PeaceRep
Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform

THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH

PA-X DATA SERIES

Peace Agreements in 2025

Insights from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database



Sanja Badanjak, Laura Wise,
Adam Farquhar, Niamh Henry, Héloïse Guichardaz,
Robert Wilson, Tim Epple

PA-X Data Series

The **PA-X Data Series** explores global insights into peace agreements signed in the previous year, including their characteristics and analysis of the agreement contents and key topics. This report draws on the PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, developed and maintained by PeaceRep researchers at the University of Edinburgh. PA-X provides a comprehensive record of peace agreements across multiple conflict contexts and stages of peace processes, systematically documenting and archiving formal peace agreements, relevant metadata and thematic coding of their contents.

For more information on the consortium and on the PA-X Peace Agreements Databases, please visit the following websites:

PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform: www.peacerep.org

PA-X Analytics & Databases: www.peaceagreements.org

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1 Executive Summary

- 62 new formal agreements have been signed in 2025. Of those, 29 have been signed in Colombia, as part of the Total Peace initiative. The second most frequent conflict location to which agreements have referred is Eastern DRC, where agreements have been signed between DRC and Rwanda, and DRC and M23.
- 2025 has seen a resurgence of international and internationalised conflict, and this is reflected in the PA-X data, with 22 of 62 agreements in PA-X dealing with such conflicts.
- There have been no comprehensive agreements in major internal conflicts since 2022. Additionally, there have been very few attempts to manage political transitions out of armed conflict in general, and attempts to formally manage such transitions through constitutional reform have fallen out of favour, with no agreements in 2025 providing for such a process.
- The agreements signed in 2025 have a clear economic focus, which is primarily related to the current US administration and its modalities of brokering peace and overt assertion of US commercial interests as the primary concern in conflict resolution.
- There have been nine local agreements in 2025 that we know of and are publicly available - seven from processes in Colombia, one each in Syria, and South Sudan.
- References to women, girls, and gender in peace agreements have reduced in 2025, as 19% of all agreements contain such references, compared to 23% in 2024. While this difference is relatively small, it is consistent with a downward trend observed since 2015.

2 Global Insights: Agreements in 2025

2.1 Overview

In 2025, PA-X researchers recorded **62 new formal and written peace agreements**.[1] These include agreements relating to all levels of armed conflict and all stages of peace processes. For the purpose of PA-X data collection, a peace agreement is defined as a 'formal, publicly available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it' (see Bell and Badanjak (2019) and Bell et al. (2026), p.12).



Figure 1: Map of interstate and intrastate agreements signed in 2025.

Compared to the formal agreements reached in 2024, when the agreements signed did not correspond to the areas of most intense organised violence, the agreements in 2025 somewhat better reflected the settings in which there have been recent active armed conflicts. For instance, in 2024, we noted the absence of formal agreements in settings such as Ukraine and Gaza; in 2025, formal agreements have been reached in both these conflicts.[2] However, neither case has seen a clear step towards a stable, long-term solution. While formal and public peace agreements offer more clarity than in-

[1] See final section for more details on the key limitations of these initial findings, as some agreements become available months or years after signing.

[2] View the locations of conflicts, as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (Davies et al. 2025) and PA-X peace agreements on the PA-X Tracker Globe in the last year.

formal arrangements, this form alone does not necessarily provide clear visions of political and social change that we may expect of peace agreements. In fact, the agreements reached in 2025, across all settings, focused on more modest aims: ceasefires, security arrangements, and facilitating the flow of natural resources on which the global economy depends.

As is noted in the Spotlights section below, agreements in 2025 have been different from those seen in the remainder of the database, which tracks formal peace agreements since 1990: there has been a marked increase in the agreements signed by states, in both international and internationalised internal conflicts. There is a clear effect of the Trump administration in the US, with more agreements signed with US support, but also more frequent use of peace agreements to manage economic relationships, particularly those reliant on the extraction of natural resources.

Comprehensive agreements, which attempt to resolve major conflicts and provide pathways to political transitions and wider institutional and political change, have again been absent from internal conflicts in 2025. This reflects trends such as the proliferation of mediation efforts, weakening role of multilateral organisations, and transformation of the mediation space into an overtly power-political arena in international politics (Beaujouan 2025; Peter et al. 2026).

Of the 62 agreements in 2025, 53 relate to intrastate and interstate conflict, while the remaining nine aimed to tackle issues related to local conflicts and local consequences of wider armed conflicts. Of the 53 agreements in interstate and intrastate conflicts, a large number have been signed in Colombia (22, or 42% of all agreements), leaving 31 agreements in interstate and intrastate conflicts signed in the rest of the world. The map in Figure 1 highlights where intrastate and interstate agreements were signed in 2025. Apart from Colombia, new intrastate and interstate agreements were recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (11), Rwanda (8 - all with DRC)[3], Cambodia/Thailand (5), Syria (2), Israel/Palestine (4), India/Nagaland (2); with one agreement signed in each: China/India, Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Ireland/United Kingdom/Northern Ireland, Papua New Guinea/Bougainville, Türkiye/Kurds-Kurdistan, and Ukraine/United States of America, as seen in Figure 2.

[3] Note that the DRC and Rwanda agreements should not be double-counted, as the 11 DRC agreements include three internal agreements, and the eight agreements between Rwanda and DRC.

The overall trend in the number of agreements signed per year is not straightforward: as can be seen in Figure 5, there has been an increase in the number of agreements signed each year in non-local processes, rebounding from the minimum of 21 signed in 2019. However, this rising trend is in line with the rising number of active armed conflicts, and should be considered in parallel with the findings below, related to the dearth of comprehensive agreements.

In terms of the total number of agreements, regardless of agreement and conflict level, Colombia ranks first, with 29 agreements, of which seven are local agreements. The second most frequent conflict location to which agreements refer is Eastern DRC, with eight agreements signed between DRC and Rwanda, and three signed between DRC and M23. The process to manage and resolve the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand resulted in five agreements, making this the third most frequently addressed area in the 2025 agreements.

Definitions of agreements in intrastate and interstate conflict, from the PA-X Codebook (Bell, Badanjak et al. 2026) [p. 16]

Interstate agreements

Interstate treaty relating to interstate conflict. E.g. Iraq/Kuwait, or North/ South Korea.

