

RESEARCH PAPER



Somalia in the Horn of Africa – Many Moving Parts

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PeaceRep Somalia research aims to deepen the understanding of the country's fragmented predicament, ten years after the establishment of the Federal government and in light of the continued pervasiveness of conflict and political instability, both domestically and regionally. Our research themes include: sub-national governance through checkpoints; justice and security in Somalia; building on the Galkayo 'local' agreement; emergent conflict and peace dynamics across the Somali regions (Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya). The programme will continue to analyse and engage stakeholders around peacebuilding processes and in relation to events that unfold in real time.

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Executive Summary

- ▶ The Horn of Africa remains embroiled in a series of interacting events that are raising alarm bells in many quarters, in a region where conflict and violence has already been considerable. This paper focuses on Somalia as an 'extraverted' state; it is both heavily influenced by external events and its elites are well practiced in instrumentalizing such events for domestic purposes.
- ▶ Regional tensions involving Somalia have been catalysed by the signing of an MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland that purports to recognize Somaliland in exchange for improved access to the sea. Djibouti's offer to Ethiopia of shared management of its second port followed several months later. Egypt has engaged more seriously in Somalia than it has done for many years; a reverberation of the conflict in Gaza, where Arab/Muslim states appear impotent and where Western powers are perceived as biased. It also reflects ongoing Ethiopia-Egypt tension around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), as well as the threat that a future Ethiopian naval capacity implies for control of traffic (and revenue) through the Suez Canal.
- ▶ These developments reflect an intensification of uncertainty in the Horn of Africa, and while most visible at the inter-state level, also play out at the ethnic and clan levels, in a context where politicised ethnic/clan identities intersect with state power. In the case of the Somali territories – including regions of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, as well as Somalia (and Somaliland) – a number of clans have a transborder presence providing an added political salience. Political elites across these territories are exploring options and positioning themselves accordingly.
- ▶ Under the Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 'Farmajo' presidency, tensions in the Gulf and between Somalia and Kenya strongly influenced centre-periphery (FGS-FMS) relations, and were clearly manifest in the 2018-2020 sub-national elections. Under the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) presidency, Egypt and Ethiopia are becoming the primary protagonists. Underlying patterns remain the same.

- ▶ Somalia has seen considerable violence in the last two years as a result of the Las Anod conflict and the 'Macawisley'/Government offensive against Al Shabaab. This has resulted in an arms race amongst many clans. The potential for Somalia to become embroiled in a regional war, or to have a proxy war fought within its own territories, should however be assessed with great caution. Playing up the possibility of war suits the interests of many political entrepreneurs and downplays some stabilizing influences.
- ▶ In interpreting the current political climate and direction, it is useful to consider four key factors in Somalia's political marketplace and political economy: (1) the competitive and decentralised nature of Somalia's political market; (2) the salience of clan identity; (3) the pervasive use of money and violence; and (4) the unpredictable nature of the political marketplace due to its multiple levels.

Introduction

This paper brings together a number of analyses and studies conducted under PeaceRep Somalia (LSE).¹ This work builds on analyses conducted under its predecessor, the Conflict Research Programme (2018-21).² Much of this analysis is framed by the political marketplace, a framework and lens with which to analyse the political economy of violence in turbulent societies, and to inform policy interventions. It is an alternative to approaches which focus narrowly on the role of economic 'drivers of conflict' as well as to explanations of conflict based on formal institutional dynamics. In this report, the term 'political marketplace' implies that political and economic conduct are under-determined by formal institutions and politics is highly personalized. Cooperation and allegiance are instead exchanged via transactional politics, which includes the use of both targeted violence and material incentives.

A point of focus for this paper is regional instability across the Horn of Africa and, by extension, the Red Sea Arena. Somalia is considered an outward looking – or extraverted – state, where business-political elites look to instrumentalise external sources of revenue/rent for domestic political and financial advantage. This logic has a several-decade-long history and continues today in different forms. Somalia today retains considerable interest for a variety of foreign powers – neighbouring States, Gulf countries, Egypt, Turkey and Western interests – where countering terrorism and migration, maritime competition, expanding trade and market opportunities, and supporting humanitarian action inform and shape the financial and coercive political environment.

