

MEND DATA SERIES

# Mediation in 2025

Navigating overlapping  
conflict systems



Mateja Peter, Elisa D'Amico,  
Kasia Houghton, Sanja Badanjak

## MEND Data Series

The **MEND Data Series** explores global insights into mediation and mediation-related activities in the previous year, focusing on third-party activities and any agreements reached. This report is based on the second release of the Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND). MEND offers a comprehensive record of peacemaking efforts within major armed conflicts, systematically tracking all mediation and mediation-related events involving external third-party actors—regardless of whether these efforts result in formal peace agreements.

For more information on the consortium, MEND dataset and the VIP project please visit the following websites:

**PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform:** [www.peacerep.org](http://www.peacerep.org)

**PeaceHub (MEND dataset):** [peacehub.st-andrews.ac.uk](http://peacehub.st-andrews.ac.uk)

**PeaceHub Vertically Integrated Project (VIP):** [peacehub.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk](http://peacehub.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk)

---

## Acknowledgments

The core research team, led by Mateja Peter, includes Sanja Badanjak, Elisa D'Amico, and Kasia Houghton. Niamh Henry plays a key role in facilitating the integration of MEND with the PA-X dataset, while Tomas Vancisin was responsible for the visualisations on the Peacehub website. This release of MEND reflects the valuable contributions of our dedicated analysts: Siheon Choi, Louise Courbin, Sarah Gharib Seif, and Ben Houghton, alongside junior analysts in the Vertically Integrated Project (VIP) PeaceHub at the University of St Andrews: Liora Berg, Ava Byrne, Nicholas de Carvalho, Zoe Guidino, Emma Kavanaugh, Samvit Nagpal, Alix Ramillon, and Leah Rose.

This research is supported by the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), funded by UK International Development from the UK government. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform. Additional funding was received from the University of St Andrews.

---

## Citations

**Cite data as:** Peter, M., Badanjak, S., D'Amico, E., & Houghton, K. (2026). Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND) (V2). Harvard Dataverse.

<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PYRHS6>

**Cite report as:** Peter, M., D'Amico, E., Houghton, K., & Badanjak, S. (2026). Mediation in 2025: Navigating overlapping conflict systems [MEND Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

<https://doi.org/10.7488/era/7185>

## Table of Contents

<b>1 Executive summary</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1 Key findings . . . . .	2
1.2 Policy recommendations . . . . .	3
<b>2 Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3 Trends in mediation</b>	<b>6</b>
3.1 Mediation across 2025 . . . . .	6
3.2 Mediation in interstate and internationalised contexts . . . . .	10
3.3 The geography of conflict mediation . . . . .	12
<b>4 Mediators</b>	<b>14</b>
4.1 Prominent mediators . . . . .	14
4.2 Mediators outside of the spotlight . . . . .	15
4.2.1 Azerbaijan . . . . .	17
4.2.2 Türkiye . . . . .	18
<b>5 Agreements</b>	<b>20</b>
5.1 Agreement focus . . . . .	21
5.2 Mediators in agreements . . . . .	22
<b>6 Appendix 1: Agreement list</b>	<b>25</b>

# 1 Executive summary

## 1.1 Key findings

1. **Interstate mediation rose in 2025**, and is increasingly embedded within internationalised intrastate conflicts rather than operating as a standalone diplomatic tool. Such mediation activity increasingly reflected not discrete wars, but **overlapping conflict systems** characterised by escalation of risks, regional spillover, and multi-actor entanglement.
2. Drawing on the **Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND)**, this report analyses **1,539 mediation and mediation-related events involving external third parties, across eight conflict affected contexts: Israel, Syria, Sudan, Libya, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Mali**. Importantly, only one fifth of these were direct mediation events, underscoring the growing importance of preparatory, facilitative, and coordination activities that are typically under-measured and under-resourced.
3. **Mediation activity was highly uneven across cases, with conflicts involving Israel accounting for 42% of all recorded events , followed by Syria (23%) and Sudan (12%)**. By contrast, mediation efforts in Mali, Afghanistan, and Yemen remained comparatively limited, reflecting both constrained diplomatic access and stalled political processes.
4. **Interstate mediation reached a new level of prominence**, particularly between May and October 2025, when disputes involving Israel-Iran, Israel-Syria, Syria-Lebanon, Israel-Lebanon, and Afghanistan-Pakistan intensified. These efforts were directly linked to internationalised civil wars rather than to isolated interstate disputes. This pattern highlights **the collapse of traditional analytical distinctions between internal and external conflict and conflict resolution, with important implications for donor programming, risk assessment, and impact evaluation**.
5. **Agreements reached in 2025 were predominantly informal, incremental, and crisis driven**. MEND recorded **46 agreements**, the majority of which focused on ceasefires, de-escalation measures, humanitarian access, prisoner and hostage exchanges, or procedural arrangements rather than comprehensive political settlements. Only a small subset overlapped with formal peace agreement datasets (seven were found in PA-X).

6. **Ability to broker agreements was highly concentrated** among a small group of repeat mediators. **Qatar, the United States (US), and Türkiye** accounted for a large share of concluded agreements, while **United Nations (UN)** missions and regional organisations played essential — but mainly process oriented — roles in sustaining dialogue rather than producing breakthroughs.
7. **Highly partial mediators** were increasingly central to crisis management, with several actors **shifting between roles as mediator, security guarantor, and belligerent**. This blurring of roles proved effective in producing short term outcomes but raised structural questions about legitimacy, sustainability, and long term conflict transformation.

## 1.2 Policy recommendations

### 1. Reframe support from “peace processes” to mediation systems.

By reframing mediation strategies around interconnected conflict systems rather than discrete conflicts, policymakers should support mediation architectures capable of operating across conflict boundaries, including regional spillovers and interstate overlays.

### 2. Invest in sustained mediation-related capacity, not only high profile talks.

Given the dominance of mediation-related activity and increasing difficulty for liberal actors to gain access as mediators, resources should prioritise third-party coordination mechanisms, shuttle diplomacy (including between mediators), the inclusion of marginalised actors in negotiations, implementation monitoring, and informal facilitation that enables mediation to function outside high profile talks.