Intrastate agreements

Intrastate agreement relating to intrastate conflict; refers mainly to conflicts within a state's borders, e.g. Northern Ireland.

Interstate agreements in intrastate conflict

Interstate in nature (treaty), but rather than referring to a single interstate conflict, they refer to intrastate conflict/conflicts, whose major components originate within existing (de-facto or legal) state borders. Parties to these are most often states or international actors e.g. Israel-Jordan Treaty in support of the PLO- Israel Peace Agreements; African Great Lakes agreements; European Union unilateral Action Plan on Former Yugoslavia; communiques, conclusions, and declarations produced by international conferences on Afghanistan. This category enables differentiating such interstate agreements from 'pure interstate agreements', which relate to international conflict.




Figure 2: Number of Agreements per Conflict Location in 2025, by Agreement Type.

2.2 Agreement Types and Stages

The major change in the types of agreements signed in 2025 compared to previous years is the increase in the proportion of interstate agreements, related to both international and internal conflicts. Figure 4 shows the increase, as the number of interstate agreements (shown in the figure in orange and red, and totalling 22 agreements) is more than doubled in comparison to 2024, and more than tripled compared to 2023. Most of these agreements are ceasefires, as indicated in Figure 3. The trend is in line with the increase in international and internationalised conflict, found by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (Davies et al. 2025). This increase is discussed more in our Spotlights section 3 below.

The incidence of comprehensive agreements in the PA-X data can be understood as an indicator of the willingness and ability of both the conflict parties and the third parties to support long-term projects of political and social change. We have noted above that there have been agreements signed in 2025 in peace processes relating to the most serious conflicts - however, these agreements have not put forward plans for comprehensive conflict resolution and transition out of war. In fact, there have been no comprehensive peace agreements in major conflicts since 2022.

While we have recorded one comprehensive agreement in each of the years since 2022, these agreements carry caveats regarding their scope in relation to the broader conflict complex within which they are ensconced. In the current data release, we have added the 2023 *Memorandum of Settlement between Government of India, Government of Assam and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)*. This is a significant document for the Assam region, in which ULFA effectively abandons armed struggle, and provision is made for land rights, cultural preservation, and development projects. However, this conflict is one of many regional conflicts in India, and one that has not been active since 2010, and which has never crossed the 1000 battle-related deaths threshold that is usually considered to be the marker of major conflict.

Last year's report on Peace Agreements in 2024 (Badanjak et al. 2025)[p.4] noted the one comprehensive agreement signed that year, the *Peace Agreement between two tribes of the Qifah al-Manasah tribes in Al Bayda Governorate*, which also did not aim to resolve a wider conflict, as it only referred to the implications of the conflict in Yemen in a single governorate. However, within the scope of local agreements, it could be understood as comprehensive to the locale.




Figure 3: Number of Agreements in 2025, by Stage and Agreement/conflict Type.

In 2025, we also added the *Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda* to the database, and classified it as a comprehensive agreement. As in the two cases above, this agreement is comprehensive, but only in one aspect of the conflict. The peacemaking processes surrounding the conflict in Eastern DRC can be understood as having three levels: local level, at which various local authorities and multiple armed groups attempt to broker agreements that resolve some local implication of the broader conflict; level of internal conflict, at which the DRC government and M23 engage in negotiations; and finally, the international level, at which the DRC government negotiates with Rwanda regarding the latter's incursions and support for the armed groups inside DRC. These levels overlap, compete, and occasionally run in parallel - but no recent talks have attempted a complete comprehensive framework for the conflict.

This agreement signed by DRC and Rwanda in 2025 is comprehensive in that it attempts to provide a framework, uncertain though it is, for the interstate dimension of the conflict and dispute between the two governments. Internally, however, the comprehensive solution between the government and M23 has not yet been fully reached, though the *Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, from 15 November 2025, puts forward a set of key principles and an agenda for a comprehensive agreement. These processes, supported by the US and Qatar, appear promising, but much uncertainty remains, with US support apparently conditional on the economic and natural resource components of the agreed documents (for more, see Section 3.3).

There are two recent trends, visible in Figure 5, that may offer some insight into the nature of recent attempts at mediation and organising peace processes. First, while there appears to have been a recovery of partial agreements and process agreements, considering this trend without also considering the settings in which these agreements are signed would lead to the wrong conclusion of there being multiple organised processes that are yielding partial framework agreements. These two categories of agreements have been dominated by agreements signed in the Total Peace initiative in Colombia, and are not representative of the peacemaking practice more broadly. Second, the one visible trend from Figure 5 is the increase in the number of ceasefires signed each year - and this is observed across conflict settings. Taken together, a lack of process agreements and partial/framework agreements, and a dominance of ceasefires, speak of ad hoc and piecemeal attempts to regulate conflict or some of its components, without engaging in attempts to develop a vision or agenda for a post-conflict future. The current global approach to conflict is that of management rather than resolution.




Figure 4: Number of Agreements per Year, by Type of Agreement




Figure 5: Number of Agreements per Year, by Stage of Process (excluding local agreements).

Definitions of agreement stages, from the PA-X Codebook (Bell, Badanjak et al. 2026) [p. 16-17]

Pre-negotiation/process

Agreements that aim to get parties to the point of negotiating over the incompatibilities at the heart of the conflict.

Framework-substantive, Partial

Agreements that concern parties that are engaged in discussion and agreeing to substantive issues to resolve the conflict, but only deal with some of the issues in ways that appear to contemplate future agreements to complete.

Framework-substantive, Comprehensive

Agreements that concern parties that are engaged in discussion and agreeing to substantive issues to resolve the conflict and appear to be set out as a comprehensive attempt to resolve the conflict.

Implementation/renegotiation

Aiming to implement an earlier agreement. Note that this category does not include ceasefires.

Renewal

These are short agreements (typically of just one page), which do nothing other than 'renew' previous commitments. Note that this category does not include ceasefire renewals which are contained in the ceasefire category.

Ceasefire/related

This category contains agreements which provide in their entirety for a ceasefire, or associated demobilisation, or an agreement that is purely providing a monitoring arrangement for, or extension of, a ceasefire.

Other

This is a residual category, capturing all agreements that do not fit the remaining definitions.

