

Religiosity, Political Tolerance, and Willingness to Reconcile in Post-conflict Contexts: Evidence From Colombia

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Abstract

This article examines the role of religiosity in shaping people's willingness to reconcile with ex-combatants in post-conflict societies, using Colombia as a case study. Drawing on LAPOP survey data from 2014 to 2018, the study employs linear and logistic regression models to reveal that individuals tend to be less willing to reconcile when they have high levels of religiosity (LAPOP 2004–2021). However, this relation can be mitigated by an individual's level of political tolerance, which fosters greater openness to support reconciliation despite strong religious convictions.

Keywords

willingness to reconcile, religiosity, political tolerance, post-conflict behaviour, Colombia

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Data Availability Statement included at the end of the article.

Introduction

In 2016, Colombia held a plebiscite to ratify the peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This process highlighted a potentially divisive role of religiosity on public opinion towards reconciliation. Theoretically, religious values might be expected to foster reconciliation. However, the context of Colombia reveals a more complex picture: some religious factions expressed reservations about the peace accord, while others staunchly supported peace efforts (Arroyave and Romero-Moreno 2023; Cosoy 2016; Rettberg and Ugarriza 2023). This complexity is not unique to Colombia. For instance, religiosity has been found to negatively impact reconciliation processes in Bosnia and Croatia (Odak and Čehajić-Clancy 2021), while it seems to have played a constructive role in Kenya, where religious institutions have facilitated dialogue and social healing (Onsati 2014). Reconciliation after armed conflicts involves a fragile transition process that involves the entire society (Bruneau et al. 2022). Several factors can upend this process (Casas et al. 2020; Collier et al. 2008; Oidor et al. 2019). For example, the presence of war economies, unresolved historical grievances, inadequate truth-telling processes, and persistent institutional mistrust have been shown to significantly undermine reconciliation efforts (Amaya-Panche 2025; Sonrex et al. 2023; Mohan 2023; Ugarriza and Nussio 2017), because they can reignite hostilities and plunge countries into a new spiral of violence (Cárdenas et al. 2014; Gibson 2004). Examples of this include Kosovo, Ethiopia, Nepal, and Myanmar (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Reeder and Seeberg 2018).

In this context, religion has played an ambiguous role vis-à-vis the willingness of individuals to reconcile (Brewer et al. 2011; Svensson and Nilsson 2018). In South Africa the Anglican Church encouraged a belief in forgiveness, thereby seeking to strengthen the willingness of believers to reconcile (Chapman 2003; Sandal 2011). In the Middle East, the religious significance of land has complicated peace negotiations, as deeply held beliefs and sacred attachments to specific territories have often hindered reconciliation efforts and stalled the resolution of conflicts (Hassner 2003). Existing research on the relationship between reconciliation and religion reveals that this connection is not always one-sided.

Religion can play a catalytic role (negatively or positively) in believers' attitudes towards reconciliation. Religion can play a positive role in reconciliation by fostering community and social support (Appleby 2003), providing religious leaders who act as mediators (Little and Appleby 2004), and promoting a moral and ethical framework (Gopin 2000). Under some circumstances, religiosity can prevent the collapse of peace agreements and the recurrence of violence (Appleby 2003; Haynes 2016; Philpott 2012). Negative aspects of religion are linked to religious extremism (Juergensmeyer 2000), historical grievances highlighted by religion (Marty and Appleby, 1993), the radicalization of religious values (Pretus et al. 2018), and the reinforcement of exclusive group identities (Gopin 2002; Gurses and Ozturk 2020). These findings reveal

that religion can influence reconciliation in various ways, contingent on contextual factors. Findings from one specific case, however, are not readily generalizable.

Religion matters in the study of reconciliation because understanding how religiosity affects willingness to reconcile can help to reduce the negative implications of some religious views on the willingness of individuals, especially those more religious, to reconcile (Longman 2010).

Scholars who have studied the connection between religion and post-conflict behaviour (Parsons et al. 2020) tend to focus on ideas and beliefs related to forgiveness (Brock and Parker 2008; Philpott 2012; Shriver 1995). Other scholars have investigated how churches' historical development and relationship with conflict actors influence building trust or distrust in peace processes (Gusnet et al. 2017; Richardson and Rammal 2018) and post-conflict processes (Appleby 2003; Haynes 2020; Philpott 2012). It has also been explored how religious leaders can support or oppose the peace process (Silberman et al. 2005). However, the study of the relationships between religiosity and willingness to reconcile is underexplored in the literature. Moreover, we still lack a deep understanding of the role of individual traits, such as political tolerance, in moderating this relation.

This article aims to contribute to bridging a gap in the existing literature on reconciliation by examining the interplay between religiosity and willingness to reconcile in non-religious conflicts. While numerous studies have focused on overtly religious conflicts, the role of religiosity in conflicts not explicitly rooted in faith still needs to be explored. Specifically, this research seeks to empirically identify how religiosity, political tolerance, and willingness to reconcile are related and how they interact in a non-religious conflict. Previous studies have not paid enough attention to the role of political tolerance and religiosity in fostering a willingness to reconcile in post-conflict societies.

More specifically, this article contributes to our understanding of reconciliation by exploring the nexus between religiosity and individuals' willingness to reconcile with ex-combatants, considering the moderating role of political tolerance. We draw on evidence from the post-conflict period in Colombia, where a peace accord between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC- was reached in 2016 and initiated a post-conflict and reconciliation process. Studying the case of Colombia is interesting because it illustrates how religious factors might influence reconciliation in a context that is not primarily defined by religious causes. If religion plays a significant role in the Colombian post-conflict process, it raises the possibility that similar dynamics could emerge in other conflicts that are not overtly religious. This perspective suggests a level of generalizability, extending the relevance of our findings beyond cases where religion is a primary source of conflict. Using data from the Americas Barometer -LAPOP, this article employs logistic and multiple linear regression analyses to study the relationship between religiosity and individuals' willingness towards reconciliation (LAPOP, 2004–2021). The study reveals nuanced findings regarding the association between religiosity and willingness to reconcile.

Moreover, it unveils the influential role of political tolerance in shaping individuals' willingness to engage in reconciliation efforts, irrespective of their distinct religiosity.

The article is structured into five sections. The first section provides a literature review, synthesizing key research on the relationship between religiosity and individuals' willingness to reconcile. The second section delineates the analytical categories underpinning our theoretical framework: political tolerance, religiosity, and willingness to reconcile. The third section details the operationalization of variables, the methodological approach, and the data employed in our analyses. The fourth section presents the results of both linear and logistic regression models, as well as the interaction effects specified in our research hypotheses. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of our findings and their broader implications for future research.