Today, the wider Red Sea Arena is described by Alex de Waal as a context in which geopolitical tensions are playing out and where the Horn of Africa (HoA) is a vulnerable 'shatter zone' of intersecting fracture lines where many populations are already under severe humanitarian stress.³ In the HoA, tensions and conflict have been considerable within the last four years and have moved into the Somali territories. The highly controversial MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland and heightened tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia are all manifest in Somalia. These tensions can be both productive and destructive.

The purpose of this paper is to provide some insights into both new developments and underlying patterns, utilizing the political marketplace as the analytical framework. The political market in Somalia has multiple levels and is very difficult to predict, where drivers of conflict and political instability operate at four levels – international, regional (transboundary), national, and local. Each of these levels is related to the others but also possesses a high degree of independent energy. This means that political changes at any one level may affect others in unpredictable ways.

The Regional Scene

On 1 January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an MoU purporting to trade improved maritime access (including a naval base) for Ethiopia with international recognition for Somaliland, although the exact details of how this would work remain unclear.⁴ This agreement took place somewhat out of the blue, when Mogadishu and Hargeisa had just been in talks around their own respective political disputes vis-à-vis the continued de facto separation of Somaliland from Somalia. The sudden apparent change of position was unexpected, with some analysts wondering about the potential disruptive role of the UAE behind the scenes.

The respective leaders of Ethiopia and Somaliland were attempting to distract from their own weak positions domestically. Ethiopia's political, security and developmental trajectory, under PM Abiy Ahmed, is highly uncertain, with most analysts pessimistic about its direction. Similarly, President Musa Bixi of Somaliland was reeling from his defeat in the Las Anod conflict.^{5 6}

The MoU generated considerable backlash from a range of regional and international constituents, including the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu. Although Ethiopia has backtracked slightly, the agreement nevertheless remains in place. Since then, Djibouti has offered Ethiopia joint management of its second seaport, Tadjourah, publicly stating a motivation to calm tensions. Over the course of 2024, Somalia has also developed security pacts with both Turkey⁷ and Egypt,⁸ both likely to be driven by the MoU.

Egypt has engaged more seriously in Somalia than it has done for many years; this development should be seen through two lenses, firstly as a reverberation of the conflict in Gaza, where Arab/Muslim states appear impotent and where Western powers are perceived as biased. The FGS is definitely encouraging the Egyptians to engage in Somalia and Egypt has responded positively. However, the extent of their engagement is less clear; whether it will expand from military equipment and training to a significant physical presence is unclear and considered unlikely. This may depend on financial and political support from Gulf countries, amongst other factors. Secondly, ongoing Ethiopia-Egypt tensions around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), as well as the threat that a future Ethiopian naval capacity implies for control of traffic (and revenue) through the Suez Canal, may be further motivating engagement.

The speed with which relations have been changing and conflict has erupted in the Horn are striking. Following the rise of Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to power and the 'peace' agreement made with Eritrea, for which Abiy received the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize,⁹ only two years later, Ethiopia and Eritrea were involved in a brutal and highly destructive war in Tigray.¹⁰ While the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement signified the partial end of that conflict, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have since soured, and major unrest and violence remains the case in Amhara and to a lesser extent in the Oromia regions in Ethiopia.

Somalia's own political and development trajectory has certainly changed character and has, arguably, worsened under President HSM. The initially popular 'Macawisley' offensive against Al Shabaab is stalled, has changed to a more explicitly Government-led campaign and for some, is considered unlikely to succeed.¹¹ Concerns about pervasive corruption in Somalia, while always present, have intensified under the current regime.¹² While the first half of HSM's rule was dominated by the offensive, the second half will be dominated by domestic election politics, in which international/regional players will become embroiled.

The ATMIS (African Transition Mission in Somalia) drawdown in Somalia continues to preoccupy concerns about the security capacity of the government, and its territories, vis-à-vis Al Shabaab. The security pact between Somalia and Egypt has been accompanied by the very public movement of military equipment into Somalia. The crucial factor remains the MoU and for Somalia, a key question is whether Ethiopia can remain part of ATMIS if they continue to support the agreement. However, equally challenging is the difficulty of replacing Ethiopian forces if they are withdrawn entirely, given the threat of Al Shabaab; this raises the possibility of new funding and new forces entering Somalia through a suitably wealthy patron and a willing partner on the ground.