2.3 Agreement Contents

The content of peace agreements signed in 2025 sees agreements dealing with their most basic purpose: regulating the security sector, primarily through references to regulating armed groups, general issues related to security, and provision for ceasefires and security guarantees, as shown in Figure 6. Management of rebel or parastatal forces, features mostly in agreements from Colombia and DRC, and appears in 39 of 62 agreements, and 31 of 53 when local agreements are excluded (see Figure 7). The second most frequent category of issues in peace agreements in 2025 is human rights, with nearly half of agreements providing for human rights and the rule of law (27 of 62). However, these provisions have tended to be very broad and brief statements about respect for international law and the principle of the rule of law.

A notable increase in references can be seen for the 'Natural resources' category in PA-X. Although this was mentioned in only one agreement in our 2024 report (Badanjak et al. 2025), in 2025 this category has moved to the top third of Figure 7. Other categories of issues that saw similar increases since 2024 are DDR, increasing from 13 mentions in the 2024 agreements to 23 in the 2025 agreements, and socio-economic development, which saw a jump from 16 to 27 agreements mentioning the issue.

There are some notably absent topics. Constitutional reform has long been a key marker of peace agreements that aimed to support transitions out of armed conflict, and this issue has been mentioned in 300 agreements since 1990. However, not a single 2025 agreement mentions commitments regarding constitutional reform. Provision for an electoral commission is a key element of arrangements for post-conflict democratic processes, appearing 141 times in agreements in PA-X. However, this institution is absent from agreements in 2025, and appears only once in 2024 and once in 2023. Taken together, these absences speak to the changing direction of peace talks, with stabilisation and conflict management displacing plans for political change (Adhikari, Hodge and Wise 2026). Peace agreement data cannot speak to whether ambitions for such change are abandoned or displaced to other fora, and more research is needed to better understand the processes that are shaping the development of political institutions in countries that are either in armed conflict or in which armed conflict is ending.




Figure 6: Number of Agreements in 2025 per PA-X Topic Category, by Stage of Process (excluding local agreements).



Figure 7: Number of Agreements in 2025 per PA-X Topic Issue, by Conflict Location (excluding local agreements).

2.4 Gender

In interstate and intrastate agreements in 2025, 10 of the 53 agreements (19%) include at least one provision referencing women, girls, gender or sexual violence.[4] This is a slight decrease from peace agreements in 2024 (23%) - a share that was heavily driven by gender-transformative peace processes in Colombia - and identical to 2023 (19%) - see Figure 8. Half of the peace agreements with gender references in 2025 were produced by peace processes in Colombia, whilst other gender references are the result of agreements in processes for Israel-Palestine, Eastern DRC, Bougainville, and Türkiye.




Figure 8: Percentage of agreements with gender provision per year (excluding local agreements) for 1990-2025

Gender provisions in 2025 included references to: participation of women's organisations and LGBTQI+ in peace processes and political life, violence against women in the context of artisanal and small-scale mining, recruitment of girls into non-state armed groups, release of women prisoners, and compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 Women, Peace and Security (see Figure 9).

[4] See the full Gender References in Peace Agreements in 2025 Report for more information: Wise, Laura (2026). Gender References in Peace Agreements in 2025: Insights from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database [PA-X Data Series]. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform. https://doi.org/10.7488/era/7195




Figure 9: Number of agreements signed in 2025, per PA-X Gender topic and country of conflict location (excluding local agreements).

2.5 Local Agreements

PA-X version 10 records nine local peace agreements for 2025; however, given the documentation practices of local peace processes in many contexts, this may not be reflective of all local peacemaking activity globally. Most of the local agreements signed in 2025 are from Colombia (7), with other local agreements reached in South Sudan and Syria. The prevalence of local agreements in Colombia may be illustrative of the turn towards more localised peace agreement making by the Colombian government, with community-based, localised agreements between the government and armed groups being part of the government's 'Total Peace' national negotiation strategy under Gustavo Petro's presidency (International Crisis Group 2025).



Figure 10: Map of local agreements signed in 2025.

Colombia

In the southern Nariño region, between April and June 2025, the government and the Comuneros del Sur reached five partial framework agreements, which attempted to address some, but not all, substantive issues related to the conflict. Issues addressed in the agreements include truth and reconciliation mechanisms, DDR programmes - including reintegration zones - management of illegal economies through replacement of illicit crops, capacity-building programmes for democratic participation, and the safeguarding of the rights of children and adolescents affected by armed groups.

A notable aspect of Colombian local agreements is the type of signatories and witnesses acting as third-party mechanisms. The *Acuerdo Número 7: Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito* addresses the transformation of illegal economies through voluntary substitution of illicit crops, with the Directorate for the Substitution of Illicit Crops/DISCI signing as a third party. Whilst the Directorate is a government body implementing the government's wider programme to reform crop management (the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops – PNIS, established in the *2016 Comprehensive Peace Agreement*), it also engages and works with farmers and local communities. Similarly, the *Acuerdo 11: Para la Protección de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes en el Marco de la Mesa para la Co-Construcción de Paz Territorial en Nariño* establishes commitments from both the government and the Southern Comuneros to ensure the protection of children and adolescents' rights, with the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) signing the agreement as a third party. The *Acuerdo Número 10: Para el Fortalecimiento de la Democracia en el Territorio* sets out arrangements to transition armed Southern Comuneros members to full citizenship, prioritising territorial peace as part of conditions for establishing a capacity-building programme for democratic participation, which is supported and implemented by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), a political institute affiliated to the Dutch government.

South Sudan

In South Sudan, the *Resolutions and Recommendations on The Twic-Ngok Dinka Youth Peace Dialogue* addresses inter-ethnic violence between youth groups within the Dinka group in the Abyei region as a pre-negotiation agreement. The agreement covers cessation of hostilities with a monitoring mechanism, opening of roads for free movement of people and goods, and reconciliation measures, including addressing hate speech.

Notably, the process was mainly led by youth groups in a voluntary design, with the main parties composed of youth group representatives and members of civil society, whilst a large number of third parties signed as witnesses, including five different UN bodies, Concordis, and the South Sudan Council of Churches. The region, which sits on the border between Sudan and South Sudan, has seen ongoing conflict based on territorial claims between Dinka Ngok (who are mostly Christian) and Misseriya (who are Arabic Muslim nomadic groups). There have been increased local peace efforts to manage further divisions within sub-sects of Dinka ethnic groups in the area.