Our results indicate a negative association between individuals' religiosity and their willingness to reconcile. However, political tolerance moderates this relationship, mitigating its negative effect and increasing individuals' propensity to engage in reconciliation efforts, regardless of their level of religiosity. This finding offers insights into how post-conflict societies can foster greater support for reconciliation initiatives.

Literature Review

Existing studies of the role of religion in reconciliation can be grouped into three types: reconciliation in explicitly religious conflicts, reconciliation between religiously defined groups, and reconciliation in conflicts without a religious dimension. We will discuss each of these in turn. Subsequently, we elaborate on the role of political tolerance.

Reconciliation in Explicitly Religious Conflicts

In explicitly religious conflicts, issues at stake are directly about religion. Scholars such as [Appleby \(2003\)](#) and [Hassner \(2016\)](#) emphasise the ambivalence of religious influences, noting the potential for both division and unity. [Clark's \(2010\)](#) study of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates this duality, where religious actors have exacerbated tensions and facilitated peace. Similarly, [Cavanaugh \(2009\)](#) discusses how religious fundamentalism can diminish support for peace in post-conflict societies, highlighting cases where heightened group radicality influenced by religion obstructs intergroup forgiveness ([Odak et al. 2020](#); [Wibisono et al. 2019](#)). [Svensson \(2007\)](#) further emphasizes that explicitly religious conflicts often involve non-negotiable positions, complicating reconciliation efforts.

[Pischedda and Vogt \(2023\)](#) argue that the rise in religiously motivated violence post-1979, catalyzed by events like the Iranian Revolution, showcases how global ideological shifts can influence the propensity for violence among religious organizations. They highlight that religious organizations became significantly more prone to violence after 1979, especially under conditions of high political corruption and religious repression.

Reconciliation in Conflicts Between Religiously Defined Groups

Conflicts between religiously defined groups involve parties identified by their religious affiliations, though the conflict issues are not inherently about religion. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is an example of political and ethnic issues that are prominent, but the groups are defined by their religious identities. [Silvestri and Mayall \(2015\)](#) argue that religion can exacerbate intergroup biases and hinder reconciliation in such contexts. [Svensson \(2007\)](#) and [Basedau et al. \(2017\)](#) provide frameworks for understanding how religious identities influence the dynamics of such conflicts.

Reconciliation in Conflicts Without a Religious Dimension

The third strand of the literature between reconciliation and armed conflicts relates to societies where conflicts are not caused or are not a consequence of a religious dimension. This means that the roots of violence have not been linked to religiosity. The involved groups have not identified themselves as part of a religious faction, or their motivation is not to defend a religious domain or purpose ([Mayer 2013](#)). This type of conflict includes a large range of multidimensional causes.

Studying religiosity in non-religious conflicts is essential because, even when conflicts are not driven by religious motivations, religious beliefs and institutions often shape individuals' values, social norms, and views on peace and reconciliation ([Appleby 2003](#); [Gopin 2002](#)). Religiosity can impact how individuals and groups perceive forgiveness, justice, and coexistence, influencing the success of reconciliation efforts ([Philpott 2012](#)). Additionally, religious groups frequently play influential roles as mediators or advocates for peace, helping to facilitate trust-building and dialogue ([Brounéus 2010](#)). Understanding the influence of religiosity in these contexts provides insights into broader social dynamics, offering a fuller picture of the factors that can either aid or hinder sustainable reconciliation efforts ([Haynes 2020](#)).

The Role of Political Tolerance

The influence of political tolerance on the nexus between religion and reconciliation has garnered scholarly attention. [Vogt \(2021\)](#) and [Kijewski and Rapp \(2019\)](#) have explored facets of political tolerance, such as intergroup forgiveness and interethnic religiosity. Notably, [Kalmoe and Mason \(2022\)](#) identified a positive association between political tolerance, support for compromise, and overall tolerance in the U.S., irrespective of religious ties. Such findings are echoed in studies from regions like Israel and Northern Ireland, suggesting that political tolerance can amplify the positive association between religiosity and reconciliation ([Bruce 2001](#); [Gopin 2002](#)).

Conversely, political intolerance can intensify religiosity's adverse implications for reconciliation. For instance, in Sri Lanka, religious intolerance hampers interfaith cooperation ([Kijewski and Rapp 2019](#)), while in Northern Ireland, sectarianism and political intolerance obstruct intergroup trust ([Hewstone et al. 2005, 2014](#)).

Interestingly, [Kalmoe and Mason \(2022\)](#) and [Feldman and Johnston \(2014\)](#) have found that higher religiosity or fundamentalism often coincided with lower political tolerance in the U.S. Despite these insights, comprehensive studies examining political tolerance's moderating role on the religion-reconciliation relationship, especially in Latin America, remain limited.

Theory

Our study aligns with this third trend in the literature by examining reconciliation within the context of a non-religious conflict. In conflicts like Colombia's, where violence is not directly motivated by religious objectives, religiosity nonetheless plays an influential role in shaping individuals' values, social norms, and perceptions of peace. As identified in prior research, reconciliation is important in post-conflict societies, acting both as a process and as a desired outcome ([Bloomfield 2012](#)). However, in non-religious conflicts, the dynamics of reconciliation can be particularly multifaceted, requiring an understanding of how secular and religious perspectives coexist and contribute to peacebuilding efforts. By exploring political tolerance as a moderating factor in these settings, our study contributes to the broader understanding of how religiosity influences reconciliation, even in conflicts without an explicitly religious dimension. It sheds light on how political tolerance can potentially shape and support reconciliation in societies moving away from violence.

Although the Colombian conflict is not inherently religious, religion has played a significant role in the dynamics of reconciliation, as certain sectors of the Church opposed the peace agreement. Segments of the Catholic Church and specific evangelical groups resisted the ratification of the 2016 peace accord. Drawing on traditional religious values, they rejected the gender provisions included in the agreement, associating ex-combatants with progressive gender ideologies. The perception that these provisions promoted a liberal agenda—one seen as contrary to the traditional religious values of Colombian society—led factions within both the Catholic Church and evangelical communities to mobilize against the agreement.