Alternative Perspectives – Ethnic/Clan Identity and the State

Political trajectories in the Horn can be conceived in terms of new risks and threats but also in terms of new possibilities and state imaginaries, including reconfigured borders, processes of reterritorialization, and new sovereign entities. In an increasingly polarised world, where international norms are under considerable strain, political elites within the Horn of Africa are asking, 'where are we going?' and positioning themselves accordingly.

Over the last 30 years we have already seen the emergence of two new states, Eritrea and South Sudan, one de facto state in the form of Somaliland, as well as other emergent sub-national autonomous polities, such as Puntland and Jubbaland in Somalia.¹³ Ethnic and clan identity and their politicization around ethno-political-territorial projects is a feature of the HoA and the Somali territories. As Norman highlights in the case of the Las Anod conflict in the Somaliland-Puntland borderlands, 'Central to these developments is the changing relationship between clan and the state', pointing out the salience of international investment – in the Berbera port and corridor in his case.¹⁴ We offer preliminary thoughts on the intersection of identity – whether ethnic or clan – and the state in relation to the juxtaposition of Oromo, Afar and Somali identities and the states of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, where maritime power is a major arena of contestation.

The MoU – maritime access or territorial expansion?

Ethiopia's aspirations for access to the sea had already intensified under PM Abiy Ahmed, prior to the MoU itself. When relations were warmer between Ethiopia and Eritrea, prior to and during the Tigray war, the latter's ports appeared to offer one alternative outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, albeit limited in terms of Ethiopia's naval ambitions, but that is now a distant prospect as relations have soured considerably. Under the short-lived tripartite alliance between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, Abiy had reportedly held discussions with ex-President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 'Farmajo' (2017-2022), on the same topic, but nothing concrete had materialised. Ethiopia's PM has also made various public statements suggesting that Ethiopia's own Somali Regional State (SRS) should have access to the sea just as all of the other Somali regions have access; the regions he was referring to effectively included all regions of 'Greater Somalia' namely, British Somaliland (Somaliland), Italian Somaliland (the South), French Somaliland (Djibouti), Kenya's Northern Frontier District (Northeast Province) and the Somali region of Ethiopia (Somali Regional State).¹⁵

Ethiopia has even courted traditional elders from the Isse and Gadabursi (Somali) clans of present-day Somaliland, with meetings organised in Harar and Addis Ababa; the Isse are present in a contiguous area linking Djibouti, Ethiopia and western Somaliland, with the Gadabursi primarily identified with the latter. A delegation of the Oromo Elders Council who visited Somaliland this year stated that 40% of the current Oromo population is of Somali-Dir descent, reflecting the politicisation of identity. While there are certainly overlapping identities,¹⁶ as we discuss below, such claims can be interpreted in relation to territorial claims, including Oromo expansionism, which worries all Somali border clans, including the Dir. The eventual outcome of these various encounters and statements materialised in the current MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

One of the core sensitivities for many Somalis in these developments is that what is articulated as access to the sea on the one hand is also perceived as the territorial expansion of Ethiopia on the other, an extremely emotive subject. The division of the Somali-speaking regions of the Horn of Africa by various colonial powers, including Ethiopia, remains highly evocative in the Somali imagination; the Somalia flag itself refers to the unity of all Somalis while referencing the colonial divisions – the five points of the star. In addition, all Somalis, no matter where they might hold nationality, are entitled to a Somali passport.

Furthermore, perceptions of Ethiopian expansionism can now be conflated with an Oromo expansionism, a perspective held by many Somalis, including those following developments in the Oromo-Somali border areas over the past 20 years. It is no exaggeration to claim that Oromo identity and power are on the rise in Ethiopia, as evidenced by PM Abiy himself, the co-location of the Oromia regional state capital and the national capital in Addis Ababa, and the continuity of the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) within the Prosperity Party (PP).

While PM Abiy Ahmed initially signalled a new, warm, and even brotherly relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, reversing the nature of this relationship under the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) led EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front), over time, Abiy has since revealed his more chameleon-like characteristics, ambitions, and unpredictability.