Syria

In Syria, the *Road map to end the crisis in Suwayda and stabilize southern Syria* is a partial framework local agreement between the governments of Syria, Jordan, and the United States. In the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime, sectarian violence spread to areas through the proliferation and further fragmenting of militias, with local armed groups looking to create spheres of influence, including in the Suwayda governorate. This agreement outlines a 13-step roadmap to address the crisis in Suwayda and is supported by a UN investigation into accountability over violations. It provides for humanitarian assistance, restoration of essential services, deployment of security forces, and removals of civilian fighters, including prisoner exchanges as a transitional justice mechanism.

2.6 Peace Processes

Apart from the *Total peace* processes in Colombia, the 2025 data indicate that structured peace processes are rare. While 2025 saw an increase in the number of structured peace processes compared to the previous year, with eight peace processes resulting in more than one agreement (versus seven last year), three of those were part of the Total Peace initiative, leaving only five non-Colombian processes with more than one agreement (same as 2024). The top peace process by number of agreements this year was the DRC: the Doha track for Eastern DRC, with a total of 11 agreements (including three intrastate). There were however a few new peace processes in 2025 which were quite prolific, including the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute process (5) and the Israel-Palestine peace process (4).




Figure 11: Number of Agreements per Peace Process 2025.

3 Spotlights

3.1 Interstate Agreements

In 2025, 22 agreements were reached between states: nine Interstate/Interstate agreements, along with 13 Interstate/Intrastate agreements. Interstate/Interstate agreements are agreements between states addressing interstate conflicts (e.g., the *Cambodia-Thailand border dispute*), while Interstate/Intrastate agreements are agreements between states that address conflicts whose major components originate within existing state borders (e.g., the *DRC-Rwanda agreements for Eastern DRC*). These conflict levels are combined in this spotlight and referred to as interstate agreements (agreements between states) for brevity.

2025 is tied with 1991 and 1992 for the joint-highest number of interstate agreements in any single year across the PA-X database, as shown in Figure 12. Furthermore, interstate agreements comprise 35% of all agreements in 2025, which is the highest proportion in any year in the database. Notably, both previous peaks coincided with the end of the Cold War and the restructuring of the international order. However, the nature of the agreements differs. Where the early 1990s peaks were driven by substantive and implementation agreements, 41% of the 2025 interstate agreements are ceasefires, suggesting that this particular period of major geopolitical transition may be generating surges in interstate agreement-making, albeit of a more stabilisation-oriented character. Although other years since 1990 have included high numbers of interstate agreements, those were dominated by agreements from one specific process, rather than what we see in 2025, which is multiple interstate agreements across a diversity of conflicts worldwide.




Figure 12: Number of Interstate/Interstate and Interstate/Intrastate agreements per year for 1990-2025.

Three peace processes account for 77% of all interstate agreements in 2025. DRC-Rwanda (8), Cambodia-Thailand (5) and Israel-Palestine (4) together produce 17 of the 22 agreements. The *DRC-Rwanda Doha track* is the most complete process arc, which includes two related sets of agreements, one primarily focused on the internal dimension of the conflict, with mediation by Qatar, and the other focusing on the cross-border dispute with Rwanda, primarily supported by the US. The eight agreements from the Doha track span four PA-X agreement stages: pre-negotiation (*Declaration of Principles*), substantive-partial (*Washington Accords*), and substantive-comprehensive (*Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda*), followed by implementation agreements (*five agreements* covering the Joint Oversight Committee, Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, and Regional Economic Integration Framework).

The process between Cambodia and Thailand to resolve the armed conflict over their shared border is the most active ceasefire process of interstate agreements of 2025. Five agreements in five months (July-Dec 2025) trace an arc from an emergency Malaysian-mediated ceasefire (*Joint Press Release on the Special Meeting Hosted by Malaysia to Address the Current Situation Between Cambodia and Thailand*) to institutionalised General Border Committee mechanisms, with increasingly detailed provisions. While all five agreements sit at the ceasefire stage, the later agreements are noticeably more sub-

stantive. The *September Special GBC meeting* ranks 41st out of 372 interstate agreements in the entire PA-X database by provision breadth, and, among the 39 interstate ceasefire agreements in the database, Cambodia-Thailand agreements hold four of the top eight positions in terms of the breadth of topics covered.

The *Northern Ireland Joint Framework* is unique among agreements, as it is referring to a setting of internal conflict, and is dealing with transitional justice. It is the only interstate agreement in the whole database (372 inter/ inter and inter/intra in total) to contain all four components of transitional justice institutions that PA-X codes for: courts (TjCou), mechanisms (TjMech), victims (TjVic), and missing persons (TjMis). It also contains detailed police reform provisions. For an interstate implementation agreement, in an intrastate conflict, this density of justice related provisions is unique.

3.2 United States of America as a Third Party Signatory

US-brokered deals feature prominently in 2025 peace agreement data, reflecting the highly publicised diplomatic activities of the second Trump administration throughout the year. Five distinct processes listed on PA-X directly involve the US as a party or third party in 2025: Armenia-Azerbaijan, DRC-Rwanda, Israel-Palestine, Thailand-Cambodia and Ukraine-US. Actors representing the US signed 9 peace agreements as a third party: 6 of the DRC-Washington accords, the *Joint Declaration by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the United States of America*, the *Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand*, and the *Implementation Steps for President Trump's Proposal for a Comprehensive End of Gaza War*. The US was also a core party to the *Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity* with Türkiye, Egypt, and Qatar, relating to the four countries' roles in the Israel/Palestine conflict and peace process, and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, authorizing the establishment of a Board of Peace as a transitional administration.

