. These are the pervasiveness of institutional pluralism, the multi-scalar nature of politics, and the role of external actors in FMG. We now take each of these in turn.

4. Institutional Pluralism in Fragile and Conflict Affected Settings

A defining feature of FMG in FCAS is institutional pluralism, where authority over revenue, spending, and monetary functions is dispersed across multiple actors and levels. This reflects both the fragmentation of political authority that is typical of FCAS, and the adaptive practices that communities often develop in contexts of limited or contested statehood. In Myanmar, for example, rather than reconfiguring centralised authority, actors resisting the military junta are creating a pluralistic and decentralised state.

In such settings, formal state institutions often coexist with informal authorities, local powerbrokers, private actors, and armed groups, each exercising de facto control over fiscal or monetary functions. Revenue may be captured through informal taxation at checkpoints, local levies, or other negotiated agreements with non state actors. Monetary practices such as barter, commodity money, or parallel currencies may emerge if the official currency loses credibility or availability.

BOX 4: Conflict and currency in Myanmar

In Myanmar, the State Administration Council (SAC - or military junta) has control over the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) and other key financial institutions. The SAC has relied heavily on borrowing from the central bank to fund its campaign – in other words, on the printing of money. The CBM also forces private banks to purchase SAC bonds (Turnell 2025). This manipulation of the monetary system has resulted in extreme monetary instability and the collapse of the value of the national currency. As people's faith in the national currency and banking system declines, they are increasingly moving their money out of kyat and into foreign currency, gold, property, and other stores of value. In border areas, people are using Thai Baht or Indian Rupees where possible, while relying on informal exchange networks such as *hundi* to bypass the central bank.

Institutional pluralism complicates the standard image of a unified fiscal authority and a central bank that exercises exclusive monetary control. It demands that analysts and policymakers recognise that FMG systems are often hybrid, and their control and reach is subject to ongoing contestation and negotiation.

This institutional pluralism has profound implications:

- ▶ *Analytical frameworks* that assume unitary authority may misinterpret the sources of revenue or the actual contours of monetary circulation.
- ▶ *Policy interventions* based on formal institutions, and/or a single political mechanism or entry-point, may fail if they do not accommodate or engage with informal authorities, and/or the range of practices through which fiscal authority plays out.
- ▶ *Legitimacy effects* of fiscal and monetary decisions may vary depending on which actors are seen as rightful authorities. Supporting a central authority that lacks legitimacy in certain regions may inadvertently strengthen parallel systems that have greater local acceptance.

The literature on governance and conflict highlights how such pluralism is not merely dysfunctional residue but often reflects underlying political bargains, social capital, and negotiated orders (North, Wallis & Weingast 2009). Recognising plural authority structures is therefore an essential starting point for politically-informed analysis and intervention.

5. Multi Scalar Dynamics and the Politics of Data

Fiscal and monetary governance operates at multiple scales, from national budgets and central bank policy to local revenue practices and informal exchange mechanisms. Understanding how these scales interact is critical.

At the macro level, national fiscal plans, debt strategies, and monetary policy decisions shape aggregate outcomes and engage with external partners and markets. These are the domains that international financial partners traditionally emphasise, using indicators such as deficits, inflation, debt sustainability, and foreign reserves to gauge performance.

Simultaneously, at the micro level, local taxation practices, illicit activity, informal payments, and transactional monetary behaviours, may be central to how citizens experience governance. Micro practices may undermine or reinforce macro policies. For example, if informal taxation is widespread, efforts to expand formal revenue collection may be resisted or evaded. Similarly, parallel currency usage may blunt the effectiveness of central monetary policy.

BOX 5: Fiscal decentralisation and armed clientelism in Colombia

From the mid-1980s, the Colombian government took forward an ambitious fiscal and administrative decentralisation strategy. It was thought that the rise of insurgent groups and paramilitaries at the time was because of the state's weak legitimacy and its failure to provide basic services at the local level. Political and economic resources were transferred to subnational governments in an attempt to improve access to the political system and encourage peaceful contestation. However, these reforms began before a peace agreement had been reached with all combatants, and in the absence of an effective state security presence across much of the country. It was thought that bringing resources and decision-making closer to the people would help defuse the grievances fuelling political violence. In reality, the capture of those same resources on the part of rebels was used to finance the continuation of the armed struggle and the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right (Eaton 2006).

The politics of data production and visibility complicates these dynamics. Reliable data on fiscal flows, revenue collections, and monetary transactions is often limited in FCAS. Security spending is particularly opaque. New data sources — including digital financial footprints, mobile transactions, and private risk modelling — offer potential insights but also raise questions about control, access, and political interpretation. These dynamics are not merely technical; they reflect power relations about who can define what counts as legitimate data, who benefits from visibility, and how information is used to shape narratives about authority and performance.

BOX 6: The impact of digital infrastructures on the politics of FMG

Digital financial systems and automated taxation platforms, often developed outside fragile states, introduce new capabilities but also new governance dynamics. In Myanmar, for example, when passing State Administration Council (military junta) checkpoints run by the Tatmadaw (state armed forces), citizens are often harassed and taxed arbitrarily. Since the rise of digital wallets and currencies, phones are now routinely inspected and digital extortion is used to supplement cash payments. This extortion is at once a means of revenue-raising, of managing the surveillance of citizens, and of contesting or controlling currency. Cash offers a stronger guarantee of individual privacy from political scrutiny at the roadblock, while digital wallets offer the inverse. Efforts to support the introduction of digital currencies in FCAS contend with the underlying political dynamics of control, surveillance, and authority.