As previously mentioned, [Gibson \(2004\)](#) also revealed a negative correlation between the importance individuals attributed to religion in their lives and their willingness to reconcile with their counterparts, prompting a further examination of the role of religion in non-religious conflicts. [Clark \(2010\)](#) contends that while different religions uphold principles of forgiveness and non-violence, they may promote discourses that impede reconciliation or encourage violence against those deemed different or incorrect, particularly when their perceived social duty is threatened. Religious leaders often use their position to propagate these views, which are disseminated through social networks to increase their persuasive power and to influence social behaviour ([Manfredi et.al. 2024](#)).

Our argument highlights the potential negative influence of religion on reconciliation efforts. While religion may potentially promote forgiveness and reconciliation, the dogmatic nature of faith and the opposition of certain religious figures to

reconciliation efforts may hinder individuals with stronger religiosity from embracing reconciliation as a societal value (Hassner 2016). This is relevant in post-conflict scenarios where individuals previously involved in armed conflict transition back into society and try to reintegrate into legality. In such situations, religious leaders' opposition to the peace process may exacerbate existing tensions and hinder the progress of reconciliation efforts (Beltrán and Creely 2018).

However, despite the potential negative association between willingness to reconcile in contexts where several religious leaders are against those efforts, this tendency will be less visible in more politically tolerant individuals. Political tolerance can be defined as the willingness of individuals or groups to respect and accept the beliefs, opinions, and actions of others with whom they may disagree politically. It involves recognising and accepting the diversity of views and opinions within a society and allowing them to be expressed and acted upon without fear of retribution or persecution. Tolerance is a component of living with others, as it enables individuals to navigate and negotiate the differences that exist between them (Gibson and Bingham 1982). Without tolerance, people would be unable to coexist with those with different beliefs and opinions (Mun et al. 2021).

In societies polarised by armed conflicts, religiosity can often be manipulated to view the opposing side as so different that one cannot reconcile with them. However, political tolerance can moderate this association despite the potential negative role of leaders who oppose reconciliation efforts. Specifically, those religious individuals who follow their spiritual leaders but also embrace diversity and view differences as a source of strength are less likely to have decreased their willingness to reconcile with others, even if their religious leaders opposed reconciliation efforts. Ultimately, political tolerance plays a role in fostering individuals' willingness to reconcile in societies divided by conflict and where religiosity can be used to polarise people.¹ Drawing from the discussion above, we can put forward the following hypotheses:

H1: *Individuals with higher levels of religiosity are less likely to be willing to reconcile in conflict and post-conflict contexts.*

H2: *The negative association between religiosity and willingness to reconcile will be diminished when political tolerance increases.*

The Colombian Case

Colombia provides a compelling case for understanding the role of religion in reconciliation processes because it is a conflict without a religious basis. While the Colombian conflict was not religious in nature, religious dynamics nonetheless influenced the reconciliation process. Religious considerations in a secular conflict highlight how deeply held beliefs and institutions can shape attitudes toward peace and reconciliation, even where religion is not a primary conflict driver. Insights from Colombia thus underscore the broader relevance of religious influence in peacebuilding within secular conflicts.

Religious groups, especially Christian organizations, influenced the contentious climate surrounding the peace agreement by actively campaigning against it. This division was further heightened by the plebiscite in which Colombians narrowly rejected the agreement, with many citizens expressing concerns over FARC's reintegration, political role, and transitional justice provisions (Albarracín et al. 2023; Basset 2018; Caetano 2023; Pizarro-Leongómez 2017; Plata and Torres 2024). Analysts attributed the plebiscite's defeat of the "Yes" vote to factors such as "Uribismo"² influence, evangelical opposition, and challenges within the government's campaign (Botero 2017; Ortega 2018).

Our study examines the polarized voting patterns of Christian groups, who influenced public opinion in 2016. Many initially supported the Peace Agreement, but at later stages, certain factions voiced opposition, specifically objecting to progressive gender provisions in the accord. Evangelical groups advocated for changes such as the removal of gendered language and recognition of Christians as conflict victims (Ortega 2024; Semana 2016).

Data and Methods

Our data is sourced from the -LAPOP- surveys funded by Vanderbilt University. These surveys have been conducted since 2004 and have incorporated items in their questionnaire that facilitate the measurement of individuals' receptivity to reconciliation and acceptance, particularly following the peace process between the government of former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC. The datasets encompass a variety of questions, including the attitudes of respondents towards political participation of demobilised combatants, and whether respondents would agree to their children playing with the children of former combatants. This range of questions allows for the selection of indicators to measure individuals' willingness to reconcile in both social and political dimensions.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable under analysis in this study is the disposition to reconcile. This variable encompasses multiple domains that include distinct forms of accepting or rejecting the social and political reintegration of ex-combatants. We propose three proxies to operationalise and measure this phenomenon. The first proxy involves assessing the presence or absence of disposition to reconcile with FARC ex-combatants dichotomously. The remaining proxies aim to capture different levels of willingness to reconcile. The second proxy pertains to the level of disposition to extend the same political rights granted to other legally recognised parties within the political system to a potential party representing ex-combatants, as stipulated by the peace agreements. The third proxy entails assessing the extent of individuals' willingness to incorporate ex-combatants into their close-knit social circles, specifically by evaluating individuals'

openness to enabling their children to engage in social interactions and shared experiences with the children of ex-combatants (Meernik et al. 2023).

The first proxy uses a question that investigates individuals' beliefs in the likelihood of reconciliation between victims and FARC ex-combatants. This question, "Is forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC possible for citizens affected by the FARC?" (colpaz6a)³ employs a dichotomous scale, which limits respondents to provide either a positive or negative responses.

Scholars such as Oettler and Rettberg (2019) argue that this question's primary limitation is its restriction of respondents' answers within a dichotomous framework, which overlooks the multifaceted nature of reconciliation. Furthermore, the question primarily focuses on assessing individuals' perceptions of these concepts rather than establishing a comprehensive understanding of reconciliation as a single construct.

Despite these criticisms' validity, including this variable in the research design offers two advantages. Firstly, by incorporating other variables to measure individuals' willingness to reconcile, we can examine whether the predictors' direction, magnitude, and significance remain consistent across different models. This approach strengthens our findings' robustness and enhances the research outcomes' reliability. Secondly, it provides evidence that, despite varying interpretations of reconciliation, individuals tend to employ heuristics that facilitate the formation of congruent positions regarding their willingness to reconcile. This supports the notion that despite the complexity of the reconciliation process, individuals can form coherent perspectives on their disposition to reconcile (Casas et al. 2020; Theidon 2006; Villa-Gómez et al. 2023).