### 3. Adjust expectations around mediation outcomes.

In highly internationalised conflicts, policymakers should recognise that incremental, informal agreements are often the primary — and most realistic — means of influence, and should design success metrics and evaluation frameworks accordingly.

### 4. Strengthen data driven mediation analysis.

Sustained support for high resolution, event level datasets capable of mapping conflict systems and cross conflict linkages — such as MEND — is essential to track mediation activity, assess effectiveness, identify emerging mediators, and inform timely policy decisions. Without such data infrastructure, donor strategies risk remaining reactive, anecdotal, and incomplete.

## 2 Introduction

Mediation in 2025 unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical fragmentation, acute regional crises, and the entanglement of intrastate wars with interstate rivalries. Rather than operating primarily within bounded civil wars or as a discrete diplomatic track between sovereign states, the findings in this report show how 2025 represents an inflection point: **a year in which mediation between states became structurally embedded within internationalised civil conflicts, reshaping both the practice and the purpose of third-party diplomacy.** The result is a mediation landscape oriented less toward comprehensive settlements and more toward crisis management, de-escalation, and the containment of regional spillover.

This assessment draws on original data from the **Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND)**. MEND systematically records mediation and mediation-related activity by external third parties across conflict systems. It uses a combination of institutional reporting and extensive global media coverage, including local and regional sources that often capture negotiations unfolding outside the international spotlight (see [PeaceHub](#)). For 2025, MEND documented 1,539 mediation and mediation-related events across **eight conflict affected contexts: Israel, Syria, Sudan, Libya, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Mali.** Around 20% (301) of these events qualify as direct mediation, while 80% (1,238) were mediation-related activities — such as persuading belligerents, third-party coordination, and attempts to bring in a wider array of local actors — highlighting the burgeoning infrastructure surrounding mediation. The MEND data also show that mediation is conducted through complex routes, with only around 30% of mediation events in our data featuring direct talks between warring sides. The remaining events are all instances of "shuttle diplomacy". Yet, none of the settings that saw mediation in 2025 relied on shuttle diplomacy alone. The dataset also captures **46 distinct agreements in the eight contexts**, the majority informal, incremental, and narrowly scoped.

Several broader messages emerge from this review. First, mediation activity in 2025 was highly uneven, **clustering around conflicts involving Israel and, increasingly, Syria**, which together anchor a wider regional conflict complex linking Lebanon, Iran, and extra-regional powers. Second, **interstate mediation constituted a growing share of mediation efforts**, yet almost always in conjunction with ongoing intrastate conflicts rather than as isolated diplomatic engagements. Mediation between Israel and Iran, Israel and Syria, or Afghanistan and Pakistan was inseparable from violence on the

ground in Gaza, southern Syria, or along contested borders. Third, the year underscored the growing prominence of **highly partial mediators**, whose roles oscillated between mediation, deterrence, and belligerence. Finally, **the dominance of short-term focused and single-issue agreements** — ceasefires, deconfliction mechanisms, humanitarian arrangements, and prisoner exchanges — points to a mediation landscape focused on stabilisation rather than resolution. As interstate mediation becomes woven into sprawling conflict systems, the question confronting policymakers is no longer whether mediation matters, but whether existing mediation architectures are equipped for a world in which the boundaries between internal war and interstate confrontation have effectively collapsed.

### **MEND Definitions**

#### **Mediation (M)**

*Non-coercive facilitation of communication or negotiation between disputing parties to help them reach a mutually acceptable agreement or resolution to their conflict by an external third-party. Mediation always involves at least two (local) conflict stakeholders, at least one of them needing to be a belligerent.*

#### **Mediation-related event (MR)**

*Non-coercive measures to facilitate the mediation. These measures are aimed at (1) encouraging a conflict party or parties to come to/continue with the negotiation; (2) expanding the range of actors directly or indirectly included in the mediation; (3) coordinating among third-parties; (4) monitoring and advising on implementation as part of formal follow-up mechanisms.*

### 3 Trends in mediation

#### 3.1 Mediation across 2025

The year 2025 was an active mediation year, with **301** mediation and **1,238** mediation-related events recorded across the eight conflict-affected contexts in MEND. Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively break down mediation (M) and mediation-related (MR) events by month across all eight conflict contexts. The stacked bars illustrate both the relative volume of activity and which conflicts drive it.




Figure 1: Intensity of mediation (M) events by month, across all conflict contexts.

Similarly to 2024, conflicts involving **Israel** (orange in both graphs) received by far the most attention from external mediators in 2025. The majority of these mediation events featured shuttle diplomacy, contributing to a rise in the number of discrete events documented in the dataset. The conflict in **Mali** (purple in both graphs) was the least active, and we recorded no mediation (M) events involving external third parties. Not only have external actors been sidelined, but the political transition itself has effectively stalled. In July 2025, Mali's Transitional Parliament (CNT) passed legislation allowing military leader Col. Assimi Goïta to serve a renewable five-year term, suspending discussions on a return to civilian rule.




Figure 2: Intensity of mediation-related (MR) events by month, across all conflict contexts.

A review of the monthly trends across both graphs reveals a pronounced **dip in mediation and mediation-related events in June, followed by a sharp increase in July**. This pattern is driven largely by a **shift in the United States' role from mediator to active belligerent in June 2025**. From January through early June, the United States maintained a steady tempo of mediation efforts, focused not only on Israel but also on other conflicts in our dataset. In June, however, conflict dynamics across the Middle East escalated significantly. The “Twelve-Day War” between **Israel and Iran** began on 13 June and culminated in US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on 21-22 June. This coincided with heightened violence in **Syria** (green in our graphs). What began as inter-communal clashes between Druze and Bedouin communities in the governorate of as-Suweida expanded after Israeli military incursions into Quneitra and Daraa, followed by Israeli strikes on Damascus in mid-July. These developments prompted the United States to intensify its mediation activity in July, particularly in conflicts involving Israel and Syria. More broadly, this shift from mediator to belligerent and back, as reflected in our data, highlights the growing **prominence of highly partial mediators in contemporary conflict management**.