Transborder identities

Djibouti is a tiny rentier-state but provides the most important maritime trade corridor for Ethiopian imports and exports. It is comprised of two major ethnic groups, the Isse and the Afar, the former a Somali clan whom have long held power over the state. Both ethnic groups are dispersed – in contiguous areas – across the borders of three states, the Isse between Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland, and the Afar between Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia. There is a history of tensions and conflict between the two groups, particularly in Ethiopia, often instrumentalised by national level political elites.¹⁶

To Djibouti, the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU represents a potential militarised corridor that could cut off the Isse of Djibouti from the wider (non-Ethiopian) Somali territories (Somalia / Somaliland). As much as the Somalis have clan-based political tensions, there also exists a pan-Somali solidarity. This includes a cultural affinity and knowledge that Somalis can engage each other in dialogue in times of disagreement. In this light, the offer to jointly manage the port of Tadjourah is notable for being in the Afar territory of Djibouti. Prior to this public offer, Djibouti had reportedly discussed the possibility with Ethiopian counterparts of trading its Afar territory with Isse territory in Ethiopia.

As alluded to above, another ongoing discussion involves the Oromo and Somali elites within Ethiopia. One of the permutations for identity-based reconfigurations has been the division of the Somali Region State of Ethiopia (SRS) into a Dir region and a non-Dir region, the Dir being seen as offering a potential means of access to the coast for Oromo/Ethiopian interests (hence the Dir-Oromo common identity claims by Oromo elites). The negotiating position for the non-Dir in the SRS was reportedly the historical town of Harar as well as the East Harar zone that surrounds it.

Exactly how the various discussions taking place between different elites will manifest is unclear, but they signify a level of exploration and potential that is not insignificant.

International Intervention and Domestic Dynamics

The MoU's affront to Somali sovereignty has revitalised efforts by the FGS to assert its external sovereignty, while at the same time potentially enabling it to assert itself more strongly domestically, including in its relations with Federal Member States (FMS) and therefore with respect to the forthcoming FMS elections planned for November 2024. It is generally well accepted that the federal arrangement in Somalia and its reacceptance as a sovereign state in the international order in 2013 were in large part a project of the international community, including its near neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia's political settlement was based on an elite bargain structured around a federal system, with the federal government as the highest authority, and the federal member states as the sub-national regional polities. This arrangement has been continually strained by unagreed power-sharing and election-related politics.¹⁸ The inability to resolve such issues can also be understood as a 'formalised political unsettlement', an enduring condition that is marked by periods of violence, obstruction and (re-)negotiation, but one in which the elite compact persists.¹⁹

The FGS acts as the Somali sovereign in multilateral and bilateral fora and relations. However, throughout the lifespan of this federal arrangement, some FMS have also maintained international relations on their own terms, often to the displeasure of the FGS. The history of Jubbaland is a case in point, where Ethiopia and Kenya were arguably the more important actors in the creation of the first FMS under the federal system, as well as in the selection of President Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madobe'.²⁰ Similarly, Puntland has retained a strong autonomy, including in its international relations.²¹

Under ex-President Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmajo', Somalia expressed a particularly strong international sovereignty which many Somalis initially approved of, as it appeared to symbolise Somalia's growing assertiveness on the international stage and re-emergence from several decades in the wilderness.²² However, this assertiveness, along with the support of Ethiopia and Eritrea, was short-lived, as Farmajo was voted out of office in 2022, in part due to his attempt to dominate from the centre.

The recent backlash by the FGS against the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, and the resultant agreements established by Somalia with Turkey and Egypt, serve to reinforce the international legitimacy and sovereignty of the incumbent leadership of the FGS, symbolically and practically. However, such political manoeuvring at the international level can expose the disconnect between Somalia's internal and external sovereignty, including perceptions of the role of foreign security actors, as we discuss below.²³

The Southwest State (SWS)

In the Baay and Bakool regions of Southwest State, the dominant clan family is the Rahanweyn, a large but historically marginalised clan family whose land was occupied by the 'warlord' Mohamed Farah Aideed and later his son, Hussein Aideed, representing the Hawiye-Haber Gedir clan in the 1990s. This occupation lasted several years, and it was only with the organisation of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), supported by the Ethiopians, that Aideed and his clan militia were ousted in 1997.²⁴ As a result, there is both a public and an elite appreciation for the Ethiopian presence in Southwest State in many circles, particularly where these historical power hierarchies still play out in the Lower Shabelle region of Southwest State. Here, Hawiye units of the Somali National Army (SNA) are mainly in control, severely restricting the influence of the Southwest State's government in one of its own regions, which is also the most populous and wealthiest region of the SWS.