Consistent with the theoretical framework this study adopts a comprehensive perspective on willingness to reconcile, acknowledging it as a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing both social and political dimensions. Specifically, individuals' willingness to reconcile entails their willingness to integrate former ex-combatants' into their inner social circles and accept their participation in political activities. By embracing this understanding, the study recognises the interplay between social integration and political integration of ex-combatants, emphasising the interconnectedness of these aspects within the broader context of reconciliation.

The rationale behind selecting these proxies will be explained further in subsequent sections. However, using two measures to assess individuals' willingness to reconcile raises a potential concern—namely, measuring a similar phenomenon through different proxies. Consequently, it becomes imperative to empirically establish the distinct nature of these two aspects of willingness to reconcile. A Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.37, significant at a 99 % confidence level, reveals a weak but positive relationship between the two measures. This indicates that these proxies offer a differentiated approach to capturing individuals' willingness to reconcile, providing complementary insights into the multifaceted concept.

In line with the considerations above, the subsequent two proxies were employed to measure the social and political aspects of individuals' disposition to reconcile. The social aspect was assessed by asking, "Would you approve or disapprove of the

following situation - that your son or daughter befriended a demobilised FARC member?" (colrecon6). Respondents were requested to indicate their level of approval on a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 denoted the highest disapproval, and 10 represented complete approval. This question aimed to gauge individuals' willingness to establish family connections with former combatants, which may indicate a stronger inclination towards reconciliation. In addition, to capture the political dimension of willingness to reconcile, the question "Do you believe that former FARC members' parties should have the same rights as other political parties?" (colpact11) was employed. Respondents were required to rate their level of agreement on a scale of 1–10, with 1 indicating minimal approval of political equality and 10 signifying acceptance of the FARC's entitlement to a political party possessing the same rights as other parties. By employing these specific questions, the study seeks to evaluate individuals' willingness to reconcile in both social and political dimensions. The scales employed enable a fine-grain analysis of respondents' religiosity, as shown in [Table 1](#).

Measurement of Religiosity: Tools and Approaches

This study operationalizes religiosity as the perceived significance of religion, the regularity of worship practices, and active membership within organised religious communities. Three proxies were employed as indicators to evaluate religiosity. Firstly, the importance of religion in individuals' lives was assessed. Respondents were asked to indicate the level of importance of religion in their personal lives. Secondly, the frequency of attendance at religious worship. This question aimed to gauge the regularity with which individuals participate in religious services or engage in religious rituals. Additionally, belonging to an organised religion was included as another proxy. This indicator sought to determine whether individuals identified themselves as members of a specific religious organisation.

To measure the first variable, namely the assessment of the importance of religion in individuals' lives, the question "How important is religion in your life" (q5b) was employed. The responses were categorised into four options: (1) "Very important," (2) "Somewhat important," (3) "Not very important," and (4) "Not important at all." To enhance the interpretability of these values, the variable's order was reversed. Thus, a value of four denoted a higher level of importance of religion, while a value of one indicated a lower level of importance. One characteristic of this variable is its asymmetrical distribution, as a significant portion of the sample assigns considerable importance to religion. Consequently, it was deemed necessary to recode this variable into three distinct categories representing varying levels of self-perceived importance of religion. These categories were as follows: "1" for individuals who attributed no importance to religion, "2" for those who assigned moderate importance, and "3" for individuals who regarded religion as central in their lives. The category of individuals who did not attribute any importance to religion was used as the reference category in the estimated models.

Table 1. Willingness to Reconcile Across Micro, Meso, and Macro Contexts by Analytical Domains.

Level	Analysis Domain	Type of Willingness	Question	Utility in Studying Reconciliation
Micro	Establishing close-knit social circles and connections with former combatants	Social willingness	Would you approve or disapprove of the following situation: That your son or daughter befriended a demobilised FARC member?	This metric assesses individuals' willingness to form closer ties with ex-combatants.
Meso	Acceptance of the right of the FARC to have a political party with the same rights as other parties	Political willingness	Do you believe former FARC members' parties should have the same rights as other political parties?	This metric gauge the acceptance of ex-FARC members' political participation and their right to form parties.
Macro	Support for reconciliation policy and the possibility of reconciliation	Willingness to reconcile between FARC and their victims	Is forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC possible for citizens affected by the FARC?	This measure assesses the public's belief in forgiveness and reconciliation between victims and the FARC.

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Secondly, the question “Do you attend meetings of a religious organisation?” (cp6) was used as another indicator. Similarly, the values of this question were inverted, such that a response of 0 represented individuals who never attended religious services, while a response of 4 indicated daily attendance. It is important to note that there is an analytical distinction between this variable and the previous one, as individuals may attribute importance to religion but not actively participate in religious rituals. This variable, therefore, has the potential to capture a deeper level of religiosity and engagement with the ideas espoused by religious leaders. Thirdly, the proxy of belonging to a religion was employed to assess individuals' religiosity towards religious affiliation, particularly emphasising Catholic and Evangelical membership and non-religious individuals. The question regarding the individual's religious affiliation (q3c) was used to construct this proxy related to religious affiliation. This question encompassed eight religious' categories, some of which had limited observations. To ensure an adequate sample size for analysis, the two organised religions with the largest number of practitioners, namely Catholics, Evangelicals, Pentecostal, and Protestants

(including various Protestant groups), were selected as distinct categories. Subsequently, the remaining religious groups were amalgamated into an additional category. Notably, this “other” category was included in the analyses presented in the article; however, its results were not analysed due to the diversity and heterogeneity of doctrines encompassed within this category. Additionally, individuals with beliefs in a higher entity but without specific religious affiliation, as well as agnostics and atheists, were collectively classified as “non-religious”. Despite their inherent differences, these groups are linked by an absence of structured religious practices and leadership. This categorization was employed as a reference category.

Political Tolerance as Moderator

The foundation of political coexistence rests on accepting the presence of diverse viewpoints (Dowd 2016; Sartori 1980). To understand how religiosity influences individuals’ willingness to engage in reconciliation, we examine political tolerance as a moderating factor. Previous studies highlight the essential role of tolerance in shaping the social expression of individual beliefs, including religious ones (Bruce 2001; Gopin 2002; Kalmoe and Mason 2022). By setting up political tolerance as the moderator, we aim to capture how increased tolerance may enable religious individuals to support reconciliation efforts more readily. Research further suggests that political tolerance often conditions how beliefs impact attitudes toward others (Hewstone et al. 2014; Kijewski and Rapp 2019), making it a valuable perspective for examining reconciliation in post-conflict contexts. By focusing on political tolerance as the moderating factor, we seek to clarify the conditions under which religiosity influences individuals’ willingness to reconcile.