**Syria remained a major focus for mediation activities in 2025.** In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Assad regime and the installation of transitional authorities headed by former Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria continued to attract substantial diplomatic engagement. This was reflected in a pronounced spike in mediation-related activity in January 2025, a pattern already noted for December 2024 in the *Mediation in 2024* report (Peter 2025, p. 5). Beyond efforts by external actors to **normalise relations with the new Syrian authorities** and support Syria's political rehabilitation and post-war reconstruction, third-party mediation initiatives focused on several sensitive security and governance issues. Chief among these were attempts to advance the demilitarisation and political integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the armed wing of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, into a reconstituted national framework. At the same time, mediation and mediation-related engagement sought to **manage regional spillovers**, particularly through deconfliction efforts involving Israel and Türkiye. This dynamic became especially salient in July amid heightened Israeli military activity. The prominence of Syria in our 2025 mediation data underscores the centrality of Syria to regional diplomacy and the extent to which international actors viewed the post-Assad transition as a moment requiring sustained third-party engagement.

Mediation activity related to **South Sudan** (shown in navy in the graphs) is particularly prominent in the early months of 2025, reflecting intense efforts by Kenya and other regional actors to salvage the [Tumaini Initiative](#). Launched in Nairobi in May 2024, this high-level mediation process sought to bring "holdout groups" that had not signed the 2018 [Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan \(R-ARCSS\)](#) into the national peace process. Although the initiative registered meaningful progress in 2024, the period from January to April 2025 was characterized by acute political tensions, a near-collapse of negotiations, and a subsequent regional push to preserve the talks. After the arrest of South Sudan's First Vice-President and leader of SPLM-In Opposition Riek Machar in September 2025, most engagement switched to mediation-related activities as external actors sought to coordinate on how to engage with the South Sudanese authorities.

Mediation and mediation-related activities in **Sudan** (yellow in our graphs) saw an increase in the later third of 2025. This was driven by two developments: formation of "the new Quad" and intense shuttle mediation following the fall of El Fasher in late October. First, the new Quad — a mediation grouping comprising the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — was publicly launched on 12

September 2025 when it issued a joint statement outlining a coordinated roadmap for ending the war in Sudan. This included a humanitarian truce, a permanent ceasefire, and a civilian-led political transition. While this initiative generated substantial diplomatic activity and achieved limited alignment among external sponsors — notably Egypt's reluctant acceptance of a civilian-led transition and the UAE's public commitment to ending external military support — it functioned primarily as a top-down coordination mechanism and had limited effect on the ground. The Sudanese Armed Forces rejected the initiative as an infringement on Sudan's sovereignty, while the Rapid Support Forces' expressions of support — including a unilateral ceasefire declaration (see Section 5) — appeared largely tactical in nature. A second surge in international engagement followed the fall of El Fasher in late October and the emergence of rival “parallel governments” in Port Sudan and Nyala, developments that threatened to entrench a de facto partition of Sudan. Most notably the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) to Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, spent the final months of the year conducting intensive shuttle diplomacy across regional hubs such as Nairobi and Addis Ababa, seeking to prevent further political fracturing while navigating the collapse of earlier diplomatic roadmaps, including the Quad proposal. The uptick in mediation activity between September and December 2025 thus reflected a race against time to consolidate international pressure, open humanitarian corridors, and avert permanent, multi-state fragmentation of Sudan.

Another noticeable uptick in mediation and mediation-related activity occurred in Afghanistan from September 2025 onward, closely linked to renewed tensions between **Afghanistan and Pakistan**. Following a series of border clashes, airstrikes, and mutual accusations related to militant sanctuaries and cross-border attacks, regional actors intensified efforts to prevent further escalation between the two neighbours. Much of this activity took the form of quiet mediation and facilitation rather than formal negotiations. Qatar and Türkiye played especially prominent roles, leveraging their established channels with the Taliban authorities in Kabul and their working relationships with Islamabad to de-escalate tensions, reopen lines of communication, and encourage confidence-building measures. These initiatives included shuttle diplomacy, back-channel talks, and coordinated messaging aimed at reducing the risk of interstate spillover while stabilising an already volatile border environment. Accordingly, the increase in activity after September reflected not a renewed intra-Afghan peace process, but a shift toward crisis management and regional conflict mediation focused on Afghanistan's external relations with Pakistan.

### 3.2 Mediation in interstate and internationalised contexts

In 2025, almost 15% of all mediation (M) events recorded in MEND related to mediation of interstate conflicts. Between May and October, a third of all mediation events pertained to interstate disputes (see Figure 4). Although MEND primarily follows intrastate conflicts — due to case selection being based on the UN Security Council agenda — **the frequency with which mediation efforts became entangled with interstate disputes points to an extraordinarily high degree of internationalisation across intrastate conflicts in 2025.** While MEND has recorded such dynamics in previous years, 2025 marked a notable departure from earlier patterns, with interstate mediation appearing far more frequently as an overlay on complex, multi-actor wars rather than as a distinct diplomatic track.




Figure 3: Interstate conflicts: standalone vs. conjoint events over time (top) and most common conflict pair overlaps (bottom).

These cross-cutting mediation events reflect **the increasingly interconnected nature of contemporary conflict systems**, where escalation, de-escalation, and third-party diplomacy in one arena routinely implicate actors and dynamics in another. This pattern is particularly visible in the Middle East, where we clearly note **the consolidation of conflicts into an overlapping regional complex linking Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran**, alongside extra-regional sponsors. Some of the most common overlaps in our 2025 data occurred in conflicts involving Israel, with Israel-Syria sharing 34 events and Israel-Lebanon sharing 13 events.

As Syria entered its post-Assad transition in December 2024, the conflict complex involving **Israel and Syria** has taken on new dimensions. Much of international mediation attention shifted away from intra-Syrian bargaining, towards mediation involving external actors as direct conflict parties. This has even produced **instances of mediation over Syrian territory that do not include Syria itself as a party to the talks**. A notable example is Azerbaijan's mediation between Israel and Türkiye to prevent direct conflict between their forces operating inside Syria (see Section 4.2)

Another notable case is Afghanistan, where most mediation in 2025 centred either on securing the release of prisoners from Western states (United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom) or mediation between **Afghanistan and Pakistan**. This is reflected also in the types of agreements reached (see Section 5).