SWS President, Abdiiaziz Hassan Mohamed 'Laftagareen', maintains relations with Ethiopian political and military figures, in part because their withdrawal would leave him vulnerable to Al Shabaab. If the FGS brings in SNA forces that are also identified by their Hawiye clan identity, memories of past domination will be easily evoked. In addition, Laftagareen's tenuous grip over the Baay and Bakool regions will be loosened, and he will be at the mercy of the FGS who are not hiding their intent to replace him as part of their re-election plans. Southwest State is a key battleground in national election politics, holding the largest number of federal MPs (similar in number to Puntland and Galmudug combined), who ultimately vote in the next Federal President. The FMS elections may take place in November this year, and Laftagareen's only insurance is the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) who helped get him elected in the first place in alliance with ex-President Farmajo.²⁵ Tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa therefore play out in SWS.

Hiraan and Hirshabelle

Hirshabelle, comprised of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, was the last of the FMS to be established and is generally considered the most unstable. The latest manifestation of its predicament has seen the emergence of two Hiraan states, both claiming to be a new FMS. This development was in part catalysed by the role of the Hawadle clan, the dominant clan in Hiraan region, in leading the fight against Al Shabaab in the ongoing government offensive. Dissatisfaction by Hawadle elites with the support from the FGS has led to competing political interests attempting to create autonomous regions.

In relation to the Ethiopian and Egyptian roles in Somalia, Hawadle elites allied to the two Hiraan State administrations can tactically oppose any FGS agenda – such as bringing in Egyptian forces – by supporting Ethiopia. The predicament of the FGS is that multiple entities all claim to represent Hawadle interests in Hiraan, so bargaining with any one group is problematic as other groups will turn to Ethiopian support. The main demand of Hawadle power brokers is the installation of a Hawadle president in Hirshabelle, a demand the FGS will have difficulty delivering given the strength of the current Hirshabelle president's security apparatus in the state capital, Jowhar, as well as the voting blocs in the Hirshabelle parliament. Furthermore, Hawadle elites are neither demonstrating a capacity to unite internally nor to consult and reconcile with others in Hiraan region or Hirshabelle state. However, unlike in Southwest State, the FGS is better placed to replace the Ethiopian ATMIS contingency in Hiraan with other forces, as there is no official or strong clan opposition to such a move.

Gedo region and Jubbaland

Jubbaland is composed of Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions. The capital, Kismayo, is in the far south, hundreds of kilometres away from Gedo and the border with Ethiopia. Ethiopian forces have been based in northern Gedo from the early 1990s, when they came in to oust the Islamist group, Al-Itihad. They maintain both ATMIS and non-ATMIS forces in the area. Any aspiring political leader in northern Gedo has to have good relations with the Ethiopians. For many years, this existed in the form of the District Commissioner and Governor, Abdirashid 'Janaan', who became the Jubbaland Minister of Security, thereby bringing Gedo and the Marehan clan into the Jubbaland FMS. However, following Janaan's arrest in 2019,²⁶ Gedo has had an ambiguous political and administrative status, notionally part of Jubbaland, but where Kismayo's leverage is variable.

Since the rise of PM Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia, and then SRS President, Mustafe Omar, Jubbaland's President Ahmed Madobe has fallen out with the Ethiopians. Madobe may be open to other forces having a presence within the region as a result, unless his patrons from the UAE or Kenya advise otherwise.