Four indicators were utilised to assess political tolerance among individuals. These indicators include “approval of the right to vote for those who criticise the form of government” (d1), “approval of the right to protest for those who criticise the form of government” (d2), “approval of the right to run for office for those who criticise the form of government” (d3), and “approval of the right to express one’s opinion for those who criticise the form of government” (d4).

These four questions, though distinct, specifically address individuals’ tolerance toward those with different political perspectives and actions. After selecting these indicators, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to assess the reliability of combining them into a single scale measuring “political tolerance.” The resulting coefficient ($\alpha = .85$) confirmed the scale’s reliability in the models presented (Ponterotto and Ruckdeschel 2007). This analysis examines the moderating role of political tolerance on the relationship between religiosity and willingness to reconcile. Rather than establishing a causal link, moderation allows observing the conditions under which this effect occurs, in order to reveal whether political tolerance strengthens, weakens, or reverses this relationship (see Appendix 1 for the correlation matrix, showing a moderate distinction between political tolerance and willingness to reconcile, $r = .29^{***}$).

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Reconciliation disposition	3,730	.508	.5	0	1
Ex-combatants social	3,840	4.341	3.048	1	10
Ex-combatants participation	4,617	3.201	2.794	1	10
Religious importance	4,692	1.63	.567	0	2
Religious attendance	4,713	2.412	1.297	1	4
Political tolerance	4,674	5.21	2.265	1	10
Women	4,722	1.499		1	2
Education	4,693	9.802	4.225	0	18
Age	4,720	39.323	15.654	18	90
Income	4,141	1.951	.824	1	3
Ideology	4,288	5.676	2.647	1	10
Trust in government	4,681	3.472	2.053	1	7

Source: Authors' elaboration.

This study included control variables for education, income, gender, and urban/rural status. Existing research, such as that conducted by [Oettler and Rettberg \(2019, 340\)](#) has demonstrated a positive relationship between higher education, income, and individuals' disposition to reconcile. Moreover, studies by [Casas et al. \(2020\)](#) have found that women exhibit a lower willingness to reconcile than men. Additionally, self-reported ideology serves as another control variable, given that in Colombia, support for the peace process and implementation of peace agreements have been a pivotal point of contention between left-wing and right-wing sectors ([Garbiras-Díaz et al 2023](#); [López-López et al. 2020](#); [Matanock and García-Sánchez 2017](#)). The inclusion of this variable aims to account for the ideological positions that influence individuals' religiosity towards reconciliation. Lastly, trust in the government is considered a control variable. Previous studies, such as [Casas et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Petrova and Rosvold \(2024\)](#), have shown that individuals with higher levels of trust in the national government are more willing to coexist with former combatants of the former FARC-EP and more likely to accept their party's participation in electoral politics. The descriptive statistics for the variables described above are the following ([Table 2](#)).

To address temporal variations and potential confounding factors, the analysis controlled for each year - 2014, 2016, and 2018 - in the estimated models, with 2014 as the reference category. This approach helps minimise the influence of unobserved temporal factors. Although the purpose of the article is not to include an analysis over time, we include data before the plebiscite (2014) and after the plebiscite (2018) as a way to address the dynamic nature of perceptions. For instance, in 2014, church factions were already sending messages to their congregations regarding the importance of protecting society against gender provisions, while some public figures, such

Table 3. Logistic and Linear Multiples Models of Willingness Towards Reconciliation.⁴

	Model 1	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Reconciliation Willingness	Reconciliation	Reconciliation Odds ratio ⁵	Social Willingness	Political Willingness
Religious Importance				
Medium	−0.663*** (0.237)	.5153789 (0.1220361)	−0.669* (0.358)	−0.613** (0.288)
High	−0.666*** (0.239)	.5139338 (0.1227266)	−0.961** (0.379)	−0.838*** (0.287)
Religious attendance				
Once or twice a year	0.426*** (0.128)	1.531631 (0.1954022)	0.414** (0.193)	0.0576 (0.145)
Once or twice a month	0.391*** (0.116)	1.478469 (0.1722197)	−0.0503 (0.150)	0.0842 (0.135)
Once a week	0.331*** (0.101)	1.391997 (0.1408057)	0.0312 (0.144)	−0.00386 (0.113)
Religion				
Catholics	−0.0446 (0.148)	.9563742 (0.1413289)	−0.732*** (0.231)	−0.562*** (0.178)
Protestants	0.305 (0.216)	1.356606 (0.2926651)	−0.321 (0.311)	−0.523** (0.261)
Evangelicals, and pentecostals	0.206 (0.200)	1.228751 (0.245775)	−0.741** (0.291)	−0.823*** (0.232)
Others	−0.0472 (0.221)	.9539203 (0.2111375)	−0.779** (0.318)	−0.528* (0.272)
Political tolerance	0.0491*** (0.0173)	1.050294 (0.0182218)	0.228*** (0.0297)	0.330*** (0.0268)
Female	−0.503*** (0.0812)	.6047302 (0.0491191)	−0.414*** (0.105)	−0.745*** (0.100)
Education	0.0315*** (0.0118)	1.032041 (0.012187)	0.0799*** (0.0162)	0.0525*** (0.0143)
Age	0.00854*** (0.00294)	1.008578 (0.002963)	−0.00443 (0.00427)	0.0216*** (0.00305)
Income	−0.0215** (0.0102)	.9787628 (0.009967)	0.0408*** (0.0129)	−0.0101 (0.0124)
Ideology	−0.0266* (0.0158)	.9737332 (0.0153516)	−0.0554** (0.0236)	−0.0856*** (0.0178)
Trust in the government	0.169*** (0.0206)	1.183607 (0.0243434)	0.0248 (0.0290)	0.134*** (0.0240)
2016	0.109 (0.111)	1.11567 (0.1242155)	1.069*** (0.174)	−0.0987 (0.148)

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

	Model 1	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Reconciliation Willingness	Reconciliation	Reconciliation Odds ratio ⁵	Social Willingness	Political Willingness
2018	−0.166 (0.132)	.8470877 (0.1117553)	0.0566 (0.134)	−0.533*** (0.142)
Constant	−0.433 (0.309)	.6484734 (0.2005089)	3.854*** (0.463)	2.085*** (0.398)
Observations	2,897	2,897	2,989	3,595
R-squared			0.124	0.136

Standard errors in parentheses.
****p* < .01, ***p* < .05, **p* < .1.
Source: Authors' elaboration.

as the Attorney General, opposed those provisions even before 2016. We are also interested in controlling for trends that occurred after citizens rejected the plebiscite, which is the reason why we include data for the year 2018.