Taken together, these developments illustrate how interstate mediation has become embedded within sprawling, internationalised intrastate conflicts, rather than operating as a separate diplomatic domain.

### 3.3 The geography of conflict mediation

MEND tracks where mediation takes place, capturing both in-country and external locations. Both mediation types occur predominantly outside the conflict countries themselves. Direct mediation (M) events take place externally in approximately 71% of cases, most commonly in capitals such as Cairo, Doha, and Baku. Mediation-related (MR) events occur externally in 74% of cases, frequently in Washington, New York, Cairo, and Doha. The similar share of external locations across both categories reflects the central role of third-party diplomatic and institutional centres in hosting mediation activity, whether direct negotiations or supporting coordination efforts (e.g., diplomatic consultations, international organization meetings, and preparatory support). Figure 4 visualises these distributions.




Figure 4: The geography of mediation: mediation (M) events (top) vs. mediation-related (MR) events (bottom).

Certain conflicts stand out for exhibiting more localised mediation patterns (in-country venues are marked with circles in Figure 4). Libya and South Sudan have the highest proportion of in-country mediation, largely reflecting the sustained presence of international peace and political missions that facilitate local dialogue. In Libya, mediation efforts are heavily shaped by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), alongside other international actors, which work through local interlocutors in Tripoli, Benghazi, and other key centres. Mediation in South Sudan is similarly concentrated in-country, particularly in Juba, reflecting long-standing international engagement through the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, and neighbouring states. In both cases, the institutionalised presence of international missions enables sustained, locally embedded mediation that differs markedly from the more externally oriented mediation observed in other conflicts in our database.

Most conflicts in our dataset, however, rely heavily on external mediation venues, with diplomatic engagement taking place outside the conflict theatre itself (marked with diamonds in Figure 4). Israel exemplifies this pattern, with mediation occurring primarily in established hubs such as Cairo (Egypt) and Doha (Qatar), which serve as centres for negotiations over Gaza, as well as increasingly in newer locations such as Baku (Azerbaijan), reflecting the diversification of external mediation venues. At the same time, Washington features prominently in the dataset as a site of mediation-related activity rather than direct mediation events. This pattern reflects the United States' central role as a broker rather than a host of formal negotiations on its own territory.

## 4 Mediators

### 4.1 Prominent mediators

Table 1 presents the most active mediators per conflict context, based on mediation (M) events only. The entries in bold are those that did not appear among the top 5 in our 2024 data. The data reveals notable continuity in mediation leadership, with most conflicts maintaining the same top mediators as in the previous year (Peter 2025, p. 7). However, some contexts have seen significant shifts in their mediation landscape.

Table 1: Top mediators by conflict (mediation events only; new to top 5 in bold)

Conflict	#1	#2	#3
Israel	United States	Egypt	Qatar
Syria	<b>United States</b>	<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>United Arab Emirates</b>
Sudan	<b>United States</b>	UNSG	<b>Egypt</b>
Libya	UNSMIL	United States	Egypt
South Sudan	Kenya	IGAD	AU
Yemen	OESG-Yemen	Oman	Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan	Qatar	<b>Iran</b>	Türkiye
Mali	<i>no external mediators</i>		

**Syria** stands out as having an entirely **new set of top mediators compared to 2024**, reflecting the dramatic geopolitical shifts following the fall of the Assad regime. In this transformed conflict environment, the United States, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as the most frequently recorded mediators.

Similarly, **Sudan** shows some reconfiguration of its mediation architecture. While the international mediation landscape has long been diverse and congested, the United States and Egypt have assumed more visible roles in 2025. Although both states featured prominently in earlier mediation efforts, the establishment of the new Quad has further elevated their salience in our data, consolidating mediation activity around a narrower set of influential external actors.

In contrast, **conflicts in and involving Israel have seen a more consistent set of prominent mediators over time**, reflecting relatively stable mediation architectures. This stability is largely driven by the enduring centrality of Qatar, Egypt, and the United States in negotiations related to Gaza, with mechanisms and channels that have been repeatedly activated across successive crises. The United States also continues to play a key mediating role in Israel's conflicts with regional states, reinforcing a pattern in which

a small group of well-established actors dominates mediation efforts.

**Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen** similarly exhibit relatively stable mediation configurations, each anchored in long-standing and institutionalised mediation processes. In all three cases, mediation efforts are characterised by **a sustained and visible presence of the United Nations and/or regional organisations, which provide continuity, coordination, and a degree of procedural coherence over time.** This institutional anchoring structures engagement among conflict parties, helping to maintain dialogue despite protracted and changing conflict dynamics. This also limits the extent to which new mediators or alternative mediation formats enter these processes.

Afghanistan and Mali continue to show low levels of mediation activity in 2025, with **no recorded mediation events in Mali**, underscoring the limited engagement of formal mediation efforts in these contexts. In **Afghanistan**, mediation activity is characterised more by continuity among key actors than by an increase in the overall volume of engagement. **Qatar and Türkiye have retained their roles as central interlocutors, while Iran has emerged as a new mediator.** This development points to shifting regional alignments and security concerns, rather than a broader diversification or intensification of mediation initiatives around Afghanistan's internal political settlement.

## 4.2 Mediators outside of the spotlight

MEND data identified several mediation efforts in 2025 that were integral to unlocking agreements among conflict parties yet operated largely outside the international spotlight. The cases of Azerbaijan in mediating Israel-Syria and Israel-Türkiye disputes, as well as Türkiye's mediation of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan underscore the challenge of capturing the full mediation landscape, as **many negotiations unfold outside the international spotlight.** This is either because parties deliberately keep them confidential or because they attract limited attention from global media. MEND is able to document such efforts through its distinctive web-scraping methodology, particularly by systematically capturing reporting from local and regional news sources that often provide early or only insight into otherwise opaque mediation processes.




Figure 5: Mediation outside the spotlight: monthly activity of emerging mediators by conflict context.