6. External Actors and the Evolving Landscape of FMG

International actors have traditionally engaged with fiscal and monetary governance in FCAS through financing, technical assistance, policy advice, and institutional partnerships. International financial institutions (IFIs) bring technical expertise and access to global capital markets, but also maintain prescriptive macroeconomic conditionalities and policy frameworks. Donor organisations often promote policy packages that assume certain levels of institutional coherence and state capacity. These assumptions may not hold in fragile settings, leading to reform fatigue, incomplete implementation, or other negative unintended consequences.

The role and relevance of these actors and forms of cooperation is changing, particularly as bilateral aid retrenches in some regions and multilateral institutions assume broader roles. Simultaneously, external private actors — including insurance markets, fintech platforms, and global investors — are reshaping aspects of FMG. For example, sovereign risk models produced by private insurers can influence creditworthiness and access to finance. Climate change and disaster risk financing further intersect with FMG. Instruments such as parametric insurance offer rapid liquidity in response to climate shocks but raise questions about affordability, institutional capacity, and long term resilience (Clarke & Dercon 2016; World Bank 2022). Whether such tools strengthen governance or create ongoing contingent liabilities remains unclear.

These evolving dynamics highlight that FMG in FCAS is embedded in broader global political economy processes. Policy engagement must therefore be sensitive to external influences as well as domestic political dynamics.

7. Enduring Trade-Offs

FMG in FCAS sits at the intersection of political authority, institutional capacity, and economic governance. As such, policies to build fiscal resilience in FCAS are likely to encounter one or more of the following trade-offs:

- ▶ **Integration vs. Institutional Separation:** While analytical integration of fiscal and monetary governance clarifies how resources and authority interconnect, institutional silos persist across ministries, central banks, IFIs, and donor agencies. However, attempts to merge mandates can create coordination costs and blur accountability.
- ▶ **Technocratic Credibility vs. Political Legitimacy:** Policies promoting macroeconomic stability may undermine social cohesion if they fail to consider distributional impacts or political sensitivities. Conversely, politically responsive policies may weaken fiscal discipline or monetary credibility.
- ▶ **Working With Existing Institutions vs. Transformation:** Existing institutions, even if imperfect or captured by elites, are often embedded in political settlements. Sudden institutional transformation may generate resistance or instability. Moreover, the potential impact of fiscal reforms on established patterns of illicit activity, political patronage, and rent-seeking, may only become apparent once those reforms have been introduced. As such, effective reform in any sector often entails 'working with the grain' of the political settlement through phased engagement, testing and adaptation, and negotiation.
- ▶ **State Centric vs. Plural Approaches:** Strengthening central state institutions is often seen as a priority. But, as noted above, authority in FCAS is often fragmented. Recognising the reality of plural governance is essential, but engaging with non state actors may raise normative and political concerns (Laws and Desai, 2025).
- ▶ **Macro vs. Micro Engagement:** National fiscal and monetary frameworks matter, but micro level practices shape lived experiences of governance. Bridging these scales requires analytical tools capable of linking macro policy effects with micro political and economic practices.
- ▶ **FCAS Exceptionalism vs. Broader Learning:** Conflict contexts pose distinct challenges, but they also share dynamics with other crisis settings (economic crises, pandemics, climate shocks). Policy learning must balance attention to unique features of FCAS, with insights from related policy domains.

8. Implications for Policy and Research

Understanding fiscal resilience in FCAS requires sustained and politically grounded analysis. The following perspectives can inform future engagement:

- ▶ Analytical integration: Develop frameworks that connect fiscal and monetary governance with political economy and institutional dynamics.
- ▶ Multi scalar approaches: Incorporate both macro indicators and micro practices into diagnostics and policy design.
- ▶ Legitimacy and inclusion: Assess how fiscal and monetary decisions shape perceptions of authority and social contracts.
- ▶ Adaptive engagement: Test and adjust reforms in ways that work with the grain of political incentives and institutional realities.
- ▶ Data politics: Attend to who produces, controls, interprets fiscal and monetary data, and how this shapes governance narratives.

These orientations do not prescribe specific technical fixes; rather, they provide conceptual guidance for navigating the complex terrain of FMG in FCAS.

9. Conclusion

Fiscal and monetary governance in fragile and conflict affected settings is not a technical sideline to broader peace or development agendas. It is a central arena of political contestation and authority formation. FMG shapes — and is shaped by — distributions of power, legitimacy, and value. Engaging with FMG demands moving beyond siloed, technocratic frameworks toward integrated, politically informed approaches that recognise persistent trade-offs and institutional pluralism.

By reframing FMG in this way, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners can better understand how economic governance intersects with the deeper dynamics of conflict, legitimacy, and collective order — and can design interventions that are more adaptive, context sensitive, and politically attuned, in pursuit of fiscal and broader systemic resilience.

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Endnotes

¹ The "concept of the 'peace dividend' is that the end of warfare brings a rapid gain in income" (Collier 1995, 3). Its financialisation refers to financial instruments whose value is secured against or refers to an underlying potential or actually-realised peace dividend.

² The literature on fiscal dominance illustrates how monetary authorities can lose autonomy when fiscal pressures require accommodation (Sargent & Wallace 1981). Its dynamics are especially prevalent in fragile environments where revenue is uncertain and political pressures intense.



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About Us


PeaceRep is a research consortium based at Edinburgh Law School. Our research is rethinking peace and transition processes in the light of changing conflict dynamics, changing demands of inclusion, and changes in patterns of global intervention in conflict and peace/mediation/transition management processes.

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PeaceRep is funded by UK International Development from the UK government.



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