Data Analysis

To present evidence regarding the association between religiosity and individuals' willingness to reconcile, logistic models were employed to estimate the dichotomous measurement of citizens' self-perception of reconciliation. In parallel, linear regression models were used to estimate individuals' willingness to reconcile socially and politically. These estimations facilitated the provision of supporting evidence for hypothesis 1. Additionally, interaction terms were incorporated into the models to examine the conditional relationships between political tolerance, individuals' religiosity, and the type of religion, as stated in hypothesis 2 (Table 3).

Regarding general willingness to reconcile, individuals who assigned religion medium or high importance in their lives showed lower scores in willingness to reconcile, with coefficients of −0.663 and −0.666, respectively. Concerning religious attendance, those attending services once or twice a year showed greater willingness to reconcile with a coefficient of 0.426. In terms of religious affiliation, Catholics demonstrate a slightly lower tendency toward reconciliation compared to agnostics and atheists, though the difference is not statistically significant. Conversely, political tolerance displayed a positive influence with a coefficient of 0.0491, suggesting that those with higher political tolerance possess an increased willingness to reconcile. The findings present an analytical puzzle: while deeper religious importance was associated with lower willingness to reconcile, frequent religious attendance promotes an increase in it. One possible explanation for this might be that strong religious beliefs can pose barriers to willingness to reconcile, but active group participation in religious practices

is associated with higher scores in education in religious principles, fostering understanding and facilitating willingness to reconcile.

In the social dimension (Model 2), religious importance once again revealed a negative association with willingness to reconcile. Those deeming religion medium or high importance exhibited coefficients of -0.669 and -0.961 , respectively. Observing religious attendance, individuals attending religious services once or twice a year exhibited higher willingness to reconcile, with a coefficient of 0.414 . In terms of religious affiliation, Catholics, Evangelicals, and Pentecostals show an association with a decreased inclination towards reconciliation in this context, with coefficients of -0.732 and -0.741 , respectively. Political tolerance maintained positive association with higher willingness to reconcile with a coefficient of 0.228 .

From a political perspective (Model 3), religious importance is associated negatively with willingness to reconcile, with coefficients of -0.613 and -0.838 for those deeming religion as medium or high importance, respectively. Concerning religious attendance, no significant effect was observed across categories. With regard to religious affiliation, Catholics, Protestants, and Evangelicals and Pentecostals indicated decreased willingness to reconcile, with coefficients of -0.562 , -0.523 , and -0.823 respectively. In this model, political tolerance presented the highest coefficient among the three, with a value of 0.330 .

Based on these findings, there is consistent evidence supporting hypothesis H1: Individuals who ascribe more importance to religion in their lives tend to be less inclined to demonstrate a willingness to reconcile.

Across the three models—addressing willingness to reconcile, social willingness to reconcile, and political willingness to reconcile—political tolerance consistently emerged as a significant predictor. The analysis indicates that as individuals display increased political tolerance, they also show higher willingness to reconcile with ex-combatants. In other words, those with higher tolerance are more open to a range of perspectives and potentially more disposed to reconcile.

Control variables provide a granular view of the landscape. For instance, gender dynamics followed a familiar trend. Throughout all models, being female was consistently linked with a reduced willingness to reconcile. With regards to education, an increase in education was consistently related positively to willingness to reconcile across the models.

Age exhibited a complex pattern. While no notable differences were observed in social willingness to reconcile, older individuals showed a greater inclination towards political reconciliation. This distinction might be attributed to the older generation's extended engagement with the repercussions of conflict or their aspiration for reconciliation. Income's influence was somewhat subtle. In the context of social willingness to reconcile, a clear positive relationship between income and the willingness to reconcile was observed. However, its importance diminished in the political willingness framework, indicating the role economic factors might play in these settings. Ideological beliefs were more consistent. Higher values in this measure, which indicate




Figure 1. Logistic Regression - Willingness to reconcile. Source: Authors' elaboration.

a greater identification with right-wing beliefs, were inversely related to willingness to reconcile. These findings are consistent with prior research in the field.

Lastly, trust in the government displayed an effect across the models. A heightened trust in governmental institutions was positively associated with willingness to reconcile. This relationship emphasizes the role institutions might play in moulding public sentiments, suggesting that when citizens trust their governing bodies, they might be more inclined to embrace reconciliation endeavours.

When examining the differences and similarities among the three models (Models 1, 2, and 3) that investigate willingness to reconcile in various contexts (general, political, and social), we can identify patterns that support hypothesis H1: Individuals with higher levels of religiosity are less likely to be willing to reconcile in conflict and post-conflict contexts. A negative association between religious importance and willingness to reconcile was found in all three models. In Model 1, each decrease in religious importance corresponded to a 48.6 percent decrease in the odds of reconciliation. This suggests that individuals with higher religiosity tend to be less willing to reconcile in general.

Additionally, individuals identifying as agnostic or non-believers demonstrated a significantly higher propensity for both forms of reconciliation. This disparity remains

Table 4. Moderation of Political Tolerance on the Role of Religiosity on the Willingness to Reconcile.