#### 4.2.1 Azerbaijan

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the international community has made renewed efforts to engage Syria diplomatically and economically. Among the multitude of actors, Azerbaijan has emerged as **the most prominent ‘newcomer’ to mediation in the Middle East**, increasingly acting as a principal mediator in efforts to de-escalate tensions and normalise ties between Israel, Syria, and Türkiye (see Figure 5).

Across 2023-2024, Azerbaijan had limited involvement in conflicts tracked in MEND. Its diplomatic activities were directed towards enhancing bilateral relations with Israel and Türkiye and discussing the ongoing conflict in Gaza. However, it moved quickly after al-Assad’s fall to engage Syria’s new transitional government led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). On 29 December 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Yalchin Rafiyev met Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, one of the earliest foreign ministerial visitors to Syria and the first from outside Syria’s immediate neighbourhood and Gulf partners.

Azerbaijan is a uniquely positioned mediator, maintaining good ties with Muslim majority nations and Israel. Over 2025, it therefore became part of two prominent mediation tracks involving Israel, Türkiye, and Syria.

From April 2025, Azerbaijan emerged as an **active mediator in efforts to deconflict Israeli and Turkish military activity in Syria**. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria’s strategic environment shifted significantly. Türkiye, having supported several rebel factions during the conflict, though notably not HTS, sought to consolidate its influence by moving personnel and equipment into Syrian military bases. Israel, in turn, conducted strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, including bases earmarked for Turkish use. It also expanded its incursions in southwest Syria beyond the UN-patrolled buffer zone around the Golan Heights. These actions formed part of Israel’s broader effort to shape the post-Assad security environment and preserve its operational freedom amid uncertainty surrounding the new Syrian authorities. Azerbaijan quickly emerged as an intermediary between Israel and Türkiye as tensions rose over their respective military activities in Syria. Its mediation resulted in a 9 April 2025 agreement creating a bilateral deconfliction hotline aimed at managing military operations and reducing the risk of escalation. Since then, Azerbaijan mediated several additional rounds of deconfliction talks between Israel and Türkiye.

Azerbaijan subsequently extended its mediation efforts to **Israel-Syria tensions**. In May 2025, US President Trump publicly raised the possibility of extending the Abraham Accords to Syria, signalling renewed diplomatic engagement. Shortly thereafter, violence erupted between Druze militias and Bedouin armed groups in Syria’s as-Suwayda

governorate, prompting a series of Israeli airstrikes on Syrian targets. On 12 July 2025, Azerbaijan hosted and mediated direct de-escalation talks between Israeli and Syrian officials. These negotiations contributed to a ceasefire agreement on 19 July — overseen by the United States, Türkiye, and Jordan — although the arrangement remained fragile and subject to renewed tensions. Further talks were brokered by Baku in July, September, and October; Azerbaijan, working alongside the United States, mediated further negotiations focused on border security arrangements and a phased Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory. The resolution of these territorial issues, especially the status of the Golan Heights, remains a central precondition for any future normalisation between Israel and Syria.

Azerbaijan's role in these mediation efforts highlights the growing importance of strategically positioned, highly connected middle powers that can leverage trusted bilateral relationships to facilitate de-escalation and exploratory normalisation in interstate negotiations.

#### 4.2.2 Türkiye

Türkiye has long played a **central mediating role** within its immediate regional neighbourhood, engaging in **conflicts in and involving Israel, Sudan, Libya, and Syria** (see Figure 5). In October 2025, this role expanded into a new arena, as Türkiye emerged as a key mediator in the latest hostilities between **Pakistan and Taleban-led Afghanistan**, signalling a widening of its mediation portfolio beyond the Middle East and North Africa into South and Central Asia.

The escalation was triggered by intensified attacks by the Pakistani Taleban (Tehreek-e-Taleban Pakistan, TTP), based in Afghanistan, against Pakistani security personnel. In response, on 9 October 2025 the Pakistani government launched an air campaign targeting TTP leadership across several locations inside Afghanistan, prompting retaliatory assaults by the Afghan Taleban authorities on Pakistani positions along the border. Fighting between the two neighbours continued for around ten days.

Mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2025 was driven primarily by Türkiye and Qatar, both of which maintain diplomatic engagement with, and political access to, the Taleban authorities. Drawing on these established channels, Türkiye, working closely with Qatar, sought to position itself as a credible intermediary capable of facilitating de-escalation between the two sides. On 18-19 October 2025, their joint efforts resulted in the brokering of a temporary ceasefire during talks held in Doha. This initial agreement was subsequently reaffirmed and further elaborated in a Joint Statement issued after

follow-up discussions in Istanbul on 30 October 2025, reflecting attempts to consolidate the ceasefire and create momentum toward a more structured dialogue.

Despite these efforts, the negotiations failed to produce a sustained reduction in hostilities. Nevertheless, Ankara continued to pursue diplomatic engagement, signalling a longer-term commitment to mediation rather than a one-off intervention. Shortly after the third round of talks, on 8 November, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Baku, aiming to encourage Pakistan's continued participation in the process and to reaffirm Ankara's role as an active facilitator.

Subsequent mediation efforts — by Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — have not produced a durable ceasefire, and hostilities have continued to escalate, highlighting both the limits of existing mediation efforts and the structural challenges posed by deep-seated security concerns, cross-border militancy, and the absence of enforcement mechanisms to support negotiated commitments.

Türkiye's sustained involvement underscores its growing importance as a regional mediator capable of engaging diplomatically with non-recognised or contested authorities, and highlights how its political access, strategic positioning, and persistence allow it to remain influential even in protracted and difficult mediation contexts.

## 5 Agreements

Across the eight conflict contexts analysed, MEND captured a total of 46 mediated agreements in 2025, involving 29 unique mediators, only 13 of which are states (see Appendix 1 for the full list of agreements). The distribution of agreements across conflicts is uneven. Conflicts involving Israel account for the largest share, with 14 agreements, including three with Lebanon and one each with Iran, Syria, and Türkiye on Syrian territory. This is followed by Afghanistan, with 10 agreements, six of which concerned prisoner releases involving Western governments, three related to Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, and one to intra-Afghan talks. Syria recorded seven agreements, including one with Israel, one with Lebanon, and one involving Israel and Türkiye on Syrian territory. Libya had six agreements, while South Sudan and Yemen each recorded four, and Sudan had three. Mali recorded no agreements in 2025.