Conclusions – Fragmentation, Election Politics and the Extraverted State

The preceding analysis reflects the current turbulence in the HoA and the logic of a transactional politics where political survival undermines institution-building. In the current international political-economic context it is extremely difficult to climb out of this reality of state 'failure'. Under President Farmajo, the regional/international-national dynamic was evident, with competing domestic elites turning to patrons in the Gulf, as the UAE and Saudi Arabia were embroiled in a dispute with Qatar (and by extension Turkey), as well as in Kenya, in the case of Jubbaland. Today, Ethiopia and Egypt are two of the primary external protagonists, though Gulf countries and Turkey still form part of the wider arena, along with the added reverberations of the conflict in Gaza and now Lebanon.

Somalia will sit on the Security Council from January 2025 for two years, a startling development given the gap between its external sovereignty and internal sovereignty. As well as engaging in grandstanding on the international stage, the incumbent elite of the FGS will attempt to instrumentalise external legitimacy, sovereignty and resources for domestic purposes, particularly through election processes (as the previous incumbents did).

In such a fragmented geopolitical context, with many moving parts across the Red Sea Arena and Horn of Africa, it is extremely difficult to negotiate a more orderly direction with and for Somalia. At a minimum, international agendas would need to align around realistic policy goals, focused on a more inclusive and reconciliatory political programme. It is also worth recognising that the continuation of a formalised political unsettlement, as is in place, benefits many political and business elites.

Endnotes

¹ See: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-and-civiness-research-group/projects/peacereps-somalia-programme>

² See: CRP Synthesis Paper (2021): <https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110878/>

³ See: <https://worldpeacefoundation.org/blog/brics-versus-pax-americana-in-the-red-sea-shatter-zone/>

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⁵ See: <https://africanarguments.org/2023/03/conflict-in-las-anod-and-crisis-in-somaliland-external-investment-intensifying-internal-competition-and-the-struggle-for-narrative/>

⁶ Even a strong Somaliland President would be reticent to trade recognition for territory (or the perception of that).

⁷ See: <https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377#:~:text=Somalia%20and%20Turkey%20recently%20announced%20that>

⁸ See: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-sends-arms-somalia-following-security-pact-sources-say-2024-08-28/>

⁹ See: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50013273>

¹⁰ See: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Northern%20Ethiopia%20IAHE%20Full%20Report%20May%202024.pdf>

¹¹ See: <https://peacerep.org/2024/09/12/al-shabaab-and-the-limits-of-maawisley-state-sponsored-vigilantism/>

¹² See: <https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Mid-term-Corruption-and-International-Engagement-DIGITAL.pdf>

¹³ Some analysts would put present-day Tigray in this category.

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¹⁵ See: <https://forskning.ruc.dk/en/publications/greater-somalia-the-never-ending-dream-contested-somali-borders-t>

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¹⁸ See: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766049/Somalia_case_study.pdf

¹⁹ See: <https://peacerep.org/publication/navigating-inclusion-in-transitions-from-conflict-the-formalised-political-unsettlement/#:~:text=Authors:%20Christine%20Bell%20and%20Jan%20Pospisil.%20The%20project%20of%20ensuring>

²⁰ See: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Research-Programme/crp-memos/jubbaland-project-transborder-ogadeen.pdf>

²¹ See: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202408210075.html#:~:text=Nairobi,%20Kenya%20%E2%80%94%20In%20a%20significant>

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²³ For a discussion on internal and external sovereignty in Somalia see: <https://issblog.nl/2024/10/01/in-this-blog-ahmed-sh-ibrahim-and-nisar-majid-consider-how-somalias-joining-of-the-un-security-council-at-a-time-when-its-nationally-recognised-government-controls-only-a-portion-of-its-t/>

²⁴ See: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271625512_Authority_and_administration_beyond_the_state_Local_governance_in_southern_Somalia_1995-2006#:~:text=It%20was%20established%20by%20the%20Rahanweyn

²⁵ See: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalias-south-west-state-new-president-installed-crisis-inflamed>

²⁶ See: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/24/high-profile-jailbreak-undermines-somalias-fight-justice#:~:text=On%2028%20January,%20Abdirashid%20Janan%20escaped>

About Us

PeaceRep is a research consortium based at Edinburgh Law School. Our research is rethinking peace and transition processes in the light of changing conflict dynamics, changing demands of inclusion, and changes in patterns of global intervention in conflict and peace/mediation/transition management processes.

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