The content of agreements in which the US is a third party also shows the primacy of economic approaches to peacemaking under Trump, and the administration's adoption of 'peace through concrete', in which statebuilding is pursued through developing infrastructure (Bachmann and Schouten 2018; Zeiderman 2020). However, these agreements also demonstrate the Trump administration's twist on the concept, in which US economic interests are central to proposed or agreed infrastructure projects, and the US is positioned as a dominant partner in developmental frameworks. Infrastructure is a key focus of the *Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the Govern-*

ment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda. The deal includes references to the Lobito Corridor (pp. 5-7) – a logistics project to connect mineral fields in Zambia and the DRC to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, in which the US has invested billions of dollars to counter China's influence in Africa and secure mineral supply chains (Way 2024). The *Joint Declaration between Azerbaijan and Armenia* included an announcement that the US would develop a "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) connectivity project" to connect the enclave of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic to Azerbaijan through Armenian territory and boost economic development. A framework for the TRIPP, published in January 2026 (United States Department of State 2026), establishes the "TRIPP Development Company", in which the US has a 'controlling stake' of 74%, whilst Armenia retains "oversight of reserve matters" and a 26% share for the first 49 years of the right to development.

Despite US claims that Donald Trump has "solved 8 wars in 8 months" (United States Department of State (@StateDept) 2025), PA-X signatory data show the diversity of states that the US has co-mediated or facilitated with, even in processes where they profess to have taken the lead. For example, some agreements from the DRC-Rwanda process[5] show Qatar, Togo (serving as the African Union mediator), and the African Union Commission as co-signatories, whilst Malaysia co-signed one agreement[6] with the US in the Thailand-Cambodia process, and a separate agreement on its own[7]. It is highly unlikely that any agreements between Israel and Hamas could have been accepted by both parties without the involvement of Türkiye, Egypt, and Qatar.[8] These processes show that many of the peace agreements reached in 2025 required the involvement of multiple - particularly regional - actors for parties to negotiate, and that the implementation or evolution of those agreements in the future will likely continue to need mini-lateral groupings of engaged third parties.

[5] See *Joint Statement on the Fourth Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda and the Initialing of the Regional Economic Integration Framework*

[6] See *Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand on the outcomes of their meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

[7] See *Joint Press Release on the Special Meeting Hosted by Malaysia to Address the Current Situation Between Cambodia and Thailand*

[8] see *Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity*

3.3 Peace agreements, the Global Economy, and *Pax Silica*

In addition to the 'peace through concrete' approach referred to above, another key plank of the Trump administration's economic approach to peacemaking in 2025 has been a focus on so-called 'critical minerals' essential for military applications, strategic digital technologies, and the green energy transition. This follows the US' push for critical minerals diplomacy under the "*Pax Silica*" umbrella (United States Department of State n.d.), aimed at reducing the country's dependence on imports from China by securing critical minerals elsewhere.

In recent decades, minerals have featured in dozens of inter- and intrastate peace agreements across the globe, including in the DRC,[9] Gabon,[10] five agreements in the Philippines/Mindanao,[11] one in South Sudan/Sudan, [12] and three in Sudan.[13] The issue of foreign ownership of the Panguna copper mine in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, is a prominent example of a conflict related to the extraction of minerals, which was subsequently discussed during the peace process (see references to the future of the mine in the 1995 *Waigini Communique*). Diamonds have also historically been associated with conflict dynamics in the DRC and Sierra Leone, among other countries (see references to gold and diamonds in the 1999 *Lomé Agreement* in the case of Sierra Leone).

The prominence of critical minerals in peace agreements, however, is a notable trend in 2025, particularly given how central these minerals have become to US peacemaking efforts, in conjunction with their importance for the development of the global economy. Agreements between the US and Ukraine, as well as between the DRC and Rwanda, illustrate this trend. The *Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America on the Establishment of a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund*, colloquially referred to as the *'US-Ukraine Minerals deal'*, effectively emerged as a 'minerals for security' agreement in which Ukraine committed to channel US investment into energy, mining, and infrastructure sectors in exchange for US commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty and security. The short, 11-page agreement lists over 50 'natural resource relevant assets' (p. 10), including graphite, lithium, and titanium, and commits the parties to enter a 'limited partnership' in setting up

[9] See *'The Sun City Agreement' signed in 2003*
[10] See the *Accord de Paris* signed in 1994
[11] In five agreements: (1) *Final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)* in 1996; (2) the *Consensus Points on the Strands on Concept, Territory Resources, and Governance at TWG level* in 2005; (3) *Minutes of the Meeting of the GRP-MILF TWG on Resources* in 2006; (4) *Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001* in 2008; and (5) *Annex on Power-Sharing to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)* in 2013.
[12] See *Sudan Peace Agreement* from 1997
[13] See (1) *Darfur Peace Agreement* (2006); (2) *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)* (2011); and (3) *Juba Agreement* (2020)

the Reconstruction Investment Fund (p. 2). Alongside legal, financial, and institutional commitments, this Fund is meant to facilitate mineral exploration and extraction deals for the US.

In DRC, natural resources have long played a role in the country's armed conflicts, with foreign actors, including its neighbours, seeking to access the country's lucrative mineral reserves. In 2025, the aforementioned Doha track for negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda clearly reflected the US' desire to pursue 'minerals for peace'. Among other commitments, the *Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda* of 27 June 2025 includes provisions on territorial integrity, a cessation of hostilities, an end to state support to armed groups, and humanitarian assistance. The agreement also called for a 'Regional Economic Integration Framework' (p. 5 ff.), focused on transparent mineral value chains and shared infrastructure. This Framework was then further specified through an agreement on 1 August 2025 (*Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework*), and then again on 4 December 2025 (*Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda*), alongside a recommitment to the June agreement (*Joint Declaration by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Occasion of Establishing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity*). Importantly, however, the US also entered a separate 'strategic partnership agreement' with the DRC on the same day, aimed at securing a steady supply of critical minerals, particularly cobalt and copper, to the US (United States Department of State 2025), highlighting once more the US government's transactional and resource-driven interest in this peace process.

3.4 PKK–Türkiye Process and the Inclusion of Unilateral Agreements in PA-X

In PA-X Version 10, we have added one unilateral announcement from 2025, the *Final Declaration of the PKK's 12th Congress*. This is the first document in PA-X relating to the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party, known as PKK) and the internal conflict in Türkiye, even though the conflict itself has been active since 1984, with multiple attempts at talks and PKK's announcements of ceasefire. The reasons for adding this agreement to PA-X include the nature of the process that resulted in this statement, but also the broader geographic context in which this process takes place.

Unilaterally announced actions in peace processes are not unusual in the PA-X data:

as of this release, we include 137 unilateral documents in the database. As a database of agreements, PA-X is treading a fine line with this inclusion of unilateral documents, since it can be difficult to see how such statements constitute agreements and how they fit into peace processes.