Figure 6: PA-X and MEND agreements 2025: formal vs. informal arrangements by conflict context.

Of the 46 agreements recorded by MEND, 16 involved multiple states as conflict parties, highlighting the extent to which mediation in 2025 addressed interstate or cross-border dimensions of conflict rather than purely intrastate dynamics. Two of these interstate agreements related to both Syria and Israel, and therefore appear under both conflicts in Figure 6.

In 2025, across all conflict contexts analysed, the majority of agreements were captured exclusively by MEND rather than PA-X (see Figure 6); only seven of the MEND agreements recorded for 2025 also appear in the PA-X database. This distinction underscores important differences in the types of arrangements captured by the two datasets. While PA-X focuses on formalised legal peace agreements with publicly available texts (Bell and Badanjak 2019), MEND systematically records a much broader range of mediation outcomes, including informal, incremental, and unwritten agreements between parties that fall below conventional thresholds for inclusion in peace agreement datasets.

The large number of agreements in MEND as opposed to PA-X reflects the predominance of informal, short-term, or highly issue-specific arrangements. While such agreements often lack the procedural formality typically associated with written peace settlements, they nonetheless play a significant role in shaping conflict dynamics. In many contexts, such informal arrangements serve as the primary means through which mediation exerts influence.

## 5.1 Agreement focus

In 2025, mediation outcomes were dominated by short-term agreements focused on incremental steps rather than comprehensive political settlements. This pattern reflects both the intensity of ongoing conflicts and the limited domestic and international political space for far-reaching compromises.

Three broad types of agreements were particularly prominent. First, **ceasefires and de-escalation arrangements** constituted a large share of mediation activity and were typically narrow in scope and time-bound. These included temporary, unilateral, or geographically limited ceasefires in conflicts in and involving Israel, Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan-Pakistan, often aimed at halting immediate violence or preventing further escalation rather than advancing a durable settlement. Many of these arrangements were interstate in nature, underscoring the growing regionalisation of conflict dynamics (see Section 3.2).

Second, **humanitarian and confidence-building measures** featured heavily, par-

ticularly in protracted conflicts where political negotiations remained stalled. Across Israel-Palestine/Gaza, Yemen, and Sudan, mediation efforts prioritised humanitarian pauses, aid access arrangements, prisoner and hostage exchanges, and detainee releases. These pragmatic measures were aimed at alleviating civilian harm while maintaining minimal channels of communication between adversaries. In Afghanistan, this logic extended to agreements on the release of foreign nationals, including US, UK, and Canadian citizens. The emphasis on confidence-building through incrementalism was especially evident in mediation around Gaza, where efforts coalesced around implementation frameworks and phased plans, notably detailed “steps” or procedures to operationalise hostage exchanges, humanitarian access, and a return to calm, rather than an immediate, comprehensive final-status agreement.

Third, a smaller but significant category of agreements involved **process-support and institutional measures**, particularly in contexts with more established mediation frameworks such as Libya and South Sudan. These included political roadmaps, electoral mechanisms, advisory committees, charters, and agenda-setting agreements intended to manage conflict, structure dialogue, and sustain mediation processes rather than resolve underlying political disputes.

Taken together, the pattern of agreements in 2025 points to a mediation landscape oriented primarily toward conflict management, stabilisation, and incremental gains, with limited progress toward comprehensive political settlements or durable interstate or regional security frameworks.

## 5.2 Mediators in agreements

In 2025, mediation effectiveness across our eight conflict systems — defined strictly by the number of concluded agreements in which a specific external mediator participated — was highly concentrated among a small group of third parties. Rather than a broad and diverse ecosystem of mediators, the year was characterised by a core set of actors repeatedly delivering agreements between conflict parties, often within the same conflicts and largely focused on crisis management rather than comprehensive conflict resolution. MEND cases capture conflicts particularly across the Middle East, and the repeated presence of a core set of agreement brokers indicates the internationalisation and regionalisation of conflicts into a broader conflict system.

Table 2 presents the most effective mediators based on the number of agreements facilitated in 2025.

Table 2: Effective mediators by number of agreements (2025)

Mediator	Number of Agreements	Conflicts and Issues
Qatar	16	Afghanistan (prisoner releases); Afghanistan-Pakistan; Israel (Gaza); Israel-Iran
United States	12	Israel (Gaza); Israel-Syria; Israel-Iran; Israel-Lebanon; Syria; Libya; Sudan
Türkiye	8	Libya; Afghanistan-Pakistan; Israel; Syria; Israel-Syria
Egypt	6	Israel (Gaza)
UNMIL	4	Libya
Kenya	3	South Sudan; Sudan
Oman	3	Yemen (prisoner and hostage releases and Ansar Allah-US ceasefire)
Jordan	3	Syria; Syria-Israel

**Qatar** stands out as the single most effective mediator in 2025, facilitating 16 agreements. Most of these related to Afghanistan, including seven agreements concerning the release of Western prisoners by the Taleban authorities and two, in cooperation with Türkiye, aimed at the de-escalation of conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The remaining seven agreements involved conflicts linked to Israel: five related to negotiations over Gaza and involved cooperation with the United States, Egypt, and Türkiye. Qatar also facilitated the release of Thai hostages held by Hamas and participated in the Iran-Israel ceasefire alongside the United States. Qatar's numerical dominance reflects a mediation style grounded in trust-based shuttle diplomacy and discretion, particularly with non-state or diplomatically isolated actors such as Hamas, Iran, and the Taleban. Its ability to repeatedly convert access into agreements allowed it to generate a high volume of outcomes during 2025.

**The United States** ranks second in terms of agreement volume, facilitating 12 agreements. While it concluded fewer agreements than Qatar, US-mediated agreements covered broader strategic terrain and often addressed moments of acute escalation with regional implications. Half of these agreements concerned conflicts connected to Israel, including three related to negotiations over Gaza, as well as one agreement each between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and Iran respectively. The United States brokered three further agreements related to conflicts involving Syria, Libya, and Sudan.