Willingness Reconciliation	Reconciliation		Reconciliation		Social Willingness		Social Willingness		Political Willingness	
Interaction	R ² PT	RA ² PT	R ² PT	RA ² PT	R ² PT	RA ² PT	R ² PT	RA ² PT	R ² PT	RA ² PT
Religious attendance										
1b. Never#c.PoliticalTolerance		0 (0)					0 (0)		0 (0)	
2. Once or twice a Year#c.PoliticalTolerance		-0.0539 (0.0620)					-0.110 (0.0834)		-0.260** (0.102)	
3. Once or twice a Month#c.PoliticalTolerance		0.00469 (0.0487)					-0.0702 (0.0726)		-0.201*** (0.0726)	
4. Once a week #c.PoliticalTolerance		-0.00490					-0.0106		-0.116*	
Religious importance (RI)										
0b. Low#c.PoliticalTolerance	0 (0)		0 (0)						0 (0)	
1. Medium #c.PoliticalTolerance	-0.154* (0.0842)		-0.0528 (0.0945)				-0.202* (0.113)		-0.374*** (0.105)	
2. High#c.PoliticalTolerance	-0.145* (0.0800)		-0.250*** (0.0933)							
0b. Atheists and agnostics#c.PoliticalTolerance			0 (0)				0 (0)		0 (0)	
1. Catholics#c.PoliticalTolerance			-0.0932* (0.0563)				-0.246*** (0.0699)		-0.362*** (0.0720)	
2. Protestants#c.PoliticalTolerance			-0.0403 (0.0891)				-0.126 (0.128)		-0.326*** (0.133)	
3. Evangelicals, and pentecostals #c.PoliticalTolerance			0.0142 (0.0888)				-0.224*** (0.102)		-0.410*** (0.135)	
4. Others#c.PoliticalTolerance			-0.0422 (0.103)				-0.256* (0.139)		-0.321* (0.166)	
Constant	-1.276** (0.586)	-0.467 (0.340)	-0.907* (0.468)		1.017* (0.563)	1.931*** (0.400)	0.728 (0.505)	1.930** (0.786)	3.266*** (0.490)	1.726*** (0.628)
Observations	2897	2897	2897		3595	3595	3595	2989	2989	2989
R-squared					0.142	0.137	0.140	0.130	0.128	0.131

Standard errors in parentheses
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.
Source: Authors' elaboration.

statistically significant across diverse demographic groups, as visually depicted in [Figure 1](#). Conversely, evangelical and Pentecostal Christians exhibited comparatively lower levels of disposition towards social and political reconciliation, followed by individuals identifying as Catholics.

After identifying the relationship between religiosity and willingness to reconcile, the second hypothesis of this article delves into the influence of higher or lower levels of political tolerance on the connection between the importance individuals place on religion and their willingness to reconcile. Multiple logistic and linear models were utilised to incorporate these interactions while controlling for the factors mentioned above. The resulting coefficients from these models are presented in [Table 4](#). This section organises the interactions around the three religiosities assessed in this article and their interaction with political tolerance. The interaction among different religious affiliations is presented in the first part, followed by the second part focusing on the importance individuals attribute to religion and the attendance of religious events.

Upon examining the interactions between religious affiliation and political tolerance, interactions emerge in social and political willingness towards reconciliation. The findings consistently demonstrate significant interactions across all models, with confidence levels ranging from 90 to 95 percent. Additionally, it is worth noting that participation in religious events only exhibits significance in fostering social willingness to reconcile ([Figure 2](#)).

The predicted values are graphically represented to explore the associations between political tolerance, religious importance, religious attendance, and reconciliation attitudes. Rather than relying solely on fixed categories—such as grouping individuals by religious affiliation—this approach examines variations within those groups. It acknowledges that individuals who share the same religious identity may differ in their levels of political tolerance and religious commitment, which are associated with differences in their willingness to reconcile. By analysing these factors along a continuous scale rather than through rigid classifications, we capture subtle patterns that categorical comparisons might obscure. To provide a clearer representation of these associations, the graphs include 95 percent confidence intervals, represented as dotted lines, which help assess the reliability of the observed trends and support the evaluation of hypothesis two.

In the interaction graphs presented in [Figure 3](#), a clear pattern emerges, corroborating the findings reported in [Table 5](#), that political tolerance positively affects willingness of individuals from diverse religious affiliations to support reconciliation efforts. However, the confidence intervals indicate that this difference fails to attain a significance level of 90 percent. Conversely, a significant association between political tolerance and social and political disposition towards reconciliation is evident.

Notably, atheists or agnostics demonstrate a more pronounced influence of political tolerance on their disposition for reconciliation. This is exemplified by individuals exhibiting higher levels of political tolerance and atheistic or agnostic beliefs display the greatest predisposition towards reconciliation among all examined religious groups. A similar tendency is observed among Catholics and Pentecostal Protestants, who




Figure 2. OLS Regression - Willingness to reconcile. Source: Authors' elaboration.

exhibit comparatively lower willingness to reconcile, albeit with a smaller. Notably, among atheists and agnostics, a stronger association is observed between political tolerance and reconciliation attitudes. Individuals in this group who report higher levels of political tolerance also tend to express a greater predisposition toward reconciliation compared to other religious groups. A similar pattern emerges among Catholics and Pentecostal Protestants, who generally report lower willingness to reconcile, though the association with political tolerance appears less pronounced. Size than the other groups examined. Additionally, it is worth noting that the role of political tolerance appears to be more pronounced in the political disposition towards reconciliation than in the social dimension. This distinction may be attributed to political tolerance, which primarily emphasises accepting others within the political sphere while not necessarily extending to interpersonal acceptance in individuals' daily social interactions. Despite agnostics and atheists manifesting the highest levels of disposition for reconciliation, their lack of tolerance is associated with the lowest levels of social and political willingness to reconcile. This implies that religious affiliation, even to a modest extent, attenuates the staunch rejection of reconciliation among individuals characterised by lower tolerance levels.




Figure 3. Predicted probability of willingness to reconcile with the FARC among individuals with different religious affiliations and varying levels of political tolerance. Source: Authors' elaboration.

Figure 4 illustrates how political tolerance influences religious importance on different dispositions towards reconciliation. Regarding the disposition to reconcile, democratic tolerance positively increases the willingness to reconcile among agnostic and atheist individuals, unlike groups that attribute some or high importance to religion, as their disposition towards reconciliation remains unchanged regardless of their tolerance levels. These differences are statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence level.

Based on the findings presented in Table 5 and the analysis of the interaction effects, hypothesis (H2) can be supported. The results indicate that the negative association between religiosity and willingness to reconcile is diminished when political tolerance increases. This is evident in the significant interactions observed across all models, particularly regarding social and political disposition towards reconciliation. The graphs and predicted probabilities further illustrate this pattern, demonstrating that individuals with higher levels of political tolerance, regardless of their religious affiliation or their importance to religion, are more willing to reconcile.




Figure 4. Predicted probability of willingness to reconcile with FARC ex-combatants among individuals with different categories of religious importance and varying levels of political tolerance. Source: Authors' elaboration.

Furthermore, the findings suggest that religious affiliation, even to a modest extent, attenuates the staunch rejection of reconciliation among individuals characterised by lower tolerance levels. To summarise the results, provide evidence to support the hypothesis that the negative association between religiosity and willingness to reconcile is diminished when political tolerance increases. The observed interaction effects highlight the importance of considering religious and political factors in understanding individuals' disposition towards reconciliation.