Peace processes unfold in unique patterns. Many processes start with third-party mediation, and this is rarely done through immediate meetings between the sides; instead, 'shuttle diplomacy', where mediators go back and forth between sides, is more frequent than direct meetings (Peter et al. 2026). The range of acceptable actions for governments, armed groups, and other organisations, can be quite limited and vary from context to context, and it is not unusual that talks take place between proxies, different wings of organisations, and through complex sequences of concessions and compromises.

These non-linear and indirect routes for talks can produce unilateral documents, and the rule for their inclusion in the PA-X data relies on sufficient evidence of mutuality and process, or a 'choreography' of moves on the part of warring sides (Bell, 2015, p.8). These documents can come from the third parties directly - e.g., when they produce a document to confirm their role in a peace process. For instance, the UN Security Council Resolutions in PA-X fit this description, as do the more unusual documents, such as the *Papal blessing* given to the process resolving the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1998. However, from the perspective of bringing armed groups into talks, the unilateral statements of armed groups which stem from a choreography of mutually supporting moves are vital parts of peace processes.

The *Final declaration of the PKK's 12th Congress*, issued on 12 May 2025, took place as part of a series of actions on the part of Türkiye's political elite and PKK leadership, with initial overture made in late 2024 by Devlet Bahçeli, a right-wing politician who is part of the ruling coalition, suggesting that the PKK's long-imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, may be granted parole if the PKK were to be dissolved. Talks followed, with several of the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (political party representing Kurds in the Turkish parliament, known as DEM) leadership alternating meetings with Öcalan and meetings with Türkiye's parliamentarians. The visits to Öcalan had previously not been allowed, so the fact that they took place clearly indicated the willingness of the government to engage in de-escalation.

After the visits, Öcalan issued a message, calling for the PKK's dissolution. The PKK issued a unilateral ceasefire[14] on 1 March, followed by a PKK congress in May, which

[14] Since we have not been able to source a verified text for this ceasefire, it is not included in the PA-X data.

has, in turn, resulted in this Final Declaration that we included in PA-X. The Declaration was welcomed by the President of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and was followed by Öcalan's first public appearance on video since 1999, PKK's public disarmament in July 2025, and corresponding messages of support for the process from President Erdoğan and the Turkish government elite. The sequencing of these events and obvious planning, such as when an imminent presidential statement was announced on the eve of the disarmament event, indicate a carefully choreographed process. In that sense, this unilateral announcement is similar to the *Statement by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Saturday)* regarding decommissioning as part of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which has been included in PA-X since its first release.

There appears to be much speculation about what may have prompted such high level of support for a rapprochement with PKK and DEM - ranging from internal dynamics related to Erdoğan seeking to extend his time in office, to the broader regional changes stemming from the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the need to further productively engage with the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control large areas in Northeast Syria, and who, along with the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, present a set of allies of the US in the region. Regardless of the motivations and political calculus, the process put in place is formal enough to support the inclusion of the key written documents in the PA-X data.

4 Limitations and Future Research

Agreements we discuss are limited by the requirements of the database itself: they need to be formal, written, and publicly available. Oftentimes, agreements become public with a delay, or are not circulated widely enough to be detected in our searches. On rare occasions, we find and verify texts of agreements but cannot verify that the text had indeed been signed or agreed by the parties.

The complete picture of peacemaking in a particular year thus only emerges with a delay, and agreements are added to PA-X as they become available and can be verified. In the current, tenth release, we have been able to add 19 agreements from 2024 to PA-X, 23 are from 2023, 6 from 2022, and the remaining 3 from the 2006-2020 period (see Figure 13 below). It is likely that some formal, written, and signed agreements from 2025 will only become available in the 11th release in 2027.

As with PA-X releases in recent years, all findings from the 2025 collection of agreements are affected by the prevalence of peace agreements signed between conflict parties in Colombia. The nature of Colombia's approach means that the resulting agreements tend to address topics like gender, environment, and intersectional provisions for equality more extensively than in other peace processes. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the global patterns emerging from the 2025 data.




Figure 13: Number of Agreements signed per Year, for PA-X Versions 1-9 and Version 10.