**Türkiye** follows, having participated as a mediator in eight agreements, with a notable presence across Libya, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Syria, and Israel-Syria. In 2025, Türkiye was involved in several ceasefires, deconfliction mechanisms, and joint statements, often acting alongside other mediators such as Qatar, the United States, or Jordan. In the Syrian context, Türkiye appeared both as a mediator and, separately, as a local party to a mediated agreement. Türkiye's effectiveness derived from the breadth of its engagement rather than intensity within a single conflict, reflecting a hybrid mediating style that combines regional influence, military presence, and diplomatic flexibility.

Two further groups of mediators are worth noting: United Nations actors and highly focused mediators.

While the mediation effectiveness of the United Nations is increasingly questioned, **UN peace operations and special envoys** continued to facilitate agreements across several contexts in 2025. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was involved in a Lebanon-Israel prisoner exchange agreement. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) mediated local agreements in South Sudan, while the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen (OSESG-Yemen) mediated prisoner and detainee exchange negotiations alongside Oman and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Among UN entities, the most prolific was UNSMIL, which facilitated all four Libyan agreements related to election planning, political roadmaps, advisory committees, and institutional mechanisms. The UN's effectiveness, measured numerically, derived from its role as a process custodian sustaining dialogue and institutional continuity rather than delivering major breakthroughs.

**Highly focused mediators** working on conflicts on their borders also played an important role. **Egypt** participated in six agreements, all relating to Israel-Gaza, including intra-Palestinian negotiations. While Egypt remains heavily involved in mediation in Libya and Sudan, it was not involved in any agreements in these two conflicts in 2025 (Peter 2025). **Oman** mediated three agreements, all related to Yemen. **Kenya** featured in three political declarations and roadmap agreements linked to Sudan and South Sudan, while **Jordan** was involved in agreements related to Syria and Syria-Israel.

Overall, mediation in 2025 was marked by a clear concentration of agreement-making among a small number of highly active mediators. Effectiveness, measured by the number of agreements, reflected repeated engagement within specific conflict systems and a strong emphasis on crisis management and incremental outcomes rather than comprehensive peace settlements.

## 6 Appendix 1: Agreement list

Table 3: Agreements by conflict, date, and parties (2025).

Date	Agreement	PAX	Mediator	Parties
<b>Afghanistan</b>				
21/01/2025	US-TALEBAN PRISONER SWAP	NO	Qatar	Taleban; United States [shuttle]
26/01/2025	RELEASE OF A CANADIAN PRISONER	NO	Qatar	Canada; Taleban [shuttle]
20/03/2025	RELEASE OF A US PRISONER	NO	Qatar	Taleban; United States [shuttle]
29/03/2025	RELEASE OF A US PRISONER	NO	Qatar	Taleban; United States [shuttle]
19/09/2025	RELEASE OF UK PRISONERS	NO	Qatar	Taleban; United Kingdom [shuttle]
28/09/2025	RELEASE OF A US PRISONER	NO	Qatar	Taleban; United States [shuttle]
14/12/2025	NATIONAL SOLIDARITY OF AFGHANISTAN'S POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS DECLARATION	NO	Iran	Opposition Groups; Political Parties
<b>Afghanistan; Pakistan</b>				
15/10/2025	48-HOUR CEASEFIRE BETWEEN TALEBAN AND PAKISTAN	NO	Qatar	Pakistan; Taleban
19/10/2025	EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE BETWEEN TALEBAN AND PAKISTAN	NO	Qatar; Türkiye	Pakistan; Taleban
30/10/2025	JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TALKS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF TÜRKIYE AND QATAR	YES	Qatar; Türkiye	Pakistan; Taleban
<b>Israel</b>				
15/01/2025	PRACTICAL PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ISRAELI HOSTAGES AND PALESTINIAN PRISONERS AND THE RETURN TO A SUSTAINABLE CALM WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE A PERMANENT CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES	YES	Egypt; Qatar; United States	Hamas; Israel; Palestinian Islamic Jihad [shuttle]
26/01/2025	ISRAEL-HAMAS HOSTAGE AGREEMENT (IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 15/01/2025 AGREEMENT)	NO	Qatar	Hamas; Israel [shuttle]
30/01/2025	THAI HOSTAGE RELEASE AGREEMENT	NO	Qatar	Hamas; Thailand [shuttle]

*Continued on next page*

Table 3: Agreements by Conflict, Date, and Parties (2025) (continued)

Date	Agreement	PAX	Mediator	Parties
02/03/2025	ISRAEL UNILATERAL TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE DURING THE MONTHS OF RAMADAN AND PASSOVER	NO	United States	Israel
11/05/2025	AGREEMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF EDAN ALEXANDER	NO	Egypt; Qatar; Türkiye	Hamas; United States [shuttle]
09/10/2025	IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR PRESIDENT TRUMP'S PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE END OF GAZA WAR	YES	Egypt; Qatar; Türkiye; United States	Hamas; Israel [shuttle]
23/10/2025	JOINT PALESTINIAN COMMUNIQUE	NO	Egypt; Qatar; Türkiye	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Democratic Reform Bloc; Fatah; Hamas; Islamic Jihad; Palestinian National Initiative; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
17/11/2025	UNSC RESOLUTION 2803	YES	UN Security Council	
<b>Israel; Iran</b>				
24/06/2025	IRAN-ISRAEL CEASEFIRE	NO	Qatar; United States	Iran; Israel [shuttle]
<b>Israel; Lebanon</b>				
11/03/2025	LEBANON-ISRAEL PRISONER RELEASE AGREEMENT	NO	France; UNIFIL; United States	Israel; Lebanon
21/05/2025	AGREEMENT ON REMOVAL OF WEAPONS FROM PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN LEBANON	NO	Saudi Arabia	Israel; Lebanon
21/08/2025	RELEASE OF AN ISRAELI HOSTAGE FROM LEBANON	NO	ICRC	Israel; Lebanon
<b>Israel; Syria</b>				
19/07/2025	CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA	NO	Jordan; Türkiye; United States	Israel; Syria
<b>Israel; Syria; Türkiye</b>				
09/04/2025	ESTABLISHMENT OF A DECONFLICTION HOTLINE BETWEEN TÜRKIYE AND ISRAEL IN SYRIA	NO	Azerbaijan	Israel; Türkiye
<b>Libya</b>				
27/01/2025	CHARTER FOR PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN LIBYA	NO	African Union	House of Representatives; Libya (2021-) National Unity
04/02/2025	FORMATION OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO ASSIST WITH ELECTION PLANNING	NO	UNSMIL	Civil Society; Political Parties; Women's Groups; Youth Groups