Conclusion

This study identifies a negative association between religiosity and willingness to reconcile in a post-conflict setting without an explicit religious dimension. While the literature has extensively documented the ambivalent role of religion in reconciliation processes within conflicts where religious identity is a central factor (Appleby 2000;

Svensson 2007; Hassner 2016), our findings suggest that religiosity also shapes attitudes toward peace in contexts where religion was not a primary driver of violence. Specifically, individuals with higher levels of religiosity tend to exhibit lower willingness to reconcile, both socially and politically, indicating that religious frameworks may reinforce normative barriers that hinder the acceptance of former combatants in societies fragmented by violence (Gopin 2002; Philpott 2012).

However, our results also indicate that political tolerance is positively associated with willingness to reconcile and appears to moderate the relationship between religiosity and openness toward ex-combatants. In line with studies that emphasize the role of political openness and pluralism in reducing polarization (Gibson 2004; Kalmoe and Mason 2022), we find that political tolerance mitigates the negative association between religiosity and willingness to reconcile. This suggests that commitment to democratic principles may help counteract certain exclusivist tendencies associated with religious belief. However, this relationship is not uniform across dimensions of reconciliation: while political tolerance appears to play a crucial role in fostering social reconciliation, other factors—such as institutional trust and ideological alignment—may shape willingness to reconcile in the political domain (Casas et al. 2020; Hewstone et al. 2014).

It is important to acknowledge the methodological limitations of this study. Willingness to reconcile was assessed through single-item measures in the LAPOP survey. While such an approach is common in large-scale surveys to minimize respondent burden, it may not fully capture the complexity of reconciliation as a multidimensional process. Reconciliation involves not only explicit attitudes toward peace but also perceptions of justice, memory, and the legitimacy of former adversaries (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004; Brett et al. 2024). Future research could enhance measurement reliability by employing multi-item scales and expanding analytical instruments as data availability allows.

Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of our study prevents us from examining how these associations evolve over time. The literature highlights that willingness to reconcile is not static but rather shaped by shifting political discourses, collective memory, and the actions of key social actors (Haynes 2020; Longman 2010). Longitudinal studies would provide valuable insights into whether the relationship between religiosity, political tolerance, and reconciliation remains stable or fluctuates in response to changing political and social conditions.

Another avenue for future research is a deeper exploration of the role of religious leadership and theological discourse in shaping attitudes toward reconciliation. Previous studies have shown that religious leaders can act as both facilitators and obstacles to reconciliation, depending on how they frame transitional justice and the reintegration of ex-combatants (Beltrán and Creely 2018; Gusnet et al. 2017). Further investigation into how religious narratives interact with political tolerance—and how different theological frameworks shape believers' attitudes—could yield critical insights into the conditions under which religion contributes to, or detracts from, reconciliation efforts.

From a theoretical standpoint, this study advances the debate on the relationship between religiosity and reconciliation by highlighting the importance of political tolerance as a moderating variable. While previous literature has emphasized that religion can reinforce exclusionary narratives and intergroup resistance (Gurses and Ozturk 2020; Juergensmeyer 2000), our findings suggest that these effects are not deterministic but rather contingent upon individuals' levels of political tolerance. This supports the notion that religion should not be conceptualized as a monolithic force in reconciliation processes but rather as a contested space where multiple actors shape interpretations of forgiveness, justice, and the legitimacy of adversaries (Gopin 2002; Philpott 2012).

Ultimately, our findings underscore that willingness to reconcile is a dynamic phenomenon shaped not only by structural and institutional factors but also by individual beliefs, values, and normative orientations toward former adversaries. While religiosity may reinforce distinctions that hinder reconciliation, political tolerance provides a counterbalance, attenuating these barriers. At a time when political polarization and the instrumentalization of religion shape peace processes worldwide, understanding the forces that foster or obstruct reconciliation is not merely an academic pursuit—it is essential for building more just, inclusive, and sustainable post-conflict societies (Gopin 2002; Philpott 2012) and for preventing the resurgence of extreme violence (Badillo-Sarmiento and Trejos-Rosero 2025).

If reconciliation is the bridge between past conflict and a shared future, political tolerance is its foundation. Without it, peace remains structurally fragile, susceptible to the same exclusionary logics that have historically undermined post-conflict transitions. As prior research has shown, peace agreements alone cannot transform post-conflict societies; broader cultural and political shifts are necessary to achieve meaningful and lasting reconciliation (Gibson 2004; Hewstone et al. 2014). Understanding these dynamics is therefore essential not only for advancing reconciliation scholarship but also for shaping policies that foster lasting peace and a shared future in deeply divided societies.

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Data Availability Statement

The data and replication materials that support the findings of this study are openly available at Figshare: <https://figshare.com/s/93b45973153992a78ddb>. These include the dataset, Stata do-files, recoding scripts, and a detailed explanation to reproduce the results.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. We argue that tolerance plays a moderating role in the impact of religion. While it is possible that religion can also moderate tolerance, we chose to focus on the body of research that examines the relationship between political tolerance and religion as our starting point (Eisenstein 2006; Gouws and du Plessis 2000). From there, we can explore what factors may moderate this relationship. Future research could investigate how tolerance might influence the effects of religion.
2. The term “uribismo” was used to refer to the political group of former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, who held the presidency from 2002 to 2010. This group is right-wing and is currently represented by the political party Centro Democrático.
3. Both the willingness to forgive and reconcile are indicators showing individuals’ readiness to establish relationships with former combatants. The question inquiries about the possibility of forgiving and reconciling with members of the FARC. Our analysis focuses on individuals’ willingness to reconcile, which allows us to specifically observe this disposition based on its presence or absence. This makes it an analytically relevant proxy. Therefore, we consider it to be one of the best questions available in existing data in post-conflict countries for measuring the relationship between reconciliation readiness and religious commitment, despite addressing forgiveness and reconciliation within the same question.
4. In the ordinal polytomous variables, the lowest level on the measurement scale was used as the reference category to see its changes as levels. In the case of the nominal polytomous variable

religions, people with no religion were used as the reference category. These conventions are used in all the models estimated in this paper.

5. Unlike odds ratios of 0–1, odds ratios are determined from the odds of probability and vary between 0 and infinity. This is a useful and intuitive way to interpret logistic regression results, as it quantifies the strength of the association between two variables.

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