5 Appendix 1: Tables of Agreements

5.1 Agreements Signed in 2025

Table 1: Agreements added in V10 PA-X Signed in 2025

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Israel/(Palestine)	Israel-Palestine peace process	Practical Procedures And Mechanisms To Implement The Agreement For The Exchange Of Israeli Hostages And Palestinian Prisoners And The Return To A Sustainable Calm Which Would Achieve A Permanent Ceasefire Between The Two Sides (15/01/2025)
Syria	Syrian peace process	Framework agreement signed by His Excellency President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and His Excellency President Mazloum Abdi (10/02/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo 3 Transformaciones Territoriales Proyecto Piloto de Transición a Economías Lícitas (12/02/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo 4 Garantías de Seguridad para los Diálogos de Paz (12/02/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo 5 Marco Judicial de la Paz Total (12/02/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Relatoría de Conclusiones - Encuentro en La Macarena para Avanzar en las Transformaciones Territoriales (16/03/2025)
Syria	Syrian peace process	Agreement between the Civilian Democratic Council and Sheikh Masour and the Executive Committee of the Royal Commission on the Application of the Agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (01/04/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Número 7: Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito (05/04/2025)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Número 6: Por La Verdad, La Memoria Y La Dignificación De Las Víctimas (05/04/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acta 10 de Abril de 2025 - Sesión N° 4 de la Mesa de Diálogos de Paz entre el Gobierno de Colombia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (10/04/2025)
India/(Nagaland)	India-Nagaland peace process	Ceasefire extension Agreement between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/K-Khango, Nagaland (11/04/2025)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Resolutions and Recommendations on The Twic-Ngok Dinka Youth Peace Dialogue (12/04/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Declaration Conjointe Des Representants De La Republique Democratique Du Congo Et De L'Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement Du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) (23/04/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Declaration of Principles (25/04/2025)
Ukraine/United States of America	Ukraine - Russia: interstate agreements	Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America on the Establishment of a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (30/04/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acuerdo de Catatumbo (03/05/2025)
Turkey/(Kurds-Kurdistan)	Turkey: PKK process	Final declaration of the PKK's 12th Congress (12/05/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acta No. 1 del 25 de Mayo de 2025 - Ciclo No. 5 de la Mesa de Diálogos de Paz entre el Gobierno de Colombia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (25/05/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo que Ratifica el Estado Avanzado del Proceso (Acuerdo No. 10) (25/05/2025)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo No. 9 - Funciones de Países Garantes y Entidades Acompañantes (25/05/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Número 8: Creación de la Zona Temporal para la "Co-Construcción de Paz Territorial" en el Municipio de Mallama (08/06/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Número 9: Reintegración Integral de Comuneros del Sur para la Paz y la Transformación Territorial (08/06/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Número 10: Para el Fortalecimiento de la Democracia en el Territorio (08/06/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo 11: Para la Protección de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes en el Marco de la Mesa para la Co-Construcción de Paz Territorial en Nariño (09/06/2025)
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Bougainville: peace process	Melanesian Agreement (26/06/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda (27/06/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Segunda Marquetalia	Acuerdo N°2: Medidas Tempranas de Desescalamiento y Acciones Humanitarias Urgentes (29/06/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo No. 11 - Renacemos Por La Paz Y Las Transformaciones Territoriales De Nariño Y Putumayo (30/06/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acerca del desarrollo de la Zona de Ubicación Temporal del área rural de Tibú Norte de Santander (14/07/2025)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Declaration of Principles between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Representatives of Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23rd Movement (AFC/M23) (the Parties), in Support of a Pathway to a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Facilitated by the State of Qatar (19/07/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo No. 12: Entrega, Verificación y Destrucción Progresiva de Material de Guerra entre el Gobierno Nacional de la República de Colombia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) (19/07/2025)
Cambodia/Thailand	Cambodia - Thailand border dispute process	Joint Press Release on the Special Meeting Hosted by Malaysia to Address the Current Situation Between Cambodia and Thailand (28/07/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework (01/08/2025)
Cambodia/Thailand	Cambodia - Thailand border dispute process	Agreed Minutes of the Extraordinary General Border Committee Meeting between Cambodia and Thailand (07/08/2025)
Armenia/ Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh)	Armenia-Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh: US-led process	Joint Declaration by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the United States of America on the outcomes of their meeting in Washington D.C., United States of America (08/08/2025)
China/India	China-India border dispute peace process	Ten Points of Consensus for 24th Round of SR Talks on Boundary Question (19/08/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Joint Statement on the Second Joint Oversight Committee Meeting for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda (03/09/2025)
India/(Nagaland)	India-Nagaland peace process	Ceasefire Extension Agreement Between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland(K)Niki, Nagaland (09/09/2025)
Cambodia/ Thailand	Cambodia - Thailand border dispute process	Joint Press Statement Special GBC Meeting (10/09/2025)
Syria	Syrian Local Agreements	Road map to end the crisis in Suwayda and stabilize southern Syria (16/09/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia	Declaración del Proceso para la Desmovilización del autodenominado Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (18/09/2025)
Ireland/ United Kingdom/ (Northern Ireland)	Northern Ireland peace process	A Joint Framework between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (19/09/2025)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Democratic Republic of Congo/ Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Joint Statement on the Second Meeting of the Joint Security Co-ordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda (24/09/2025)
Israel/(Palestine)	Israel-Palestine peace process	Implementation Steps for President Trump's Proposal for a Comprehensive End of Gaza War (10/10/2025)
Israel/(Palestine)	Israel-Palestine peace process	Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity (13/10/2025)
Cambodia/ Thailand	Cambodia - Thailand border dispute process	Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand on the outcomes of their meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (26/10/2025)
Afghanistan/ Pakistan	Afghanistan-Pakistan: border incursions process	Joint Statement on the Talks Between Afghanistan and Pakistan Through the Mediation of Türkiye and Qatar (30/10/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Joint Statement on the Fourth Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda and the Initialing of the Regional Economic Integration Framework (07/11/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	The Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (15/11/2025)
Israel/ (Palestine)/ (United Nations)	Israel-Palestine peace process	UNSC Resolution 2803 (17/11/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acuerdo sobre Transformaciones Territoriales y Tierras (17/11/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acuerdo sobre Ambiente, Bioeconomía y Revitalización de la Selva Amazónica (18/11/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acuerdo Especial sobre el Desescalamiento del Conflicto Armado, Hechos y Gestos de Paz (19/11/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acuerdo para la Comisión Jurídica Mixta y Garantías de Seguridad de la Mesa de Diálogos de Paz MDP (19/11/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Declaración VII Ciclo Campo Hermoso (20/11/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Acuerdo Especial de la Mesa de Diálogos de Paz para Garantías Electorales (20/11/2025)

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Table 1 – continued from previous page

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Joint Declaration by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Occasion of Establishing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity (04/12/2025)
Democratic Republic of Congo/ Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda (04/12/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Acuerdo Marco sobre las Zonas para la Capacitación Integral y Ubicación Temporal (Acuerdo No 14) (05/12/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia	Compromisos de Paz en Doha - Proceso para la desmovilización del autodenominado Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia – (a)EGC y la construcción de paz con el pueblo en los territorios (05/12/2025)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia	Protocolo para el Seguimiento, Monitoreo y Verificación de los Compromisos de Paz en Doha (05/12/2025)
Cambodia/ Thailand	Cambodia - Thailand border dispute process	Joint Statement of the 3rd Special General Border Committee (27/12/2025)