Continued on next page

Table 3: Agreements by Conflict, Date, and Parties (2025) (continued)

Date	Agreement	PAX	Mediator	Parties
20/05/2025	THE POLITICAL ROADMAP FOR ELECTIONS (REPORT BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE)	NO	UNSMIL	Advisory Committee established by UNSMIL
13/09/2025	AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AND THE DETERRENCE FORCE (RADAA)	NO	Türkiye; UNSMIL	Libya (2021-) National Unity; Special Deterrence Forces
18/11/2025	AGREEMENT ON THE UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	NO	United States	Central Bank of Libya; High Council of State; House of Representatives
28/11/2025	AGREEMENT ON THE MECHANISM FOR THE SELECTION OF THE BOARD MEMBERS OF THE HIGH NATIONAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION	NO	UNSMIL	High Council of State; House of Representatives
<b>South Sudan</b>				
29/01/2025	AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS	NO	Kenya	South Sudan; South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance
03/02/2025	AGREEMENT WITH SPLA-IO KIT-GWANG FACTION	NO	Sudan	South Sudan; Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition Kit-Gwang
12/04/2025	RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TWIC-NGOK DINKA YOUTH PEACE DIALOGUE	YES	Concordis International; FAO; IOM; South Sudan Council of Churches; UNESCO; UNISFA; UNMISS	Civil Society; South Sudan; Twic Dinka; Youth Groups
26/11/2025	AGREEMENT BETWEEN NGOK DINKA AND MISSERIYA COMMUNITIES ON CATTLE MIGRATION RELATED VIOLENCE	NO	Cordaid International; FAO; UNISFA	Local Leaders/Communities/Tribes (Generic); Misseriya; Ngok Dinka
<b>Sudan</b>				
22/02/2025	RSF-LED SUDAN FOUNDING CHARTER FOR ESTABLISHING A PEACE AND UNITY GOVERNMENT	NO	Kenya	Political Parties; Rapid Support Forces; Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army; Sudan Revolutionary Front; Tassis
24/11/2025	ONE-SIDED HUMANITARIAN CEASEFIRE DECLARED BY RSF	NO	United States	Rapid Support Forces [shuttle]

*Continued on next page*

Table 3: Agreements by Conflict, Date, and Parties (2025) (continued)

Date	Agreement	PAX	Mediator	Parties
16/12/2025	DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR BUILDING A NEW HOMELAND (NAIROBI ROADMAP)	NO	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; Kenya	National-Umma Party; Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; Sudanese Congress Party; Sumoud Alliance
<b>Syria</b> (see above for agreements on Syria-Israel and Syria-Israel-Türkiye)				
10/03/2025	FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT SIGNED BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT AHMAD AL-SHARAA AND HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MAZLOUM ABDI	YES	United States	D: Democratic Forces; Syria
16/07/2025	CEASEFIRE BETWEEN DAMASCUS, BEDOUIN GROUPS, AND DRUZE	NO	Jordan; Saudi Arabia; Türkiye; United States	Religious Leaders; Syria; Tribal Groups
16/09/2025	ROAD MAP TO END THE CRISIS IN SUWAYDA AND STABILIZE SOUTHERN SYRIA	YES	Jordan; United States	ria
07/10/2025	COMPREHENSIVE CEASEFIRE IN NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN SYRIA	NO	United States	Syria; Syrian Democratic Forces
<b>Syria; Lebanon</b>				
28/03/2025	AGREEMENT ON BORDER DEMARCATION BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON	NO	Saudi Arabia	Lebanon; Syria
<b>Yemen</b>				
22/01/2025	RELEASE OF THE 25-MEMBER INTERNATIONAL CREW OF THE GALAXY LEADER CARGO SHIP	NO	Oman	Ansar Allah
25/01/2025	UNILATERAL RELEASE OF 153 PRISONERS OF WAR	NO	International Committee of the Red Cross	Ansar Allah
06/05/2025	US-HOUTHİ CEASEFIRE	NO	Oman	Ansar Allah; United States [shuttle]
23/12/2025	PRISONER SWAP AGREEMENT	NO	International Committee of the Red Cross; Oman; UN Special Envoy for Yemen	Ansar Allah; Yemen (2022-) Presidential Leadership Council

## References

- Bell, Christine and Sanja Badanjak (2019). 'Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset'. In: *Journal of Peace Research* 56.3, pp. 452–466.
- Peter, Mateja (2025). *Mediation in 2024: First Insights from the MEND Database*. Edinburgh: PeaceRep.

## Mediation Event and Negotiators Database

The Mediation Event and Negotiators Database (MEND) is an evolving dataset by PeaceRep researchers at the University of St Andrews and the University of Edinburgh. MEND offers a comprehensive record of peacemaking efforts within major armed conflicts, systematically tracking all mediation and mediation-related events involving external third-party actors — regardless of whether these efforts result in formal peace agreements.

## PeaceRep

PeaceRep is a research consortium based at the University of Edinburgh focused on peace and conflict resolution, mediation, and peace process design.

## Acknowledgments

The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Program (PeaceRep) is funded by UK International Development from the UK government.

---

### Contact and further information

**MEND:** [peacehub.st-andrews.ac.uk](https://peacehub.st-andrews.ac.uk)  
[mp240@st-andrews.ac.uk](mailto:mp240@st-andrews.ac.uk) (Dr Mateja Peter)  
**PeaceRep:** [peacerep.org](https://peacerep.org)  
[peacerep@ed.ac.uk](mailto:peacerep@ed.ac.uk)