5.2 Other Agreements in V10

Table 2: Other Agreements added in V10 PA-X

Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
China/Russia	China-Russia border dispute peace process	Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the regime of the Russian-Chinese border (09/11/2006)
Sudan	Sudan Transition Process	Final Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period (04/08/2019)
Iraq/(Kurds-Kurdistan)	Kurdistan/Iraq territorial conflict	Agreement for Restoring Stability and Normalising Conditions in the Sinjar District (09/10/2020)
South Sudan/ Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Pre-migration Peace Conference for Dinka Malual and Rezeigat (11/06/2022)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Resolutions of the Civil-Military Dialogue between the Community of Panyume (Civilians) and the Sudan People Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA/IO); Mobile Force (03/09/2022)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Comunicado Conjunto Reinstalación Mesa de Diálogos (04/10/2022)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo 2: Países garantes y países, organismos e instituciones acompañantes (24/11/2022)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo 4: Declaraciones y comunicaciones conjuntas (24/11/2022)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo 5: Institucionalización de la Mesa de Diálogos (12/12/2022)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	The Resolutions of the Civilian-Military Dialogue in Otogo Payam Yei River County-CES (02/02/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Elementos iniciales para abordar el cese al fuego entre el Gobierno de la República de Colombia y el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (10/03/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo No. 7: Ideas básicas para el desarrollo del primer punto de la Nueva Agenda de Diálogos: la participación de la sociedad en la construcción de la paz (10/03/2023)
South Sudan/ Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	The Resolutions and Recommendations of Dinka Malual and Rezeigat 2023 Pre-Migration Peace Conference (22/03/2023)

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Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
South Sudan/ Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	The Resolutions and Recommendations of Dinka Malual and Misseriya 2023 Pre-Migration Peace Conference (30/03/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Agreement between Kajo-Keji Community and Ground Force, Battalion 2, KajoKeji Area on the Resolutions on Civil – Military Relations (05/04/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	The Resolutions of the Civilian – Military Dialogue in Mundu Diocese, Kupera Payam, Lainya County (01/05/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Civil and Military Dialogue (24/05/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Resolutions passed during the Civilian-Military Dialogue in Gulumbi Payam, Morobo County (14/06/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Civil-Military Dialogue Held 16th - 18th 2023 at Rwonyi Boma, Yei River County (18/08/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Marco Político y Conceptual de Acciones y Dinámicas Humanitarias (04/09/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo Parcial sobre la Evaluación Jurídica de la Situación de Presos Políticos y Personas Privadas de la Libertad Reconocidas como Miembros del ELN Recluidos en las Prisiones y Centros de Detención del País (04/09/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Segundo Acuerdo de Caracas - Zonas Críticas o de Crisis Humanitaria (04/09/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	The Resolutions of the Civilian-Military Dialogue in Wuji Payam, Lainya County (04/10/2023)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) Yei River County-CES (05/10/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Reafirmación del Horizonte del Proceso de Paz entre el Gobierno de la República de Colombia y el Ejército de Liberación Nacional en el Marco de la Agenda de México (17/12/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo sobre la Suspensión de las Retenciones con Fines Económicos, según la Denominación del ELN, durante el CFBNT (17/12/2023)

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Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo sobre la Creación y Puesta en Marcha de un Observatorio sobre las Formas del Paramilitarismo (17/12/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo sobre la Prórroga del Cese al Fuego Bilateral, Nacional y Temporal (17/12/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Declaración y Acuerdo sobre el Proceso de Diseño de la Participación (17/12/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acciones y Dinámicas Humanitarias en las Zonas Críticas (17/12/2023)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Creación de Condiciones Económicas y Financieras para la Materialización del Acuerdo de México (17/12/2023)
India/(Assam)	India-Assam	Memorandum of Settlement between Government of India, Government of Assam and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) (29/12/2023)
Myanmar	Myanmar ceasefires process with ethnic armed groups	Haigeng Agreement (12/01/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo sobre la continuidad de la fase de diseño de la participación de la sociedad en la construcción de la paz (05/02/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo sobre comunicaciones de la mesa de diálogos para la paz (05/02/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Acuerdo de creación del fondo multidonante para el proceso de paz con el ELN (05/02/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with ELN	Comunicado Conjunto Nro. 22 (26/02/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with FARC-EP	Resolución Número 065 De 2024 (28/02/2024)
India/(Nagaland)	India-Nagaland peace process	Ceasefire extension Agreement between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/K-Khango, Nagaland (07/03/2024)

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Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
South Sudan/ Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	The Resolutions and Recommendations of Dinka Malual, Misseriya and Rezeigat Pre and Post Migration Peace Conference (17/03/2024)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Wedwiel Host Community - Refugees Peace Conference Declaration (21/04/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Segunda Marquetalia	Acuerdo para el inicio formal de la Mesa de Diálogos de Paz entre el Gobierno Nacional de Colombia y la Segunda Marquetalia – Ejército Bolivariano (05/06/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Hoja De Ruta Para La Co-Construcción de Paz Territorial en Nariño (03/08/2024)
India/(Nagaland)	India-Nagaland peace process	Ceasefire Extension Agreement Between The Government of India and The National Socialist Council of Nagaland(K)Niki (04/09/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Mesa Para La Co-Construcción De Paz Territorial En Nariño - Acuerdo Número 1 (19/09/2024)
South Sudan	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	Resolutions & Recommendations of the Youth Dialogue for Peace & Community Cohesion (28/09/2024)
Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda	DRC: the Doha Track for Eastern DRC	Concept of Operations for the Harmonized Plan for Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures of Rwanda (12/10/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Nro. 2 - Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas en el Territorio - Mesa para la Co-construcción de Paz Territorial en Nariño (17/10/2024)
China/India	China-India border dispute peace process	6 Point Consensus of the 23rd meeting of the Special Representatives on the China-India Boundary Question (18/12/2024)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo N° 3: Sobre el Cese al Fuego Bilateral, de carácter local y temporal (CFBLT). (19/12/2024)

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Country	Peace Process	Agreement (ctrl + click to view in PA-X)
Colombia	Colombia VII - Petro Peace Dialogues with Comuneros del Sur (Nariño Regional Process)	Acuerdo Número 4: Procedimiento de Destrucción de Material de Guerra de Comuneros del Sur (19/12/2024)

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PeaceRep
Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform

PA-X
Peace Agreements Database

PA-X Peace Agreements Database & Dataset

The PA-X Peace Agreement Database is a database and repository of peace agreements from 1990 to date, current up to December 2025. PA-X provides a comprehensive dataset of peace agreements, capable of underpinning both quantitative and qualitative research.

PA-X is primarily produced by a team of researchers at the University of Edinburgh as part of the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Program (PeaceRep).

PeaceRep

PeaceRep is a research consortium based at the University of Edinburgh focused on peace and conflict resolution, mediation, and peace process design.

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Contact and further information

peaceagreements.org
peacerep.org
peacerep@ed.ac.uk

THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH

University of Edinburgh, School of Law, Old College, South Bridge, Edinburgh EH8 9YL